(Un)justified expectations on nuclear deterrence of non-nuclear NATO members: the case of Estonia and Latvia?

ABSTRACT

Nuclear assets are one of the cornerstones of credible collective deterrence of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. Paradoxically, the most endangered member states are the ones without nuclear capabilities, left with the hope and expectation that the owners of nuclear assets will defend them and that their potential enemies are deterred by these capabilities. However, the expectations from one side, practical commitment of allies from other side may not go in harmony and synchronisation. Is there a capability gap which needs to be fulfilled? If yes then, is the gap in the side of nuclear powers or is it on the side of those endangered states who need to understand what can or cannot realistically be expected? The current article focuses on the question of how the political and military elite of the Baltic states describes their expectations in terms of using Alliance's nuclear capabilities to deter Russia's regional ambitions.     

Are the Baltic States and NATO on the right path in deterring Russia in the Baltic?

ABSTRACT

The aim of the current study is to discuss which particular factors Russia considers as sufficient deterrent capabilities and whether the national defence models implemented in the Baltic countries have the potential to deter Russia's military planners and political leadership. Whilst the existing conventional reserves of NATO are sizeable, secure, and rapid, deployment is still a critical variable in case of a conflict in the Baltic countries because of the limited range of safe transportation options. However, whilst the Baltic States are developing their capabilities according to the priorities defined by NATO in 2010; which were updated after the invasion of Crimea in 2014, Russian military planners have meanwhile redesigned both their military doctrine and military forces, learning from the experience of the Russo-Georgian war, the Russia-Ukraine conflict, and other recent confrontations. Accordingly, there is a risk that the efforts of the Baltic countries could prove rather inefficient in deterring Russia.     

NATO options and dilemmas for deterring Russia in the Baltic States

According to the NATO’s collective defence strategy and the principle of deterrence, “no one should doubt NATO’s resolve if the security of any of its members were to be threatened”. In this sense, credible deterrence acts as a guarantee for peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic region. However, recent events in Ukraine and Georgia have revealed the potential weaknesses of the current deterrence models. Without any overt fear of retaliation, we have seen Russia’s aggressive steps towards its neighbours, which were planned and executed with great sophistication, initiative, agility and decisiveness. Although contrary to Ukraine and Georgia which are not the members of the Alliance, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are granted security guarantees in the NATO framework, the Baltic countries clearly constitute Russia’s point of contact with NATO and are, therefore, also subject to the interests of Russia to test mutual capabilities and commitment, and to send strategic messages to the Alliance. In this context, the article aims to assess how credible is the deterrence posture provided by NATO in avoiding potential aggression on the part of Russia against the Baltic countries.