云南边境地区毒品犯罪特点及对策

当前,云南边境地区毒品犯罪呈现出武装贩毒明显、特殊人群贩毒突出、境内外相互勾结、缅甸籍人员贩毒突出等特点.这源于人们对毒品犯罪的危害认识不足、宣传教育力度不够、受毒品高额利润驱动等原因.要提高打击毒品犯罪实效,必须采取加强综合冶理、完善法律制度、加强区域合作、加强情报调研工作、加大专项打击力度等措施.     

刑事政策指导下受贿罪定罪的立法完善

刑事政策影响定罪，尤其是定罪政策。当前我国受贿罪的定罪政策是单向化犯罪。建构严密的受贿罪体系要求扩大受贿罪的对象，不能局限于“财物”，对“为他人谋取利益”重新定位，并且采用主从式立法方法建立完整的罪名体系。     

Military support and transnational terrorism

Analysing the relationship between the provision of military support and the probability of becoming the target of a terrorist attack, this paper contributes to the literature on the causes of transnational terrorism. We find that deployment of military troops of country X in country Y increases the probability of a terrorist attack on citizens of country X by a terrorist group located in country Y. Exporting weapons to country Y seems to increase the probability of being attacked by the terrorists of this country Y as well. Deploying materials, however, does not seem to significantly influence the probability of attack. Including lagged values for our military support variables ensures that the causality direction is from military support to terrorist attacks. Moreover, these results indicate that while the effect of military deployment on the probability of attack lasts for more than 1 year, the effect is rather short-lived.     

我国反恐系统化处置机制的建构

恐怖主义是威胁当今世界和平与稳定的主要因素。“藏独”和“疆独”是我国当前面临的主要恐怖势力。传统单一性的反恐处置模式在打击恐怖主义时很容易陷入顾此失彼的困难境地。坚持立足全局和放宽视野,从系统化的角度提出一套反恐处置战略具有十分重要的理论价值和实践意义。在反恐处置机制中,要充分发挥法律战的基础性作用、情报战的先导性作用、经济战的根源性作用、心理战的瓦解性作用、舆论战的宣传性作用以及协作战的堵截性作用。     

美国对化学、生物恐怖事件防护装备的技术要求分析

为了给在核化生事件中遂行任务的应急处置人员提供符合要求的个人防护装备,美国于2001年实施了NFPA1994《化学、生物恐怖事件用防护装具标准》．介绍了该标准中提出的化学、生物恐怖事件防护装备的技术要求,包括设计要求和技术性能要求,并讨论了各级防护装具的使用场合和时机、防护服的型式结构和对防护材料的要求．     

India: Fleeting Attachment to the Counterinsurgency Grand Strategy

India’s success in dealing with insurgency movements was based on adherence to four key rules of engagement: identifying a lead counter-insurgent force, launching population-centric counterinsurgency (COIN) operations, non-use of excessive force and confining the role of the COIN operations to preparing a ground for a political solution. While the country does not yet have a COIN doctrine, these four rules of engagement do constitute what can be referred to a COIN grand strategy. Analysis of the several continuing insurgencies, however, reveals the country’s inability to adhere to the grand strategy. Political considerations, incapacity to manoeuvre through the demands of various stake holders, and even the wish to expedite the decimation of insurgent outfits through a force-centric approach has produced a long history of failures in dousing the fires of discontent.     

The fragility of elite settlements in Tunisia

Six years after the revolution that ousted Zine El-Abidine Ben Ali, Tunisia remains in flux. On the face of it, the country should be celebrated for transitioning from political ferment to consensual normalcy. Unfortunately, there is more to Tunisia’s transition to consensual politics than meets the eye. The country is still caught in a turbulent grey zone where strong authoritarian tendencies threaten to pull down the country’s tortuous march towards democratic stability. Some developments are particularly worrisome. The old authoritarian discourse emphasising stability and law and order has regained credence. The repressive habits of the police and security services are also back in full swing. The outlook for democratic stability darkens as the chasm between ordinary citizens and political elites expands. The lurch towards illiberalism and the failure of the successive postrevolutionary governments to make even the slightest dent in Tunisia’s dreadful unemployment rate and sharp regional economic inequalities are undermining faith in elite settlements and state institutions.     

Military deployment and international terrorism: do location and mission type matter?

Extant literature documents a relationship between military deployment and the risk of an international terrorist attack against citizens of the deploying country. It appears that deployment significantly increases the possibility of terrorist actions in the home country. In particular, if country A decides to send troops to nation B, then citizens of the former country are more likely to fall victim of an attack carried out by a terrorist organisation originating from the latter country. Contributing to this line of literature, we further refine this relationship by distinguishing between regions where the troops are sent as well as by introducing differences between types of deployment. Our results indicate that missions to Asia and the Middle East are more dangerous than missions to other regions as reflected by the terrorist threat in the home country. Robustness tests do however show that the significance of the location variable Asia is predominantly attributed to the mission to Afghanistan. As for types of deployment, only ad hoc missions seem to increase the risk of an attack, whereas no significant results are found for other missions such as operations under UN and NATO flag. Leaving out the missions to Iraq and Afghanistan however also increases the danger resulting from missions by fixed coalitions. Our results find however no evidence that ‘wearing a blue helmet’ increases the probability of a terrorist attack at home.     

Violence and the state: Lessons from Colombia

Whether or not Colombia has improved is a controversial topic. If improvement has occurred, what, if any, lessons from the Colombian model can be learned? The first lesson is that Colombia's problems were caused more by a weak state than by drugs. The second lesson is that improving state capacity requires more than just increased security. The state must also provide the basic social services that citizens require to gain and maintain their support. Additionally, government institutions need to improve their professionalism, protect human rights, and root out impunity and corruption. The alternative is to suffer from new cycles of violence as old foes are vanquished, but new ones emerge.