Military deployment and international terrorism: do location and mission type matter?

Extant literature documents a relationship between military deployment and the risk of an international terrorist attack against citizens of the deploying country. It appears that deployment significantly increases the possibility of terrorist actions in the home country. In particular, if country A decides to send troops to nation B, then citizens of the former country are more likely to fall victim of an attack carried out by a terrorist organisation originating from the latter country. Contributing to this line of literature, we further refine this relationship by distinguishing between regions where the troops are sent as well as by introducing differences between types of deployment. Our results indicate that missions to Asia and the Middle East are more dangerous than missions to other regions as reflected by the terrorist threat in the home country. Robustness tests do however show that the significance of the location variable Asia is predominantly attributed to the mission to Afghanistan. As for types of deployment, only ad hoc missions seem to increase the risk of an attack, whereas no significant results are found for other missions such as operations under UN and NATO flag. Leaving out the missions to Iraq and Afghanistan however also increases the danger resulting from missions by fixed coalitions. Our results find however no evidence that ‘wearing a blue helmet’ increases the probability of a terrorist attack at home.     

IN SEARCH OF THE AVERAGE TRANSNATIONAL TERRORIST ATTACK VENUE

In this paper we develop an empirical model for transnational terrorist activity for a panel consisting of 139 countries over the period 1985–1998. Essentially, we attempt to sketch the profile of the average terrorist attack venue. Our findings suggest that the terrorist attack venue is, on average, characterized by low economic openness, high demographic stress, and a high level of international disputes. Furthermore, we document a strong regional component suggesting the presence of infectious contagion on a spatial level. Our results also support the presence of addictive contagion captured by a strong autoregressive component in each country’s terrorist activity. Finally, we find a weak statistical link between the level of democracy and terrorist activity, although the level of democracy is a significant determinant of the potential under‐reporting bias of terrorist activity.     

应对“Google Earth”的营区规划对策研究

针对美国Google公司依靠其＂Google Earth＂免费卫星图片浏览软件将大量涉及我军事设施的高清晰度卫星图片公布到互联网上的严重泄密问题,从分析我军营区易暴露的征候出发,探索能够混淆视听、有效规避光学卫星侦察的营区规划对策,为应对战时敌人的攻击、防范平时敌对情报人员的侦察以及恐怖组织的袭击提供一定的技术保障。     

Indications and warning in Belgium: Brussels is not Delphi

The terrorist attacks in France and Belgium of 2015–2016 that occurred while these countries were in a heightened state of alert raise questions about indications and warning methodology as well as effectiveness of the blanket-protection deployment of security services assisted even by the military. Response and perhaps even more anticipation may require strategic rethinking in light of the predatory attacks that target the most vulnerable spots of the public space. This study looks at threat analysis in Belgium as conducted through her intelligence fusion centre Coordination Unit for Threat Analysis (CUTA)?????? since its inception in 2006. With a special focus on what is known, at the time of writing, about the terrorist attacks in Paris and Brussels, this study hopes to put into context how the system (mal)functions and will also consider the preventive measures that respond to the threat, and the international aspects which have implications far beyond Belgian borders. Therefore, a case is made for not just a Belgian homeland security framework, but one that fits into an EU-wide security concept.     

Weakest‐link attacker‐defender games with multiple attack technologies

In this article, we examine a model of terrorism that focuses on the tradeoffs facing a terrorist organization that has two qualitatively different attack modes at its disposal. The terrorist organization's objective is to successfully attack at least one target. Success for the target government is defined as defending all targets from any and all attacks. In this context, we examine how terrorist entities strategically utilize an efficient but discrete attack technology — e.g., suicide attacks — when a more conventional mode of attack is available, and the optimal anti‐terrorism measures.© 2012 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2012     

Proportional use of force in asymmetric military operation

This paper studies a strategic conflict between a state and a non-state military organization. The non-state military organization decides whether to attack or not to attack the state, while the state decides on its counter-measure. If the state uses a high level of violence against the non-state organization, it may be accused by the international community of ‘non-proportional’ use of force, and both sides of the conflict take this possibility into account. The model predicts that it may be rational for the non-state organization to attack the state, even if as a reaction the state will militarily destroy this organization, due to a positive probability the state will be punished by the international community for non-proportional use of violence.     

A NEW STANDARD FOR PREEMPTIVE MILITARY ACTION AGAINST WMD THREATS

International law clearly requires an imminent threat of attack as a justification for the preemptive use of military force. However, the standard definition of an imminent threat was derived centuries before the development of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons or ballistic missiles and other delivery systems that can reach their targets in a matter of minutes. Any use of force to alleviate threats posed by weapons of mass destruction (WMD) prior to tactical warning of the actual launch of such weapons falls into the legally and ethically controversial category of “anticipatory self-defense,” leaving decision makers potentially liable to prosecution for war crimes. Effective and ethical enforcement of nonproliferation therefore demands a standard for imminence of threat broad enough to allow military action as a last resort but sufficiently restrictive to prohibit indiscriminate action against suspected WMD programs. Following a critical review of selected literature and cases on preemption, the author proposes a new standard for preemptive military action: the existence of operational WMD, or a clandestine program to develop WMD, in contravention of international law. The author discusses the implications of this new proposed standard, which at the time of writing would permit preemptive attack against WMD-armed terrorist groups but prohibit it against all states except Iran and possibly North Korea.     

Whatever Happens to Somalia…Ignoring it is No Longer an Option

The war against terrorism has brought Somalia, a country located in a key strategic region, back onto the radar of US and Western security concerns. Following a vicious civil war, a failed peace support operation and several attempts to start a peace process, lawless Somalia, a country without government, has gained the potential to be exploited as a terrorist base. Although this country in the Horn of Africa does not represent a direct and immediate threat to the US or its Western allies, its potential to destabilize the region is extremely high. This article offers an analysis of Somalia's potential to become a ground for terrorist activities and suggests a two-track approach. On the one hand, US foreign and security policy in Somalia needs to be more assertive; on the other, the only way to prevent Somalia from becoming a fertile ground for international terrorist groups is to help stabilize the country. In order to achieve this objective, it is crucial to adopt any initiative aimed at strengthening Somalia's civil society.     

Military Expenditures,Income Inequality,Welfare and Political Regimes: A Dynamic Panel Data Analysis

The goal of this paper is to investigate the relationship between type of welfare regimes and military expenditures. There is a sizeable empirical literature on the development of the welfare state and on the typology of the welfare regimes. There appear to be, however, no empirical studies that examine welfare regimes with special attention to military spending. This study aims at providing a comprehensive analysis on the topic by considering several different welfare regime typologies. To do so, we use dynamic panel data analysis for 37 countries for the period of 1988–2003 by considering a wide range of control variables such as inequality measures, number of terrorist events, and size of the armed forces. We also replicate the same analyses for the political regimes. Our findings, in line with the literature, show that there is a positive relationship between income inequality and share of military expenditures in the central government budget, and that the number of terrorist events is a significant factor that affects both the level of military expenditure and inequality. Also, the paper reveals a significant negative relationship between social democratic welfare regimes and military expenditures.     

Missile warfare and violent non-state actors: the case of Hezbollah

Over the last three decades, Hezbollah adapted its military strategy and the operational function conferred to its missiles. Starting in 1992, rocket warfare became one of the primary tactics of the group to compel Israeli Forces in Lebanon. After the Israeli withdrawal in 2000, the strategy evolved into a deterrence posture to support the Party’s objective to remain the primary military power inside Lebanon. Hezbollah’s posture could serve as a template for smaller terrorist groups. It would broaden the array of strategic options for violent non-state actors, allowing them to implement military postures that could be described as rudimentary and low-cost denial of access strategies. However, this scenario would require the same level of state support that Hezbollah currently enjoys from Iran, and that other non-state actors (Hamas, Houthi insurgents) do not at this stage.     

基于排队论的防空兵力部署优化模型

兵力部署优化问题是防空指控系统的重要研究内容之一。针对多型防空武器多层多区段混合部署问题,对异型空袭武器和防空武器基于作战效能标准化处理,基于排队论给出空袭武器的突防概率计算模型,将防空武器系统综合防御效能作为优化目标,建立多型防空武器扇形部署优化模型。仿真实验验证了优化模型的有效性和合理性,可为科学制定兵力部署方案提供参考。     

Other side of the Iranian coin: Iran’s counterterrorism apparatus

Iran’s support for terrorist groups is the subject of countless articles and monographs. Less emphasis is placed on Tehran’s efforts to fight terrorist groups targeting the Iranian state. Yet, modern domestic and foreign terrorist groups have targeted Iran for decades. As a result, the country has developed fairly sophisticated, albeit opaque, counterterrorism apparatus and mechanisms. This article sheds light on the Iranian counterterrorism apparatus and efforts since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, drawing on several years of fieldwork in Iran, interviews with current and former officials, and Persian sources.     

ARE USA CITIZENS AT RISK OF TERRORISM IN EUROPE?

This paper analyzes the determinants of the probability of US citizens being victims of terrorist attacks in European countries, taking into account uncontrolled heterogeneity of the data. The analysis employs ITERATE data from February 1968 to December 2002 to ascertain significant characteristics that influence the probability (e.g. location, type of casualties, type of attack, and type of terrorists). To deal with the unobserved heterogeneity a random‐parameter logit model (mixed logit) is used. Some policy implications are presented.     

Reassessing Military Assistance to the Civil Powers: Are Traditional British Anti-Terrorist Responses Still Effective?

The provision of Military Assistance to the Civil Powers (MACP) encapsulates the traditional approach towards countering terrorism on the British mainland, which emphasises minimum force, proportionality, police primacy and the rule of law, with the military retained as a supporting instrument, being employed only as a measure of last resort. Recent terrorist incidents in major urban centres do, however, question the effectiveness of these established methods. This analysis initially codifies the conceptual issues that underscore the tensions between civil policing and military anti-terrorist approaches in the UK, and proceeds to evaluate and compare a number of operations that indicate the nature of the challenges facing the MACP apparatus. In particular, potential shortcomings in the MACP provisions are identified in the form of threat perception and deployment and enforcement gaps. The assessment finds that there are facets of MACP that are of enduring relevance in the current era, yet a continuing need persists to reconcile police and military imperatives toward serious civil disorder contingencies and conditions of emergency.     

新型复杂武器装备早期部署阶段军代表技术保障工作研究与实践

新型复杂武器装备形成部队战斗力问题是我军武器装备建设与发展面临的重大课题,其早期部署阶段的技术保障工作更是形成部队战斗力的重中之重,涉及到研制生产单位、院校、部队等各方面工作。本文着重围绕新型复杂武器装备早期部署阶段军代表的技术保障工作进行了研究,并结合某型自行高炮武器系统的实践,提出了建立以军代表为核心和纽带的新装备尽快形成战斗力的技术保障工作模式。     

Country survey: Angola

This paper is a survey of Angola’s defence sector and policy from 1992, the year the civil war ended, to 2012. Angola achieved its independence upon the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) defeating National Union for the Total Independence of Angola. Since then, fuelled by its rich natural resources, the country has grown steadily. The MPLA military forces were a central factor behind independence and maintain their central role to this day. Moreover, Angola’s support for African peace with monitoring military missions is a clear indication that the country aims to intervene in African security and military issues, with its military capabilities funded by oil revenues.     

现代防空体系中三层作战问题研究

对现代防空体系中三道防线的基本概念和三层作战的任务区分进行了讨论,然后围绕如何对现代防空作战做三层部署展开了论述。首先概述了第一层作战中远程破击的必要性并进一步提出了抗击预警机的主要战法,然后在关于第二层作战问题上重点通过数学建模的方法,对地空导弹距离保卫目标的最佳配置距离进行了研究,最后对第三层作战防空兵作战部署形式及方法进行了讨论,为指挥员进行正确战斗部署提供了一定的参考。     

US Counterinsurgency vs Iranian-Sponsored Terrorism

Terrorist networks involve not only non-state actors but also an international environment in which state sponsors and 'gray areas' play significant roles. Non-state actors need the sanctuaries of state sponsors and of areas outside of effective state control to recruit, organize, and train their ranks, and to finance their activities. Through statistical analysis of statements of Iranian state intentions, and measures of direct US military interventions, this study examines how US military interventions into Iran's perceived sphere of interests deterred Iranian support for terrorist actions by its proxy groups against United States targets from 1980 to 1990.     

A cost–benefit analysis of terrorist attacks

A cost–benefit analysis of terrorist attacks is developed and placed within a systematic theoretical structure. For the target or object of the attack, we consider the lost value of human lives, lost economic value, and lost influence value, counted as benefits for the terrorist. The corresponding losses for the terrorist are counted as costs. The terrorist attacks if benefits outweigh costs. Bounded rationality is enabled where the three kinds of benefits and costs can be weighted differently. We account for two ex ante probabilities of successful planning and attack, and enable the terrorist to assign different weights to its multiple stakeholders. We introduce multiple time periods, time discounting, attitudes towards risk, and subcategories for the benefits and costs. The cost–benefit analysis is illustrated with the 11 September 2001 attack, and 53 incidents in the Global Terrorism Database yielding both positive and negative expected utilities. The paper is intended as a tool for scientists and policy-makers, as a way of thinking about costs and benefits of terrorist attacks.     

印度处置孟买恐怖袭击事件的教训及启示

2008年11月,发生在印度最大的海港城市孟买的恐怖袭击事件,引起人们普遍关注。从分析印度应对此次袭击事件的行动入手,总结了印度反恐行动失败的教训和暴露出的问题,并着重阐述了印度处置孟买恐怖袭击事件对我国反恐力量建设及做好反恐斗争准备工作的几点启示。