The impact of operational decisions on the design of salesforce incentives

When facing high levels of overstock inventories, firms often push their salesforce to work harder than usual to attract more demand, and one way to achieve that is to offer attractive incentives. However, most research on the optimal design of salesforce incentives ignores this dependency and assumes that operational decisions of production/inventory management are separable from design of salesforce incentives. We investigate this dependency in the problem of joint salesforce incentive design and inventory/production control. We develop a dynamic Principal‐Agent model with both Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection in which the principal is strategic and risk‐neutral but the agent is myopic and risk‐averse. We find the optimal joint incentive design and inventory control strategy, and demonstrate the impact of operational decisions on the design of a compensation package. The optimal strategy is characterized by a menu of inventory‐dependent salesforce compensation contracts. We show that the optimal compensation package depends highly on the operational decisions; when inventory levels are high, (a) the firm offers a more attractive contract and (b) the contract is effective in inducing the salesforce to work harder than usual. In contrast, when inventory levels are low, the firm can offer a less attractive compensation package, but still expect the salesforce to work hard enough. In addition, we show that although the inventory/production management and the design of salesforce compensation package are highly correlated, information acquisition through contract design allows the firm to implement traditional inventory control policies: a market‐based state‐dependent policy (with a constant base‐stock level when the inventory is low) that makes use of the extracted market condition from the agent is optimal. This work appears to be the first article on operations that addresses the important interplay between inventory/production control and salesforce compensation decisions in a dynamic setting. Our findings shed light on the effective integration of these two significant aspects for the successful operation of a firm. © 2014 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 61: 320–340, 2014     

Structural models of award fee contracts

This paper describes the construction of a mathematical model structure in a particular area of management. In addition it is intended as an illustration of how appropriate levels of mathematics can be utilized in management research when original formulations lack sufficient precision for conducting quantitative analyses. The specific area studied deals with the formulation and analysis of contract types. In particular the award fee type contract is treated. At present mathematical structure models for other contract types have received considerable attention, but award fee types have not been structured in mathematical terms. The paper provides a discussion of model formulation for award fee contracts, develops a detailed example of such a structure, and illustrates that model by numerical examples indicating the application of such models to the formulation and analysis of award fee contracts.     

NO SUCH THING AS A FREE LUNCH

The funding of international nuclear risk mitigation is ad hoc, voluntary, and unpredictable, offering no transparent explanation of who is financially responsible for the task or why. Among many non-nuclear-armed states, this exacerbates a sense of injustice surrounding what they see as a discriminatory nuclear regime. The resulting erosion of the regime's legitimacy undermines support for efforts to prevent nuclear weapons dissemination and terrorism. This article proposes a transparent, equitable “nuclear-user-pays” system as a logical means of reversing this trend. This system envisions states contributing financially to international efforts to mitigate nuclear risks at a level relative to the degree of nuclear risks created by each state. “National nuclear risk factors” would be calculated by tabulating the risks associated with each state's civilian and military nuclear activities, as well as advanced dual-use and nuclear-capable missile activities, multiplying the severity of each risk by the probability of it occurring, and combining these results. A nuclear-user-pays model would create financial incentives for national and corporate nuclear risk mitigation, boost legitimacy and support for nuclear control efforts among non-nuclear-armed states, assist in preventing nuclear weapons dissemination and terrorism, and advance nuclear disarmament by helping progressively devalue nuclear weapons.     

导弹目标识别的最小贝叶斯风险分类器

在贝叶斯决策理论的基础上,通过划分目标特性空间的方法,推导了目标分类问题的总风险表达式.并根据导弹目标识别的特点,建立了导弹目标识别的最小贝叶斯风险模型,给出了基于风险分析的导弹目标识别的具体实现方法.最后,依据导弹目标的实际情况给出了仿真参数并进行了仿真试验,试验结果证明了本方法的有效性.     

Supply contracts in manufacturer‐retailer interactions with manufacturer‐quality and retailer effort‐induced demand

We consider a decentralized distribution channel where demand depends on the manufacturer‐chosen quality of the product and the selling effort chosen by the retailer. The cost of selling effort is private information for the retailer. We consider three different types of supply contracts in this article: price‐only contract where the manufacturer sets a wholesale price; fixed‐fee contract where manufacturer sells at marginal cost but charges a fixed (transfer) fee; and, general franchise contract where manufacturer sets a wholesale price and charges a fixed fee as well. The fixed‐fee and general franchise contracts are referred to as two‐part tariff contracts. For each contract type, we study different contract forms including individual, menu, and pooling contracts. In the analysis of the different types and forms of contracts, we show that the price only contract is dominated by the general franchise menu contract. However, the manufacturer may prefer to offer the fixed‐fee individual contract as compared to the general franchise contract when the retailer's reservation utility and degree of information asymmetry in costs are high. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2008     

Optimal admission pricing policies for M/Ek/1 queues

This paper extends the Low-Lippman M/M/1 model to the case of Gamma service times. Specifically, we have a queue in which arrivals are Poisson, service time is Gamma-distributed, and the arrival rate to the system is subject to setting an admission fee p. The arrival rate λ(p) is non-increasing in p. We prove that the optimal admission fee p^* is a non-decreasing function of the customer work load on the server. The proof is for an infinite capacity queue and holds for the infinite horizon continuous time Markov decision process. In the special case of exponential service time, we extend the Low-Lippman model to include a state-dependent service rate and service cost structure (for finite or infinite time horizon and queue capacity). Relatively recent dynamic programming techniques are employed throughout the paper. Due to the large class of functions represented by the Gamma family, the extension is of interest and utility.     

装备采购线性合同优化研究

高额装备费支出使对招投标合同优化问题备受国防经济学界关注,对装备采办过程中招投标线性合同的优化进行了研究。采用招投标模型与委托-代理模型分析相结合的方法,先从道德风险与风险分担2个方面分析装备采购合同的优化问题,然后引入竞争效应,分析风险分担的问题。即使在双方为风险中性不需要风险分担时,DoD仍然需要在最初的投标竞争与中标后承包商降低成本行为之间进行权衡。一般的投标中,应使最终支付基于实际成本和投标值2个因素,并考虑最终支付基于道德风险损失。研究的基本结论是:固定价格合同应尽可能少地使用;若存在2个以上的投标人,成本加价合同也应禁止使用;在使用激励合同时,应慎重选择合同系数,提出了计算优化线性激励合同系数的方法。     

The internal control constraint on compliance

Compliance to non-violent norms of collective behaviour may be contingent on the internal political stability of a state. If external developments give rise to economic incentives for agents to change their allegiance, increasing international tension may be a strategy employed in order to produce counter-incentives. A model based on the theory of investment under uncertainty is developed to examine this issue. Increases in tension will offset incentives created by growth opportunities to switch employment and hence political allegiance. The proportion of incentive rewards as compared to position-specific rents in an economy turns out to be crucial to the behaviour of the model. The model allows various policy options, such as embargoes to be analysed.     

武器系统经济性参数的支持向量机方法分析

采用一种基于支持向量机的武器系统费用分析方法.计算结果表明,这种方法有效解决了参数法对样本量要求较高以及对非线性问题处理能力较弱等问题.与传统方法相比较,有更好的拟合精度和泛化能力,因而该方法可以作为研究此类问题的新途径.     

基于形态滤波的漏磁信号基线漂移在线处理

为了实现快速漏磁检测,采用形态滤波的方法对漏磁信号的基线漂移进行在线处理．首先,运用Maragos类型形态滤波器,选择平面结构元素作为最佳形态滤波形式,并通过实验得到最佳结构元素选取标准;然后,利用该滤波器和小波分解的方法分别对仿真信号和采集到的漏磁信号进行基线漂移的处理．结果表明：形态滤波的方法能够实时准确地实现基线漂移的去除．     

H∞鲁棒滤波在机动目标跟踪中的应用

在交互多模型中通常使用的卡尔曼滤波器中，引入广义H∞鲁棒滤波器，以一定的精度为代价，换取满意的鲁棒性能。H∞鲁棒滤波算法可以分解为卡尔曼滤波和鲁棒化两个环节，从而形成一种基于增益失调因子的结构化分解算法。、为验证算法的有效性，进行了Monte Carlo仿真。仿真结果表明，本文算法跟踪复杂机动目标时跟踪性能有较大提高，有很好的可实现性.     

古今汉字构造理论对比研究

通过对传统六书理论和现代汉字构造理论的对比评析,首先论述了古今汉字构造理论是否具有普遍的适应性;其次就部件和笔画的规范问题进行了深入探讨,最后分析了汉字理论系统化问题。就研究方法而言,从微观切入,实现宏观目标,旨在全面认识汉字的构造理论,使汉字的未来发展更具有科学理性。     

Bayesian sampling plans for exponential distributions with interval censored samples

This article studies the problem of designing Bayesian sampling plans (BSP) with interval censored samples. First, an algorithm for deriving the conventional BSP is proposed. The BSP is shown to possess some monotonicity. Based on the BSP and using the property of monotonicity, a new sampling plan modified by the curtailment procedure is proposed. The resulting curtailed Bayesian sampling plan (CBSP) can reduce the duration time of life test experiment, and it is optimal in the sense that its associated Bayes risk is smaller than the Bayes risk of the BSP if the cost of the duration time of life test experiment is considered. A numerical example to compute the Bayes risks of BSP and CBSP and related quantities is given. Also, a Monte Carlo simulation study is performed to illustrate the performance of the CBSP compared with the BSP. The simulation results demonstrate that our proposed CBSP has better performance because it has smaller risk. The CBSP is recommended. © 2015 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 62: 604–616, 2015     

The effects of customer rebates and retailer incentives on a manufacturer's profits and sales

In some industries such as automotive, production costs are largely fixed and therefore maximizing revenue is the main objective. Manufacturers use promotions directed to the end customers and/or retailers in their distribution channels to increase sales and market share. We study a game theoretical model to examine the impact of “retailer incentive” and “customer rebate” promotions on the manufacturer's pricing and the retailer's ordering/sales decisions. The main tradeoff is that customer rebates are given to every customer, while the use of retailer incentives is controlled by the retailer. We consider several models with different demand characteristics and information asymmetry between the manufacturer and a price discriminating retailer, and we determine which promotion would benefit the manufacturer under which market conditions. When demand is deterministic, we find that retailer incentives increase the manufacturer's profits (and sales) while customer rebates do not unless they lead to market expansion. When the uncertainty in demand (“market potential”) is high, a customer rebate can be more profitable than the retailer incentive for the manufacturer. With numerical examples, we provide additional insights on the profit gains by the right choice of promotion.© 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2010     

基于两级供应关系的军械战备器材存储模型研究

提出了在一定经费的约束条件下,使所有二级存储场站的所有战备器材期望缺货数最小的模型,通过对后方仓库存量初值和场站库存量的确定,求解出后方仓库和场站之间库存量的优化分配调整方案。最后通过实例得出发散型布局形态模型。     

Reconstruction,the Long Tail and Decentralisation: An Application to Iraq and Afghanistan

In this paper, we examine the current state of knowledge in the economics literature on the conduct of reconstruction activities in Iraq and Afghanistan. As stabilisation and reconstruction missions grow in importance for units deployed to these regions, it becomes more important to understand what activities can promote economic growth at the local level. While military operations focus on interdicting the insurgency, successful counter-insurgency campaigns have typically addressed the conditions conducive to the insurgency. Mitigating the incentives for individuals to participate in an insurgency is imperative. Well-crafted and timed reconstruction activities can, we argue, attenuate these incentives.     

先秦兵家军事激励思想研究

先秦时期的兵家军事激励思想以赏罚为核心,以宗法家族为支撑,以情感为纽带,以道德为原则,以礼、仪为形式。这些构成了先秦时期兵家军事激励思想的主体部分,同时以其派生物为补充,构成了整个先秦时期的兵家军事激励内容。     

Impacts of sequential acquisition,market competition mode,and confidentiality on information flow

We investigate information flow in a setting in which 2 retailers order from a supplier and sell to a market with uncertain demand. Each retailer has access to a signal. The retailers can disclose signals to each other (horizontal information sharing), while the supplier can solicit signals by offering retailers differential payments as incentives for signal disclosure (vertical information acquisition). In the base setting, market competition is in quantity, and a retailer can fully infer the signal that the other retailer discloses to the supplier. We show that the supplier prefers to sequentialize the procedure for information acquisition. Moreover, vertical information acquisition by the supplier is a strategic complement to horizontal information sharing between the retailers to establish information flow. In the equilibrium, the retailers have no incentive to exchange signals, but system wide information transparency can be realized through a combination of information acquisition and inference. We further study the signaling effect, whereby the supplier utilizes wholesale pricing as an instrument to affect the retailers' inference of the shared signals, and price competition to explore their impacts on the supplier's preference for sequential acquisition and the sustainability of information flow.     

Spatial pricing and product allocation in online retailing

Spatial pricing means a retailer price discriminates its customers based on their geographic locations. In this article, we study how an online retailer should jointly allocate multiple products and facilitate spatial price discrimination to maximize profits. When deciding between a centralized product allocation ((i.e., different products are allocated to the same fulfillment center) and decentralized product allocation (ie, different products are allocated to different fulfillment centers), the retailer faces the tradeoff between shipment pooling (ie, shipping multiple products in one package), and demand localization (ie, stocking products to satisfy local demand) based on its understanding of customers' product valuations. In our basic model, we consider two widely used spatial pricing policies: free on board (FOB) pricing that charges each customer the exact amount of shipping cost, and uniform delivered (UD) pricing that provides free shipping. We propose a stylized model and find that centralized product allocation is preferred when demand localization effect is relatively low or shipment pooling benefit is relatively high under both spatial pricing policies. Moreover, centralized product allocation is more preferred under the FOB pricing which encourages the purchase of virtual bundles of multiple products. Furthermore, we respectively extend the UD and FOB pricing policies to flat rate shipping (ie, the firm charges a constant shipping fee for each purchase), and linear rate shipping (ie, the firm sets the shipping fee as a fixed proportion of firm's actual fulfillment costs). While similar observations from the basic model still hold, we find the firm can improve its profit by sharing the fulfillment cost with its customers via the flat rate or linear rate shipping fee structure.     

Shifting power,preventive logic,and the response of the target: Germany,Russia, and the First World War

If a declining state has incentives for preventive war, the rising state should have incentives to delay a confrontation until it is stronger. We develop the theoretical paradox and examine the July 1914 crisis. Why did Russia, rising relative to Germany, not adopt a buying-time strategy? We argue that although most Russian leaders hoped to avoid a confrontation, they feared that the failure to support Serbia would lead to a loss of Russian credibility and a significant setback to Russia’s position in the Balkans, one that could not easily be reversed, even with Russia’s expected increase in relative military power.