Peace enforcement in Africa: Doctrinal distinctions between the African Union and United Nations

When the United Nations (UN) Security Council needs to authorize a peace enforcement operation in Africa, its partner of choice is the African Union (AU). Africa has developed significant peace operations capacity over the past decade. In addition to deploying eight AU operations, Africa now contributes 50% of all UN peacekeepers. African stability operations, like its mission in Somalia, are often described as peace enforcement operations. In this article, I question whether it is accurate to categorize African stability operations as peace enforcement? I answer the question by considering what the criteria are that are used to differentiate between peace enforcement and peacekeeping operations in the UN context. I then use the peace enforcement criteria to assess whether AU stabilization operations would qualify as peace enforcement operations. In conclusion, I consider the implications of the findings for the strategic partnership between the AU and the UN.     

BANNING BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) underpins the international regime to control biological weapons. The strength of the treaty however relies on national implementation. The first step for many states party to the Convention is drafting appropriate national laws and regulations. So far, 32 countries in Africa are signatory to the BTWC. More recently, in 2004, the United Nations Security Council adopted resolution 1540, which requires all UN Member States to put in place legislation to prevent the illicit trafficking of material that could be used to develop weapons of mass destruction. The need for such wide-ranging legislation is recognised African countries but its creation and implementation pose specific challenges.     

Comprehensive Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons: An Emerging International Norm?

ABSTRACT

There have been calls for the abolition of nuclear weapons from the day they were invented. Over the last fifteen years, some indications can be found that such calls have been getting louder, among them Barack Obama's famous 2009 speech in Prague. In this article, we investigate if support for a comprehensive norm that would prohibit development, possession, and use of nuclear weapons is really growing. To assess the current status of that norm, we use the model of a “norm life cycle,” developed by Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink. We then analyze 6,545 diplomatic statements from the review process of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as well as from the UN General Assembly First Committee on Disarmament and International Security, covering the years 2000 to 2013. The evidence shows that a comprehensive prohibition can be considered an emerging international norm that finds growing support among states without nuclear weapons and nuclear weapon states alike. Only a core group of states invoke the norm consistently, however. This leads us to conclude that the “tipping point” of the life cycle, at which adherence to a new norm starts to spread rapidly, has yet to be reached.     

THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE ORGANISATION OF AFRICAN UNITY

The UN relies on regional organisations to carry out peacekeeping activities and has very good reasons for doing so: resource constraints and relevant political influence. In Africa, however, the UN Security Council seems unwilling to take decisive action when faced with complex emergencies and leaves the burden to the OAU which has its own problems. The UN charter does allow regional organisations to take enforcement action even without prior armed attack. The OAU charter converges with that of the UN in ways that should make cooperation easier than it has been. Despite the rhetoric, the UN Security Council has undertaken very little visible action in Africa when it is most needed. A lack of significant African representation in the Council is perhaps a cause. The Council will improve its global authority if it undertakes reforms that reduce the power of the US and the UK over its decisions.     

Conflict management in the Central African Republic: making genocide prevention work

This commentary analyses the international response to the crisis that struck the Central African Republic (CAR) in early December 2013. It examines three intertwined dimensions defining the courses of action available to policymakers dealing with pre-genocidal crises: the politics and institutional manoeuvring shaping the United Nations (UN) Security Council's decision to authorise an enforcement mission without deploying ‘blue helmets’ on the ground; the operational complexities involved in launching rapid reaction forces; and the interdependent logics between peacebuilding and atrocity prevention. The author argues that there are three ways for the UN Secretariat to ensure a more effective response to CAR-type situations: generating political will to respond swiftly to deteriorating crises leading to widespread abuses of human rights by advancing the concept of Responsibility to Protect as a core component of states' national interests; developing strategic frameworks for the deployment of multi-plural missions equipped to avert the actual or potential threat of atrocities; and developing joint early warning and scenario planning between peacebuilding and atrocity prevention agencies.     

MEASURING UN SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION AND INACTION IN THE 1990S

Although Africa is host to the vast majority (and the most deadly) of conflicts in the world, it would appear that there is a distinct lack of genuine interest in African affairs shown by the UN Security Council and its key members. This paper proposes a 10-level scale of response system to measure the seriousness of the Council in dealing with conflicts. By comparing the Council response with the size and severity of each individual conflict, the scale attempts to assess the Council performance in the fulfilment of its duty to restore international peace and security. The results show that Africa has been (and remains) marginalized in the Council work.     

Early warning,the protection of civilians and United Nations peacekeeping operations

This commentary traces the increasing importance of early warning in United Nations (UN) peacekeeping, an emphasis that has emerged in connection with the evolution of protection of civilians mandates in UN peacekeeping missions. It examines the current and emerging practice of early warning in UN peacekeeping as well as the challenges faced, drawing on case studies from the UN missions in South Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The authors also propose a set of basic principles upon which early warning in UN peacekeeping operations might be approached in the future.     

‘Calmly critical’: Evolving Russian views of US hegemony

Russia has consistently opposed US hegemony since the early 1990s. Moscow has sought to create a world overseen by the UN Security Council and several power centres supporting an anti-hegemonic axis. Until recently, Russia's resources have been very limited. Russian opposition therefore was largely conceptual or a work in progress. Russian policy was largely reactive – and non-confrontational. However, the failure of the Russia-US relationship to develop practically has highlighted negative views of US hegemony, and the greater wealth generated through high energy prices is supporting an increasingly active Russian policy.     

HISTORY REPEATING ITSELF

The response of the UN Security Council to the massive world war in the DRC is characterised by an abundance of rhetoric and a deficit of concrete action. When it has ac ted, its actions have often been clearly inappropriate, with the token deployment of lightly armed peacekeepers into a volatile area of ongoing conflict. In choosing such an option, it has shown how little political will there is for serious engagement, but also how little the Council has learnt from its own history. This paper seeks to analyse the Council's response to the conflict in the DRC, separating the rhetoric and the appearance of action from concrete measures designed at realising some form of conflict resolution.     

UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL REFORM

Much has changed since the United Nations was established in 1945. New challenges confront the organization including global warming, global diseases and global terrorism. Responding to these challenges requires continual change, adaptation and learning—a hallmark of the stewardship of current UN Secretary General Kofi Annan. In 1997 Annan announced major structural changes to streamline the organization, follow up five years later by another initiative to clarify, simplify and rationalize the organization and subsequent efforts to streamline UN peacekeeping. The UN has also forged new partnerships with civil society and the private sector. Important as these changes are, reform of the General Assembly and the Security Council hold the organization hostage to the vested interests of key member states. There are a number of options to make the Council more representative including regionalism, population distribution, economic weight, culture/religion/civilization and democracy. Clearly the largest challenge is the absence of representation for Asia, Africa and Latin America. Currently Germany, Japan, India and Brazil have strong claims—plus at least one candidate from Africa. Should these four countries decide to act in unison, they could force reform of the Security Council     

Can Limited Intervention Work? Lessons from Britain’s Success Story in Sierra Leone

ABSTRACT

Following frustrating campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, Western interventions are becoming more limited, with troops being deployed for short bursts and residual peace-building tasks being left to others. Although this approach limits exposure for the intervening government, it struggles to achieve meaningful political change. Examining the comparatively successful British intervention in Sierra Leone (2000–02), this article identifies the conditions for effectiveness in these campaigns. It challenges the historiography of the case by framing armed confrontations and raids as enablers of politics rather than ends in themselves; indeed, in both the conduct and study of intervention, politics must reign supreme.     

United Nations rapid reaction mechanisms: Toward a global force on standby?

This article analyses the main challenges and future prospects of creating United Nations (UN) rapid reaction mechanisms, particularly in the light of past attempts and current discussions about a “UN Vanguard Force” in the wake of the High-Level Panel on Peace Operations report. The article reviews major initiatives (in particular lessons from the Standby High Readiness Brigade for UN Operations) and assesses the main achievements, failures, and challenges related to past UN-led rapid reaction mechanisms. In line with the overall aim of this special forum, the article highlights the future potentials and institutional, operational, financial, and political challenges that need to be overcome in order to design and create a pragmatic and effective rapid reaction tool at the disposal of the UN.     

试论联合国维和行动的理念演变

联合国维持和平行动的指导理念随着国际局势的发展而不断变化，其中既有自身的发展与完善，也折射时代的演进和各种政治力量的对比。联合国维和行动产生初期遵循绝对中立理念，冷战后准军事介入阶段带有明显的隐性强权理念，反恐时代则对维和理念演变产生了新的影响。     

The economic impact of peacekeeping. Evidence from South Sudan

This paper investigates the effect of the deployment of United Nations Blue Helmets on economic activity in South Sudan with a special focus on agricultural production. Since UN troops are predicted to improve security, in particular, we expect a positive relationship between deployment of UN blue Helmets and cereal production. We test our hypothesis using an original data-set including all the 78 South Sudanese counties over the period 2009–2011. We control for the non-random assignment of UN troops through an Instrumental Variables approach. Our empirical results show that a 10% increase in the size of the troop allows the production of additional 600 tonnes.     

WHILE WAITING FOR THE PROTOCOL

The Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) regime currently suffers from a lack of effective compliance procedures. Because a legally binding compliance protocol to the BWC is not available, other measures are needed to stabilize the regime against the risk of violations of its rules. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Chemical Weapons Convention, and the experiences of UN inspection teams show that among the necessary components of effective compliance mechanisms are an intermediary level between bilateral consultations of states parties and involvement of the UN Security Council as well as independent assessment capabilities. This article suggests that the UN Secretary General could assume such an intermediary function and, using the authority contained in Article 99 of the UN Charter, could investigate not only alleged use of biological weapons but also alleged breaches of the BWC. A standing expert unit in the Department for Disarmament Affairs could provide the independent expertise necessary for such investigations. Such a compliance mechanism could provisionally help stabilize the BWC regime until a permanent compliance system can be agreed.     

The convergence and divergence of three pillars of influence in gender and security

This article explores the convergence between three pillars of influence – feminist security studies, civil society activism and policy decision-making – and its role in the adoption and implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325. It argues that these three pillars, individually and collectively, have made important contributions to the debate and action on the gender and security agenda, but that they remain organically disconnected. Their convergence has the potential to achieve path-breaking results in the sphere of gender and security, whilst their divergence makes transformation unattainable. We show the disconnect in the application of UNSCR 1325 in Africa and argue that this is partly the reason why, despite enormous efforts, the gains realised in terms of gender equality in the peace and security arena have been negligible.     

Strategic Ambiguity: Nuclear Sharing and the Secret Strategy for Drafting Articles I and II of the Nonproliferation Treaty

ABSTRACT

Since the 1950s, the United States has engaged in nuclear sharing with its NATO allies. Today, 150-200 tactical nuclear weapons remain on European soil. However, the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) prohibits the transfer of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear weapon states. The potential discrepancy between text and practice raises the question of how the NPT's negotiators dealt with NATO's nuclear-sharing arrangements while drafting the treaty that would eventually become the bedrock of the international nonproliferation regime. Using a multitiered analysis of secret negotiations within the White House National Security Council, NATO, and US-Soviet bilateral meetings, this article finds that NATO's nuclear-sharing arrangements strengthened the NPT in the short term by lowering West German incentives to build the bomb. However, this article also finds that decision makers and negotiators in the Lyndon B. Johnson administration had a coordinated strategy of deliberately inserting ambiguous language into drafts of Articles I and II of the Treaty to protect and preserve NATO's pre-existing nuclear-sharing arrangements in Europe. This diplomatic approach by the Johnson administration offers lessons for challenges concerning NATO and relations with Russia today.     

Burden Sharing in CSDP Military Operations

Abstract

Military burden sharing has been a subject of repeated debates in NATO and the UN. Despite more modest goals, the European Union’s (EU) Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) has experienced no fewer difficulties in garnering men, money, and materiel. While this may not come as a surprise, the fact that some EU member states have carried disproportionate shares of the burden of CSDP operations is a puzzle that remains unaccounted for. We address this gap by analyzing determinants of contribution levels to CSDP operations. In employing an innovative multi-method design that combines insights from collection action theory with those from integrated theories of military burden sharing, our results indicate that EU countries tend to contribute in positive disproportion with their capabilities when they have a strong peacekeeping tradition and elections are distant. In contrast, they undercontribute when small trade volumes with the area of operations combine with a weak peacekeeping tradition.     

A plan for military intervention in Darfur

This article contains a plan on how the African Union/United Nations hybrid force authorised by the UN Security Council in July 2007 could realistically and effectively use military power to save civilian lives in Darfur. It is envisaged that the international force, given its limited size, would mainly focus on protecting and policing refugee and internally displaced persons camps, rather than trying to stop all violence in the region. This intervention is unlikely to provoke a violent military reaction from the Sudanese government. In fact, a careful analysis of the conflict suggests that Khartoum has been engaged in a scorched-earth counterinsurgency rather than in an attempt to exterminate Darfur's ‘black’ population as an end in itself, and thus would stand to benefit from interveners' efforts to keep the camps demilitarised.     

Re-thinking the Unthinkable: Arms Control in the Twenty-First Century

ABSTRACT

Since the end of the Cold War, arms control proponents tried to make the case for deep nuclear reductions and other forms of security cooperation as necessary for strategic stability. While different versions of strategic stability analysis did sometimes produce innovative proposals, constructive negotiations, and successful ratification campaigns in the past, this analytical framework has become more of a hindrance than a help. Treating arms control as a predominantly technical way to make deterrence more stable by changing force structure characteristics, military operations, relative numbers of weapons on either side, or total number of nuclear weapons gives short shrift to political factors, including the fundamental assumptions about world politics that inform different arms control logics, the quality of political relations among leading states, and the political processes that affect negotiation, ratification, and implementation. This article compares two logics for arms control as a means to enhance strategic stability, one developed by the Cambridge community in the 1960s and one used by the Reagan administration and its successors, with current perspectives on strategic stability in which flexibility and freedom of action are preferable to predictability and arms control. It also contrasts what the Barack Obama administration has tried to achieve through strategic stability dialogues with Russia and China with how they envision security cooperation. It then presents an approach developed during the Cold War by Hedley Bull for thinking about both the technical and the political dimensions of arms control, and suggests that the logic of Cooperative Security (which shares important features with Bull's approach) is a more appropriate and productive way to think about arms control in the twenty-first century than strategic stability analysis is.