To Be or Not To Be: The Development of Soviet Deck Aviation

Few issues were as contentious in the development of the Soviet Navy as the role of aircraft carriers and sea-based aviation. Despite the continued insistence by the highest naval authorities and scientific experts that surface combatants simply could not be protected in the open ocean without the support of ship-borne aviation, Soviet leaders – for a variety of reasons – resisted aircraft carrier development until the final decades of the Cold War. In examining one of the most defining and telling asymmetries of the Cold War at sea, the author argues that while the USSR was economically and technologically capable of building aircraft carriers of any class, bureaucratic infighting, misperceptions of cost and practicality, and the inherent flaws of a totalitarian system ultimately created an impossible gap in capabilities between the two sides. The priorities and direction of Soviet weapons and defense technology development during the Cold War was largely a factor of the military-political situation taking shape at home, and in the world. As a rule, the navy was assigned missions that corresponded to its capabilities at a given point in time, rather than the other way around. Often, the navy lacked the material resources needed to implement its core mission. The availability of these resources, in turn, depended on the country's economic situation, its scientific potential, the technological state of its industry, as well as the subjective influence of political and military leaders on the priorities of technological development. The impact of the country's socioeconomic imperatives was undoubtedly also felt in the sluggish pace of development of ship-borne aviation and aircraft carriers in the USSR.     

Stalin's Conception of Maritime Power: Revelations from the Russian Archives

Through unprecedented access to archival documents, the author places Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin's decisions regarding the navy in the context of a national economy in ruins, bureaucratic infighting, and Stalin's own unique understanding of geopolitics and naval strategy. These documents illustrate the decidedly defensive character of Stalin's maritime conception, as it reveals the Kremlin leader's strong disposition against attempts to ‘mimic the Americans’ and pursue an ocean-going fleet. The author also discusses Stalin's lessons from the Korean War and the impact of these lessons on the subsequent development of the Soviet fleet. Finally, this study offers insights for students of asymmetric warfare, as it explores the challenges and dilemmas that confront relatively limited powers within intense rivalries.     

支持并行工程的造船分段作业计划系统

针对传统造船模式下,车间作业计划与工艺设计串行工作方式的缺点,基于并行工程的原理,提出了分段作业计划与工艺设计的集成运行模式,为实现造船CAPP系统与PPC系统的集成化和并行化提供了实现的基础。针对集成模式的特点,建立了分段作业计划系统资源优化的数学模型,应用遗传算法解决了针对任意分段装配工艺方案的多资源平衡优化问题,可以得到每项作业最优的开工时间,同时能够给出多种资源的最优分布结果,满足了多工艺方案之间资源利用率的比较。最后,给出了计算实例,计算机模拟结果说明了这一方法的有效性。