Programming with linear fractional functionals

Charnes and Cooper [1] showed that a linear programming problem with a linear fractional objective function could be solved by solving at most two ordinary linear programming problems. In addition, they showed that where it is known a priori that the denominator of the objective function has a unique sign in the feasible region, only one problem need be solved. In the present note it is shown that if a finite solution to the problem exists, only one linear programming problem must be solved. This is because the denominator cannot have two different signs in the feasible region, except in ways which are not of practical importance.     

DELEGATES,DIALOGUE AND DESPERADOES

Progress in the DRC peace process has continually originated from sources outside of the existing agreements, treaties and protocols. This has been the case since the signing of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement. Of great concern is the increase in armed groups who shoot their way to the negotiating table and then assert themselves within the ICD. The implication is that military action, not popular support for a manifesto, has propelled individuals and groups into positions of power. Many of these groups seek to pre-empt the democratic process of the elections to be held two years from now. Against this background, ordinary citizens in the DRC have faced terrible living conditions. Forced to flee from the marauding groups (especially in the east), hundreds of thousands of Congolese have sought refugee in neighbouring states. Furthermore, in the two Kivu provinces and the Ituri region, intense fighting has erupted between the signatories of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement and amongst former allies: Rwanda and Uganda. The ICD, though expected to provide a new political order, has not achieved that goal. The ICD did not reach agreement on a constitution, a balanced transitional authority, or the formation of a new national army. Agreement has only been secured through discussion outside the framework of the ICD process.     

Reinterpreting western use of coercion in Bosnia‐Herzegovina: Assurances and carrots were crucial

This article demonstrates that assurances and carrots accompanied credible threats every time Western coercion succeeded in Bosnia. This finding is hardly surprising as it merely confirms earlier research on coercive diplomacy, but it is nevertheless important because the crucial role played by assurances and carrots has been completely ignored in most analyses to date. It also has important policy implications at a time when Western, and particularly American, policy‐makers tend to ignore this fact at their peril. US policy towards Iraq and Western policy towards Yugoslavia have been based almost exclusively on the stick in recent years, and its lack of success is therefore not surprising. If Western policy‐makers had learned the right lessons from Bosnia, they would have known that strategies coupling credible threats with credible assurances and carrots would have been more likely to succeed.     

When to Get Out of the Trench? Using Smart Pressure to Resolve Civil Wars

This article puts forward a theory of smart pressure, which emphasises that third-party pressure only works if the conflict parties under pressure can agree with the endpoint of this pressure. Hence, a potential mutually acceptable agreement needs to be formulated before a mediator starts to apply pressure. To this argument, this article employs two case studies: the mediation efforts leading up to the Sudan Comprehensive Peace Agreement concluded in 2005 and the Darfur Peace Agreement concluded in 2006. These cases support the smart pressure theory and suggest that mediators need to be modest about what they can accomplish using pressure.     

A FOCUS ON SMALL ARMS

For much of the past two years, the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) has managed to achieve a semblance of stability in much of Darfur, which has been reflected in the improvement of humanitarian conditions. At the same time, the mission has come under serious international pressure to respond appropriately to the deteriorating security situation on the ground by enhancing its presence and effectiveness. Subsequently, following the decisions of the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC), AMIS has undertaken two successive enhancements. Although the last enhancement exercise was remarkably successful, it could not be considered complete without the provision of the outstanding personnel and logistics by both member countries and the international partners. Meanwhile, serious challenges continue to undermine the mission's effectiveness and its prospects, not the least of these obstacles being adequate funding. At present, the mission is in a dilemma with respect to its mandate, engaging with the parties, partners, implementation of the N'sDjamena Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement (HCFA), and the way forward, as the AU is now almost totally dependent on external donations to sustain its Darfur operations. This article therefore explores the way forward in all these thematic areas in order to make appropriate recommendations.     

Deferred verification: verifiable declarations of fissile-material stocks for disarmament purposes

ABSTRACT

Nuclear disarmament is often seen as eventually requiring access to nuclear warheads or to the warhead-dismantlement process to verify that a state has not hidden weapons or weapon-materials despite promising to disarm. This article suggests this view is misplaced, and that what is needed is a verification mechanism able to provide reliable assurances of the absence of fissile materials available for use in weapons after a state has disarmed. Such a mechanism will need an initial declaration of the amount of fissile materials held by a state for all purposes, military and civilian. In a state with a nuclear arsenal awaiting elimination, this declaration would have to include materials that may not be available for verification because they are in nuclear weapons or are in other classified or proliferation-sensitive forms. This article describes a verification arrangement that does not require access to materials in weapons and in sensitive forms while still allowing checks on the overall accuracy of the declaration. Verification of the completeness and correctness of the declaration is deferred to the time when the weapons-relevant material enters the disposition process, at which point it no longer has any sensitive attributes. By removing the focus on monitoring warheads and dismantlement, this new approach could provide a more manageable path to nuclear disarmament.     

Implementing the Global Strategy where it matters most: the EU’s credibility deficit and the European neighbourhood

The EU Global Strategy (EUGS) is a broad and ambitious document in terms of its geographic scope and thematic priorities. However, the EU cannot devote equal attention to all aspects of the EUGS; so there is still scope for more clarity regarding the EU’s core strategic aims. This article argues that in addition to fostering internal cohesion, the EU’s strategic priority must involve stabilizing its own neighbourhood. This task has challenged the EU for decades because of an inherent credibility deficit regarding the EU’s own capabilities, yet the EUGS does not diagnose and remedy this problem as effectively as it could have. Therefore much more work will need to be done in terms of reforming EU institutions and developing common capabilities if the EU hopes to achieve its central internal and external security goals as outlined in the EUGS and related policy statements.     

PART II: CONTINUING TO QUESTION THE RELIABILITY OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE

Responding to Derrin Culp's critique, the author argues that distinguished nuclear theorists may be wrong because groups of experts have been wrong in the past, that city attacks are central to nuclear deterrence theory because killing civilians en masse is what nuclear weapons do best, and that understanding how effective city attacks would be in war is crucial to understanding how well they would work as threats. Moreover, while it is undeniable that nuclear deterrence works some of the time, this simply is not good enough. Because any failure of nuclear deterrence could end in catastrophic nuclear war, nuclear deterrence must be perfect or almost perfect. This is a very difficult standard to reach.     

Landmark in defense literature

Some books which have fallen within Defense & Security Analysis's fields of interest have paved the way for further studies, either because they have opened up a new era for enquiry and research, or because they have introduced new approaches and methodologies to existing areas. Other volumes have had impact, but have, in their turn, owed an intellectual debt to an earlier work. Again, there are many books and studies on defense which have become forgotten or which were unappreciated at the time of their publication, but which have immediate relevance to today's problems. This section is designed to review books that fall within these categories with a view to highlighting how and why they deserve serious attention.     

Augustine's Laws: Norman Augustine

Some books which have fallen within Defense & Security Analysis's fields of interest have paved the way for further studies, either because they have opened up a new era for enquiry and research, or because they have introduced new approaches and methodologies to existing areas. Other volumes have had impact, but have, in their turn, owed an intellectual debt to an earlier work. Again, there are many books and studies on defense which have become forgotten or which were unappreciated at the time of their publication, but which have immediate relevance to today's problems. This section is designed to review books that fall within these categories with a view to highlighting how and why they deserve serious attention.     

The Morale Maze: the German Army in Late 1918

The state of the German Army’s morale in 1918 is central to our understanding not only of the outcome of World War I, but also of the German Revolution and, indeed, through the pernicious ‘stab-in-the-back-myth’, on Weimar politics and the rise of the Nazis, too. This article presents new evidence from the German archives, blended with statistical analysis, to show that the morale of some units held up better than previously thought almost to the end, and thus to suggest three things. First, it proposes that some historians have placed too much reliance on English-language sources alone, such as British Army intelligence reports, which have various flaws as evidence. Second, it argues that, while historians have increasingly moved away from generalisations about German morale, this process has further to run. Third, it suggests that no single tipping point can be identified, and that morale alone does not provide a sufficient explanation for battlefield defeat. Indeed, much of the data can only be explained if the tactical realities of the war in late 1918 are clearly understood.     

A semieconomic method for the determination of optimal lot sizes

The construction of lot sizes usually depends upon factors influencing homogeneity. When these factors are not a function of lot quantity, it is possible to determine an optimal lot size. The optimization process balances the cost of sampling against the expected cost of lot rejection for some specified procurement quantity. The rationale for balancing the two costs is contingent upon the fact that rejection criteria waivers frequently occur when the lot size is large. This concept implies that the lot size should be as small as possible, whereas the cost of sampling drives the lot size up. Hence, trade-offs may be made. The formulation is termed a semieconomic one because it combines a pure economic objective function with a pure statistical constraint. This constraint is necessary because the nature of the items under study dictates that the cost of accepting defective material cannot be explicitly stated. The paper presents the formulation, describes when it should be used, derives a good analytical approximation under certain assumptions and gives various ramifications when it is used.     

The African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crisis: conceptual breakthrough or anti-imperialist phantom?

The creation of an African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crisis (ACIRC) is a sign of Africa's willingness to take its destiny into its own hands. Presented as a reaction to the slowness of the development of the African Standby Force (ASF), it is also a response to some of the ASF's conceptual weaknesses. This decision reflects a wish to establish an instrument better equipped to deal with the challenges Africa is facing. Departing from the (sub)regional logic of the ASF results from a desire to take into account the transnational nature of threats, while its enlarged mandate is meant to offer Africa the capacity to intervene in all kinds of conflicts, including by undertaking peace enforcement activities. But the obstacles on the road towards the actual creation and mobilisation of this capacity should not be underestimated. These include material difficulties, but also political tensions, between ‘small’ and ‘big’ states as well as between the African Union and subregional organisations. The risk then is high that the ACIRC, whose announcement came as a reaction to France's intervention in Mali, ends up joining the ranks of the many ‘anti-imperialist’ phantoms haunting the history of the Organization of African Unity/African Union (OAU/AU). Confronted by events considered ‘neocolonial’ initiatives, African actors have indeed traditionally reacted by launching grand projects that never got off the ground. However, by actually establishing this new instrument, they may also demonstrate that times have definitively changed.     

TIME-VARYING CHARACTERISTICS OF SOUTH KOREA-UNITED STATES AND JAPAN-UNITED STATES MILITARY ALLIANCES UNDER CHINESE THREAT: A PUBLIC GOOD APPROACH

This paper investigates the nature of two military alliances under Chinese threat. The findings are as follows: First, South Korea does not consider China a significant threat while Japan and the United States have recognized China as a serious threat since the 1990s and the 2000s, respectively. Second, the relationship between South Korea and the United States is a true military alliance for all time periods, but the nature of the alliance has changed since the 1970s. Third, although Japan began to form an alliance relationship with the United States in the 1990s, Japan is considered a more significant ally by the United States. This paper implies that, should China provoke a military confrontation, it might be difficult to deduce a common solution among the three countries because of the different response to military threats from China.     

India nuclear weapons: No first use or no full disclosure?

This article argues India is laying the foundation to move away from “no-first-use” (NFU) as its nuclear weapons employment policy. Since the inception of its nuclear weapons program, India has claimed NFU as the centerpiece of its nuclear strategy. But India has a history of developing foundational changes to its nuclear weapons program before such changes actually occur. For example, the infrastructure of India’s nuclear weapons program was already being created in the 1950s under the guise of civilian nuclear power. Similarly, the weaponization of India’s program, which did not officially occur until after the 1998 tests, had its genesis in far earlier decisions. A close examination of trends in India’s nuclear weapons production complex, its delivery systems, and its command and control complex all lead to the conclusion that India is laying the groundwork for more flexible employment options, up to and including first use. This article does not argue such a decision has been taken. Rather, it argues the underpinning is in place to allow for a move to more flexible options, perhaps very quickly, at some point in the future. This could occur during crisis or it could occur incrementally over time.     

BORDER CONTROL AND REGIONALISM

The control over shared borders has become increasingly important as a result of the international trend towards the establishment of free trade areas. While opening up for trade, most of the free trade groupings have concomitantly relinquished border control restrictions for the crossborder movement of their own citizens across internal borders, and have tightened controls at external borders. Border controls must not be seen as preventing the crossborder movement of people and goods, but rather as assistance in regulating orderly legal movement. The free movement of goods and people is essential, for example, if SADC wishes to move towards a free trade area, and to grow and prosper. This article will use recent developments in South Africa to demonstrate the challenges facing the country in implementing effective border control. By implication, it also illustrates the challenges facing SADC in implementing its Protocol on Trade and the region's free trade area launched in 2000. The total liberalisation of the SADC market is expected by 2012. In this process, free trade must be effectively reconciled with appropriate border control.     

Indian and Chinese espionage

India and China both have powerful spy networks; completely different in their approaches to espionage; both effective against their perceived enemies. China focuses first on internal threats, on Taiwan and Hong Kong, and then the US and Japan. India’s defense policy focuses on Pakistan and internal terrorist threats, and then on China. In reality, however, when it comes to spying on each other, both China and India suffer from incompetence and apathy – which endangers both their own security and regional stability. This article looks at how they spy on each other, and asks why and how they need to improve. The narrative also touches upon some of the individuals who are waging the spy war, from India’s wily spymaster Ajit Doval down to junior Chinese agents such as Wang Qing and Pema Tsering. The two countries are not friends. They have the largest territorial dispute in the world on their hands, covering an area the size of North Korea, and they have large armies facing each other along 4000 kilometers of frontier. But they also lay claim to the world’s two oldest and richest civilizations, with a rich history of exchange, and now with a combined population of 2.6 billion people and more than a quarter of the world’s economic output. If they cooperated, they could solve many of the world’s problems; but if they lurch into conflict, the potential consequences are terrifying to contemplate. Unfortunately, despite their geographical closeness, they do not know much about each other. They have few cultural interchanges, little diplomacy, few trade missions. They do not watch each other’s films, read each other’s books or listen to each other’s music. Chinese tourists would rather fly to New Zealand for their holidays than cross the border to India, and Indian students would rather study in Europe than China. China and India are neighbors that barely talk to each other. Most significantly, they do not spy on each competently. For countries that do not interact socially, defensive understanding is important for security – but China prefers the glamor of facing up to its Pacific and other maritime rivals such as the US and Japan. India, for its part, does talk a great deal about the China threat, but its resources and expertise are wrapped up in controlling its security threat from Pakistan and the Islamic world. When China and India do try to spy on each other, it is often without the benefit of a long-term focus or understanding. India has some very skilled operatives within the Research and Analysis Wing, but few that specialize in China. China has an enormous pool of resources spread across several government departments, including the Ministry of Public Security, and also has extensive facilities and manpower in the Joint Staff Department of the Central Military Commission (the JSD) and the new Strategic Support Force (the SSF). However, China’s intelligence services generally behave as if India is not worth spying on. Given that the two countries do not have the cultural or political machinery in place to understand each other, espionage and intelligence gathering is vital to ensure that miscalculations do not take place. This has been apparent over the last few years in stand-offs in the Himalaya, as well as top-level suspicions on each side about a variety of subjects including terrorism, covert operations in Sri Lanka and Burma, and the two countries’ nuclear weapons programs. Both countries do occasionally make efforts in espionage against each other, especially during sensitive periods such as the mountain stand-offs of 2014 and 2013 and during policy developments in nuclear warfare. In this article the author looks at actual spying incidents between the two countries, their methodologies, their staff, their technical capabilities, and how the act of spying, which is usually viewed as intrinsically adversarial, can be a force for good. The article relies on interviews with actual participants in intelligence from both countries as well as extensive use of contemporary online sources, and secondary analysis by both military and academic experts from China, India and NATO countries.     

Moral Advantage,Strategic Advantage?

This article argues that Man is a moral being and strategy inherently is a human project. It follows that strategy has to have a moral dimension. All human beings have a moral compass, acquired by social–cultural necessity. The compass has survival value. The problem is that the human race does not possess only one such compass. Since will is key to strategic performance, and because that will requires as fuel a sufficient confidence in the justice of a cause, in principle at least one belligerent's moral armament may be usefully superior to another's. One can claim with confidence that strategic advantage can be secured by some moral advantage.     

The viability of civil war peace agreements

Civil war peace agreements are prone to collapse. While some research suggests that multiple layers of power-sharing provisions lead to more viable agreements, others have suggested that negotiated settlements are not only more likely to return to violence, but that those cases will be more deadly as a result. We suggest here that previous research has failed to address the various ways that peace agreements emerge and that this context is crucial in explaining peace agreement viability. In some situations, rebels are likely to earn those concessions through battlefield success. Governments may feel compelled to address underlying grievances in order to stop the bloodshed and ultimately maintain some political clout in the postwar regime. In other cases, however, governments may feel pressure to engage in discussions and to provide concessions by outside actors, whether in the form of diplomatic intervention, economic, or foreign military intervention. Hypotheses are tested on all civil war peace agreements identified by the UCDP Peace Agreement Data-set for 1975–2011. Findings from logit and hazard models suggest that agreements brought about in the aftermath of military intervention on behalf of rebels are more likely to endure while those earned on the battlefield (i.e., stronger rebels) do not. In addition, mediation enhances peace agreement viability, while interventions on behalf of governments tend to undermine it.     

Enmeshed in insurgency: Britain's protracted retreats from Iraq and Afghanistan

Ten years of counterinsurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan have produced little in Britain's national interest. This article examines the political objectives set in these wars and the reasons why they have proved elusive. The core foreign policy aim was to sustain Britain's position as a great power by assuming responsibility for global order. Alliances with the United States and NATO would be the diplomatic tool for pursuing this aim. These alliances brought obligations, in the shape of agreed common threats. Rogue regimes with weapons of mass destruction and international terrorists harboured in failed states were deemed the primary threats to British security. Military means were therefore used in Iraq and Afghanistan to attack them. Whether Tony Blair's vision of global order ever made sense is debatable, and it attracted scepticism from the outset. The article argues experience in Iraq and Afghanistan showed that a strategy to eliminate terrorism (the WMD threat turned out never to have existed) by expeditionary counterinsurgency could only fail. Therefore the attention lavished on operational-level performance by most studies is misplaced, because no amount of warfighting excellence could make up for strategic incoherence. Finally, the article proposes the more important question arising from the last ten years is why the UK pursued a futile strategy for so long. The difficulties associated with interpreting events, a malfunctioning strategic apparatus, weak political oversight, and bureaucratic self-interest are posited as the most significant explanations.