Group Concentration and Violence: Does Ethnic Segregation Affect Domestic Terrorism?

This paper examines the link between ethnic segregation and domestic terrorism. The results show that ethnic segregation has a positive and significant effect on the incidence of domestic terrorism, which indicates that countries where ethnic groups are spatially concentrated face a higher risk of suffering this type of violence. This finding is not affected by the inclusion in the analysis of different covariates that may affect both ethnic segregation and domestic terrorism. The observed relationship between the degree of spatial concentration of ethnic groups and domestic terrorism is confirmed by various robustness tests. The results also suggest that the threat of secession is an important transmission channel linking ethnic segregation and domestic terrorism.     

What are the Effects of Large-scale Violence on Social and Institutional Trust? Using the Civil War Literature to Understand the Case of Mexico, 2006–2012

What is the relationship between drug violence and political attitudes? In this article, we test the relationship between violence and trust using both individual and municipality data for Mexico from 2006 to 12. Using multilevel analysis, we find no support for the thesis that individual experiences with criminal violence drives trust, nor do we find a relationship between levels of violence at the municipio level and trust. However, we do find that perceived threats to individual security leads to less social and institutional trust, but this is independent of personal experience and whether the individual resides in violent communities.     

State Capacity,Inequality and Inter-Group Violence in Sub-Saharan Africa: 1989–2011

Most studies on internal armed conflict focus on the dyadic interaction between the state and a rebel group, leaving less attention to inter-group fighting. Addressing this gap in the literature, this study argues that the interplay between economic and political inequality and weak state capacity increases the risk of non-state conflict. An empirical analysis of 178 non-state conflicts in Sub-Saharan Africa between 1989 and 2011 provides support for the theorized conditional effect, but only for the role of economic inequality. The effect of political exclusion in the context of a weak state is not confirmed, suggesting that such conditions may be more prone to violence of another kind (i.e., mobilization against the state). Overall, these findings highlight the importance of a functioning state for maintaining peaceful inter-group relations, while they also lend support to earlier research that reports divergent effects of economic and political inequalities on civil conflict risk.     

The ‘Happy Outcomes’ May Not Come at All – Postwar Violence in Central America

The non-recurrence of war is mostly considered as the main indicator for successful peace processes. Nevertheless, even in these postwar contexts, other forms of violence – i.e. state repression or homicide – have the potential to endanger the larger process of peace-building. Hence, the analysis of variations in postwar violence is important for the broader peace processes. Three interdependent factors explain variations in postwar violence: the patterns of war termination, policies aiming at the mitigation of the conflict root causes and last but not least institutional reforms. The different experiences of Central American postwar societies show that violence reduction does not require the resolution of major grievances but at least their political recognition.     

Research on modeling of nonlinear vibration isolation system based on Bouc–Wen model

A feedforword neural network of multi-layer topologies for systems with hysteretic nonlinearity is constructed based on Bouc–Wen differential model. It not only reflects the hysteresis force characteristics of the Bouc–Wen model, but also determines its corresponding parameters. The simulation results show that restoring force–displacement curve hysteresis loop is very close to the real curve. The model trained can accurately predict the time response of system. The model is checked under the noise level. The result shows that the model has higher modeling precision, good generalization capability and a certain anti-interference ability.     

Terrorism research: should we focus on the opponent or on our own people?

In terrorism research, three different sources of information and data exist: the terrorists and their environment; the incidents; and the population. This article discusses the strengths and weaknesses of research that is concerned with, or relies on, any of the mentioned sources. An in-depth understanding of the methodological issues that come with these sources is important to correctly interpret results from scientific studies. It is highlighted how the different scientific approaches add to a holistic view of terrorism as a phenomenon. Furthermore, the double-edged sword of information in the field of terrorism is discussed. From these deliberations, guidance concerning the future work of both scholars and decision-makers can be deducted.     

Bayonets on Musa Dagh: Ottoman Counterinsurgency Operations – 1915

This article examines the Ottoman military's escalatory response to violence and frames the Armenian insurrection of 1915 in the historical context of contemporary early twentieth-century counterinsurgency campaigns. A case study is presented, from a military historian's perspective, of counterinsurgency operations conducted by the Ottoman Army's 41st Infantry Division against Armenian insurgents on Musa Da? (Musa Dagh) in an operational area south of Iskenderun (Alexandretta). In this particular operational area, it appears that the modern label which most closely approximates what happened there is ethnic cleansing. Finally, the article concludes with an objective assessment of the effectiveness of the Ottoman Army's counterinsurgency operations.     

Explaining the impact of militancy on Iran–Pakistan relations

ABSTRACT

Sectarian militants have for years launched attacks from Pakistan across the border to Iran. Finding sanctuary in a neighbouring country can make the difference between success and failure for militants. Conventional wisdom holds that a lasting transnational militancy challenge would typically create serious interstate conflict. Militancy has triggered armed encounters between Iran and Pakistan. This article argues that despite some tension militancy has resulted in deeper cooperation in the ambivalent dyad. Both states’ overarching security concerns, having exhausted other options, the believed involvement of third-party states, and economic potential, have moderately alleviated negative pressure caused by militancy.     

Counter‐punching on the Mudzi: D Company, 1st Rhodesian African Rifles,on operation ‘Mardon’ 1 November 1976

Designed to harrass and weaken Ian Smith's principal enemy, Robert Mugabe, in his safe haven of Mozambique, Operation ‘Mardon’ involved co‐ordinated incursions over the Rhodesian border on a wide front. The secondary purpose was to persuade the African nationalist insurgents to abandon their incursion routes in the north‐east and south‐east in favour of those from the east where the mountainous terrain favoured their interception. Although other Rhodesian units wreaked more physical damage, D Company, 1st Battalion, the Rhodesian African Rifles, inflicted the heaviest casualties in their classic infantry attack on Mudzi Camp.¹     

Winning hearts and minds in the ‘war on terrorism’

Ten days after the attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon US President George W Bush addressed a joint session of Congress. In an emotional speech he declared war on terrorism and vowed that the US would not rest until all of the perpetrators were brought to justice and A1 Qaeda destroyed. In virtually the next breath he hastened to add that the US-led campaign would not be a war on Islam, a promise Muslims might have found more reassuring had the President not sounded so much like a Baptist preacher. Whatever its propaganda value, the speech distorted the reality of the struggle facing the West while tacitly acknowledging an important truth. Since terror is merely a weapon in a larger struggle, there can be no war on terrorism per se. The West faces a counterinsurgency campaign on a global scale. Winning the hearts and minds of disaffected people in lands where terrorism thrives must be central to conducting this campaign.     

Communication: Wrap‐up on the cost of the gulf war

This paper discusses how crises and war may “disrupt” company activities, and how companies adapt to these disruptions. Croatia is used as a case study. The original hypothesis was that war led to breaks in physical flows: in other words, that companies experienced difficulties in importing and obtaining supplies of goods. Instead, it appears that loss of customers and severely worsened conditions of payment were the principal problems for Croatian companies. Although it does not fall within the scope of this investigation, it is interesting to note that the Croatian government has not imposed any direct rationing on the industrial sector, but rather via the banking system.     

The Impact of ETA’s Dissolution on Domestic Tourism in Spain

In late 2011, the Spanish terrorist organization ETA announced the end of armed violence after more than forty years of illegal activity. While the existing literature has already established the negative impact of terrorist actions on international tourism in a particular region, this paper aims to determine whether ETA’s final ceasefire and definitive dissolution had a positive impact on domestic tourism in Basque Country. To that end, a directed gravity model is estimated over a panel data-set of 699 domestic tourist flows between the Spanish regions from 2008 to 2013. Results suggest that the negative impact on visitor flows was localized in the Basque Country. Also, regardless of a permanent ceasefire announced in 2010, only the 2011 ‘definitive cessation of violence’ had an immediate significant impact on the number of visitors to the Basque Country. These results complement the scarce literature on post-conflict tourism analysis and may have implications for regional authorities in affected regions in their efforts to rebuild their destination brands.     

Pakistan's policy on minimum deterrence: why minimum is not the minimum?

This article focuses on Pakistan's policy option of “minimum deterrence” (MD) post-1998 nuclearization of South Asia and explores why “minimum” in reality is not the minimum. It states that the term “minimum” has not been fully defined yet due to which MD stays ambiguous. In addition, it endeavors to elaborate the rudimentary factors responsible for the non-existence of an MD, which, in turn, keeps the Pakistani stance on MD dynamic and evolving.