Applying Order-of-Battle to Al Qaeda Operations

Since the global war on terror began, the pursuit of Al Qaeda is widely considered as warfare and not the pursuit of criminals. In light of counter-terrorism being redefined as war, the criteria applied for tracking militaries of conventional enemies may also be applicable to Al Qaeda. Intelligence analysts have long used the nine order-of-battle (OB) criteria as part of the estimative process for conventional, or nation-state, enemies. Applying OB criteria to Al Qaeda may assist intelligence analysts in knowing the enemy and identifying changes that will allow for predictive analysis. Many elements of Al Qaeda's OB prior to the events of 11 September were viewed as clutter and not significant changes that might have otherwise alerted intelligence analysts to the impending attack. This essay suggests how one might go about applying the nine OB criteria to analysis of Al Qaeda. Although more difficult and requiring modification, using an analytical procedure that has been tested successfully over many years is a logical step in the war on Al Qaeda. If all OB changes are tracked and analyzed using a systematic approach as outlined in this essay, Al Qaeda attacks may be predicted and/or curtailed in the future.     

Systems failure: the US way of irregular warfare

ABSTRACT

Since 9/11, the United States has achieved notable gains against al Qaeda, and also Islamic State (IS), all while avoiding another mass-casualty attack at home. Yet, institutionally, culturally, and in its capabilities, the US government remains seriously ill-equipped for the task of countering irregular threats. Partly as a result, Islamist extremism shows no sign of being defeated, having instead metastasized since 9/11 and spread. Why, given the importance accorded to counterterrorism, has the US approach remained inadequate? What is impeding more fundamental reforms? The article evaluates the United States’ way of irregular warfare: its troubled engagement with counterinsurgency and its problematic search for lower cost and lower risk ways of combating terrorism. It suggests needed reforms but acknowledges also the unlikelihood of change.     

The impact of Islamic State’s ideological correction initiative on al Qaeda’s bid for relevance

ABSTRACT

Al Qaeda following 9-11 experienced a period of stagnation which it sought to remedy through a project of re-branding. Critical of this approach, Islamic State claimed that al Qaeda was an elitist organization that had facilitated the stagnation of the Salafi Jihadist project. In an attempted to claim dominance over the jihad, Islamic State’s endeavored to discredit al Qaeda through a process it presented as ideological correction, linked to Islamic eschatology, sectarian agitation, permissive violence, and the caliphate. Following Islamic State’s acquisition of vast territory in Iraq and Syria, arguments proliferated that Islamic State had surpassed al Qaeda. As the caliphate has collapsed what effects will this have on al Qaeda’s fortunes and strategy? It is argued that Islamic State has provided al Qaeda’s strategic approach with renewed vigour to help ensure its survival and pursue resurgence. Al Qaeda acting in concert with the meta-strategy for survival concept, has altered an existential threat into an advantage through disavowing Islamic State’s methods, continuing to engage with localism, and pursuing rebranding by positioning itself as a moderate alternative. The cases of al Qaeda affiliates in Yemen, Syria, West Africa, and South Asia are instructive in assessing the effectiveness of al Qaeda’s resurgence.     

Operational Combat Analysis of the Al Qaeda Network

Contemporary network organizational structures have gradually developed over the last decades of the twentieth century. These new structures are challenging the traditional hierarchical structure form in a number of venues. In conflict and war, they made their potentials unequivocally known on 11 September 2001 via Al Qaeda's strategic suicide bombings against the United States. To better understand the military potentials of networks, an operational combat analysis of the Al Qaeda network was conducted. This analysis, a modification of weapons systems analysis, focused on network speed, along with offensive, defensive and combat multiplier attributes. Such analysis allows for a better understanding of the military capabilities and vulnerabilities of non-state OPFORs (opposing forces) and our own emergent counter-insurgency networks.     

An Evolving View of Warfare: War and Peace and the American Military Profession

The Western way of warfare has not prepared the US Army or American society for appreciating an approach to national security that does not yield decisive and measurable outcomes. This proclivity may have significant consequences given the changing nature of the international security environment in the twenty-first century. In order to preserve national security and global stability, American strategic thinkers must understand the evolution of the national strategic culture. Then adjustments must be made to deal effectively with the challenges of a changed world order. Rather than limiting the use of force to decisive means and outcomes, the American military profession must be seriously prepared for success in less dramatic stability and support missions.     

Uncovering foreign military innovation

An analysis of US assessments of Germany's development of armored warfare illustrates the problems that intelligence agencies face as they attempt to understand military innovation. The covert nature of German Army's tank research in the years immediately following World War I limited the number of indicators of Berlin's interest in armored warfare. Similarly, the United States possessed at best a fragmentary picture of German experimentation with armor. By the outbreak of World War II, however, US military attaches had nonetheless developed an accurate understanding of German concepts of armored warfare. If the United States is to avoid strategic surprise in the future, it must cultivate intelligence sources and employ considerably different methods from those of the Cold War.     

‘Full spectrum dominance’: Donald Rumsfeld,the Department of Defense,and US irregular warfare strategy, 2001–2008

This article examines the evolution of US irregular warfare (IW) doctrine and practice from 2001 onwards. It argues that, after 9/11, top-tier civilian policymakers in the US Department of Defense (DoD) and across the US government developed a heightened awareness of asymmetric threats and non-conventional forms of warfare, especially those shaped by contemporary globalisation. The result was a gradual turn towards irregular warfare, led by Rumsfeld and the DoD, designed to ensure ‘full spectrum dominance’ across all modes of conflict. This pre-dated the insurgency in Iraq and the promotion of counterinsurgency in the US Army by General David Petraeus and others. Policymakers' reluctance to acknowledge the insurgency in Iraq was not down to a failure to understand the concept of IW, but because they had viewed Iraq in conventional terms for so many years and were reluctant to admit their mistake.     

Warfare by other means: special forces,terrorism and grand strategy

This contribution looks at the role of Special Forces in anti-terrorist operations with particular emphasis on the British Special Air Service. It argues that Special Forces have played a pivotal role in such operations since the era of Palestinian terrorism in the early 1970s. The essay looks at the operations in Afghanistan leading to the overthrow of the Taliban in 2001 and shows that the seven Special Forces involved there proved crucial to the success of the limited ground forces. In particular they served a valuable force multiplier by acting as a nexus between the regional warlords and the use of air power as well as mobile strike units against fortified Al Qaeda and Taliban positions. In the latter instance their success was mixed, involving attacks on difficult cave hideouts, though overall it can be concluded that Special Forces have demonstrated their capacity in fighting unconventional warfare against mobile and transnational terrorist groupings.     

Deviant globalization: the application of strategic landpower*

In both Afghanistan and Iraq, US landpower was able to gain control rapidly over terrain. However, that control ebbed as US presence weakened. Non-state actors, such as the Taliban, the Haqqani network, the Islamic State, and Al Qaeda, gained control of segments of the population. Transnational Criminal Organizations capitalized on this permissive environment to strengthen their networks, often eroding the legitimacy of the host nation government, fueling regional instability, and, ultimately, undermining US policy objectives. The proliferation of deviant globalization, or the connectedness of subversive elements, is a key indicator of future conflict. Strategic landpower is uniquely positioned to influence the physical, psychological, economic, and social interactions of various non-state actors and their association with deviant globalization. It is no longer enough to seize and hold terrain. Landpower must also have the capability to influence the actions and attitudes of populations on that terrain wherever and whenever these interactions occur.     

Challenging the Hegemon: Al Qaeda's Elevation of Asymmetric Insurgent Warfare Onto the Global Arena

This chapter examines how Al Qaeda, an asymmetric power, was able to become a global challenger to the existing international structure. Neither regional insurgency theories nor grand-scale global theories alone are adequate to explain Al Qaeda's ability. Rather, a modification of the seven dimensions of the Manwaring paradigm for successful insurgency combined with key concepts of global revolutionary or imperial powers formerly applied to states gives insight to this fundamental question. Al Qaeda's asymmetric global challenge is unique, and understanding the nature of the threat is key to finally defeating it.     

Waging the inchoate war: Defining,fighting, and second-guessing the ‘Long War’

Abstract

This article answers three questions: What is the nature of the Long War? How is progress (or lack thereof) to be assessed? Where is it likely to go next? An appreciation of Clausewitz shows that practical centers of gravity exist for the Long War, and that the conflict pivots upon the ability to persuasively link ideology to events via a strategic narrative. A close examination of an illustrative case study, the interaction between the US and the late Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in Iraq 2004 – 2006, shows that Al Qaeda has suffered a severe setback, but also that the nature of the war is set to shift yet again. Further tangible progress for the US requires waging the Long War as a global counterinsurgency based on a strategy of ‘selective identification’ (versus pure ‘disaggregation’) as well as an understanding of how to more effectively craft a strategic narrative.     

“No boots on the ground”: the effectiveness of US drones against Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula

The number of US drone strikes against Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in Yemen has increased significantly since 2010, but received limited academic attention. This article examines the effectiveness of this drone campaign using an existing theoretical framework. Crucially, we contribute to the framework by adding a fourth intervening variable, namely target correspondence. Through a single case study, it is found that drones have only enjoyed limited success in degrading AQAP's hierarchical structure, qualified human resources and access to key material resources, and in some cases – owing to our target correspondence analysis – this limited success has come at a price. It is found that drones have temporarily disrupted AQAP by successfully eliminating senior leaders involved in coordinating and overseeing external operations. Overall, AQAP's ability to hit Western targets remains significant.     

The dangerous myths and dubious promise of COIN

Counterinsurgency (COIN) has again emerged as a topic of both contemporary and historical interest in the age of what has been called a global counterinsurgency. However, little attention is being paid to the historical lineage of a COIN doctrine that is being rediscovered and promoted by an enthusiastic group of military intellectuals and commanders as the basis for US Army and Marine Corps doctrine. This article argues that historical claims for COIN success, based on courting popular gratitude by improving economic conditions, are at best anchored in selective historical memory, when not fantasy fabrications. The first argument of this article is that COIN does not constitute a distinct form of warfare, but merely a sub-set of minor tactics. Second, ‘hearts and minds’, so-called population-centric warfare, has seldom been a recipe for lasting stability. Rather, historically counterinsurgency succeeded when it has shattered and divided societies by severely disrupting civilian life. In fact, COIN is a nineteenth century legacy of empire whose uniqueness and impact was mythologized in its own day, and that is unlikely to prove a formula for strategic success in the twenty-first century.     

Why Pakistan failed: tribal focoism in Kashmir

The classical repertoire of insurgency types is under-specified, and does not apply well to the case of Pakistan's conduct of insurgency in Kashmir. Pakistan's approach to insurgency has been a consistent tribal variant of focoism, in which there is a reliance on imported itinerant insurgents to conduct raids to stimulate an uprising. This has its basis in the traditional warfare of the region, learned US insurgency doctrine in the 1960s, and an historical disregard for subject populations, which has led to an aversion to fostering grass-roots political movements.     

网络中心战及其脆弱性分析

当前,在世界范围内,网络技术迅猛地向前发展,在这种背景之下,一种全新的作战样式"网络中心战"正在形成.1997年美国海军率先提出"网络中心战"的观念.对"网络中心战(NCW)"的基本内涵、"网络中心战"和"网络战"及"平台中心战"的区别、"网络中心战"的关键要素进行了概要的阐述,并重点分析了NCW现在和将来可能存在的薄弱环节.     

PIRA Lessons Learned: A Model of Terrorist Leadership Succession

In the global war against terrorism key questions need to be asked concerning how Al Qaeda is reorganizing and who will be leading it. In the absence of, at the very least adequate open source data, how can we answer these vital questions and predict the next evolution of this deadly menace? One possible solution is to study the emergence and evolution of leadership within another terrorist organization. Based on an analysis of the Provisional Irish Republican Army, it is assessed that there have been at least two and possibly three distinct generations of leadership in that group. It is important to note, however, that although these three generations have emerged sequentially, they may well all be in positions of power at the same time. These generations are designated as; early or founding leaders; follow-on and continuity leaders; and embryonic leaders. Such analysis will not tell us whom the new and emerging leaders of Al Qaeda actually are but it might help us to frame the right questions to ask our intelligence collectors.     

Non-lethal weapons and the long tail of warfare

This paper examines whether non-lethal weapons (NLWs) enhance the capability of the US armed forces to conduct irregular warfare (IW) operations. With expectations that the operational environment will only continue to become more complex in the future, NLWs may reduce the level of violence received, as well as dispensed, by US forces while performing tasks in the IW spectrum. We argue that NLWs increase the ability of US forces to address the long tail of warfare and their deployment should be increased in the near term.     

舰空导弹武器抗干扰与反隐身技术研究

电子战在现代战争中的地位和作用日益提高,已从战争辅助保障手段发展成为战争中不可缺少的重要作战武器;电子战是现代战争的序幕与先导,并贯穿于战争的全过程,进而决定战争进程和结局.在分析舰空导弹武器面临的典型干扰目标威胁环境基础上,分析了目前舰空导弹武器存在的主要问题,提出了舰空导弹武器系统发展方向的建议.     

高科技武器装备发展推动作战理念的创新

结合美国在近几年的几次局部战争中所使用的高科技的信息化武器装备、远程作战武器和精确打击武器等武器装备,研究分析了高科技武器装备的发展动态,促进产生了一些新的作战理念(战术战法、作战理论),如网络中心战、夺取制信息权、非对称作战和非线性作战,而新的作战理念又推动了高科技武器装备的完善和进一步发展。同时还分析了高科技武器装备目前尚存在的一些不足。     

Winning hearts and minds in the ‘war on terrorism’

Ten days after the attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon US President George W Bush addressed a joint session of Congress. In an emotional speech he declared war on terrorism and vowed that the US would not rest until all of the perpetrators were brought to justice and A1 Qaeda destroyed. In virtually the next breath he hastened to add that the US-led campaign would not be a war on Islam, a promise Muslims might have found more reassuring had the President not sounded so much like a Baptist preacher. Whatever its propaganda value, the speech distorted the reality of the struggle facing the West while tacitly acknowledging an important truth. Since terror is merely a weapon in a larger struggle, there can be no war on terrorism per se. The West faces a counterinsurgency campaign on a global scale. Winning the hearts and minds of disaffected people in lands where terrorism thrives must be central to conducting this campaign.