Choosing arrival process models for service systems: Tests of a nonhomogeneous Poisson process

Service systems such as call centers and hospital emergency rooms typically have strongly time‐varying arrival rates. Thus, a nonhomogeneous Poisson process (NHPP) is a natural model for the arrival process in a queueing model for performance analysis. Nevertheless, it is important to perform statistical tests with service system data to confirm that an NHPP is actually appropriate, as emphasized by Brown et al. [8]. They suggested a specific statistical test based on the Kolmogorov–Smirnov (KS) statistic after exploiting the conditional‐uniform (CU) property to transform the NHPP into a sequence of i.i.d. random variables uniformly distributed on [0,1] and then performing a logarithmic transformation of the data. We investigate why it is important to perform the final data transformation and consider what form it should take. We conduct extensive simulation experiments to study the power of these alternative statistical tests. We conclude that the general approach of Brown et al. [8] is excellent, but that an alternative data transformation proposed by Lewis [22], drawing upon Durbin [10], produces a test of an NHPP test with consistently greater power. We also conclude that the KS test after the CU transformation, without any additional data transformation, tends to be best to test against alternative hypotheses that primarily differ from an NHPP only through stochastic and time dependence. © 2014 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 61: 66–90, 2014     

A mean cost approximation for transportation problems with stochastic demand

Among the many tools of the operations researcher is the transportation algorithm which has been used to solve a variety of problems ranging from shipping plans to plant location. An important variation of the basic transportation problem is the transportation problem with stochastic demand or stochastic supply. This paper presents a simple approximation technique which may be used as a starting solution for algorithms that determine exact solutions. The paper indicates that the approximation technique offered here is superior to a starting solution obtained by substituting expected demand for the random variables.     

THE MYTH OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE

Nuclear deterrence is sometimes treated as a known quantity—a definite thing that keeps us safe and ensures our security. It has also often been used as a justification for possessing nuclear weapons. Nuclear deterrence, however, is based on an unexamined notion: the belief that the threat to destroy cities provides decisive leverage. An examination of history (including recent reinterpretations of the bombing of Hiroshima) shows that destroying cities rarely affects the outcome of wars. How is it possible that an action that is unlikely to be decisive can make an effective threat? Recent work on terrorism suggests that attacks against civilians are often not only ineffective but also counterproductive. And a review of the practical record of nuclear deterrence shows more obvious failures than obvious successes. Given this, the record of nuclear deterrence is far more problematic than most people assume. If no stronger rationale for keeping these dangerous weapons can be contrived, perhaps they should be banned.     

Book reviews

John Lawrence Tone, The Fatal Knot: The Guerrilla War in Navarre and the Defeat of Napoleon in Spain. Chapel Hill and London; The University of North Carolina Press 1994. Pp.vii + 239, 1 map, biblio., index. $34.95 (cloth). ISBN 0–8078–2169–1.

Robert Holland (ed), Emergencies and Disorder in the European Empires after 1945. London: Frank Cass, 1994. Pp.x + 256; index. £32 (cloth); £15 (paper). ISBN 0–7146–4516–8 and 4109 X

Deborah L. Norden, Military Rebellion in Argentina: Between Coups and Consolidation. Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1996. Pp.242, index, $35/$17.50 (paper). ISBN 0–8032–8369–5.

William M. Minter, Apartheid's Contras: An Inquiry into the Roots of War in Angola and Mozambique. London and Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Zed Books Ltd; Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press, 1994. Pp. xii +308, 3 maps, biblio., index. $69.95/£39.95 (cloth); $29.95/£16.95(paper). ISBN 1–85649–266–4 and 266–4.     

A method for reducing coefficients in integer linear inequalities

Approaches are considered for the reduction of coefficients in linear integer inequalities. It is shown that coefficients may be reduced easily in many practical examples. The (0-1) problem is also reconsidered and certain areas of exploration developed.     

Many‐server loss models with non‐poisson time‐varying arrivals

This article proposes an approximation for the blocking probability in a many‐server loss model with a non‐Poisson time‐varying arrival process and flexible staffing (number of servers) and shows that it can be used to set staffing levels to stabilize the time‐varying blocking probability at a target level. Because the blocking probabilities necessarily change dramatically after each staffing change, we randomize the time of each staffing change about the planned time. We apply simulation to show that (i) the blocking probabilities cannot be stabilized without some form of randomization, (ii) the new staffing algorithm with randomiation can stabilize blocking probabilities at target levels and (iii) the required staffing can be quite different when the Poisson assumption is dropped. © 2017 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 64: 177–202, 2017     

Scheduling combat logistics force replenishments at sea for the US Navy

The Replenishment at Sea Planner (RASP) is saving the U.S. Navy millions of dollars a year by reducing fuel consumption of its Combat Logistics Force (CLF). CLF shuttle supply ships deploy from ports to rendezvous with underway U.S. combatants and those of coalition partners. The overwhelming commodity transferred is fuel, ship‐to‐ship by hoses, while other important packaged goods and spare parts are high‐lined, or helicoptered between ships. The U.S. Navy is organized in large areas of responsibility called numbered fleets, and within each of these a scheduler must promulgate a daily forecast of CLF shuttle operations. The operational planning horizon extends out several weeks, or as far into the future as we can forecast demand. We solve RASP with integer linear optimization and a purpose‐built heuristic. RASP plans Replenishment‐at‐Sea (RAS) events with 4‐hour (Navy watch) time fidelity. For five years, RASP has served two purposes: (1) it helps schedulers generate a daily schedule and animates it using Google Earth, and (2) it automates reports command‐to‐ship messages that are essential to keep this complex logistics system operating.     

The BWC protocol mandate for failure

The stage may be set for what could be a historic turning point in America's reliance on nuclear weapons to meet its fundamental national security interests. Proponents of a refurbished nuclear stockpile and infrastructure are convinced that nuclear weapons will remain central to U.S. security interests, yet they admit that there is no national consensus on the need for and role of nuclear weapons. Nuclear opponents are gravely concerned that to the extent nuclear refurbishment creates a global perception that nuclear weapons remain essential instruments, it will eviscerate nuclear nonproliferation measures precisely at a time when nuclear ambitions are growing. Moreover, opponents see deterrence through advanced conventional weapons as decisively more credible than any nuclear alternative. With hopes of elevating discourse to the national level, this article examines the key current arguments pro and con within the specialist community and forecasts changes in the U.S. nuclear arsenal over the next decade. It concludes with a brief prognosis on prospects for complete nuclear disarmament.     

Conflict,technology, and the impact of industrialization: The Great War 1914–18

In major respects, World War I appeared markedly unlike even quite recent wars. What, by and large, caused the difference was not quality of command or changing morale. It was industrial mobilisation and technological advancement. The emergence of new weapons, and of new methods of producing them in volume and at speed, played a crucial role in changing the nature of war.

Certainly, the peculiar qualities of the Great War of 1914–18 were not determined solely by technology. Quite other factors, such as the profundity of the issues at stake ('This war is life and death'), and the relative equality in resources and determination between the principal rivals, also profoundly influenced the nature of the conflict. Yet in delineating the dominant aspects of that struggle, the contribution made by industrialization and technology and a culture of inventiveness must loom large.

Admittedly, in some respects, the transformation of weaponry under the impact of industrialisation did not necessarily produce a new kind of war. The battleship of 1914 was hugely unlike the battleship of 1805, yet the Great War at sea was not strikingly different from the naval war against Napoleon. War in the air was an entirely new phenomenon, yet the aircraft had not reached a state of development where it could fundamentally alter the face of battle.

But in the case of the land war, new weapons and new volumes of weaponry did indeed make a vast difference to the nature and consequence of military operations. In large measure they generated the features by which this struggle is best remembered: stalemate, immobility, great battles of attrition, and ‘futility’.