Insights from a Database of Lashkar-e-Taiba and Hizb-ul-Mujahideen Militants

This article uses a novel database of 1,625 posthumously published biographies of members of two Islamist militant organizations (Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HM)), all of whom were killed in the course of carrying out militant attacks. In general, each biography provides data on the militant’s birthplace, education, recruitment, and training. The number of observations in this database is a full order of magnitude larger than those of previous databases assembled from militant biographies. While the sample of militants in this database is the product of multiple selection effects, analysis of the database undermines many common myths about Pakistani militants and casts doubt on current policy approaches to mitigating Islamist militancy in Pakistan.     

地缘政治视角下的中巴军事技术合作

中国和巴基斯坦是社会制度和意识形态完全不同的两个国家,但是自1951年正式建立外交关系的50多年来,两国之间发展起来的睦邻友好＂全天候和全方位＂的国家关系堪称世界上双边关系的典范。中巴友好关系的存在有力的支撑了南亚地缘政治格局的安全与稳定,其中,中巴军事技术合作又是这一友好关系中极为重要的一个侧面。通过分析中巴军事技术合作的背景、历史和现状,可以有效的了解南亚地缘政治格局的复杂性以及我国在其中的核心战略利益所在。文章分为三个部分：第一部分分析中巴友好的地缘政治因素和历史原因;第二部分分析中巴军事技术合作的历史、现状以及其在中巴关系起到的重要作用;第三部分在前几部分的基础上,对中巴军事技术合作中存在的一些不足之处提出看法并对未来进行展望。     

India's Military Instrument: A Doctrine Stillborn

For six years, India has sought to implement an army doctrine for limited war, ‘Cold Start’, intended to enable a Cold War era force optimised for massive offensives to operate under the nuclear threshold. This article asks whether that is presently feasible, and answers in the negative. Doctrinal change has floundered on five sets of obstacles, many of which are politically rooted and deep-seated, thereby leaving the Army unprepared to respond to challenges in the manner envisioned by the doctrine's architects.     

Tilting at windmills: The flawed U.S. policy toward the 1971 Indo-Pakistani war

ABSTRACT

This article examines decision-making mistakes made by U.S. President Nixon and national security advisor Kissinger during the 1971 India-Pakistan crisis and war. It shows that Nixon and Kissinger routinely demonstrated psychological biases that led them to overestimate the likelihood of West Pakistani victory against Bengali rebels as well as the importance of the crisis to broader U.S. policy. The evidence fails to support Nixon and Kissinger’s own framing of the 1971 crisis as a contest between cool-headed realpolitik and idealistic humanitarianism, and instead shows that Kissinger and Nixon’s policy decisions harmed their stated goals because of repeated decision-making errors.