Into the black box? Technology sharing in major arms transfers and beyond

From the recipients’ perspective, arms transfers have, through the use of offsets, technology transfers, and industrial participation, become an opportunity to receive not only advanced weapons, but also technologies not otherwise available. How important are friendly relations for securing a military export order? To what extent do buyers demand advanced military or commercial technology and how are these demands accepted by the supplier? How does this influence smaller producers in relation to major producers? These questions are addressed by studying (a) the Joint Strike Fighter/F-35 by Lockheed Martin, USA, and the JAS-39 Gripen aircraft by Saab, Sweden, (b) the Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft competition in India for 126 combat aircraft, and (c) the Indian offset policy. In the final section, some long-term consequences are discussed.     

F—K理论在堆积固体自燃火灾调查中的应用

堆积固体自燃火灾是常见多发火灾，由于其规模庞大、着火延迟期长等特点，难以进行全尺寸的模拟实验，为火灾预防和调查工作带来了一定的难度。基于F—K（Frank—Kamenetskii）理论，将小规模实验结果外推，从而预测或判断一定尺寸的堆积固体在一定的环境温度下自燃起火的危险性。     

美军装备采办中需求牵引与技术推动融合研究——以F-22战机为例

通过分析F-22项目中需求牵引和技术推动两大动力,指出美军的体制机制保障动力融合,采办文件明确动力融合,机构设置促使动力融合。总结出我国武器装备发展一是系统构建、综合权衡,二是瞄准实战、滚动评估,三是紧跟前沿、严控陷阱。     

动态飞行求解双35标准值方法

通过顺解法,利用录取的目标现在点数据,已知的射表数据及对有关偏差量的修正,可求解出斜距离４５００ｍ,高低角０°至８４°范围内的标准值     

Striking a deal on the F-35: multinational politics and US defence acquisition

Why does joint defence production of advanced weapons systems, which appears like a logical choice at first, become harder for both the primary production state and its allies to manage and justify as the acquisition process runs its course? To answer this question, we analyze the multinational politics of the F-35 JSF with a focus on how secondary states who have bought into the program are affected by domestic politics within the primary production state. We find that US congressional and bureaucratic politics, cuts to US defence spending, and a desire to retain tight control over the program has locked allies into a program with which they have little leverage. Potentially losing the ability to fight along side the US if they don’t follow through, coupled with inter-Alliance pressures, leaves secondary states who are involved with the F-35 program, vulnerable to the whims of US domestic politics.