When the military become a security and political threat: Zimbabwean army generals in electoral politics

The military poses an ongoing threat to modern democratic rule in some African countries, especially in the Zimbabwean context. This paper reveals the ways in which Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA) generals have played a political role in the Zimbabwean elections, an issue which is both a political threat and a security threat to the state. It is argued that the ways in which ZNA generals engage in the political process goes against Section 208(2) of the constitution of Zimbabwe, which summarily states that the military must be apolitical. In substantiating this argument, the paper presents and analyses various public speeches made by army generals. It is contended that the army generals’ support of the Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) and President Robert Mugabe has to be understood as a ‘mutual accommodation’, i.e. the generals are offered privileges in return for the political protection of the ruling regime which negatively impacts the security of the vote.     

Counterinsurgency as armed reform: The political history of the Malayan Emergency

Despite the emphasis in doctrine and academia that counterinsurgency is in its essence political, these operations are all too commonly discussed and approached as primarily military endeavors. Informed by the need to refocus counterinsurgency studies, this article revisits a foundational case of the canon – the Malayan Emergency – to discuss its political (i.e., not military) unfolding. The analysis distinguishes itself by emphasizing the diplomatic processes, negotiations, and deals that gave strategic meaning to the military operations underway. In so doing, the article also generates insight on the use of leverage and elite bargains in creating new political settlements and bringing insurgent conflicts to an end.     

Learning to Fight and Fighting to Learn: Practitioners and the Role of Unit Publications in VIII Fighter Command 1943–1944

A military cannot hope to improve in wartime if it cannot learn. Ideally, in wartime, formal learning ceases and the application of knowledge begins. But this is optimistic. In 1942, USAAF Eighth Air Force assumed it had the means necessary for victory. In reality, its technique and technology were only potentially – rather than actually – effective. What remained was to create the practice of daylight bombing – to learn. This article (1) recovers a wartime learning process that created new knowledge, (2) tests existing tacit hypotheses in military adaptation research, and (3) offers additional theoretical foundation to explain how knowledge is created in wartime     

Small footprint,small payoff: The military effectiveness of security force assistance

After 15 years of war in Afghanistan and Iraq, many now see ‘small-footprint’ security force assistance (SFA) – training, advising and equipping allied militaries – as an alternative to large US ground-force commitments. Yet, its actual military efficacy has been little studied. This paper seeks to fill this gap. We find important limitations on SFA’s military utility, stemming from agency problems arising from systematic interest misalignment between the US and its typical partners. SFA’s achievable upper bound is modest and attainable only if US policy is intrusive and conditional, which it rarely is. For SFA, small footprints will usually mean small payoffs.     

From the sociology of the (military) profession to the sociology of (security) expertise: the case of European national defence universities

Few would disagree that European militaries have experienced dramatic changes since the end of the Cold War. Much of the discussion on these changes to date has referred to the concept of professionalism. However, this approach became outdated as professions in post-industrialist societies entered a state of crisis as a result of growing competition from a variety of competitors. The present study adapts a new framework from the sociology of knowledge literature – sociology of expertise – into one, sociology of security expertise, which is suitable for study of contemporary armed forces. Its utility is demonstrated through analysis of five European professional military education institutions. The analysis shows that European military organisations are transiting, albeit in various degrees, from one form of social organisation of military knowledge production – associated with the military education model common to traditional military colleges – toward another, which is related to the military education model of national defence universities. Hence it is highly probable that European military organisations lose, either voluntary or unintentionally, their professional character and can no longer be unquestionably assumed to be military professions. Hence, they should be analysed hereafter using the sociology of security expertise framework.     

Civil–military relations in francophone Africa and the consequences of a mistaken analysis

The Building Security Overseas Strategy is at its core an ‘Intervention to end all Interventions’ – from a Western as well as an African perspective. Two of its main pillars are security sector reform in specific countries and systematic support to the development of the African Peace and Security Architecture. This article addresses the question why such efforts have met little success in francophone Africa. It argues that the failure of Western advisers to understand the sociological dynamics of African armed forces, shaped by a political culture based on personal loyalty to the leader, is at the root of the problem. In that context, the Huntingtonian-type distinction between the civilians and the military does not apply as military and civilians act in concert within common clientelism systems. As a result of the curtailing of the state-formation experience in most African countries, the military never had to demonstrate its performance as a state builder, nor did it have to bargain its legitimacy against the support of the citizens. Partnership in that context will remain a misnomer, at least until African military can credibly demonstrate commitment to state-building grounded in a broad-based social contract.     

The fateful phoenix: the revival of Al-Qa’ida in Iraq

Although the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) is seen as a novel manifestation of Islamic extremism, it is in fact the latest, albeit perhaps the most effective, of a long line of revivalist movements in the Islamic and the Arab worlds. Its motivations – hisba and jihad – differ little from its predecessors and its ambitions – to create a state organised in accordance with the precepts of the Islamic caliphate – reflect a long-standing Islamic ambition. It differs, of course, in terms of the sophistication of its political and military strategies, which mirror the contemporary complexities of the world in which it operates, but its objectives recall long-standing Islamic ideals, even if articulated in radically brutal and extremist ways. More importantly, perhaps, ISIS or Da’ish, to give it its Arabic sobriquet, reflects the enormous degree of resentment inside the Middle East at the ways in which Western powers have intervened in regional affairs over recent years, particularly their support for regimes and economic systems there that have betrayed, in the popular imaginary, the essential principles of social justice that lie at the root of Islamic vision of ideal social order. Indeed, in many respects, its analysis of the world in which it operates and of the objectives it seeks differ little in essence from those any other resistance and rejectionist movement, whether religious or sectarian. More specifically, it has been the sectarian conflict that resulted from the reversal of political order in Iraq as a result of the 2003 American-led invasion that has driven the success of the movement in capturing widespread Sunni support. Whether it can manage the complexities of the administration of a state remains open to question.     

Fleet management in European integration: the case of military helicopter support

The article focuses on both economics and spatial issues related to Maintenance Repair and Overhaul (MRO) of defence platforms in Europe. Using facts and figures related to costs, trends and fleet sizes evolution, the authors discuss the interest of a spatial reorganisation of MRO production. Given the fiscal situation of the main European countries with a modern army, the relevant scale to consider the reorganisation is certainly Europe. Through the example of defence helicopters fleets of a selection of European countries, the authors address the question of cooperation of the MRO. A greater cooperation in the support of fleets would lead to a spatial reorganisation of MRO. On one side economies can be expected from this reorganisation, but, on the other hand, new problems arise. Specifically, a number of costs associated with different forms of “distances” – geographical, operational and political distances – limit the potential savings that could be expected. This work provides insights on these important issues for the construction of a European defence, both in its political, military and industrial dimensions.     

A comparative study of demand forecasting techniques for military helicopter spare parts

This paper deals with techniques applicable to predicting spare parts demand for military helicopters. The military helicopter is a distinct weapons system, whose unique configuration may preclude the direct application of forecasting techniques which have proved successful for other weapon systems. Furthermore, although the military helicopter has become extremely important tactically in modern warfare, it has received scant attention in terms of research concerning its supply support. Specifically, this paper summarizes research done to measure and compare the forecasting accuracy of six mathematical models, as they were applied to three prominent military helicopters. In addition, the paper describes attempts that were made to define, where possible, the conditions under which a specific forecasting technique might be applicable. In general, it is shown that the most accurate set of helicopter spare parts demand forecasts are produced by a second order polynomial exponential smoothing model. This model is observed to have most accurately described the highly volatile, and upward-trended demand time series which were the subject of the study.     

Mimetic and normative isomorphism in the establishment and maintenance of independent air forces

Why do countries have air forces? Organizational alternatives, such as maintaining separate air arms for the army and navy, have become quite rare. The conventional narrative advanced by advocates of independent air forces stress that the primacy of airpower in modern warfare mandates centralized control of most military aviation. In this view, political–military uncertainty has driven mimetic isomorphism – pressure on national governments to organize as others organize so as to fight or deter war just as effectively. However, working from a set of 56 countries that were politically independent within a few years of the establishment of the first ever independent air force (the Royal Air Force) in 1918, and continuing through nearly the present, there is no clear pattern of external military pressure prompting this particular reorganization. Rather, from anecdotal evidence, the cause has more likely been normative isomorphism – a professional craving to look as others look to foster political or personal legitimacy. For whatever reason, though, choices of structures tend to lead to specific choices of policies. Thus, the result suggests that defense ministries looking for more effective or less costly organizational schemas may reasonably consider alternatives to the tripartite army–navy–air force structure.     

Threats and civil–military relations: explaining Singapore’s “trickle down” military innovation

This article explains why Singapore, despite its small size and semi-authoritarian regime, retains one of the best military forces in the Indo-Pacific. It unpacks Singapore’s ability to continuously innovate since the 1960s – technologically, organizationally, and conceptually – and even recently joined the Revolution in Military Affairs bandwagon. Drawing from the broader military innovation studies literature, this article argues evolutionary peacetime military innovation is more likely to occur in a state with a unified civil–military relation and whose military faces a high-level diverse set of threats. This argument explains how the civil–military fusion under the People’s Action Party-led government since Singapore’s founding moment has been providing coherent and consistent strategic guidance, political support, and financial capital, allowing the Singapore Armed Forces to continuously innovate in response to high levels and diversity of threats.     

DETERMINING THE DEFENCE INDUSTRIAL BASE

This paper models the determination of the defence industrial base – the number of different military systems a country decides to maintain. High R&D costs means that few countries can afford to produce major weapons systems and the producers also import systems. Non‐producers rely on imports and we assume their demand is driven by regional arms races. Military capability is determined by the number of systems and the quantity and quality of each. We examine how the defence industrial base is influenced by military expenditures, R&D costs, export controls, the nature of regional arms races and a variety of other factors.     

North European security after the Ukraine conflict†

Russia’s illegal occupation and annexation of the Crimean peninsula in February–March 2014, and the country’s well-documented involvement in the separatist conflict in Eastern Ukraine, have led to a significant worsening of Russia’s relations with the West. Vladimir Putin’s move to redraw Russia’s southern borders through the use of military force and subversive measures has given rise to an uncertainty that goes well beyond the post-Soviet space. Since 2014, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has had to reassess many aspects of its relationship with Russia. The alliance has also initiated various measures to strengthen the military security of its eastern member states, particularly the Baltic states, Poland, and Romania. Further to the North, NATO’s northernmost member – Norway – is following developments in Russia with a heightened sense of awareness. The same goes for non-aligned Sweden and Finland, which are trying to adapt to the emerging, and increasingly complex, security environment in Northern Europe.     

基于复杂网络理论的岸防作战体系骨干网络研究

随着信息技术在战争中的大量应用,现代战争越来越呈现出网络化和体系对抗性,研究其拓扑特性已十分必要。基于复杂网络理论,首先建立了岸防作战体系网络模型,然后提出一种基于贪心思想的骨干网挖掘算法,最后对模型的骨干网络进行了研究。结果表明该方法能够快速、准确地挖掘出岸防作战体系的网络骨干,并能为军事对抗体系的复杂网络应用研究提供借鉴和参考。     

Information Is Not a Weapons System

ABSTRACT

While many militaries have tried to capitalize on the potential of information operations in internal war, few have succeeded. I argue that military information campaigns fall short of expectations for two reasons. First, the theory of influence militaries generally embrace – communications as a non-lethal weapons system – is largely invalid. While treating information as a weapons system makes it easier to integrate it into the existing military planning system, this overstates the independent effects of communications on behavior and understates the importance of interactive effects of what commercial marketing theory refers to as the “marketing mix” – product, price, promotion, and placement. It would be more appropriate to treat military information operations as a form of marketing: a composite effort to induce a specific behavior in a target audience by applying a combination of material and ideational instruments. The marketing model suggests that the efficacy of information operations will depend not simply on the message and its delivery (promotion) but on the behavior the sender seeks to induce (the product), the costs of that behavior (the price), and the opportunities available for such behavior (the placement).     

Measuring Military Professionalism in Partner Nations: Guidance for Security Assistance Officials

The U.S. spends billions of dollars in its security cooperation program to develop “professional, accountable, and capable security forces” in other nations, part of a grand strategy to improve global stability and counter violent extremism. Despite its great investment in professionalizing foreign militaries, however, the U.S. has no functional definition of military professionalism – a term that until now has been considered too vague and multi-faceted to operationalize. In this article, the author seeks to remedy this oversight, drawing from twenty years of security cooperation fieldwork in Latin America and Africa, as well as a vigorous literature review, to define four important components of military professionalism: (1) formal military education and vocational training, (2) military subordination to elected civilian officials, (3) knowledge and practice of the law of armed conflict and human rights law, and (4) a clearly established program of professional military ethics. This article provides guidelines for U.S. and European officials who work with partner nations to develop more professional military forces and, in particular, for officials managing security assistance programs with developing countries.     

‘Blackmailing the army’ – ‘Strategic Military Refusal’ as policy and doctrine enforcement: the formation of a new security agent

The study shows how ‘strategic military refusal’ in Israel developed as a rational and institutional means to influence security policies. As opposed to the perspective that sees military refusal as a spontaneous individual act, the study illustrates how organizations operate to distribute military refusal in order to pressure decision-makers to change their military policies. This strategy has proven to be effective when the military is involved with groups that threaten it with refusal – which threatens the military's operational ability and its official and apolitical image. These include soldiers whose civilian authorities, rather than their military commanders, are perceived as an epistemic authority regarding security issues. The case study refers to the impact of strategic military refusal in Israel on security policies and the military doctrine. This was influenced by leftist groups, which, although they belonged to the parliamentary opposition, had dominant presence in the military ranks. Furthermore, the study examines the effect of the use of strategic military refusal on the model of military recruitment.     

When the military became militarised: Accounts of Zimbabwean National Army deserters in exile in South Africa

In post-colonial Africa, the military has been central to sustaining freedom. However, the current political trends in Zimbabwe represent a different phenomenon, with the army perpetrating violence against its own citizens. For many years, the concept of ‘militarisation’ has been used to define social and political practices outside the military. Scholars have deployed the concept of militarisation as a category of analysis and practice. In doing so, scholarly writing portrays the military as an instrument of militarisation. So, who militarises the military? While scholars use the concept of militarisation to analyse other state institutions, the central argument of this paper is that the concept of militarisation has been deployed inappropriately and narrowly by scholars to refer to the appointment of military personnel in state institutions. I argue that in the Zimbabwean post-2000 political crisis, what has in fact been militarised is the military itself as an institution – through the command and control of soldiers against their moral will – and this phenomenon is exemplified by the growing involvement of the military in the perpetration of political violence against the civilian population in Zimbabwe. This paper draws on the experiences of 44 Zimbabwe army deserters.     

RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT: TRENDS IN COST AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR UK AEROSPACE

This paper, intended to stimulate debate, suggests that we are at a turning point in the history of the UK military aerospace industry. It argues that there is urgent need for a fresh vision as to how the UK military aerospace industry can both prosper and make its maximum contribution to the defence of Britain. Further, the resulting plans and policies must emphasise the robustness of defence capabilities in a future in which the only thing we can be certain is that it will be very different from the present – especially whenever defence most matters.     

唐朝兵役制度和后勤制度变迁下的军事审计

唐朝是中国历史上最为强大的王朝之一,其军事实力可谓中国历史的巅峰。唐朝国祚在安史之乱后还延续了150余年,唐朝的兵役制度和后勤制度对其内外军事斗争及政权的发展和延续起到了重要作用。在军事审计的保驾护航之下,唐朝的兵役及后勤制度为其初期开疆拓土与后期定土戡乱均提供了有力支持。本文以唐朝历史的衍进为线索,以唐朝兵役制度和军事后勤制度的变迁为背景,剖析唐朝军事审计制度的特点与规律,详述军事审计主体、对象、方法、法规在这一时期的发展与变化,进而探究军事审计与兵役、后勤制度的关联,总结提炼出军事审计在国家兵役、后勤制度和国家安全方面发挥的重要作用,为现阶段军事审计更好服务于军事制度提供发展思路。