Stolen trauma: why some veterans elaborate their psychological experience of military service

The embellishment of a warrior biography has a long history but examples of veteran elaboration of traumatic experience have become increasingly apparent. Although legislative change in the UK has removed the penalties for fabrication and a progressive decline in the military footprint may have increased the likelihood of such false trauma narratives, a paradigm shift in explanations for mental illness underpins this phenomenon. The recognition of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) in 1980, followed by studies to identify risk factors, led to a greater appreciation of psychological vulnerability. As a result, the use of shame to discourage acts formerly labelled as “cowardly” or “lacking in morale fibre” is no longer considered appropriate. Recent conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan generated popular sympathy for service personnel, whilst media focus on PTSD has led the UK public to believe that most veterans have been traumatised by their tours of duty.     

The military recruiting productivity slowdown: The roles of resources,opportunity cost and the tastes of youth*

After a decade of successful recruiting, the US military began experiencing recruiting difficulties in the 1990s. Cyclical factors as well as trend factors may have played a role. This paper uses monthly data by state over the period 1989-1997 to estimate models of enlistment and evaluate the various explanations for the recruiting slowdown. Estimates of the impact of economic variables - relative military pay and unemployment - and recruiting resource variables - recruiters and advertising - are similar to those in previous studies. Two trend factors, rising college attendance and declining adult veteran population (influencers), are found to be important factors explaining the decline in enlistment.     

Myth and the small war tradition: Reassessing the discourse of British counter-insurgency

In recent years a number of commentators have posited that the British reputation for conducting small wars has suffered in the wake of setbacks in Iraq and Afghanistan. The argument here contests whether such a tradition can be truly said to have ever existed. A close examination of this supposed tradition reveals it to be a myth. In fact, rarely have the British armed forces claimed a facility for counter-insurgency or small war. Invariably, commentators outside the Army have ascribed the tradition to them. Most notably, commentators in the United States keen to discern practices of minimum force or rapid institutional learning generated the narrative of British COIN expertise. Ultimately, what this myth reveals is that, when deconstructed, it is political will, not an ingrained understanding of fighting insurgencies, that has determined Britain's success, or otherwise, in so-called small wars.     

Israeli counter‐insurgency strategy and the war in South Lebanon 1985–97

Little has been written about attempts to alter the domestic political systems of these countries, even though this was central to the missions. The latter two cases were selected as extremes on a ‘degree of difficulty’ scale. In Somalia there was basically no governing structure; the US had to build one in order to end the starvation caused by civil war. In Panama the US took over a government in place and had an alternative national leader; the problem was to change the existing state system. The cases reveal a stress on short‐run security issues over long‐term political questions.     

Attitude,Aptitude, and Testing in the Efficient Mobilization of Military Manpower

Militaries commonly require recruits to pass a test that measures aptitude for military service. In this paper, we show that such tests may also act as a device for screening out low-motivation recruits, even if it is assumed that motivation is not measured by such tests and is not correlated with aptitude.