DoDAF视图下的反导作战军事概念建模与仿真系统设计

反导作战概念模型是保证不同地空导弹武器系统之间指控系统可集成、可互操作性、高效一体化的关键。首先,针对传统建模语言在模型可执行验证方面的不足,在DoDAF视图框架下,提出一种基于统一建模语言（UML）的反导作战军事概念建模方法;其次,结合军事概念模型给出反导作战仿真系统设计的方法。规范建模框架并选择可执行性强的UML语言建立军事概念模型,对反导作战研究及指控系统开发具有一定参考价值。     

INTEGRATING NUCLEAR WEAPONS STOCKPILE MANAGEMENT AND NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL OBJECTIVES TO ENABLE SIGNIFICANT STOCKPILE REDUCTIONS

In his 2009 Prague speech and the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, President Barack Obama committed the United States to take concrete steps toward nuclear disarmament while maintaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent. There is an inherent tension between these two goals that is best addressed through improved integration of nuclear weapons objectives with nuclear arms control objectives. This article reviews historical examples of the interaction between the two sets of objectives, develops a framework for analyzing opportunities for future integration, and suggests specific ideas that could benefit the nuclear weapons enterprise as it undergoes transformation and that could make the future enterprise compatible with a variety of arms control futures.     

“It would be impossible to estimate the value of these works...” Mass Production at Springfield Armory during the American Civil War

The U.S. Armory in Springfield, Massachusetts, rarely appears in Civil War histories except perhaps as an unexplained statistical wonder. By late 1863, the Armory was the largest single supplier of rifles to Union forces. Springfield Armory workers out-produced over thirty American contractors, making more Army rifles at less cost while providing contractors with gauges, inspectors, and models, even though there were significant wartime private-sector mechanical innovations. This article identifies and explains the factors in the Armory’s success, provides context on contemporary American arms production and rifle models, and argues that the Armory’s methods and performance were among the first if not the first example of mass production in American small arms manufacture. The relative brevity of the Civil War episode, and the fact that it was not repeated in any comparable way at the Armory until World War II, has obscured its significance in American manufacturing history.     

NUCLEAR BOMB SQUAD

Defusing Armageddon: Inside NEST, America's Secret Nuclear Bomb Squad, by Jeffrey T. Richelson. W.W. Norton & Company, 2009. 318 pages, $27.95.     

Claude Blair 1922–2010

Abstract

The historic displays at the Tower Armouries underwent two significant rearrangements during the nineteenth century. Undertaken by two noted antiquarian scholars, Dr Samuel Meyrick in 1826 and James Robertson Planché in 1868, the underlying circumstances that led up to these developments have not been fully considered; neither has the role played by the Storekeeper’s Department at the Tower in this process. Yet at precisely the same time as these changes were being made the Storekeeper’s Department was becoming more expert in its own collections, acquiring new objects, conducting research, and playing an active part in the scholarly and museological developments of Victorian Britain.     

以数据为中心的天基预警系统视图模型研究

借鉴美国国防部体系结构框架思想(Department of Defense Architecture Framework,DoDAF),从核心体系结构实体、体系结构建模集和建模步骤几方面研究了以数据为中心的体系结建模方法,针对天基预警系统的特点和在反导中的应用,采用体系结构工具System Architect（SA）从系统层面建立了典型的天基预警系统的系统视图模型,对理解天基预警系统体系结构、开展天基预警系统顶层设计研究具有一定的参考价值。     

When Programming Trumps Policy and Plans: The Case of the US Department of the Navy11

Traditionally, policy and planning have been institutionally weak in the Naval Staff (Office of the Chief of Naval Operations – OPNAV). In their place, the N8 (Programming) has dominated resource decision-making, and, by default, decisions relating to policy and planning. Recent uncertainty over defense authorization and appropriations has resulted in calls for a greater role to be played by the N3/5, Policy and Plans Directorate. The article argues that reform of the Department of the Navy’s planning process is urgently needed. OPNAV’s weak planning and overly dominant programming practices are compared with those of the Departments of the Army and Air Force and are shown to be out of conformance with them. The article concludes with specific and detailed recommendations for reform of both the current planning and programming processes.     

The national defense function and federalism: the importance of the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act

Countries with a federalist system of government have different arrangements for providing national security. US national security is provided by national and State defense forces. The quintessential national function – national defense – experienced some changes that enhanced the role of the States. Policy changes in the National Defense Authorization Act of 2008 (2008 NDAA) introduced new roles for the Governors and the State defense forces, or the National Guard. This article explores how the interests of Congress and States aligned in the 2008 NDAA such that the national defense function changed. This article finds that the national government continues to have the central coordinating role, but that the politics and provisions of the 2008 NDAA changed the national–State relationship in mission, decision-making, and command and control so that US federalism in the national defense function is evolving in unexpected ways.     

US strategic preferences in the early twenty-first century

This article investigates how US national security planners have envisioned the emerging strategic environment during the early twenty-first century and evaluates how their perceptions of this strategic environment have changed during these years. This conceptual evolution can be seen in how defense planners define threats, identify defense priorities, and design security strategies. Five key strategic planning documents serve as the basis for this analysis and illustrate significant shifts in how the US government has envisioned its own security requirements as well as the context within which its strategic vision will need to be realized. These planning documents are: (1) Joint Vision 2020, (2) the Bush Administration's 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States, (3) the Obama Administration's 2010 National Security Strategy, (4) US Strategic Defense Guidance entitled Sustaining US Global Leadership: Priorities for 21^st Century Defense, and (5) the US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's Capstone Concept for Joint Operations: Joint Force 2020.     

Indian and Chinese espionage

India and China both have powerful spy networks; completely different in their approaches to espionage; both effective against their perceived enemies. China focuses first on internal threats, on Taiwan and Hong Kong, and then the US and Japan. India’s defense policy focuses on Pakistan and internal terrorist threats, and then on China. In reality, however, when it comes to spying on each other, both China and India suffer from incompetence and apathy – which endangers both their own security and regional stability. This article looks at how they spy on each other, and asks why and how they need to improve. The narrative also touches upon some of the individuals who are waging the spy war, from India’s wily spymaster Ajit Doval down to junior Chinese agents such as Wang Qing and Pema Tsering. The two countries are not friends. They have the largest territorial dispute in the world on their hands, covering an area the size of North Korea, and they have large armies facing each other along 4000 kilometers of frontier. But they also lay claim to the world’s two oldest and richest civilizations, with a rich history of exchange, and now with a combined population of 2.6 billion people and more than a quarter of the world’s economic output. If they cooperated, they could solve many of the world’s problems; but if they lurch into conflict, the potential consequences are terrifying to contemplate. Unfortunately, despite their geographical closeness, they do not know much about each other. They have few cultural interchanges, little diplomacy, few trade missions. They do not watch each other’s films, read each other’s books or listen to each other’s music. Chinese tourists would rather fly to New Zealand for their holidays than cross the border to India, and Indian students would rather study in Europe than China. China and India are neighbors that barely talk to each other. Most significantly, they do not spy on each competently. For countries that do not interact socially, defensive understanding is important for security – but China prefers the glamor of facing up to its Pacific and other maritime rivals such as the US and Japan. India, for its part, does talk a great deal about the China threat, but its resources and expertise are wrapped up in controlling its security threat from Pakistan and the Islamic world. When China and India do try to spy on each other, it is often without the benefit of a long-term focus or understanding. India has some very skilled operatives within the Research and Analysis Wing, but few that specialize in China. China has an enormous pool of resources spread across several government departments, including the Ministry of Public Security, and also has extensive facilities and manpower in the Joint Staff Department of the Central Military Commission (the JSD) and the new Strategic Support Force (the SSF). However, China’s intelligence services generally behave as if India is not worth spying on. Given that the two countries do not have the cultural or political machinery in place to understand each other, espionage and intelligence gathering is vital to ensure that miscalculations do not take place. This has been apparent over the last few years in stand-offs in the Himalaya, as well as top-level suspicions on each side about a variety of subjects including terrorism, covert operations in Sri Lanka and Burma, and the two countries’ nuclear weapons programs. Both countries do occasionally make efforts in espionage against each other, especially during sensitive periods such as the mountain stand-offs of 2014 and 2013 and during policy developments in nuclear warfare. In this article the author looks at actual spying incidents between the two countries, their methodologies, their staff, their technical capabilities, and how the act of spying, which is usually viewed as intrinsically adversarial, can be a force for good. The article relies on interviews with actual participants in intelligence from both countries as well as extensive use of contemporary online sources, and secondary analysis by both military and academic experts from China, India and NATO countries.