Emergency transshipment in decentralized dealer networks: When to send and accept transshipment requests

While there has been significant previous literature on inventory transshipment, most research has focused on the dealers' demand filling decision (when to fill transshipment requests from other dealers), ignoring the requesting decision (when to send transshipment requests to other dealers). In this paper we develop optimal inventory transshipment policies that incorporate both types of decisions. We consider a decentralized system in which the dealers are independent of the manufacturer and of each other. We first study a network consisting of a very large number of dealers. We prove that the optimal inventory and transshipment decisions for an individual dealer are controlled by threshold rationing and requesting levels. Then, in order to study the impact of transshipment among independent dealers in a smaller dealer network, we consider a decentralized two‐dealer network and use a game theoretic approach to characterize the equilibrium inventory strategies of the individual dealers. An extensive numerical study highlights the impact of the requesting decision on the dealers' equilibrium behavior in a decentralized setting. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2006     

Inventory sharing under decentralized preventive transshipments

We consider preventive transshipments between two stores in a decentralized system with two demand subperiods. Replenishment orders are made before the first subperiod, and the stores may make transshipments to one another between the subperiods. We prove that the transshipment decision has a dominant strategy, called a control‐band conserving transfer policy, under which each store chooses a quantity to transship in or out that will keep its second‐subperiod starting inventory level within a range called a control band. We prove that the optimal replenishment policy is a threshold policy in which the threshold depends on the capacity level at the other store. Finally, we prove that there does not exist a transfer price that coordinates the decentralized supply chain. Our research also explains many of the differences between preventive and emergency transshipments, including differences in the optimal transfer policies and the existence or nonexistence of transfer prices that coordinate the system. © 2010 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2010     

Terminal allocation problem in a transshipment hub considering bunker consumption

This article investigates the method of allocating arriving vessels to the terminals in transshipment hubs. The terminal allocation decision faced by a shipping alliance has the influence on the scheduled arrival time of vessels and further affects the bunker consumption cost for the vessels. A model is formulated to minimize the bunker consumption cost as well as the transportation cost of inter‐terminal transshipment flows/movements. The capacity limitation of the port resources such as quay cranes (QCs) and berths is taken into account. Besides the terminal allocation, the QC assignment decision is also incorporated in the proposed model. A local branching based method and a particle swarm optimization based method are developed to solve the model in large‐scale problem instances. Numerical experiments are also conducted to validate the effectiveness of the proposed model, which can save around 14% of the cost when compared with the “First Come First Served” decision rule. Moreover, the proposed solution methods not only solve the proposed model within a reasonable computation time, but also obtain near‐optimal results with about 0.1～0.7% relative gap. © 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 63: 529–548, 2016     

Inventory transshipment game with limited supply: Trap or treat

Inventory transshipment is generally shown to be beneficial to retailers by matching their excess demand with surplus inventory. We investigate an inventory transshipment game with two newsvendor-type retailers under limited total supply and check whether the retailers are better off than the case without transshipment. We derive the ordering strategies for the retailers and show that unlike the unlimited supply case, a pure Nash equilibrium only exists under certain conditions. Furthermore, contrary to the conventional wisdom, we show that inventory transshipment may not always benefit both retailers. Although one of the retailers is guaranteed to be better off, the other could be worse off. The decision criteria are then provided for the retailers to determine if they will benefit from the exercise of inventory transshipment. Numerical study indicates that the carefully chosen transshipment prices play an important role in keeping inventory transshipment beneficial to both retailers. Subsequently, a coordinating mechanism is designed for the retailers to negotiate transshipment prices that maximize the total profit of the two retailers while keeping each of them in a beneficial position.     

The transshipment fund mechanism: Coordinating the decentralized multilocation transshipment problem

The multilocation replenishment and transshipment problem is concerned with several retailers facing random demand for the same item at distinct markets, that may use transshipments to eliminate excess inventory/shortages after demand realization. When the system is decentralized so that each retailer operates to maximize their own profit, there are incentive problems that prevent coordination. These problems arise even with two retailers who may pay each other for transshipped units. We propose a new mechanism based on a transshipment fund, which is the first to coordinate the system, in a fully noncooperative setting, for all instances of two retailers as well as all instances of any number of retailers. Moreover, our mechanism strongly coordinates the system, i.e., achieves coordination as the unique equilibrium. The computation and information requirements of this mechanism are realistic and relatively modest. We also present necessary and sufficient conditions for coordination and prove they are always satisfied with our mechanism. Numerical examples illustrate some of the properties underlying this mechanism for two retailers. © 2010 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2010     

Transshipment through crossdocks with inventory and time windows

A major challenge in making supply meet demand is to coordinate transshipments across the supply chain to reduce costs and increase service levels in the face of demand fluctuations, short lead times, warehouse limitations, and transportation and inventory costs. In particular, transshipment through crossdocks, where just‐in‐time objectives prevail, requires precise scheduling between suppliers, crossdocks, and customers. In this work, we study the transshipment problem with supplier and customer time windows where flow is constrained by transportation schedules and warehouse capacities. Transportation is provided by fixed or flexible schedules and lot‐sizing is dealt with through multiple shipments. We develop polynomial‐time algorithms or, otherwise, provide the complexity of the problems studied. © 2005 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2005