Setting military reenlistment bonuses

The United States military frequently has difficulty retaining enlisted personnel beyond their initial enlistment. A bonus program within each service, called a Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB) program, seeks to enhance reenlistments and thus reduce personnel shortages in critical military occupational specialties (MOSs). The amount of bonus is set by assigning “SRB multipliers” to each MOS. We develop a nonlinear integer program to select multipliers which minimize a function of deviations from desired reenlistment targets. A Lagrangian relaxation of a linearized version of the integer program is used to obtain lower bounds and feasible solutions. The best feasible solution, discovered in a coordinate search of the Lagrangian function, is heuristically improved by apportioning unexpended funds. For large problems a heuristic variable reduction is employed to speed model solution. U.S. Army data and requirements for FY87 yield a 0-1 integer program with 12,992 binary variables and 273 constraints, which is solved within 0.00002% of optimality on an IBM 3033AP in less than 1.7 seconds. More general models with up to 463,000 binary variables are solved, on average, to within 0.009% of optimality in less than 1.8 minutes. The U.S. Marine Corps has used a simpler version of this model since 1986. © 1993 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.     

The effect of deployment on first‐ and second‐term re‐enlistment in the US active duty force

Why should deployment affect re‐enlistment? In our model, members enter the military with naïve beliefs about deployment and use actual deployment experience to update their beliefs and revise their expected utility of re‐enlisting. Empirically, re‐enlistment is related to the type and number of deployments, consistent with the learning model. Non‐hostile deployment increases first‐term re‐enlistment but hostile deployment has little effect except for the Army, where the effect is positive. Both types increase second‐term re‐enlistment. Interestingly, first‐term members with dependants tend to respond to deployment like second‐term members. In addition, deployment acts directly to affect re‐enlistment, not indirectly through time to promotion.     

ARMY RE‐ENLISTMENT DURING OIF/OEF: BONUSES,DEPLOYMENT, AND STOP‐LOSS

In 2004, stretched by wartime deployments, the US Army countered declining retention by increasing re‐enlistment bonuses and implementing stop‐loss to prevent soldiers from separating at the end of their enlistment. We estimate the effects of bonuses, deployment, and stop‐loss on re‐enlistment between FY 2002 and 2006. We estimate that the baseline propensity to re‐enlist fell by 20%. However, we find that deployed soldiers are more likely to re‐enlist and that the estimated effects of re‐enlistment bonuses are similar to those estimated in peacetime. We evaluate the reasons for our findings, and calculate the cost effectiveness of re‐enlistment bonuses.     

The sensitivity of first term navy reenlistment to changes in unemployment and relative wages

Multiple regression analysis was used to analyze newly developed twenty year time series of first term reenlistment rates for nine major Navy occupational categories. Results indicate that there are significant differences among the occupational categories in the determinants of their reenlistment behavior. More importantly, it is apparent that reenlistment rates are highly sensitive to current unemployment and especially unemployment about the time of enlistment. By comparison, relative wages (measures of military versus private sector rates of compensation) are relatively insignificant and appear powerless to control reenlistment in the context of normal fluctuations in economic activity.     

Environmental regulation in project‐based industries

We study the environmental regulation of industrial activities that are organized as projects. Applications arise in construction, ship and aircraft building, and film making, among other industries. Relative to manufacturing, environmental regulation is different in project‐based industries, due to the uniqueness and geographical diversity of projects, and a lack of product takeback programs. Because the amount of waste and pollution generated by project companies can be large, regulators need environmental policies to ensure reduction of waste and pollution. We consider a regulator who attempts to maximize social welfare. We model this problem as a bilevel nonlinear program. The upper level regulator specifies waste reduction targets, which the lower level project companies meet using waste stream reduction and remediation of pollution, while attempting to control their project costs. We find that high waste diversion targets lead to outcomes with little pollution, but excessive project costs and only modest waste stream reduction. Projects that have lower task precedence density, or that have pollutants with different environmental impacts, show larger increases in project cost and time resulting from regulation. We describe a subsidy for waste stream reduction that coordinates the system, and we estimate the value of coordination. We also describe a bonus that encourages truthful reporting by project companies, and evaluate the relative cost and effectiveness of the subsidy and the bonus. © 2015 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 62: 228–247, 2015     

Alleviating time inconsistent behaviors via a competition scheme

Under quasi‐hyperbolic discounting, the valuation of a payoff falls relatively rapidly for earlier delay periods, but then falls more slowly for longer delay periods. When the salespersons with quasi‐hyperbolic discounting consider the product sale problem, they would exert less effort than their early plan, thus resulting in losses of future profit. We propose a winner‐takes‐all competition to alleviate the above time inconsistent behaviors of the salespersons, and allow the company to maximize its revenue by choosing an optimal bonus. To evaluate the effects of the competition scheme, we define the group time inconsistency degree of the salespersons, which measures the consequence of time inconsistent behaviors, and two welfare measures, the group welfare of the salespersons and the company revenue. We show that the competition always improves the group welfare and the company revenue as long as the company chooses to run the competition in the first place. However, the effect on group time inconsistency degree is mixed. When the optimal bonus is moderate (extreme high), the competition motivates (over‐motivates) the salesperson to work hard, thus alleviates (worsens) the time inconsistent behaviors. © 2017 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 64: 357–372, 2017     

An inventory model of incentives for on-time delivery in just-in-time purchasing contracts

This article formulates an analytic model of just-in-time purchasing contracts and compares the minimum cost solution with the cost attainable through vertical integration. The models use standard inventory theory cost parameters and decision variables. The results quantify the increase in cost of buying an item rather than making it. Optimal incentives are characterized when JIT purchasing contracts are used. When JIT purchasing is implemented, buffer inventories are typically reduced. This inventory reduction makes on-time delivery critical to the buyer; yet timeliness is controlled by the supplier. As an incentive to provide on-time delivery, the buyer offers the supplier a bonus for on-time delivery. The supplier chooses a flow time allowance based upon the bonus offered. First- and second-order conditions are characterized in general, and examples are provided for exponentially and uniformly distributed flow times. The delivery timeliness obtainable in a vertically integrated firm is determined and compared with timeliness obtainable between separate firms. This comparison indicates that buyers who choose to purchase materials from a separate firm are more likely to experience late deliveries. The relationship between the value of the bonus and the proportion of on-time deliveries is also considered. The bonus required to achieve the same probability of on-time delivery as under vertical integration is also determined. © 1993 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.     

Recruiters,advertising, and navy enlistments

Regression analysis is used to estimate the effects on Navy enlistments of recruiters, advertising, unemployment and other factors. In measuring the effects of these factors on enlistments, changes in both the demand for and supply of enlistments are taken into account. Advertising is treated as a capital investment; its effect is estimated using a maximum likelihood technique that was developed for measuring the effects of capital investments. We find strong evidence that recruiters and unemployment increase enlistments. Advertising also seems to increase enlistments, but its effect is highly uncertain. The results suggest that increases in recruiting resources would have eliminated the enlistment shortfalls experienced by the Navy in FY 1978–79.     

The military recruiting productivity slowdown: The roles of resources,opportunity cost and the tastes of youth*

After a decade of successful recruiting, the US military began experiencing recruiting difficulties in the 1990s. Cyclical factors as well as trend factors may have played a role. This paper uses monthly data by state over the period 1989-1997 to estimate models of enlistment and evaluate the various explanations for the recruiting slowdown. Estimates of the impact of economic variables - relative military pay and unemployment - and recruiting resource variables - recruiters and advertising - are similar to those in previous studies. Two trend factors, rising college attendance and declining adult veteran population (influencers), are found to be important factors explaining the decline in enlistment.     

A note on the sensitivity of navy first term reenlistment to bonuses,unemployment and relative wages

Multiple regression analysis of first term reenlistment rates over the period 1968–1977 confirms previous findings that reenlistment is highly sensitive to unemployment at the time of reenlistment and shortly after enlistment, almost four years earlier. Bonuses, particularly lump sum bonuses, were also shown to be a significant determinant of reenlistment.     

CONFLICT RESOLUTION PROCESSES,UNCERTAINTY AND INVESTMENT DYNAMICS: EVIDENCE FOR THE BASQUE COUNTRY

The Junior Reserve Officers’ Training Corps is a high school program that combines classroom teaching with extracurricular activities. The program is located primarily in inner city schools and serves at‐risk students. Its goals are multidimensional and include military preparation and improving academic achievement. Using High School and Beyond data we find that the program’s effects depend on the timing and intensity of involvement. Test scores, graduation rates, and enlistments are higher for students who participate early in high school and for those who persist in the program. Conversely, we find few effects for students participating in the last two years of high school.     

MILITARY SPENDING AND ECONOMIC GROWTH IN SRI LANKA: A TIME SERIES ANALYSIS

In this paper, we employ a VAR analysis to examine the nexus between military spending and economic growth in Sri Lanka which, due to the civil war there, has witnessed a significant increase in military spending over the last three decades while also recording healthy economic growth. The study finds that, compared with non‐military spending, military spending exerts only a minimal positive impact on real GDP. Over a 10‐year period, a 1% increase in non‐military spending increases GDP by 1.6%. In contrast, military spending only increases GDP by 0.05%, suggesting that the economic benefits for Sri Lanka from a sustained peace may be considerable.     

EUROPEAN DEFENCE FIRMS: THE INFORMATION BARRIER ON PRIVATE FINANCE*

After the fall of the Berlin Wall, European governments adopted a hands‐off policy towards the defence industrial base, in an attempt to increase the sector’s efficiency and reactivity. In this context, one topical issue is how to motivate defence firms to apply for private rather than public finance. Since banks have no prior experience with European defence firms, a problem of asymmetric information may block this transition. The problem is analysed within the framework of a game between defence firms and banks. It is shown that the Bayesian Equilibrium might correspond to a situation where low‐risk firms prefer the state‐financed scheme; yet, in a perfect information set‐up, the same firms would apply for bank credit. In order to facilitate the transition to private finance, the government might decide to subsidize investors who agree on financing defence firms; the state aid should be made available during a transitory learning period.     

Investigating optimal replacement of aging air force systems

An availability‐oriented approach has been developed to decide when to replace an aging system. For an existing system, it is optimal to operate another year if and only if the incremental cost per available year is less than the lifetime average cost per available year of a new aircraft. We illustrate our approach using United States Air Force KC‐135 tanker data. In demonstrating our approach, we find it will be optimal to replace the KC‐135 by the end of the decade.     

装备研制需求与计划滚动方式研究

本文对武器装备研制计划的制订过程进行了分析,针对计划制订问题的特点．提出了用理论需求和实际需求曲线的方式将项目研制的需求与计划制订的约束联系起来,在此基础上对五年计划的滚动作了详细的分析,并给出了五年和年度计划经费滚动的程序算法。     

Robust capacity planning in semiconductor manufacturing

We present a stochastic programming approach to capacity planning under demand uncertainty in semiconductor manufacturing. Given multiple demand scenarios together with associated probabilities, our aim is to identify a set of tools that is a good compromise for all these scenarios. More precisely, we formulate a mixed‐integer program in which expected value of the unmet demand is minimized subject to capacity and budget constraints. This is a difficult two‐stage stochastic mixed‐integer program which cannot be solved to optimality in a reasonable amount of time. We instead propose a heuristic that can produce near‐optimal solutions. Our heuristic strengthens the linear programming relaxation of the formulation with cutting planes and performs limited enumeration. Analyses of the results in some real‐life situations are also presented. © 2005 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2005.