What U.S. Navy strategists and defense planners should think about in the era of maritime great power competition

ABSTRACT

For the first time in a generation, the US Navy finds itself in an era of great power competition. As US naval strategists and defense planners begin to organise materially and conceptually to confront the strategic and operational-level challenges posed by China and Russia, what should they keep in mind? What should frame their thinking? Absorbed with the day-to-day tasks associated with managing how the fleet is being built, operated, and rationalised, these busy officers and civilians seldom can step back and gain some perspective on fundamental aspects of the security environment and relate those to naval purpose. To that end, this article provides a primer on what to keep in mind and how to think in an era of maritime great power competition.     

Making long-range planning work: the case of the US Army's 30-year strategic modernization plan

The extensive timespan of evolving assumptions about future adversaries, US military engagements, and technology inherent in the US Army's 30-year modernization strategy can overwhelm the management capacity of planners, and misdirect acquisition investments. Some military scholars have argued that long-range planning is futile due to the complexities of the global security environment. So how can the US Army manage the evolving assumptions inherent in its 30-year modernization strategy to ensure it remains a superior global force? This study will answer the above question by arguing that the US Army's 30-year modernization strategy, while emulative of a similar modernization approach in the threat-based planning environment of the Cold War, is viable if supported by a method and a tool that manage investments and planning assumptions.     

Rose-tinted lenses: how American functionalist strategy inhibits our appreciation of complex conflicts

Strategists and military professionals have previously questioned many of the methodological (theoretical underpinnings, the principles, and rules applied by the discipline) decisions associated with American military strategy, but the direction this essay takes is above and beyond the common methodological rivalries in how we pursue strategic desired future states. To get beyond methodological disputes entirely, we must consider thinking about our thinking as an organization on American strategy. Thus, this article hovers between philosophies, organizational theory, as well as our usually unquestioned belief in something called “strategy”. Questioning things about our basic understanding of the world tends to trigger strong organizational defense mechanisms, for good reason. Critical reflection at deep levels puts our worldview, and our role within it at stake. Nonetheless, as strategic disappointment emerges over multiple complex conflict developments, even the most cherished and guarded choices on how the world ought to work are ripe for critical inquiry. This essay examines the limited single strategic paradigm of the US defense industry and how the latest American National Security Strategy and Army Future Operating Concept (Win in a Complex World through 2030) presents a flawed strategic position. This essay presents valid alternative strategies that operate within different paradigmatic constructs.     

美国国防太空力量发展的动向及应对 ——基于对美国2020年《国防太空战略》的解读

发展国防太空力量是美国谋划大国竞争的战略支点。特朗普政府执政以来,为捍卫一超独霸的太空地位,加速推进太空军事化进程,已制定《国家太空战略》,签署新的太空政策指令,成立第六军种“天军”。2020年6月,美国公开最新版《国防太空战略》报告。本文对其梳理分析以研判美国国防太空力量发展动向,并运用网络调研法搜集近年美国政府部门关于国防太空力量发展的权威政策文本及知名智库的深度研究报告。在此基础上,把美国2020年最新版《国防太空战略》作为中心文本,以文献分析法归纳美国国防太空力量发展的动因、目标及行动计划。中国作为负责任的发展中太空大国,应当积极借鉴并应对美国2020年《国防太空战略》：内强素质,提升国防太空军事技术硬实力;外树形象,在国际场合积极推动太空和平利用的政策议程。     

Making defense planning meaningful: the evolution of strategic guidance in the Hungarian Ministry of Defense

Hungary, a former communist state, adapted a Western-style defense planning system during the 1990s and 2000s. Although on the surface the elements of this planning system were similar to the planning programming budgeting system (PPBS) developed by the US Department of Defense, strategic guidance for defense planning has not been properly developed until recently. Thus, albeit PPBS-based defense plans were developed in the Hungarian Ministry of Defense (Hungarian MoD) regularly, they lacked both an expression of clear priorities and strategic focus. This article delineates the evolution of strategic guidance in the Hungarian MoD concentrating on current developments, and introduces the newly elaborated analytical concepts and tools, which helped to create needed strategic guidance in Hungary.     

From the ESS to the EU Global Strategy: external policy,internal purpose

Security strategies are important sites for narrating the EU into existence as a security actor. The unveiling of a new global strategy on foreign and security policy for the EU immediately post-Brexit could be conceived as a pledge to remain together as a Union for the purposes of contributing to global security in a particular way. This paper offers a brief stock-taking of the EU’s way of writing security from the European Security Strategy (2003) to the EU Global Strategy (2016). A concise exegesis of these documents exposes an interesting dynamic: as exercises in ordering the world, both strategic guidelines have turned out to be major exercises in ordering the self. The comparative snapshot shows the EU as increasingly anxious to prove its relevance for its own citizens, yet notably less confident about its actual convincingness as an ontological security framework for the EU’s constituent members over time.     

Cover for Thor: Divine Deception Planning for Cold War Missiles

In the late 1950s, as intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) replaced bombers, the development of Soviet ICBMs prompted fears of strategic vulnerability in the West. The Eisenhower administration's decision to deploy Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBMs) on the territory of NATO allies sought to redress the perceived vulnerability until American ICBMs were ready. British deception planners considered how to enhance the threat posed by the IRBMs. An outline plan codenamed ‘Celestial’ was intended to persuade the Soviets that the otherwise vulnerable missiles could not be readily neutralised. This article explores this deception and how such planning also sought to convey accurate information alongside disinformation. It also suggests that deception planners appear to have given little heed to the potentially counterproductive consequences of such an operation.     

National security,military spending and the business cycle

This paper develops a Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium model where national security is an argument in the agent’s utility function and the government chooses optimally the level of military spending to maximize social welfare. National defense depends on military expenditure and on the strategic environment reflecting a potential hostile external threat. We use aggregate data on consumption, investment, and military spending for the US economy to estimate the parameters of the model. Estimation results suggest that consumption and national defense are complements and that military spending variability is mainly explained by external threat shocks although it also depends on the macroeconomic conditions. We compute impulse response functions of the main macroeconomic variables to several shocks: a total factor productivity shock, a defense technology shock, and a strategic environment shock. Surprisingly, we find that the optimal response to an increase in the external threat (a worsening in the strategic environment) will rise output by reducing consumption and increasing investment.     

The national defense function and federalism: the importance of the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act

Countries with a federalist system of government have different arrangements for providing national security. US national security is provided by national and State defense forces. The quintessential national function – national defense – experienced some changes that enhanced the role of the States. Policy changes in the National Defense Authorization Act of 2008 (2008 NDAA) introduced new roles for the Governors and the State defense forces, or the National Guard. This article explores how the interests of Congress and States aligned in the 2008 NDAA such that the national defense function changed. This article finds that the national government continues to have the central coordinating role, but that the politics and provisions of the 2008 NDAA changed the national–State relationship in mission, decision-making, and command and control so that US federalism in the national defense function is evolving in unexpected ways.     

Antelope,Poseidon or a Hybrid: The Upgrading of the British Strategic Nuclear Deterrent, 1970–1974

It is the purpose of this article to illustrate how the British government reached its decision to upgrade the Polaris strategic nuclear deterrent in 1973. Using British and American documentation it is demonstrated that the strategic imperatives for upgrading Polaris were fundamental to the project. Existing accounts of the Polaris Improvement Project, however, have not given the appropriate attention to the wider US–UK political differences in this period. By doing so it is shown how in addition to the wider economic, strategic and political factors, this was of paramount significance in the Heath government opting for the ‘Super Antelope’ method in upgrading Polaris.1 ¹‘Super Antelope’ was the codename for the upgrade of Polaris. This was eventually changed to ‘Chevaline’. Peter Hennessy, Cabinets and the Bomb (Oxford: OUP 2007), 28–9. View all notes     

“Flectas non frangas”: revisiting early twenty-first century UK–US defense relations (2000–2005) after five years

Adopting the analytical framework of the established interpretive “schools” of Anglo-American relations, this article offers several reflections on UK–US defense relations as they occurred over the significant years of 2000–2005. During those years, trajectories were established on which UK–US defense relations continue to travel today and outcomes emerged which are still being navigated. This article concludes that the Latin phrase, “Flectas Non Frangas” (essentially translated as: “Bend not Break”), is the most appropriate to adopt to characterize the developments undergone in recent UK–US defense relations. Many historical and strategic lessons with contemporary relevance are drawn.     

Iraq, 2003–2011: succeeding to fail

ABSTRACT

This study examines the US experience during the Iraq war, from the planning phase that began in 2001 to the withdrawal of US forces in 2011. It reveals a dearth of planning and intelligence leading up to the invasion; reluctance by conventional coalition military forces to conduct reconstruction, political and security capacity-building; and, later, full spectrum counterinsurgency operations. These forces took on some missions traditionally reserved for special operations forces, and they increasingly assumed diplomatic roles as they interfaced with the Iraqi leadership and local kingpins. Although these efforts yielded some impressive organizational learning and limited operational successes, they were hampered by lack of adequate preparation, a poor understanding of the human terrain, shortsighted strategies, and ultimately a dearth of political will to stay the course. The outcome was far from the model Middle East democracy envisioned by the invasion’s architects, and the American experience in Iraq instead became a cautionary tale for military intervention.     

A Doctrine without Dogma

ABSTRACT

In No Use: Nuclear Weapons and U.S. National Security Policy, Thomas M. Nichols calls for a constructive rethinking about the history of nuclear weapons and the attitudes that have grown up around them. Despite dramatic reductions since the end of the Cold War, the United States still maintains a robust nuclear triad that far exceeds the needs of realistic deterrence in the twenty-first century. Nichols advocates a new strategy of minimum deterrence that includes deep unilateral reductions to the US nuclear arsenal, a no-first-use pledge, withdrawing US tactical nuclear weapons from Europe, and ending extended nuclear deterrence for allies. The weakest part of his argument eschews nuclear retaliation against small nuclear states that attack the United States, opting instead to use only conventional weapons to guarantee regime change. He admits this will entail enormous cost and sacrifice, but cites the “immorality” of retaliating against a smaller power with few targets worthy of nuclear weaponry, which totally ignores the massive underground facilities constructed to shield military facilities in many of these states. Despite this, Nichols's thoughtful approach to post-Cold War deterrence deserves thoughtful consideration.     

Re-thinking the Unthinkable: Arms Control in the Twenty-First Century

ABSTRACT

Since the end of the Cold War, arms control proponents tried to make the case for deep nuclear reductions and other forms of security cooperation as necessary for strategic stability. While different versions of strategic stability analysis did sometimes produce innovative proposals, constructive negotiations, and successful ratification campaigns in the past, this analytical framework has become more of a hindrance than a help. Treating arms control as a predominantly technical way to make deterrence more stable by changing force structure characteristics, military operations, relative numbers of weapons on either side, or total number of nuclear weapons gives short shrift to political factors, including the fundamental assumptions about world politics that inform different arms control logics, the quality of political relations among leading states, and the political processes that affect negotiation, ratification, and implementation. This article compares two logics for arms control as a means to enhance strategic stability, one developed by the Cambridge community in the 1960s and one used by the Reagan administration and its successors, with current perspectives on strategic stability in which flexibility and freedom of action are preferable to predictability and arms control. It also contrasts what the Barack Obama administration has tried to achieve through strategic stability dialogues with Russia and China with how they envision security cooperation. It then presents an approach developed during the Cold War by Hedley Bull for thinking about both the technical and the political dimensions of arms control, and suggests that the logic of Cooperative Security (which shares important features with Bull's approach) is a more appropriate and productive way to think about arms control in the twenty-first century than strategic stability analysis is.     

An historical review of US defense strategy from Vietnam to operation Iraqi freedom

Facing nearly half a billion dollars in spending cuts over the next five years, US defense planners and strategists must simultaneously rebuild a war-weary Army weakened from over a decade of war, build new sea and air capabilities for the Pacific theater, and reduce manpower, procurement, and contractor budgets while promoting innovation. The US defense department is embarking on what may be the most sweeping period of defense transformation in recent memory. This article reviews the history of American defense transformation, focusing on an important but largely overlooked period of military innovation that began in the shadow of Vietnam and ended with troops fighting through blinding sandstorms at night on the road to Baghdad. The multifaceted transformation strategy conceived in the 1970s paved the way for a military revolution in the 1990s and enabled unprecedented battlefield adaptation in the 2000s. After reviewing the revolutionary changes that led to American dominance in conventional warfare in the 1990s, the article examines US transformation policies in the 2000s to inform defense strategy and planning efforts in the 2010s.     

Securitising humanitarian assistance and post-conflict reconstruction in Africa: A critical review of South Africa's new defence policy

The South African Defence Review 2014 is the country's new defence policy. The Review, which is expected to steer South African defence policymaking for the next few decades, discusses in detail the role of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) in peace missions in Africa and proposes the direct involvement of the country's soldiers in both military and civilian tasks, from peacekeeping to humanitarian assistance, post-conflict reconstruction and development. This paper contains a critical review of the Review with regard to South Africa's envisaged contribution to regional and continental peace and stability. It is argued that humanitarian assistance and post-conflict reconstruction should not be securitised and that the SANDF should only be tasked with peacekeeping and the establishment of stability and security in fragile in-conflict and post-conflict settings. The humanitarian work should be left to humanitarian and aid agencies, while reconstruction and development should be left to organisations such as the New Partnership for Africa's Development, continental and international development organisations, and local actors.     

FOUNDATIONS FOR REGIONAL SECURITY: PREPARING TO KEEP THE PEACE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

Since the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, the continent of Africa, particularly Greater East Africa, has played an increasingly signifi cant role in United States (US) national security strategy. Transnational security threats and political authoritarianism continue to plague the region, creating calls for greater US and international involvement. Before reacting to the situation, however, it is prudent to pause, reflect, and understand that the United States developed strategic relations with nation-states in the region well before contemporary concerns for international terrorism and ungoverned spaces entered the strategic lexicon. Toward a more comprehensive understanding of Greater East Africa's strategic history, this paper examines the core strategic relationship in the region, US-Kenya relations, its origins and implications, and offers policy recommendations that will affect future international security.     

Lost in transition: the South African military and counterinsurgency

Washington's growing reliance upon international private security companies (PSCs) will lead to these firms becoming prominent vehicles in the prosecution of the counterinsurgency in Iraq. This shift, however, risks labeling PSCs as mercenaries and presents considerable challenges regarding the control of non-state violence. Moreover, tradeoffs exist regarding the different nationalities of PSC personnel. Utilization of personnel from the developed world risks compromising the capabilities of Special Operations Forces. Additionally, shifts in casualty recognition amongst US policymakers and the media suggest that the private option is becoming politically salient and thus less useful. Many developing world states are increasingly concerned about how the global outsourcing of security sector expertise risks their stability and ability to execute coherent policy. Finally, the employment of Iraqis in PSCs sends mixed messages to the Iraqi populace about the need for and the effectiveness of a cohesive and responsible indigenous security sector.

Frankly, I'd like to see the government get out of war altogether and leave the whole feud to private industry.

[Catch-22 – Major Milo Minderbinder]     

Reviews

A. Hamish Ion and E.J. Errington (eds.), Great Powers and Little Wars: the Limits of Power. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1993. Pp.246, select biblio, index. $49.95. ISBN 0275–93965–0

John M. Rothgeb, Jr., Defining Power: Influence and Force in the Contemporary International System. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993. Pp.205. $39.95 (hbk); $18.70 (pbk). ISBN 0312–086–822 and 061–056

Brian L. Job (ed.), The Insecurity Dilemma: National Security in Third World States. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992, Pp.257. $37. ISBN 1–55587–267–0

Edwin G. Corr and Stephen Sloan (eds.), Low‐Intensity Conflict: Old Threats in a New World. Westview Studies in Regional Security, Boulder, CO: Westview, 1992. Pp.310, maps, figures, index. $55 (hbk); $18.85 (pbk). ISBN 0–8133–8593–8 and 8594–6     

United States Security Policy in the Western Hemisphere: Why Columbia,Why Now,and What is to be Done?

An evaluation of US policy toward Latin America and Columbia and its implications for the military begins with an understanding of the purposes and patterns of intervention over the years. An evaluation of contemporary security policy in the Western Hemisphere also hinges on an understanding of the broadening view of US national security. In developing these themes, this article (1) analyzes the major tenets of US policy toward Latin America, and the criteria for intervention; (2) examines the concepts of security; (3) explains and clarifies 'Why Columbia, why now, and what is to be done?'; (4) outlines some strategic and high operational-level imperatives for US civil-military involvement in Columbia; (5) puts forward seven additional strategic and operational imperatives for playing in the contemporary security area; (6) addresses the strategic adaption of US military power in the Columbian threat situation; and (7) provides some final conclusions and recommendations. Such an exercise, will, hopefully, stimulate North American, Columbian, and Latin American thinking and action regarding a set of complicated problems that - whether one likes it or not, or is prepared to deal with it or not - is likely to be with us for some time beyond the year 2001.