Deterrence Beyond Downunder: Australia and US Security Guarantees since 1955

ABSTRACT

From 1944 to 1973 Australia attempted to acquire atomic weaponry. This ambition was driven by the desire to contribute to defending British interests in Asia, fears of invasion by China, Indonesia, and Japan, great-power war, and the belief that nuclear weapons were merely bigger and better conventional weapons, that they would proliferate, and that US security assurances lacked credibility. Although the pursuit of the bomb was eventually abandoned, this was not the result of US assurances. Rather, geopolitical changes in Australia’s environment meant that a major attack on the continent was unlikely to occur outside the context of a confrontation between the US, China, and the Soviet Union. This article argues that Australia may soon have to rethink its policies towards US extended deterrence and instead focus on developing its own deterrent.     

Merely ‘Docile Self-Deception’? German Experiences with Nuclear Consultation in NATO

ABSTRACT

Recent nuclear-weapons-related consultation in NATO within the framework of the Defence and Deterrence Posture Review sheds light on historical experiences with nuclear consultation in NATO. In the early years of the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG), which became the main forum for multilateral nuclear consultation in the alliance, developing a nuclear weapons first use doctrine was of particular importance. This process led to the adoption of the Provisional Political Guidelines (PPGs) on the threat to initiate the use of nuclear weapons. With a focus on West Germany as the primary addressee of the NPG, it will be postulated that nuclear consultation functioned and may still be seen as an essential tool to manage the credibility of US extended nuclear deterrence in the framework of NATO.     

核动力装置人机系统可靠性数字仿真研究

对核动力装置人机系统进行了可靠性数字仿真研究,将人的因素和设备的安全性、可靠性、维护性及其它参数进行综合平衡,研制出可靠性较高的系统,并在其使用维护中获得最佳的有效性.     

核电站运行诊断系统探讨

根据国外核电站诊断系统的现状,简要叙述其基本组成及工作过程,分析了运行诊断系统在核动力方面的应用前景,提出了加强核电站运行诊断系统应用有效性的几个问题。     

Nuclear weapons and alliance institutions in the era of President Trump

The swearing in of Donald Trump as the 45th President of the United States presages, at the very least, a period of flux in American strategy with respect to the relationship between nuclear weapons and alliances. In this response to three thoughtful rejoinders to our article, “Nuclear weapons, the United States and alliances in Europe and Asia: Toward an institutional perspective,” we clarify key aspects of our argument and discuss why alliance institutions are likely to be relatively robust in the face of change, how they can influence national decision-making, and argue that they may exert a moderating influence over the new administration.     

Military Innovation and Tactical Adaptation in the Israel–Hizballah Conflict: The Institutionalization of Lesson-Learning in the IDF

This article highlights a pattern of military adaptation and tactical problem-solving utilized by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) while engaged in protracted conflict with the Lebanese militant group Hizballah. It discusses the IDF’s recent attempts to institutionalize their historically intuitive process of ad-hoc learning by developing a formal tactical-level mechanism for ‘knowledge management’. The diffusion of this battlefield lesson-learning system that originated at lower-levels of the organization is examined, as well as its implementation and effectiveness during the 2006 Lebanon War. A nuanced analysis of IDF adaptation illustrates the dynamic interplay between both ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ processes of military innovation.     

Indian Military Modernization and Conventional Deterrence in South Asia

In recent years, headline grabbing increases in the Indian defense budget have raised concerns that India’s on-going military modernization threatens to upset the delicate conventional military balance vis-à-vis Pakistan. Such an eventuality is taken as justification for Islamabad’s pursuit of tactical-nuclear weapons and other actions that have worrisome implications for strategic stability on the subcontinent. This article examines the prospects for Pakistan’s conventional deterrence in the near to medium term, and concludes that it is much better than the pessimists allege. A host of factors, including terrain, the favorable deployment of Pakistani forces, and a lack of strategic surprise in the most likely conflict scenarios, will mitigate whatever advantages India may be gaining through military modernization. Despite a growing technological edge in some areas, Indian policymakers cannot be confident that even a limited resort to military force would achieve a rapid result, which is an essential pre-condition for deterrence failure.     

Missile Strategy in a Post-Nuclear Age

While the arrival of nuclear weapons coincided roughly with the development of short, medium, intermediate, and eventually intercontinental missiles, the contribution of missile technology to the deterrence equation is often lost. If nuclear weapons were eliminated, even new generation missiles with conventional payloads could struggle to render effective deterrence. But some of the physical and psychological effects commonly ascribed to nuclear weapons could still be in play. And in a world without nuclear weapons, thinking about the use and control of force from the nuclear age would also deserve renewed attention.     

美军在信息安全视野下利用社交媒体政策研究

近年来,美军逐步调整社交媒体政策,重视发挥其在公共事务、家庭服务以及塑造军队形象中的独特功能。从信息安全的角度出发,在分析美军社交媒体政策发展变化及其内在动因的基础上,总结出美军运用社交媒体所采取的信息安全措施。     

The Obama administration's phased-adaptive architecture: technological,operational and political issues

In 2009, the Obama administration announced a new missile defense strategy, termed a phased-adaptive architecture (PAA) focused primarily on countering the growing threat from theater ballistic missiles. The success of this strategy is predicated on the rapid development and fielding of successive increments of defensive capability in a manner adapted to the specific requirements for missile defenses in different regions of the world. The administration is committed to building a European regional missile defense system, the European PAA or EPAA between now and 2020. The first elements of the EPAA were deployed in late 2011. However, much progress is still required in order to reach the goals set for the PAA. This article addresses the technological, operational and political issues confronting the Obama administration in its efforts to make the PAA a reality.