The practice and theory of British counterinsurgency: the histories of the atrocities at the Palestinian villages of al-Bassa and Halhul, 1938–1939

This article details two largely unreported atrocities by British forces operating against Arab rebels during the Arab revolt, 1936–9, at the Palestinian villages of al-Bassa and Halhul. It then examines the military-legal system that underpinned and authorised British military forces operating in aid of the civil power, suggesting that the law in place at the time allowed for a level of reprisals and punitive actions, such as happened at al-Bassa and Halhul. The article does not conclude that the law allowed for atrocities but it does argue that it gave a basic form and understanding to an operational method that was brutal and could lead to atrocities. It thus tests the idea in much of the literature on counterinsurgency that the British were restrained and used minimum force when compared to other colonial and neo-colonial powers fighting insurgents.     

The Iranian nuclear dilemma: light at the end of the tunnel?

In February 2012, Iran announced its willingness to resume negotiations with the Western powers. This statement followed in the wake of a damning report by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors and the imposition of additional sanctions by the international community on an Iranian economy already under pressure. Tehran's announcement also coincided with increased speculation regarding an Israeli military strike on Iranian nuclear facilities. At the same time, however, this seemingly positive step appeared to be undermined by Iran's concomitant announcement that “huge” technical progress has been made on Iran's nuclear programme. This article will explore the significance of the recent political, diplomatic and technical developments in the Iranian nuclear affair and situate them in the broader context of Tehran's nuclear strategy. The analysis will assess the potential for this latest phase in the Iranian nuclear crisis to reverse Iran's current trajectory and initiate a rapprochement between Iran and Western powers.     

Allies at War: British and US Army Command Culture in the Italian Campaign, 1943–1944

This article compares the philosophy and practice of command in the British and US Armies during the Italian Campaign of 1943–44. It assesses pre-war influences on the command approach adopted by each army, and shows how refinements derived from wartime experience enabled British and American commanders to successfully utilise mission command principles to outfight the German Army in the latter years of World War II. This examination directly challenges the historical consensus that Allied commanders were disadvantaged by an inability to exploit the advantages of mission command, and that the German Army retained superior command practices, despite its other failings, throughout the fighting between 1939 and 1945. These conclusions hold additional relevance to modern military organisations which have emphasised mission command as the optimal solution to effective command in battle since the 1980s, but from an inaccurate understanding of German, British and American command traditions and experience that persists to this day.     

The right place at the right time,or the right person in the right place?

South Africa's military has, since the First World War, been an oft-used and effective tool in the conduct of South African foreign policy, but this role has not always translated into power for Defence Department principals in its formulation. South African Defence Ministers for most of the country's history have played a minor role in the making of foreign policy; despite a change in this dynamic between approximately 1975–1990, the post-apartheid era has once again seen a diminishment of Defence's power in this arena. This article examines why Defence Ministers have generally been such weak players, with an eye toward disaggregating whether this was a product of interpersonal relationships with Cabinet and – most importantly – the Head of State, or whether this influence (or lack thereof) was more a function of South Africa's international standing. While determining who has influence on this process is difficult given the primacy of the national leader in making foreign policy and a lack of insider accounts by participants in the process, this article relies upon several interviews with participants and knowledgeable observers that help illuminate the process and Defence's role in it.     

Did the Panamanian Defense Forces conduct infiltration operations at the Arraijan Tank Farm in 1988?

This article reviews the circumstances surrounding a relatively obscure and almost forgotten US Marine Corps and Army security enhancement operation undertaken in Panama that commenced in early April of 1988. Marines were sent to Panama to protect oil and ammunition storage facilities from potential saboteurs. By April 1989 they had reported sighting armed, uniformed intruders on at least 43 occasions and receiving gunfire or discharging their own weapons during 16 incidents. Yet despite the repeated barrages of small arms fire over the course of a year, they failed to recover enemy ammunition, bodies or body parts and their own equipment and positions displayed no signs of suffering from hostile fire. This article analyzes the events from the point of view of a veteran of the operation and highlights the role that psychological operations may have played in generating the situation.     

Gas and the North‐West Frontier

John Terraine, Business in Great Waters: The U Boat Wars 1916 ‐1945. London: Leo Cooper, 1989. Pp.xx + 841; £19.50.

Peter Simkins, Kitchener's Armies: The Raising of the New Armies, 1914–16. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1988. Pp.xvi + 359; index; illustrations. £37.50 (hardback).

Keith Grieves, Sir Eric Geddes: Business and Government in War and Peace. Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 1989. Pp.xiv + 188; £35.

Jeffrey Grey, The Commonwealth Armies and the Korean War: An Alliance Study. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1988. Pp.xii + 244; £12.95.

Rajan Menon and Daniel N. Nelson (eds.), Limits to Soviet Power. Lexington, MA/Toronto: Lexington Books, 1989. Pp.vii + 231; $35.

Michael Leifer, ASEAN and the Security of South‐East Asia. London and New York: Routledge, 1989. Pp.x + 198; £30.

Grant Wardlaw, Political Terrorism: Theory, Tactics and Counter‐measures. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, second edn. 1989. Pp.xv + 248; £27.50 (hardback); £10.95 (paperback).

John F. Murphy, Punishing International Terrorists: The Legal Framework for Policy Initiatives. Totowa, NJ: Rowman &; Allanheld 1985. Pp.x + 142; $25.95.

Hanns Maull and Otto Pick (eds.), The Gulf War. London: Pinter Publishers, 1989. Pp.193; £30.

Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies and Brassey's Defence Yearbook 1989. London: Brassey's Defence Publishers, 1989. Pp.xxviii + 361; £35.

Virginia Gamba‐Stonehouse, Strategy in the Southern Oceans: A South American View. London: Pinter Publishers, 1989. Pp.xiii + 155; £30.

Ola Tunander, Cold Water Politics: The Maritime Strategy and Geopolitics of the Northern Front. London: Sage Publications for the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo, 1989. Pp.194; £25.

Richard Fieldhouse and Shunji Taoka, Superpowers at Sea: An Assessment of the Naval Arms Race. Oxford: Oxford University Press for SIPRI, 1989. Pp.183; £19.50.

Kenneth E. Boulding, Conflict and Defense: A General Theory. University Press of America, 1988. Pp.xiv + 347; $16.75 (paperback). (First Published, 1962).     

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‘Getting COIN’ at the Tactical Level in Afghanistan: Reassessing Counter-Insurgency Adaptation in the British Army

This article reassesses the extent to which the British Army has been able to adapt to the counter-insurgency campaign in Helmand Province, Afghanistan. While adopting Farrell's definition of bottom-up military adaptation, this article contends that the task force/brigade level of analysis adopted by Farrell and Farrell and Gordon has led them to overstate the degree to which innovation arising from processes of bottom-up adaptation has actually ensued. Drawing on lower level tactical unit interviews and other data, this article demonstrates how units have been unable or unwilling to execute non-kinetic population-centric operations due to their lack of understanding of the principles of counter-insurgency warfare.     

Strategy,Fleet Logistics,and the Lethbridge Mission to the Pacific and Indian Oceans 1943–1944

In modern warfare at and from the sea, logistics are crucially important to the implementation of strategy and conduct of operational campaigns. Between August 1943 and March 1944, a British joint service mission led by Major-General John Lethbridge travelled to North America, the Pacific, and India to study the organisation, equipment, and methods necessary for coming offensive operations against Japan. The British obtained valuable information from the Americans and connected with those countries of the British Empire most directly involved. The Lethbridge Mission's progress and findings informed evolving Admiralty planning for supporting naval forces to be sent to the Indian and Pacific Oceans in pursuance of British wartime strategy.     

Turkey’s imperial legacy and the conflict potential in the Balkans

Turkey is the only Eurasian state surrounded in almost a full circle by acute hot or “frozen conflicts,” ranging from low-intensity violence, terrorism to fully fledged wars. The prevailing pattern of intercommunal and interethnic conflicts in the continental Balkans and on Cyprus has long been different from those in the rest of Europe and in the Near East. This difference is closely related to the fact that these lands had experienced in the past centuries-long rule by the Ottoman Empire, whose legal successor is the Republic of Turkey. The intercommunal conflict potential in the rest of Europe used to differ substantially, but the difference has been greatly reduced as Western Europe has, in one respect, become “balkanized.”     

De Gaulle,the ‘Anglo-Saxons’, and the Algerian war

Rejecting the orthodoxy of French diplomatic historiography that de Gaulle was the founder of a new French independence and effected a revolution in French diplomacy after freeing himself from the Algerian yoke in 1962, this essay argues that de Gaulle sought from 1958 to make Algeria a central plank of his diplomatic strategy. That strategy sought to transform the relationship with Algeria in order forit to become the key to a neo-colonial French community, the basis for French leadership in Europe and the foundation of a new relationship of equality with Britain and the United States. However, largely as a result of de Gaulle's own making this policy failed to materialise.     

‘Loose Nukes’ and the nuclear mirror: The dangers and opportunities resulting from the break‐up of the Soviet Union

Soviet Nuclear Fission. Control of the Nuclear Arsenal in a Disintegrating Soviet Union by Kurt M. Campbell, Ashton B. Carter, Steven E. Miller, Charles A. Kraket. Harvard University, CSIA Studies in International Security, No. 1 (November 1991), pp. v. 129.     

In the right place at the right time: US signals intelligence relations with Scandinavia,1945–1960

This paper demonstrates that US–Scandinavian intelligence relations in general, and Signals Intelligence (Sigint) relations in particular, during the period 1945 through 1960 were more extensive and complicated than had previously been believed. Bilateral US intelligence liaison relations with nominally neutral Sweden were of particular importance in the early years of the Cold War given its geographic location adjacent to the northwestern portion of the USSR. Moreover, the importance of Sigint received from the three principal Scandinavian countries covered by this paper (Norway, Denmark, and Sweden) proved to be quite important to the US intelligence community during the early years of the Cold War, when the US Sigint infrastructure was relatively weak and stretched thin by commitments in Asia and elsewhere. This paper covers the quantity, quality, and types of intelligence information provided to the US by each of the Scandinavian nations, demonstrating that the nature of US intelligence relations with these countries changed substantially as time went by.     

The end of the “INF Treaty” and the US-China military balance

ABSTRACT

Whereas much of the debate about the demise of the 1987 Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty has focused on the European context and Russia’s alleged treaty violations, Asia looms large in the minds of proponents of the United States’s immediate withdrawal from the treaty. For many proponents, the fast-changing military balance in Asia and China's conventionally armed missiles constitute a sufficient cause for withdrawal. What does the end of the INF Treaty bode for the US-China military balance? This article argues that, although there are some near-term benefits for the US position in the conventional military balance with China, the advantages offered by prohibited missiles are minor and can be readily substituted by extant capabilities that are compliant with the treaty. Given the negative implications of the end of the INF Treaty for the future of arms control, the costs and benefits of withdrawing from the treaty require further examination; the military balance in Asia is an unpersuasive rationale for withdrawing from an important part of the arms-control architecture.