THE FUTURE OF BIOLOGICAL DISARMAMENT

The Sixth Review Conference of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) gave the future of biological disarmament new hope. It brought the BWC back closer to the core of multilateral efforts to combat the weaponization of disease, agreed to an intersessional work program for 2007–2010, created an implementation support unit, and revived the interrupted process of BWC evolution through extended understandings agreed at review conferences. However, its aims were deliberately modest. Having set their sights realistically low, delegations did not have to lower them much further. What was most important was to prevent U.S.-Iranian acrimony from paralyzing the conference. With deadlock once again narrowly averted, the conference had to clear away the debris left from past dissensions in order to open the way to constructive evolution for the treaty. In particular the conference avoided contentious subjects such as permanent organization and verification measures for the BWC; its institutional deficit and compliance problems remain. Successes and limitations of the conference are analyzed, as is its equivocal outcome on confidence-building measures. Developing on the endogenous principle, the BWC will continue to need constant attention. At the center of a complex edifice, the BWC must be kept sound, strong, and solid.     

BANNING BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) underpins the international regime to control biological weapons. The strength of the treaty however relies on national implementation. The first step for many states party to the Convention is drafting appropriate national laws and regulations. So far, 32 countries in Africa are signatory to the BTWC. More recently, in 2004, the United Nations Security Council adopted resolution 1540, which requires all UN Member States to put in place legislation to prevent the illicit trafficking of material that could be used to develop weapons of mass destruction. The need for such wide-ranging legislation is recognised African countries but its creation and implementation pose specific challenges.     

THE G8 GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP

ABSTRACT

Since the 1990s, the group of stakeholders working to combat biological weapons (BW) proliferation has broadened to include new actors who have not traditionally focused on security issues, including organizations from the public health sector, researchers in the life sciences, and the biosafety community. This has had significant benefits for the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) and the arms control establishment more broadly. However, the BWC's agenda has become increasingly dominated by issues of international health and global health security. By focusing solely on response strategies, the United States and other interested parties risk losing sight of other important elements of a counter-BW strategy, including deterrence and prevention. Focusing on public health-related issues to the exclusion of more traditional security matters puts the nonproliferation regime at risk, because it limits the amount of time that stakeholders have available to grapple with the critical questions facing the BWC and the biological weapons nonproliferation establishment—questions that must be answered if the regime is to survive.     

HARNESSING GLOBAL TRADE DATA FOR BIOLOGICAL ARMS CONTROL

Unlike treaties dealing with nuclear and chemical weapons, the Biological Weapons Convention still lacks formal verification measures, 31 years after entering into force. Here we propose a global export-import monitoring system of biological dual-use items as an additional measure for a web of biological arms controls that could complement traditional export controls. We suggest that such a measure may help to guide consultation or verification processes in the biological area.     

谈奥巴马时代美国的联合国政策

奥巴马对联合国政策的调整，反映出奥巴马政府全球外交和安全战略的需要，体现了实用主义外交风格。较之于其前任，奥巴马将更加重视联合国维和行动，并让联合国更多地参与解决包括伊拉克和阿富汗在内的热点问题。奥巴马的联合国政策面临挑战，联合国仅仅是奥巴马实现美国国家利益的手段之一。     

从建设和平的视角看联合匡维和行动的困境

联合国维和行动目前面临着日益严峻的困难和挑战。其中的一个重要原因在于维和人员被赋予了过多的建设和平的职责,使得维和行动处于两难的境地。要缓解这一困境,国际社会需重新审视和定义维和行动的职责范围,大力加强和平委员会的能力建设,并给予更多的授权。在实现这些长期目标之前,维和特派团将继续代替建和委履行建设和平协调员的职责。     

简述与《禁止化学武器公约》相关的生化融合技术

《禁止化学武器公约》是一项十分重要的国际公约。《公约》全面、切实地履行,对在全球范围禁止化学武器使用,防止化学武器扩散,减少化学武器对人类的危害具有重大而深远意义。然而,随着科技的发展,《公约》面临着新的挑战。特别是生物学和化学的发展与融合,对《公约》实施可能产生的影响日益明显。文章结合禁止化学武器组织科学咨询委员会向第三次《禁止化学武器公约》审议大会提交的报告,重点就与《公约》有关的化学与生物融合的技术问题进行了简要的归纳和分析。     

论自主武器军控的国际法及政策要点

如何规制自主武器是1980年《常规武器公约》框架下讨论的热点问题,目前这一议题已进入到政府专家组讨论阶段,对自主武器的研发、测试、部署及使用的关键问题,进行了比较深入的讨论。2018年以来,政府专家组会议最后文件已包含了未来谈判的若干指导性原则。本文认为,结合国际军控博弈的背景和各军事大国人工智能技术发展现状考虑,《日内瓦公约:第一附加议定书》第36条下缔约国审查义务、使用自主武器违反国际人道法的责任不得转移规则,以及2013年《武器贸易条约》对自主武器贸易的管制,是三个法律、政策背景极其复杂的问题。以自身军事能力不受到国际军控规则的严重削弱为基础考量,我国应该对此采取审慎的态度,尽力完善法律和政策。     

对我国维和警察政治考察工作的思考

在联合国任务区执行任务的中国维和警察,展示的是我国警察的整体形象,这就要求维和警察不仅要具备较强的业务素质还要具备较高的政治素质。因此,维和警察的政治考察工作尤为重要。阐述了政治考察工作的必要性和几个重要环节,对政治考察工作提出了构想。     

防化研究院履约十年回顾

《禁止化学武器公约》生效10周年之际,简要回顾公约生效以来防化研究院参与的履约研究、核查接待、单一小规模设施建设、指定实验室建设、日本遗弃化武处理等各个方面的履约活动,以期总结经验,展望未来。     

Reading the Riot Act: Toward a More Comprehensive Ban on Chemical Weapons

ABSTRACT

The recent use of chemicals in warfare in Syria and Iraq illustrates that, despite the important work of the 1997 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), the world has not yet been totally successful in stopping the use of indiscriminate toxic agents in conflicts, either by states or non-state actors. Michael Crowley's excellent and timely new book, Chemical Control, analyzes the use of “riot control agents” (RCAs) and “incapacitating chemical agents” (ICAs), including launch and dispersal systems, by police, paramilitary, and military forces over the last decades and raises the challenging question about where the red line might be drawn between banned and permitted uses of chemicals. He discusses this problem not only in the context of the CWC, which allows use of RCAs for civilian riot control, but also in the context of international law, human rights, and criminal justice, including the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and other disarmament and abolition regimes. He proposes a “holistic, three-stage approach” to addressing this issue “for effective regulation or prohibition of the weapon or weapon-related technology of concern.” As we approach the global abolition of a whole class of weapons of mass destruction in the next decade or even sooner, Chemical Control is helpful in better understanding and solving the dilemma of what's actually banned or permitted under international law, and precluding states undermining the chemical weapons ban.     

区域性国际组织参与维和事务研究

当今世界,区域性国际组织以其独特优势,成为联合国以外维护和平与稳定的重要力量。以典型的区域性国际组织实施、参与的维和行动为例,分析其存在的重要性;援引《联合国宪章》等重要文献,说明区域性国际组织在维护世界和平事务中的合法性;通过对区域性国际组织本身特点的分析,说明其实施维和行动的优势以反对联合国维和行动地位产生的影响;最后,从如何发挥区域性国际组织的重要作用进行分析,并提出建议。     

The State of UN Peacekeeping: Lessons from Congo

The article considers the state of UN peacekeeping through the prism of its long-running operation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Focusing in particular on the challenges raised by use of force and the protection of civilians in conditions of ongoing armed conflict, it argues that UN field operations must be aligned much more closely than they have been over the past 15 years to political and diplomatic efforts aimed at securing viable political settlements to internal conflict. The issues raised by the history of the UN’s troubled mission in the DRC are deeply relevant to the wider discussion of the organisation’s role in the field of peace and security.     

Serious Rules for Nuclear Power Without Proliferation

The authors propose five principles for addressing the major deficiencies of the current treaty-based approach to nonproliferation. These involve: effectively closing the door to withdrawals from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT); defining which nuclear technologies fall within the NPT's “inalienable right” provision, so as to maintain a reasonable safety margin against possible military application; expansion of International Atomic Energy Agency inspections to include greater readiness to use its “special” inspection authority; creation of an NPT enforcement regime, to include a secretariat; and universalizing the NPT so as to apply to all states, while creating a path for current non-parties to come into compliance. There is no illusion here about the prospects for the adoption of this approach. At a minimum, the world needs to be frank about the gap between nuclear programs and current nonproliferation protection. Encouragement of greater use of nuclear power should be predicated on closing that gap.     

THE ROLE OF LEGITIMACY IN STRENGTHENING THE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION REGIME

The nuclear nonproliferation regime and its essential foundation, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), are currently under grave stress. The challenges that have plagued the regime since its inception–universal adherence and the pace of disarmament–persist. But new threats raise questions about the effectiveness of the treaty in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. These include: clandestine pursuit of nuclear weapons by some NPT parties without the knowledge of the international community and the International Atomic Energy Agency in violation of their obligations; the role of non-state actors in proliferation; and renewed interest in the full nuclear fuel cycle, technology necessary to create fissile material for weapons. This article considers recent prominent proposals to address these three threats and assesses them according to their ability to gain legitimacy, a crucial element in strengthening a regime's overall effectiveness.     

MONGOLIA

Formed according to broad principles laid out by the United Nations, nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZs) play an important role in promoting nuclear nonproliferation, paralleling and complementing the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. But the traditional regional treaty-based path to establishing NWFZs is not open to all states. Owing to various factors, some countries cannot realistically follow the path of states that have established traditional NWFZs. Mongolia, having declared itself a single-state NWFZ in 1992 and gained UN General Assembly recognition of this status in 1998, may provide an example for other countries to follow. This viewpoint presents Mongolia's case as a state seeking to acquire a nontraditional nuclear-weapon-free status despite unfavorable geopolitical circumstances. The case of Mongolia clearly demonstrates that the creation of a credible, single-state NWFZ status is possible, but demands the support and flexibility of both neighboring states and the nuclear weapon states.     

建立维和警察心理调控机制之我见

联合国维和警察是一个特殊的职业群体，所处的工作和生活环境艰苦、恶劣、危险。维和警察面对这种超出常规的精神压力，出现各种各样的心理问题是必然的。维和警察的心理问题仅仅依靠维和警察个人自我调节是远远不够的，必须建立一套有效的调控机制来预防和治疗其心理问题，维护好他们的心理健康。     

On the Road to the 2015 NPT Review Conference

The second session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference (RevCon) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) highlighted two issues in particular—progress toward a Middle East Weapons of Mass Destruction–Free Zone and the Joint Statement on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons—that may not only greatly affect the health and vitality of the NPT and the 2015 RevCon, but possibly also have implications for the international nonproliferation regime as a whole. Dr. William Potter, director of the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, interviewed Ambassador Cornel Feruta, chairman of the 2013 PrepCom, to discuss these and other issues related to the meeting and the future of the treaty and its review process.     

Chemical-weapon use in Syria: atrocities,attribution, and accountability

ABSTRACT

International efforts to hold the government of President Bashar al-Assad accountable for the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Civil War have entered a new phase. For the first time, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the international organization responsible for implementing the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention, has been empowered to identify the perpetrators of chemical attacks in Syria. The Investigation and Identification Team (IIT), which was formed to conduct the OPCW’s new attribution mission, has announced its intention to investigate and identify the perpetrators of nine chemical attacks in Syria, including the April 7, 2018, attack in Douma. This article reviews recent efforts to attribute chemical attacks in Syria, describes what we know about the nine incidents to be investigated, summarizes what is known about the Syrian government officials, military commanders, and chemical-warfare scientists suspected of being responsible for these attacks, discusses what to expect during the next phase of the attribution process, and offers insights into how the international community can move beyond attribution to accountability. Accountability is necessary to provide justice for victims and to prevent future incidents by demonstrating that perpetrators of chemical attacks will be identified and punished.     

NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION

As the potential for the involvement of corporations in the manufacture of nuclear weapons has increased, particularly through dual-use technology, global regulation has failed to keep pace. Where regulation of private corporations does exist, in the form of treaties, UN resolutions, or more informal arrangements, the obligations fall only on states. This state of affairs is a result of international law's traditional deference to state sovereignty; yet, it has led to significant shortcomings in the global regulatory regime, where states are unwilling or unable to meet their obligations. While radical departures from the traditional model of international law might remove the regulatory gaps caused by noncompliant states, such changes are unrealistic in the current political climate. More realistic changes must be focused on, offering greater recognition of the role of private corporations in nuclear proliferation and increasing state compliance with existing regulation.