陆军装备技术保障能力建设转型研究

陆军装备技术保障能力建设呈现"四个转变"的新形势、新要求,实现转型发展面临"四个不相适应"的现实矛盾,需从更新抓建理念、完善标准体系、固化建设路径、优化运行机制四个方面着手,统筹规划,重点突破,积极稳妥推进陆军装备技术保障能力转型发展。     

What is the global landpower network and what value might it provide?

US national security guidance, as well as the US Army’s operational experiences since 2001, emphasizes the importance of working closely with partner countries to achieve US strategic objectives. The US Army has introduced the global landpower network (GLN) concept as a means to integrate, sustain and advance the Army’s considerable ongoing efforts to meet US national security guidance. This study develops the GLN concept further, and addresses three questions. What benefits can the GLN provide the Army? What are the essential components of the GLN? What options exist for implementing the GLN concept? By developing the GLN concept, the Army has the opportunity to transition the GLN from an often ad hoc and reactive set of relationships to one that the Army more self-consciously prioritizes and leverages as a resource to meet US strategic objectives.     

Terrorism as Method in Nepali Maoist Insurgency, 1996–2016

During the period 1996–2006, the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) waged overt people’s war to seize state power and institute a new order that realized the party’s understanding of ‘New Democracy’ as posited by Mao Tse-tung. Contextual shifts led to a crucial strategic turning point in September 2005, when the Maoists agreed to a united front with estranged legal parties to oust the monarchy and establish a republic. Though touted as acceptance of political reintegration, the move was tactical rather than strategic. The party had no intention of supporting a parliamentary version of democracy and thus, 2006–2016, engaged in a covert effort to seize power. Central to this effort was the paramilitary Young Communist League (YCL), the members of which responded to inflammatory party verbiage and exhortations with attacks upon rival political actors. These attacks, academically and legally, were terrorism and offered a salient illustration of intra-state unrestricted warfare. Ultimately, organizational, national, and regional circumstances caused the main Maoist movement to move decisively away from its covert approach. By that time, however, radical splinters had embraced the use of terrorism against rival political actors, creating a situation whereby local politics is yet a dangerous endeavor in certain areas and at certain times.     

The People’s Liberation Army and China’s Smart Power Quandary in Southeast Asia

Abstract

China has a strong interest in pursuing a smart power strategy towards Southeast Asia and has worked laboriously to engage with regional countries economically, socially, and politically. But China has been only partially successful in achieving its goals in the region. This paper argues that China’s security policy towards Southeast Asia significantly contradicts many other objectives that Beijing wishes to accomplish. Given the deep-seated, narrowly-defined national interests of the Chinese military in the South China Sea disputes, it is likely that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) will continue to pose the main obstacle to the effective implementation of a Chinese smart strategy in Southeast Asia.     

美军思想教育的历史特点与启示

思想教育是加强军队全面建设、完成各项任务的中心环节,各国军队都十分重视。美军是当今世界各国军队建设中总体水平最高的一支军队。其社会制度性质的不同,决定了美军与我军在思想教育内容上有着本质的区别,但美军对军人进行思想教育的方式方法有值得我们借鉴的地方。考察美军思想教育的历史,总结其特点,得出几点启示,目的是为了不断创新发展我军思想政治教育的形式方法,增强实际效果。     

Applying a bootstrap approach for setting reorder points in military supply systems

This paper develops and applies a nonparametric bootstrap methodology for setting inventory reorder points and a simple inequality for identifying existing reorder points that are unreasonably high. We demonstrate that an empirically based bootstrap method is both feasible and calculable for large inventories by applying it to the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force General Account, an inventory consisting of $20–30 million of stock for 10–20,000 different types of items. Further, we show that the bootstrap methodology works significantly better than the existing methodology based on mean days of supply. In fact, we demonstrate performance equivalent to the existing system with a reduced inventory at one‐half to one‐third the cost; conversely, we demonstrate significant improvement in fill rates and other inventory performance measures for an inventory of the same cost. © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 47: 459–478, 2000     

美军作战实验室建设研究

简要回顾了美军作战实验发展的历史,从军种到联合详细阐述了美军作战实验室完整的体系,并简要介绍了各作战实验室所完成的典型实验,研究了美军作战实验室主要的实验方法和技术手段,剖析了美军作战实验室的运行机制,探讨了美军作战实验室建设带给我们的启示。     

The British army,information management and the First World War revolution in military affairs

Information Management (IM) – the systematic ordering, processing and channelling of information within organisations – forms a critical component of modern military command and control systems. As a subject of scholarly enquiry, however, the history of military IM has been relatively poorly served. Employing new and under-utilised archival sources, this article takes the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) of the First World War as its case study and assesses the extent to which its IM system contributed to the emergence of the modern battlefield in 1918. It argues that the demands of fighting a modern war resulted in a general, but not universal, improvement in the BEF’s IM techniques, which in turn laid the groundwork, albeit in embryonic form, for the IM systems of modern armies.     

India's counter-insurgency experience: the ‘trust and nurture’ strategy

The Indian Army, a force trained primarily for conventional warfare, has been engaged in internal counter-insurgency operations since the 1950s. Despite such a long innings on a counter-insurgency mode, little attention has been accorded within military circles to doctrinal innovation for waging sub-conventional warfare in India's democratic political context. At best, the Army continues to view counter-insurgency duty as secondary to its primary duty of defending India from external conventional threats. By conceptualizing a counter-insurgency strategy of ‘trust and nurture’, this article aims to fill this critical doctrinal gap in India's military policy. The author argues that a counter-insurgency strategy of ‘trust and nurture’ based on democratic political culture, measured military methods, special counter-insurgency forces, local social and cultural awareness and an integrative nation-building approach will result in positive handling of India's internal security problems. The author utilizes India's counter-insurgency experiences in Assam, Mizoram, Nagaland, Punjab, and Operation ‘Sadhbhavana’ in Jammu and Kashmir as illustrative empirical indicants in order to validate the ‘trust and nurture’ strategy.     

Croatia's bitter harvest: Total National Defence's role in the Croatian War of Independence

Croatia's successful bid for independence was one of the defining moments of the immediate post-Cold War period. Nevertheless, the means that Croatia used to obtain independence remains relatively unexamined by academics. This article focuses on the early period of Croatia's bid for secession, and specifically the role that Yugoslavia's policy of Total National Defence played in facilitating its independence. Unlike in Slovenia, where the legacies of Total National Defence facilitated Slovenia's bid for secession, in Croatia the decision of its political leaders meant that the country largely neglected its positive legacies, resulting in a protracted four-year struggle.