Arms Control,Proliferation and Terrorism: The Bush Administration's Post-September 11 Security Strategy

The current Bush Administration considers ‘outlaw regimes’ and their terrorist clients acquiring weapons of mass destruction (WMD) the gravest danger to international security. Thus, arms control, proliferation and terrorism are inextricably linked. The administration also believes that arms control and non-proliferation, as traditionally practiced, do not provide effective tools for preventing WMD spread. As evidenced in Iraq, Washington subscribes to an interventionist policy of rolling back WMD programs it considers threatening. This article examines the logic that underpins US arms control and proliferation thinking and considers the implications of US policy for relations with other states deemed to be proliferation risks.     

FROM PROLIFERATION TO PEACE

Despite both regional and international efforts to establish a weapons of mass destruction–free zone (WMDFZ) in the Middle East, regional support beyond mere rhetoric seems unattainable. The lack of commitment to WMD disarmament results from the complexity of regional security dynamics, which are characterized by a high level of weaponization and crosscutting conflicts. This article examines a strategy for WMD disarmament in the Middle East. First, such a strategy must reflect the motives underlying a state's WMD aspirations. Security and prestige may be identified as two motives that affect the acquisition, and thus also the abandonment, of WMD. Second, Egypt, Iran, Israel, and Syria are important actors because their reasons for desiring WMD cannot be considered apart from each other, and progress will consequently depend on the inclusion of all these actors. In this regard, we recommend the establishment of a parallel process between efforts to establish a WMDFZ and peaceful relations in the Middle East. Solving central problems, like the lack of political determination and security cooperation, is vital to create consensus on the final framework of a zone. This study suggests a way forward by analyzing the central causes of conflict in the region and recommending ways to resolve them in order to establish a WMDFZ.     

An evolving state of play? Exploring competitive advantages of state assets in proliferation networks

Illicit procurement networks often target industry in developed economies to acquire materials and components of use in WMD and military programs. These procurement networks are ultimately directed by elements of the proliferating state and utilize state resources to undertake their activities: diplomats and missions, state intelligence networks, and state-connected logistical assets. These state assets have also been utilized to facilitate the export of WMD and military technologies in breach of sanctions. While used in most historic proliferation cases, their role has seen limited consideration in the scholarly literature. This article seeks to systematically contextualize state resources in proliferation networks, arguing that their use lies between state criminality and routine activity in support of national security. Considering the competitive advantages of these assets compared to similar resources available in the private sector, the article argues that nonproliferation efforts have caused states to change how they use these resources through an ongoing process of competitive adaptation.     

Does Intent equal Capability? Al-Qaeda and Weapons of Mass Destruction

The prospect of terrorists deploying weapons of mass destruction (WMD) is often referred to as the foremost danger to American national security. This danger has become more realistic because of al-Qaeda's expanding global network and the expressed willingness to kill thousands of civilians. In the past four years, numerous media reports have documented the group's ongoing quest for WMD capabilities; many reports have detailed al-Qaeda members’ attempts to manufacture or obtain certain chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) agents to use in WMD against targets in the West and the Middle East. Yet the question remains: Does al-Qaeda's current WMD capability match its actual intent? While most studies of the group have focused on its explicit desire for WMD, allegations of CBRN acquisition, and the killing potential of specific CBRN agents, few open-source studies have closely examined the evolution of al-Qaeda's consideration of WMD and, most notably, the merit of actual CBRN production instructions as depicted and disseminated in the group's own literature and manuals. The following report will examine the history of al-Qaeda's interest in CBRN agents, the evolution of the network's attitude toward these weapons, and the internal debate within the organization concerning acquisition and use of WMD. More so, the following research will assess the validity of actual CBRN production instructions and capabilities as displayed and disseminated in al-Qaeda's own literature and websites.     

FOOD AID

Abstract

This paper seeks to critically appraise Africa's position within the United Nations Security Council from the inception of the UN in 1945 until the end of 2010, spanning the entire history of the world body. A few factors make such an appraisal a useful exercise. These include the ongoing debates about the reform of the Council in particular and the UN as a whole, and the growing interest that many African students and observers of and actors in international relations seem to have developed in recent years in the working of the world body. In this appraisal, emphasis will be placed on the origin and rationale behind the establishment of the Security Council as well as the use of the veto power by its permanent members, with a special reference to Africa.     

National interests and the power of ‘language’: West German diplomacy and the conference on security and cooperation in Europe, 1972–1975

Based on newly released documents from the German foreign ministry archives, this article investigates Bonn's goals, strategies and negotiation tactics at the Conference on Security and Development in Europe (CSCE). By focusing in particular on the multilateral preparatory talks in 1972/73 when the general Conference framework was negotiated and national and alliance positions were determined, it will be shown that (1) the Federal Republic of Germany was the key Western player at the CSCE, and (2) its policies were largely driven by national, Deutschlandpolitik interests – although on the surface the emphasis was always on a multilateral approach and a united Western (EPC/NATO) position. Furthermore, this article will reveal the significance of the ‘politics of language’ in West German diplomacy; and offer some wider reflections on the importance of language and its symbolism in international relations.     

Does counterterrorism spending reduce the incidence and lethality of terrorism? A quantitative analysis of 34 countries

Following the 11 September 2001 attacks, the US government increased its counterterrorism (CT) funding and created several Federal Agencies such as the Department of Homeland Security; Transportation Security Administration; and National Counterterrorism Center. Similarly, the 7 July 2005, London bombings also compelled the British government to increase its CT funding. These examples illustrate a phenomenon that when states experience terrorism, they dramatically increase public safety spending in order to reduce or eliminate the incidents of and casualties resulting from acts of terror. Using statistical data collected from 34 countries covering nine years, this article examines recent CT spending increases. Critically, the authors explore whether recent public safety expenditures can measurably reduce the number of domestic and international terrorist attacks. The implications of their findings should be salient for policy-makers’ assessments of their countries’ current CT strategies and policies concerning their respective Intelligence and Security Communities.     

Proliferation Optimism and Pessimism Revisited

Policies to counter the threat of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) have, for the most part, been modeled on strategies originally devised to counter the danger of nuclear proliferation. While useful in countering a traditional CBN (chemical/biological/nuclear)/WMD threat, current counter-proliferation and non-proliferation regimes are insufficient to meet the challenge of maritime terrorism. Maritime terrorism represents a new category of threat; one that partially overlaps with conventional WMD, but for which – due to the scope and nature of the maritime industry – traditional counter-proliferation policies may be inadequate and even inappropriate. This article outlines the means by which maritime shipping can be used as WMD and discusses the policies implemented to deal with these threats, in light of the challenges presented to traditional conceptualizations of WMD and counter-proliferation strategies.     

All Together Now? Questioning WMDs as a Useful Analytical Unit for Understanding Chemical and Biological Weapons Proliferation

ABSTRACT

The popular use of the term “weapons of mass destruction” (WMD) can be understood to imply a relationship between nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons proliferation insofar as it assumes that the separate weapons technologies can be usefully grouped into a single analytic category. This article explores whether WMD is actually a useful construct. It begins by reviewing the literature on nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons proliferation, including a recent study that sought to estimate the relationship between the pursuit and acquisition of these different weapons. It then explores some policy inferences that academics and policy makers may be tempted to draw from these studies, particularly regarding the Barack Obama administration's pursuit of deep nuclear reductions. It argues that many of these policy inferences are premature at best and misleading at worst. It concludes with a call for additional research into the causes and consequences of chemical and biological weapons proliferation, and a call for scholars to remain cautious in their desire to draw premature policy implications from their studies in order to be “policy relevant.”     

A NEW STANDARD FOR PREEMPTIVE MILITARY ACTION AGAINST WMD THREATS

International law clearly requires an imminent threat of attack as a justification for the preemptive use of military force. However, the standard definition of an imminent threat was derived centuries before the development of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons or ballistic missiles and other delivery systems that can reach their targets in a matter of minutes. Any use of force to alleviate threats posed by weapons of mass destruction (WMD) prior to tactical warning of the actual launch of such weapons falls into the legally and ethically controversial category of “anticipatory self-defense,” leaving decision makers potentially liable to prosecution for war crimes. Effective and ethical enforcement of nonproliferation therefore demands a standard for imminence of threat broad enough to allow military action as a last resort but sufficiently restrictive to prohibit indiscriminate action against suspected WMD programs. Following a critical review of selected literature and cases on preemption, the author proposes a new standard for preemptive military action: the existence of operational WMD, or a clandestine program to develop WMD, in contravention of international law. The author discusses the implications of this new proposed standard, which at the time of writing would permit preemptive attack against WMD-armed terrorist groups but prohibit it against all states except Iran and possibly North Korea.     

A FOCUS ON SMALL ARMS

For much of the past two years, the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) has managed to achieve a semblance of stability in much of Darfur, which has been reflected in the improvement of humanitarian conditions. At the same time, the mission has come under serious international pressure to respond appropriately to the deteriorating security situation on the ground by enhancing its presence and effectiveness. Subsequently, following the decisions of the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC), AMIS has undertaken two successive enhancements. Although the last enhancement exercise was remarkably successful, it could not be considered complete without the provision of the outstanding personnel and logistics by both member countries and the international partners. Meanwhile, serious challenges continue to undermine the mission's effectiveness and its prospects, not the least of these obstacles being adequate funding. At present, the mission is in a dilemma with respect to its mandate, engaging with the parties, partners, implementation of the N'sDjamena Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement (HCFA), and the way forward, as the AU is now almost totally dependent on external donations to sustain its Darfur operations. This article therefore explores the way forward in all these thematic areas in order to make appropriate recommendations.     

US strategic preferences in the early twenty-first century

This article investigates how US national security planners have envisioned the emerging strategic environment during the early twenty-first century and evaluates how their perceptions of this strategic environment have changed during these years. This conceptual evolution can be seen in how defense planners define threats, identify defense priorities, and design security strategies. Five key strategic planning documents serve as the basis for this analysis and illustrate significant shifts in how the US government has envisioned its own security requirements as well as the context within which its strategic vision will need to be realized. These planning documents are: (1) Joint Vision 2020, (2) the Bush Administration's 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States, (3) the Obama Administration's 2010 National Security Strategy, (4) US Strategic Defense Guidance entitled Sustaining US Global Leadership: Priorities for 21^st Century Defense, and (5) the US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's Capstone Concept for Joint Operations: Joint Force 2020.     

THE BRAZILIAN WAY

This article examines the positions held by Brazil under the administration of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (2003–present) on nuclear nonproliferation, arms control, and disarmament regimes and on contentious issues in those areas. Under Lula's government, Brazil has wanted to mediate between nuclear weapon and non-nuclear weapon states to consolidate its position as a strong negotiator and to benefit from the possible gains of this position in terms of greater participation in international institutions. It has also wanted to pressure nuclear weapon states to fulfill their disarmament obligations in order to reduce asymmetries in its relations with powerful nuclear weapon countries. At the same time, Brazil has tried to preserve its autonomy and flexibility to protect commercial secrets and preserve national security in relation to its own nuclear program.     

BANNING BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) underpins the international regime to control biological weapons. The strength of the treaty however relies on national implementation. The first step for many states party to the Convention is drafting appropriate national laws and regulations. So far, 32 countries in Africa are signatory to the BTWC. More recently, in 2004, the United Nations Security Council adopted resolution 1540, which requires all UN Member States to put in place legislation to prevent the illicit trafficking of material that could be used to develop weapons of mass destruction. The need for such wide-ranging legislation is recognised African countries but its creation and implementation pose specific challenges.     

NON-GOVERNMENT ORGANISATIONS IN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

“An International Criminal Court (“the Court”) is hereby established. It shall be a permanent institution and shall have the power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of international concern, as referred to in this Statute, and shall be complementary to national criminal jurisdictions. The jurisdiction and functioning of the Court shall be governed by the provisions of this Statute.”     

THE ROLLBACK OF LIBYA'S CHEMICAL WEAPONS PROGRAM

In 2003, Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi agreed to eliminate his country's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs and long-range Scud missiles under strict verification by U.S. and British experts and international inspectors. This article examines the negotiation and implementation of Libya's WMD rollback, with a primary focus on its chemical weapons program, and draws some lessons for the future. Although the Libyan case was unique in many ways, some aspects have relevance for other countries, including the critical role played by multilateral nonproliferation organizations, the utility of economic sanctions and export controls, the importance of a flexible U.S. disarmament funding mechanism, the value of rotating technical assistance teams in and out of the country that is disarming, and the desirability of remaining politically engaged with a former proliferator after rollback is complete.     

Conflict management in the Central African Republic: making genocide prevention work

This commentary analyses the international response to the crisis that struck the Central African Republic (CAR) in early December 2013. It examines three intertwined dimensions defining the courses of action available to policymakers dealing with pre-genocidal crises: the politics and institutional manoeuvring shaping the United Nations (UN) Security Council's decision to authorise an enforcement mission without deploying ‘blue helmets’ on the ground; the operational complexities involved in launching rapid reaction forces; and the interdependent logics between peacebuilding and atrocity prevention. The author argues that there are three ways for the UN Secretariat to ensure a more effective response to CAR-type situations: generating political will to respond swiftly to deteriorating crises leading to widespread abuses of human rights by advancing the concept of Responsibility to Protect as a core component of states' national interests; developing strategic frameworks for the deployment of multi-plural missions equipped to avert the actual or potential threat of atrocities; and developing joint early warning and scenario planning between peacebuilding and atrocity prevention agencies.     

The rise and fall of counterproliferation policy

The US government initiated a Defense Counterproliferation Initiative to address the concern that, in the post-Cold War years, the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons would be widespread and create a significant challenge to the US military’s combat operations. In particular, non-nuclear states might use chemical or biological warfare agents against US forces with the belief that nuclear weapons would not be used against them in retaliation. Following the events of September 11, 2001, defense strategy and policy shifted to a wider view of the threat of adversarial use of “weapons of mass destruction” (WMD) and the term “counterproliferation” was replaced by “combating” or “countering WMD.” Over time, the Defense Department increasingly moved away from counterproliferation principles with the detrimental effect of losing capabilities that US forces still need for contemporary adversaries. This shift has been aggravated by other US government agencies’ use of “counterproliferation” in lieu of what would have been termed “nonproliferation” activities in the 1990s. The loss of clarity within the US government on these terms has led to the inability to focus the “whole of government” on this significant national security challenge. To alleviate this challenge, the US government needs a top-down initiative to refocus policy on the distinctly different aspects of WMD with respect to military combat operations, combating terrorism, and homeland security.     

INTERNATIONAL REGIME OF FRESH FUEL SUPPLY AND SPENT FUEL DISPOSAL

Recent events in Iran and elsewhere demand a reevaluation of the need for increasing nuclear fuel supplies and assuring reliable flow of fuel to nuclear power user states vis-à-vis the need for strengthened security for all countries against the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The right of countries to a guaranteed supply of nuclear energy for peaceful uses must be balanced with the global community's desire to limit flows of nuclear material and sensitive nuclear facilities that could create opportunities for nuclear proliferation. This article proposes elements of an international regime of fresh fuel supply and spent fuel disposal that will guarantee fresh fuel supplies to countries honoring their obligations under the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), while reducing concerns about diversion of spent fuel for weapons purposes. A specific application to countries with small pre-commercial uranium enrichment plants is also proposed.     

试论科技进步与中国国际责任的现实担当

当代科技进步不仅影响着世界格局的变革,也深刻影响着国家的外交行为。随着中国经济实力和科技实力的快速发展,中国更为主动、自信地以大国身份融入国际社会,在几乎所有重要的全球性国际机制中都发挥着积极作用,遵守和履行相应的规则和义务,承担为国际社会提供公共产品以及维护正常合理的国际秩序等国际责任。但随着全球问题的不断增多,国际社会对中国承担更多国际责任的期待也在增多,有些西方国家甚至要求中国承担超出能力的国际责任。面对错综复杂的新形势,中国应该清醒认识自身的国际角色定位,在确保自身崛起的前提下,以科技实力和综合国力承担起力所能及的国际责任,为中国的和平发展提供更广泛的认同基础。