Defense spending and economic growth: evidence from China, 1952–2012

This paper examines whether defense expenditures contributed to economic growth in China for the 1952–2012 period. We examine the contribution of defense to economic growth using recently published official data on economic activity, defense, and government expenditures. We employ the Feder-Ram and augmented Solow models of economic growth to explore the defense-growth relationship. The Feder-Ram model appears to poorly explain economic growth in China. The augmented Solow model suggests, however, that a 1% increase in defense expenditures raises the economic growth rate by approximately 0.15–0.19%.     

US–China military relations: competition and cooperation

ABSTRACT

China’s efforts to build a ‘new type of great power relations’ and a ‘new type of military-to-military relations’ do not constitute a major turning point in relations with the United States. Political relations set limits on military cooperation, and the two sides have been unable to construct a sustainable strategic basis for relations. This has contributed to an ‘on-again, off-again’ pattern in military ties. Trends show a pattern of frequent disruptions in military-to-military relations from 2000 to 2010, followed by an increase in interactions beginning in 2012. Nevertheless, obstacles on both sides are likely to limit mutual trust and constrain future development of military-to-military relations.     

The Intergovernmental Authority on Development's Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism

The Intergovernmental Authority on Development's (IGAD) Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN) 2012–2019 Strategy Framework has proposed that the CEWARN mechanism expand its conflict typologies and geographic coverage. The argument advanced in this paper is that the proposed CEWARN expansion should be welcomed. Since its establishment in 2003, CEWARN had restricted itself to dealing with cross-border pastoral conflicts among the member states. However, conceptually and legally, CEWARN was not precluded from dealing with other types of conflict. Firstly, in the past, any conflict, other than cross-border pastoral ones, had been considered by the member states as firmly within their national jurisdiction that mechanisms like CEWARN are precluded from handling. Secondly, CEWARN, which has hitherto been dependent on external donations, just does not have the requisite financial resources to expand its coverage. Thirdly, and most importantly, governments often know the imminence of some, if not all, of the conflicts because they cause them. Thus, they are not interested in reacting to them. In the end, the paper concludes that the proposal to expand CEWARN's conflict portfolio and geographic spread may just remain that – a proposal.     

Explaining the (il)legality of Uganda's intervention in the current South Sudan conflict

During the night of 15 December 2013, fighting broke out between factions of the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) in Juba, the capital of the Republic of South Sudan. The fighting pitted forces loyal to President Salva Kiir against those loyal to former Vice President Riek Machar. Five days later, Uganda sent troops into South Sudan, advancing a number of reasons for intervention, including that it had been invited by the legitimate government of South Sudan to ensure order; it needed to evacuate Ugandan citizens caught up in the fighting; it had been asked by the United Nations Secretary-General to intervene; and that the regional organisation, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development had sanctioned the intervention. As the conflict escalated, Ugandan troops started fighting on the side of forces loyal to Kiir. The underlying reasons for the intervention were clearly economic, but those advanced were legal. This article discusses both sets of reasons and concludes that the economic reasons are more persuasive. Nevertheless, while some of the legal arguments (such as being invited by the legitimate government of South Sudan) can be asserted, others are clearly dubious. In addition, the participation of Ugandan troops in the fighting on the side of the Kiir government renders the intervention illegal.