Armed Conflict,Military Expenses and FDI Inflow to Developing Countries

This paper investigates the relationship between military expenditure and FDI inflow conditioning on the exposure of a country to armed conflict in the long run. We apply the band spectrum regression estimator, and the maximal overlap discrete wavelet transform, to a panel of 60 developing countries, for the years 1990 to 2013. The estimated results indicate that military expenditure, in the absence of armed conflict, reduces FDI inflow. However, the negative effect is mitigated by increased military expenditure, in the presence of armed conflict. We also show that the effect of military expenditure on FDI is time sensitive, in that it takes time for military expenditure to affect FDI inflow. FDI inflow in response to higher military expenditure is higher for the country that faces higher armed conflict than the country that faces lower armed conflict. The findings are robust in the case of overall as well as internal conflict. These results are also robust to the alternative specification, subsample analysis with different armed conflict thresholds, and the estimation using the time variant long-run models.     

The human consequences of foreign military intervention

The empirical international conflict literature has given much recent attention to interstate armed force’s impact on human well-being. While empirical research has advanced our understanding of the phenomenon considerably, we argue that one conclusion that many studies have reached is preliminary. Some recent research contends that only full-scale war, and not force short of war, has a discernable impact on human welfare or physical quality of life (PQOL). We develop theory on one type of force short of war, large-scale foreign military intervention (FMI), and its potential effects on PQOL. Using interrupted time series and panel corrected standard error methodologies, we find that from 1960 to 2005 large-scale FMI had a statistically and substantively significant impact on the PQOL of populations in 106 developing countries. The specific effect that this type of armed force has depended in large part on the regime type of the target country.     

Resource Dependence and Armed Violence: Impact on Sustainability in Developing Countries

The dependence on oil, gas, and mineral exports arguably has a negative impact on economic growth in resource-rich, developing countries. This article looks at the impact of resource dependence on adjusted net savings (ANS) as an indicator of weak sustainability. Our results, based on a panel of 104 developing countries during the recent commodity price boom, confirm a negative relationship between resource extraction and sustainable development as measured by ANS. We further look at the specific role of armed conflict and armed violence as captured by the homicide rate. Armed conflict, which is positively associated with resource dependence, negatively affects ANS per capita according to both our OLS and instrumental variables (IV) estimates. Similarly, armed violence has a detrimental effect on sustainable development. Our IV estimate suggests that a one-point increase in the homicide rate decreases ANS per capita by $60. Since education expenditures are a critical ANS component, we further examine the impact of resource dependence and violence on human capital. Consistent with previous findings, resource-dependent countries underinvest in education but armed conflict and violence do not affect the instantaneous share of education expenditures, hinting at a detrimental effect working through physical and social capital rather than education.     

The evaluation of a possible future Sino-Japanese armed conflict through the application of the ACEI-model

There is relatively little formal modeling of the economic effects of armed conflicts even though they have substantial economic effects. We set forth a new model, namely the armed conflict economic impact model – ACEI-Model. The model looks at the economic effects of war in three different stages: (i) pre-conflict stage; (ii) armed conflict stage; and (iii) post-conflict stage. The model is based on economic desgrowth (-δ) and other new conceptual indicators. We evaluate an imaginary armed conflict between China and Japan by applying the ACEI-Model.     

Moving Beyond Population-Centric vs. Enemy-Centric Counterinsurgency

Historically, insurgency is one of the most prevalent forms of armed conflict and it is likely to remain common in the foreseeable future. Recent experiences with counterinsurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan offer many lessons for future counterinsurgents, but the discourse on the subject continues to be mired in a traditional dichotomy pitting population-centric approaches to counterinsurgency against enemy-centric approaches. Historical analysis suggests that this traditional dichotomy is not a sufficiently nuanced way to understand or plan for such operations. Instead, discussions of counterinsurgency should focus on two dimensions: actions (use of physical force vs. political or moral actions) and targets (active insurgents vs. insurgent support). This perspective divides the space of possible counterinsurgency efforts into four quadrants, suggesting that effective counterinsurgency campaigns find a balance of effort across the four quadrants that is well matched to the specific context.     

Evaluating the Spillover Effects of the Colombian Conflict in Ecuador

The Colombian civil war lasted for nearly six decades with approximately 10 percent of its population being displaced over the same period. The implications of this conflict have transgressed international boundaries. Countries such as Ecuador experienced an exodus of victims as well as an increase in the presence of armed groups, along with the proliferation of illegal businesses. Even though the internal social and economic consequences of the Colombian conflict have been documented in the literature, there is yet to be a study addressing these issues from the perspective of impacted neighboring countries. In this work, we contribute to the literature by evaluating whether the influx of asylum seekers and the increasing presence of armed groups in the bordering provinces of Ecuador have lead to an increase in violence among these provinces. We do not find any link between the arrival of asylum seekers and the incidence of violent crimes in the Ecuadorean bordering provinces. Similarly, our results indicate that despite an increase in the presence of armed groups, these regions did not experience an increase in the homicide rates significantly different from the other provinces. The results are robust to various specifications and econometric techniques.     

Does civil war hamper financial development?

We examine how armed conflict effects financial development in a cross-country setting using dynamic panel data analysis in a panel of 66 developing countries for the period 1985–2010. Financial development is measured by M2 as a share of GDP, and credit allocated to private sector by banks as a share of GDP. Our findings suggest that armed conflict has a significant adverse effect on financial development. Simultaneously, the quality of governance is always highly significant and conducive to the financial development. The quality of governance is more salient in determining financial development compared to low- and medium-intensity armed conflict; however, the quality of governance cannot entirely offset the adverse impact of high-intensity armed conflict on financial development.     

Rebel politics and the state: between conflict and post-conflict,resistance and co-existence

Abstract

An important factor shaping the rebel-to-political transition of armed movements in post-conflict settings pertains to the political identity these groups develop in wartime. This political identity is itself a multi-dimensional concept shaped not only by the political ideology, practices and institutions established by the rebel organisation, but also by the relationship with the state and its political institutions. Far from functioning in a vacuum or isolated, rebel groups, especially when operating as alternative providers of governance, build multi-layered networks of relations with the state, the pre-existing traditional society institutions as well as with other domestic and international political actors. The study focuses specifically on two complex armed groups, Hezbollah and Hamas, relying on primary sources as well as in-depth fieldwork on these groups’ socio-political institution (In this case field work refers to both in-depth direct observation of the groups’ social networks and political infrastructures as well direct interviews and meetings with key stakeholders involved in the administration of those activities. The time-frame for the field work spans between 2008 and 2013). The research tracks their multiple interactions with the state through grassroots activism, institutional politics and governance. Despite their considerable differences, at their cores, both organisations operate in a liminal space between open war and fragile post-conflict setting; between grassroots activism and institutional politics; between armed resistance and political accommodation; and between competition and cooperation with the state. As such, they represent useful starting points to begin deconstructing and problematising existing dichotomies still prevalent in studying both rebel governance and rebel-to-political transitions, including the binary state-non-state opposition. In doing so, the analysis highlights the importance of taking into account the often hybrid and multi-layered political legacies adopted by armed groups during wartime and their impact in shaping their political trajectories as well as the potential roles for these groups in post-conflict settings.     

Resourcing for defense: Solving the roles and missions puzzle

One of the most important issues facing the post‐Cold War U.S. defense establishment concerns the future allocation of combat tasks and responsibilities among different branches of the armed forces. The challenge is to reduce unnecessary redundancy across roles and missions when resources are highly constrained, without compromising military effectiveness. Defining the policy problem as one of resource allocation rather than operational effectiveness, we develop a methodology for allocating roles and missions. Our methodology focuses at the highest level of force aggregation and uses a mathematical programming model to produce cross‐service cross‐mission trade‐offs that will yield the best total force combat and non‐combat potential within resource consumption constraints.     

Dynamic inventory and pricing models for competing retailers

We address infinite‐horizon models for oligopolies with competing retailers under demand uncertainty. We characterize the equilibrium behavior which arises under simple wholesale pricing schemes. More specifically, we consider a periodic review, infinite‐horizon model for a two‐echelon system with a single supplier servicing a network of competing retailers. In every period, each retailer faces a random demand volume, the distribution of which depends on his own retail price as well as those charged by possibly all competing retailers. We also derive various comparative statics results regarding the impact several exogenous system parameters (e.g., cost or distributional parameters) have on the equilibrium decisions of the retailers as well as their expected profits. We show that certain monotonicity properties, engrained in folklore as well as in known inventory models for centralized systems, may break down in decentralized chains under retailer competition. Our results can be used to optimize the aggregate profits in the supply chain (i.e., those of the supplier and all retailers) by implementing a specific wholesale pricing scheme. © 2003 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2004.     

Does aid cause conflict in Pakistan?

This study provides evidence from Pakistan on how the delegated task of achieving strategic objectives of the donor can lead to incompatibility of aid objectives which then generates perpetual and multidimensional domestic conflict in the recipient society. We use count data method to estimate the relationship between aid and conflict. At the aggregate level, social sector spending, regime change and youth bulge are positively and significantly related with conflict. However, aid per capita gives ambiguous results. It is significant with conflict count in the terrorism data-set and insignificant for data on armed conflict. Inclusion of youth bulge and unemployment rate confirms the marginalization hypothesis of conflict. Inflation rate and the tax variables are insignificant. This confirms that aid erodes fiscal capacity. At project-level data, conflict is strongly related with aid commitment and purpose. Discrepancy in aid allocation and commitment may accentuate conflict.     

An integrated electric power supply chain and fuel market network framework: Theoretical modeling with empirical analysis for New England

In this article, we develop a novel electric power supply chain network model with fuel supply markets that captures both the economic network transactions in energy supply markets and the physical network transmission constraints in the electric power network. The theoretical derivation and analysis are done using the theory of variational inequalities. We then apply the model to a specific case, the New England electric power supply chain, consisting of six states, five fuel types, 82 power generators, with a total of 573 generating units, and 10 demand market regions. The empirical case study demonstrates that the regional electric power prices simulated by our model match the actual electricity prices in New England very well. We also compute the electric power prices and the spark spread, an important measure of the power plant profitability, under natural gas and oil price variations. The empirical examples illustrate that in New England, the market/grid‐level fuel competition has become the major factor that affects the influence of the oil price on the natural gas price. Finally, we utilize the model to quantitatively investigate how changes in the demand for electricity influence the electric power and the fuel markets from a regional perspective. The theoretical model can be applied to other regions and multiple electricity markets under deregulation to quantify the interactions in electric power/energy supply chains and their effects on flows and prices. © 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2009     

After the Split: Partition,Successor States,and the Dynamics of War in the Horn of Africa

Why do partitioned successor states engage one another in armed conflict? We explore the drivers of war between successor states by comparing two border crises that followed the partitions of Ethiopia (1993) and Sudan (2011). We argue that the politico-military struggles that give way to partition create important historical memories that shape what successor states think about the utility of military force. While the partition of Ethiopia yielded successor states led by regimes that were victors of the preceding war of partition, the war of partition in Sudan produced successor states that emerged out of military stalemate. This distinction explains why Ethiopia and Eritrea waged a costly border war that Sudan and South Sudan were able to avoid.     

Revisiting the Naga conflict: what can India do to resolve this conflict?

Soon after India attained its independence from British colonial administration in 1947 the Nagas started waging an armed conflict against India to establish a sovereign independent state in Nagaland in the country's Northeast region. The conflict is today one of the world's longer running and little known armed conflicts. India's central government has tried unsuccessfully to tackle the problem through political reconciliation, use of force, and several development measures. Over the years, it has also undergone several changes in which the situation of conflict deepened whenever India's central government intervened. And yet, the road ahead also faces severe challenges because the demand for bringing the Nagas of India together into a single political entity will not go unchallenged from other ethnic groups. Moreover, a bitter leadership battle divides the Naga rebels and hence any future agreement is likely to be difficult due to factional politics as have happened in the past. Thus one way to satisfy the aspirations of different ethnic groups while protecting the boundaries of the existing states in India is to explore the option of cultural autonomy. This idea is not entirely new, but has lost significance over the years.     

Generalized orienteering problem with resource dependent rewards

We introduce a generalized orienteering problem (OP) where, as usual, a vehicle is routed from a prescribed start node, through a directed network, to a prescribed destination node, collecting rewards at each node visited, to maximize the total reward along the path. In our generalization, transit on arcs in the network and reward collection at nodes both consume a variable amount of the same limited resource. We exploit this resource trade‐off through a specialized branch‐and‐bound algorithm that relies on partial path relaxation problems that often yield tight bounds and lead to substantial pruning in the enumeration tree. We present the smuggler search problem (SSP) as an important real‐world application of our generalized OP. Numerical results show that our algorithm applied to the SSP outperforms standard mixed‐integer nonlinear programming solvers for moderate to large problem instances. We demonstrate model enhancements that allow practitioners to represent realistic search planning scenarios by accounting for multiple heterogeneous searchers and complex smuggler motion. © 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2013     

Capitalism & the “new wars”: free markets and societal insecurity before and after the cold war, 1970–2013

Critics of globalisation suggest that growing free-market conditions generate anomie, leading ultimately to what some term ‘new wars’ and new insecurities. Others argue that liberal economies dissuade violence since people gain from peace. This study argues for a micro perspective that views predatory economic policies driving higher investment in rebellion-specific capital, such as shadow economic activity that easily translates into insurgency in weak-state settings. Investment in the shadows determines survivability against superior state forces, and survivability determines rebellion, by definition. Using civil war onset data from 1970 to 2013, as well as the Global Peace Index (GPI) and several of its individual components, which capture societal insecurity above and beyond the absence of armed violence, this study finds that countries that are more capitalistic have a lower risk of civil war and societal insecurity. The results are robust to alternative models, testing methods, and uphold when examining several relevant subcomponents of the index, such as internal conflict, violent crime, homicides, ease of access to small arms, and political instability. Surprisingly, democracy tends not to be associated with peace but associates with increased criminality whereas strong autocracy reduces it, suggesting that capitalism, more than democracy, associates with conditions favourable to societal security, independently of a country’s level of development.     

The Damoclean sword of offensive cyber: Policy uncertainty and collective insecurity

Cyberspace is a new domain of operation, with its own characteristics. Cyber weapons differ qualitatively from kinetic ones: They generate effects by non-kinetic means through information, technology, and networks. Their properties, opportunities, and constraints are comparable to the qualitative difference between conventional and nuclear weapons. New weapons and their target sets in a new domain raise a series of unresolved policy challenges at the domestic, bilateral, and international levels about deterrence, attribution, and response. They also introduce new risks: uncertainty about unintended consequences, expectations of efficacy, and uncertainty about both the target’s and the international community’s response. Cyber operations offer considerable benefits for states to achieve strategic objectives both covertly and overtly. However, without a strategic framework to contain and possibly deter their use, make state and non-state behavior more predictable in the absence of reciprocal norms, and limit their impact, an environment where states face persistent attacks that nonetheless fall below the threshold of armed conflict presents a policy dilemma that reinforces collective insecurity.     

Attrition modeling in the presence of decoys: An operations-other-than-war motivation

Under various operational conditions, in particular in operations other than war (OOTW) or peacekeeping, an intervening force, here Blue, must occasionally engage in attrition warfare with an opposing force, here Red, that is intermingled with noncombatants. Desirably, Red armed actives are targeted, and not the unarmed noncombatants. This article describes some simple Lanchesterian attrition models that reflect a certain capacity of Blue to discriminate noncombatants from armed and active Red opponents. An explicit extension of the Lanchester square law results: Blue's abstinence concerning the indiscriminate shooting of civilians mixed with Red's is essentially reflected in a lower Blue rate of fire and less advantageous exchange rate. The model applies to other situations involving decoys, and reflects the value of a discrimination capability. © 1997 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 44 : 507–514, 1997     

The inherent propensity toward peace or war embodied in weaponry

Thomas Schelling argues that armed adversaries face an inherent propensity toward peace or war embodied in their weaponry, geography and military organizations. Inherent propensity is the idea that there are characteristics embodied in the weapons that push adversaries toward peace or war, independent of the goals of the decision‐makers, the political disagreement between adversaries, and misperceptions about mutual resolve and hostility. We theoretically illustrate inherent propensity in conventional and nuclear arms settings using Lanchester and Intriligator war models. Our work extends the Intriligator‐Brito model, identifies when the competing Richardson and Intriligator‐Brito views of the relationship between arms races and war are correct, illustrates the stabilizing/destabilizing effects of alliances, and highlights the importance of arms quality control in the US‐USSR relationship.     

Between the Cracks: Actor Fragmentation and Local Conflict Systems in the Libyan Civil War

Abstract

After nearly four years of civil war, Libya continues to be described as an ‘ungoverned space’ where the collapse of state institutions reignited tribal, political, religious and ideological tensions. These accounts, however, obscure Libya’s complex subnational governance, and the role of non-state armed groups in shaping the emerging political orders. By contrast, we contend that distinct subnational political orders have emerged in Libya since 2014 in which actors engage in state-making practices driven by local interests. Using empirical evidence to explore the activity of non-state armed groups during the Libyan civil conflict, we highlight that the local conflict environments in eastern, western and southern Libya provide specific incentives that shape the process of armed group splintering and patterns of violence. The findings demonstrate that claims to authority and notions of statehood extend far beyond the state whereby governance relations are negotiated between state and non-state actors. Conflict patterns, (in)stability and the prevailing political order are therefore conditional on the nature of the dominant actor, their strategies and modes of violence within their areas of influence. Through this analysis, the paper provides a more granular understanding of the local political dynamics that drive violence in Libya and civil wars more generally.