Dangerous work: Terrorism against U.S. diplomats

The goal of diplomats is to represent their countries’ interests through diplomacy, not arms. Because they are not military personnel, they may be perceived as at lower risk of being the target of terrorists. However, recent events have called this perception into question. Despite this danger, there has been little research on terrorist attacks against diplomats. Drawing on the terrorism studies literature, this article argues that diplomats are targeted more than non-diplomatic targets in countries where certain U.S. foreign policies are implemented. An empirical analysis of 471 attacks against U.S. diplomats from 1970 to 2011 reveals that while U.S. alliances and foreign aid increase the likelihood of attacks against diplomats, U.S. military intervention and civil war, on the other hand, increase the risk of terrorism against non-diplomatic targets. This finding is relevant because it shows terrorist attacks against diplomats result from certain types of foreign policy.     

The U.S. Navy's task forces: 1–199

ABSTRACT

Grouping warships for combat has evolved greatly over the centuries. In the early 1940s, the United States Navy began to group its warships for combat in much more flexible task forces than the previous single-type-of-warship formations. This system has evolved and spread to naval forces ashore but remains fundamentally unchanged. It now covers numbers between 1 to over 1000, of which the most prominent is the first 100 or so which U.S. Navy combat forces use. The numbered fleets worldwide utilize the series covering 20-79; 1-19 and 90-99 appear to be reserved for special allocations and Commander, Pacific Fleet; numbers over 80 to the Atlantic; 100-119 for Northern Europe and briefly Tenth Fleet; the 120 series for Second Fleet as a Joint Task Force leader; the 150 series for Naval Forces Central Command; and the 180 series for Atlantic Fleet and now-Fleet Forces Command.     

Public opinion: A powerful predictor of U.S. defense spending

Public opinion survey responses regarding the desirability of changes in defense spending can be compressed into a single variable, the public opinion balance, which, when accompanied by a control variable measuring the proportion of responses in the “residuum” (no opinion or keep the status quo), permits an accurate prediction of subsequent changes in the rate of change of U.S. defense outlays from the mid‐1960s through the 1980s. This finding cannot be interpreted as a simple case of “the public got what it wanted,” however, because public opinion was not autonomous or spontaneous, and defense decision makers themselves played a central role in shaping public opinion.     

Innovation for seapower: U.S. Navy strategy in an age of acceleration

ABSTRACT

A call for innovation as a means to outpace the acceleration of technological change and to bolster capabilities quickly is a central theme of contemporary U.S. Naval Strategy. The need for innovation is accepted, but the integration of readily available technologies into the Fleet is slow. Innovation unfolds according to “Navy-Time,” a cycle lasting between a long-decade and thirty-years. To accelerate the innovation process in the U.S. Navy, the article offers a Concept of Operations for Innovation that outlines how a deliberate process of analysis, weaponisation and integration can move new ideas and weapons into the Fleet in a strategically relevant time-frame.     

美国2010版《国家安全战略》报告浅析

文章分析了奥巴马政府的首份《国家安全战略报告》,该报告对美国当前所处的战略环境、所面临的威胁、所期望实现的战略目标及具体战略手段做了清晰的阐述。作为美国国家安全战略的最高纲领性文件,该报告将对美国的国防、外交、安全等政策产生重要影响,同布什政府时期的两份《国家安全战略报告》相比有很多新特点,"先发制人"、"单边主义"的强硬基调已不见踪影,取而代之的则是强调接触和合作,看似与布什主义的彻底决裂,然而该战略仍然是以维持美国世界领导地位、追求绝对安全为出发点,难免有一些局限性,特别是存在诸多掣肘因素的情况下,其实现前景还有待观察。     

Tilting at windmills: The flawed U.S. policy toward the 1971 Indo-Pakistani war

ABSTRACT

This article examines decision-making mistakes made by U.S. President Nixon and national security advisor Kissinger during the 1971 India-Pakistan crisis and war. It shows that Nixon and Kissinger routinely demonstrated psychological biases that led them to overestimate the likelihood of West Pakistani victory against Bengali rebels as well as the importance of the crisis to broader U.S. policy. The evidence fails to support Nixon and Kissinger’s own framing of the 1971 crisis as a contest between cool-headed realpolitik and idealistic humanitarianism, and instead shows that Kissinger and Nixon’s policy decisions harmed their stated goals because of repeated decision-making errors.