Desert insurgency: lessons from the third Tuareg rebellion

This article provides an in-depth examination and analysis of the 2006–2009 Tuareg rebellion in Mali and Niger. It identifies the underlying reasons behind the rebellion, explores contrasting counter-insurgency (COIN) strategies employed by the two governments, and presents some lessons learned. While both COIN approaches ultimately produced similar peace settlements, the article argues that the Malian strategy of reconciliation combined with the selective use of force was far more effective than the Nigerien iron fist approach at limiting the size and scope of the insurgency and producing a more sustainable peace. It concludes by looking at the role of external actors, particularly the United States, and how the failure to internationalize the conflict was actually more beneficial to the local COIN effort, as well as to the longer strategic interests of the United States in the region.     

The case for Azawad

Since Mali achieved independence from France, the marginalised Tuareg population of Mali has sought independence and the right to form their own nation, ‘Azawad’. These efforts have continuously been frustrated by the Tuaregs' neighbours, due to competing nationalist pride and interests in the mineral resources believed to lie under the northern Malian soil. Thus far, the Tuaregs of northern Mali have been largely neglected and denied both inclusive and effective governance by the various Malian governments from the southern Malian capital of Bamako. When negotiations have failed, Tuareg attempts to seize their own independence through violence have been brutally crushed by the Malian government. The Malian government will neither advance the interests of the Tuaregs nor allow them the freedom to pursue their own path in the world. The advent of the ‘Arab Spring’ in Libya provided another opportunity for the Tuaregs to pursue their dreams of an independent Azawad. Tuareg fighters returning from Libya carried with them both considerable combat experience and stockpiles of arms that they used to temporarily free their homeland. Unfortunately, the Tuaregs' whirlwind conquest of northern Mali was undone by the emergence of a new transnational threat in the Sahel. Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) supplanted the previously victorious Tuaregs and attempted to turn Azawad into a Taliban-esque caliphate. French intervention defeated AQIM, but set the stage for a continuation of the cycle of violence and instability borne from the unwillingness of the international community to support the Tuaregs' legitimate right to self-determination.     

The National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad factor in the Mali crisis

Mali has been a battleground for more than a year now. While the armed conflict came in the aftermath of the Libyan crisis that left the regional security environment depleted, it also served as a catalyst for the collapse of state authority in Mali. This created conditions conducive for the proliferation of, and attacks by, radical religious armed groups in the northern regions of the country, including the Tuareg armed movement: the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA). But, far from being a new phenomenon, the Tuareg-led armed insurrection in the northern regions is as old as the post-colonial Malian state, and continues to pose tremendous challenges in West Africa and the Sahel region for both regional and extra-regional actors. The recent crisis in the Sahel region is seen as one of the most serious since the end of the Cold War, with anticipated dire long-term impacts on the security of the region and beyond. While attention is predominantly focused on defeating the jihadist groups that have threatened the survival of the Malian state, one must not lose sight of the fact that the ‘Tuareg Factor’, as represented by the rebellion launched by MNLA, remains critical both in terms of appreciating the deterioration of the situation and attempting to frame long-lasting solutions. The paper argues that the Tuareg's persistent recourse to rebellion against Bamako needs to be understood within a historical trajectory that takes into consideration three key parameters: firstly, the post-colonial state in Mali and its African leadership's relations with the descendants of the Tuareg communities; secondly, the amalgamation created by the so-called war on terror; and, finally, the contradictions of the democratisation process of the 1990s.¹1 This article is based on field research carried out between 2008 and 2013 on the ‘Resurgence of Tuareg-led Rebellions’.     

French intervention in Mali: strategic alliances,long-term regional presence?

The March 2012 coup in Mali opened the door to expanded territorial occupation in northern Mali by Tuareg separatists and subsequently armed Islamist extremists. French forces intervened at the behest of the interim government in Mali. This article examines how various actors frame the conflict to their advantage. While the Malian government and France are allies, the position of various Tuareg actors shift over time as they strategize and weigh the value of allegiance with the French. Local extremist organizations are labeled as terrorists and are targeted as enemies. This article argues that the conflict has been decontextualized and framed within the ‘war on terror’. France’s decision to intervene and to expand their regional military presence, rather than exit, is legitimized by the framing of their intervention as integral to counterterrorism efforts.