WHO IS THE ENEMY?

We examine who benefits when there is a strong leader in place, and who benefits when a situation lacks a proper leader. There are fractious terrorist groups who seek to serve the same people in common cause against a common enemy. The groups compete for rents obtained from the public by engaging in actions against the common enemy. We determine the leadership structure under which each group is better off, as well as the circumstance that the common enemy prefers. We are able to state simple and general conditions for each group and the common enemy to benefit.     

均衡聚类市场拍卖机制的异构无人机集群任务规划方法

针对大规模异构无人机集群的全局任务规划问题,提出一种基于均衡聚类市场拍卖机制的任务规划方法。对无人机群协同合作完成任务的场景进行分析,综合任务聚类和无人机联盟的优势,建立了通用性较高的任务规划模型。考虑到对无人机群负载均衡的需求,融合和改进了K-means聚类算法和市场拍卖机制,形成一种综合考虑路程消耗和任务消耗的均衡聚类市场拍卖算法。在拍卖过程中引入平衡参数,通过计算旅行商问题来修正平衡参数,保证无人机群在负载均衡的同时整体成本不断降低。仿真结果表明,使用均衡聚类市场拍卖机制的任务规划方法能够在较短时间内完成异构无人机群的复杂任务规划,保证无人机群负载均衡的同时,整体成本和总时间上也有较好表现,具有一定的实际应用价值。     

A sequential auction‐bargaining procurement model

One of the most important decisions that a firm faces in managing its supply chain is a procurement decision: selecting suitable suppliers among many potential competing sellers and reducing the purchase cost. While both auctions and bargaining have been extensively studied in the literature, the research that combines auctions and bargaining is limited. In this article, we consider a combined auction‐bargaining model in a setting where a single buyer procures an indivisible good from one of many competing sellers. The procurement model that we analyze is a sequential model consisting of the auction phase followed by the bargaining phase. In the auction phase, the sellers submit bids, and the seller with the lowest bid is selected as the winning bidder. In the bargaining phase, the buyer audits the cost of the winning seller and then negotiates with him to determine the final price. For this auction‐bargaining model, we find a symmetric equilibrium bidding strategy for the sellers in a closed form, which is simple to understand and closely related to the classical results in the auction and bargaining literature. We also show that the auction‐bargaining model generates at least as much profit to the buyer as the standard auction or sequential bargaining model. © 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2010     

Auctions in the post‐change‐order period

A change order is frequently initiated by either the supplier or the buyer, especially when the contract is long‐term or when the contractual design is complex. In response to a change order, the buyer can enter a bargaining process to negotiate a new price. If the bargaining fails, she pays a cancellation fee (or penalty) and opens an auction. We call this process the sequential bargaining‐auction (BA). At the time of bargaining, the buyer is uncertain as to whether the bargained price is set to her advantage; indeed, she might, or might not, obtain a better price in the new auction. To overcome these difficulties, we propose a new change‐order‐handling mechanism by which the buyer has an option to change the contractual supplier after bargaining ends with a bargained price. We call this the option mechanism. By this mechanism, the privilege of selling products or services is transferred to a new supplier if the buyer exercises the option. To exercise the option, the buyer pays a prespecified cash payment, which we call the switch price, to the original supplier. If the option is not exercised, the bargained price remains in effect. When a switch price is proposed by the buyer, the supplier decides whether or not to accept it. If the supplier accepts it, the buyer opens an auction. The option is exercised when there is a winner in the auction. This article shows how, under the option mechanism, the optimal switch price and the optimal reserve price are determined. Compared to the sequential BA, both the buyer and the supplier benefit. Additionally, the option mechanism coordinates the supply chain consisting of the two parties. © 2015 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 62: 248–265, 2015     

面向网络化无人机集群的计算换通信分布式任务调度方法

针对网络化无人机集群任务自主协同问题以及市场竞拍法的优缺点,提出“计算换通信”思想及其相应的分布式任务调度方法。通过对显式和隐式冲突任务的分析,建立任务相关智能体集合。提出基于任务抑制的局部优化方法,用于提前消解部分任务冲突,以减少算法迭代次数。设计基于历史竞标信息的智能体位置推断法,为局部优化提供必要的信息输入。基于组网仿真平台与集群救援场景开展蒙特卡罗仿真实验,结果表明,相比于市场竞拍法中具有代表性的基于共识的捆绑算法和性能影响算法,所提方法能够获得更少的迭代次数、更短的收敛时间以及更优的调度性能。     

多平台雷达有源干扰资源分配算法

根据现代干扰机特点,建立"多对多"雷达有源干扰资源分配数学模型,结合分配算法的具体应用环境,提出了基于多Agent分布协同拍卖的雷达干扰资源分配算法,实例表明该方法可行。