Explicit solution of partitioning problems over a 1‐dimensional parameter space

We consider a class of partitioning problems where the partitioned set is a finite set of real numbers and the objective function of a partition is a function of the vector whose coordinates are the sums of the elements in each part of the given partition (the number of such parts is assumed given). We obtain an explicit solution of such partitioning problem with polynomial complexity bounds. © John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 47: 531–540, 2000     

Resource allocation in an asymmetric technology race with temporary advantages

We consider two opponents that compete in developing asymmetric technologies where each party's technology is aimed at damaging (or neutralizing) the other's technology. The situation we consider is different than the classical problem of commercial R&D races in two ways: First, while in commercial R&D races the competitors compete over the control of market share, in our case the competition is about the effectiveness of technologies with respect to certain capabilities. Second, in contrast with the “winner‐takes‐all” assumption that characterizes much of the literature on this field in the commercial world, we assume that the party that wins the race gains a temporary advantage that expires when the other party develops a superior technology. We formulate a variety of models that apply to a one‐sided situation, where one of the two parties has to determine how much to invest in developing a technology to counter another technology employed by the other party. The decision problems are expressed as (convex) nonlinear optimization problems. We present an application that provides some operational insights regarding optimal resource allocation. We also consider a two‐sided situation and develop a Nash equilibrium solution that sets investment values, so that both parties have no incentive to change their investments. © 2012 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 59: 128–145, 2012     

Inspection games with local and global allocation bounds

This article discusses a two‐player noncooperative nonzero‐sum inspection game. There are multiple sites that are subject to potential inspection by the first player (an inspector). The second player (potentially a violator) has to choose a vector of violation probabilities over the sites, so that the sum of these probabilities do not exceed one. An efficient method is introduced to compute all Nash equilibria parametrically in the amount of resource that is available to the inspector. Sensitivity analysis reveals nonmonotonicity of the equilibrium utility of the inspector, considered as a function of the amount of resource that is available to it; a phenomenon which is a variant of the well‐known Braess paradox. © 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2013     

Inducing coordination in supply chains through linear reward schemes

Decentralized decision‐making in supply chain management is quite common, and often inevitable, due to the magnitude of the chain, its geographical dispersion, and the number of agents that play a role in it. But, decentralized decision‐making is known to result in inefficient Nash equilibrium outcomes, and optimal outcomes that maximize the sum of the utilities of all agents need not be Nash equilibria. In this paper we demonstrate through several examples of supply chain models how linear reward/penalty schemes can be implemented so that a given optimal solution becomes a Nash equilibrium. The examples represent both vertical and horizontal coordination issues. The techniques we employ build on a general framework for the use of linear reward/penalty schemes to induce stability in given optimal solutions and should be useful to other multi‐agent operations management settings. © 2005 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2006     

Some comments on the optimal assembly problem

It is shown that two recent results of Baxter and Harche [1] on monotone and balanced optimal assemblies hold only under conditions that are more restrictive than those originally proposed by the authors. We describe such additional conditions, illustrate why they are needed, and establish their sufficiency. We also consider a recent result by Malon [11] and demonstrate that, while the result itself is correct, its two proofs were incomplete. A complete proof of an extension of the result is then suggested. © 1995 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.     

Constant risk aversion in stochastic contests with exponential completion times

This article analyzes a class of stochastic contests among multiple players under risk‐averse exponential utility. In these contests, players compete over the completion of a task by simultaneously deciding on their investment, which determines how fast they complete the task. The completion time of the task for each player is assumed to be an exponentially distributed random variable with rate linear in the player's investment and the completion times of different players are assumed to be stochastically independent. The player that completes the task first earns a prize whereas the remaining players earn nothing. The article establishes a one‐to‐one correspondence between the Nash equilibrium of this contest with respect to risk‐averse exponential utilities and the nonnegative solution of a nonlinear equation. Using the properties of the latter, it proves the existence and the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium, and provides an efficient method to compute it. It exploits the resulting representation of the equilibrium investments to determine the effects of risk aversion and the differences between the outcome of the Nash equilibrium and that of a centralized version.© 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 66:4–14, 2019     

Democracy for the rescue—of dictators? The role of regime type in civil war interventions

Intrastate conflicts, long eclipsing interstate conflicts, are often internationalized. This paper examines internationalized intrastate conflicts through the types of both the intervening and the embattled regimes. Do democracies, more or less than autocracies, support autocratic governments in their fights against rebels? This paper tests three hypotheses: (1) democracies support autocrats fighting rebels less than autocracies do. (2) Democracies support democratic governments fighting against rebels more than autocracies do. (3) The more democratic two states are, the higher the probability one would support the other’s fight against rebels. Covering all documented external support in intrastate wars (1975–2000), our findings support hypothesis one and two only partly and confirm hypothesis three. However, comparing the two major accounts of the Democratic Peace theory (DPT)—the normative and the structural—our findings corroborate only the former robustly. The paper thus helps enriching the insights of the DPT beyond interstate conflicts.