Waging the inchoate war: Defining,fighting, and second-guessing the ‘Long War’

Abstract

This article answers three questions: What is the nature of the Long War? How is progress (or lack thereof) to be assessed? Where is it likely to go next? An appreciation of Clausewitz shows that practical centers of gravity exist for the Long War, and that the conflict pivots upon the ability to persuasively link ideology to events via a strategic narrative. A close examination of an illustrative case study, the interaction between the US and the late Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in Iraq 2004 – 2006, shows that Al Qaeda has suffered a severe setback, but also that the nature of the war is set to shift yet again. Further tangible progress for the US requires waging the Long War as a global counterinsurgency based on a strategy of ‘selective identification’ (versus pure ‘disaggregation’) as well as an understanding of how to more effectively craft a strategic narrative.     

Escalation in Irregular War: Using Strategic Theory to Examine from First Principles

Abstract

If all violence is intended to achieve political effects, what is distinctive about escalation in irregular war? Indeed, what is irregular war? To answer such fundamental questions this analysis employs the principles of strategic theory in an attempt to offer a theoretical and practical framework that will facilitate an appreciation of the subsequent contributions to this special issue. The assessment seeks to articulate how the escalation process in conditions of so-called irregular war might be conceptualized and, via examples, illustrate how certain broad observations may be held to be true. Ultimately, though, the argument emphasizes that the process of escalation cannot be distinctive or follow predictable patterns given that all wars are unique to their time and place and will be affected in their conduct by the contingent forces of passion, chance and reason.     

Grammar but No Logic: Technique is Not Enough – A Response to Nagl and Burton

Abstract

In issue 33/1 of The Journal of Strategic Studies, John Nagl and Brian Burton were provided with the opportunity to respond to the observations we made in our article, ‘Whose Hearts and Whose Minds? The Curious Case of Global Counter-Insurgency’, which appeared in the same issue. Nagl and Burton's reply, however, did not overtly address the points raised in our article, but instead offered a re-statement of the precepts of classical counter-insurgency (COIN). While we certainly recognise the value of counter-insurgency methods in conflicts such as those in Iraq and Afghanistan, Nagl and Burton's reply overlooks our original concerns about the limited utility of neo-counter-insurgency thinking outside these environments and the dangerous political implications it contains. They further ignore our core contention that a narrow preoccupation with theatre-specific technique has profound limitations when offered as a universal panacea to address complex transnational threats.     

What U.S. Navy strategists and defense planners should think about in the era of maritime great power competition

ABSTRACT

For the first time in a generation, the US Navy finds itself in an era of great power competition. As US naval strategists and defense planners begin to organise materially and conceptually to confront the strategic and operational-level challenges posed by China and Russia, what should they keep in mind? What should frame their thinking? Absorbed with the day-to-day tasks associated with managing how the fleet is being built, operated, and rationalised, these busy officers and civilians seldom can step back and gain some perspective on fundamental aspects of the security environment and relate those to naval purpose. To that end, this article provides a primer on what to keep in mind and how to think in an era of maritime great power competition.     

The First Carlist War (1833–40), insurgency,Ramón Cabrera,and expeditionary warfare

ABSTRACT

The period 1833 to 1840 witnessed a brutal civil war in Spain waged between insurgent Carlists and the government Cristinos. The Carlists managed to secure reliable territorial control only over one part of Spain (upland Navarra and rural parts of the neighbouring Basque provinces). Although pockets of armed Carlism flourished elsewhere in Spain, especially in Catalonia, Aragón and Galicia, these insurgents were ineffective at coordinating actions. The Carlist court in the Basque country tried to break its strategic blockade by launching a series of expeditions into Cristino-held territory in the hope of destabilising the Madrid regime and consolidating distant insurrections. This article explains how and why these expeditions scored tactical victories but strategic failures. In particular it argues that Carlist raiding strategy was a failure, for its use of violence against real and imagined enemies in marginal and Cristino areas of control alienated civilian support.     

The struggle of a Kantian power in a Lockean world – German leadership in security and defence policy

ABSTRACT

German security and defence policy has undergone substantial transformation. This transformation requires an unprecedented level of political leadership, suggesting that Germany needs to solve the dilemma of how to supply leadership to increasingly demanding partners. What are the conditions under which German leadership can unfold in security and defence policy? To what degree do German role-conceptions of international agency and role-expectations of German leadership coincide? What kind of leadership outputs are produced? This study offers a comprehensive analysis of German security and defence policy in terms of supply (role conceptions) and demand (role expectations). We outline three leadership role conceptions present in the German strategic debate, which we then assess in the context of the Wendtian theory of cultures of anarchy. We then analyse Berlin's leadership in terms of outputs via the case study on Anchor Army and the Framework Nations Concept. We conclude that while Germany has tried to match leadership role expectations both rhetorically and in action, Berlin's leadership inputs have so far been insufficient. This has led to an imbalance in terms of role conceptions and expectations hampering effective German leadership in security and defence policy.     

Worth many sins: Al-Shabaab’s shifting relationship with Kenyan women

ABSTRACT

What happens when the world’s ‘oldest profession’ interacts with history’s oldest form of war? In the Horn of Africa, a symbiotic relationship between prostitutes and terrorists has emerged, illuminating critical information about the group’s ideology and strategy. In this article, we argue that al-Shabaab’s differential treatment of Somali and other East African women reveals the group’s strategic focus on Somalia, despite its claims to be a globally focused Islamic extremist organization. Through original ethnographic fieldwork in Kenya, the authors explore al-Shabaab’s deliberate relationships with different groups of women and explain how this helps scholars better understand the group. This article suggests the next phase of scholarship on gender and terrorism, encouraging scholars not only to pay attention to the relationship between women and terrorist groups, but to also examine the nuanced relationships between different categories of women and terrorist groups.     

Rethinking strategic culture: A computational (social science) discursive-institutionalist approach

ABSTRACT

The strategic culture approach has been suffering from a prolonged theoretical stalemate, despite a surge in case studies, which culminated in the Johnston-Gray debate and subsequent schism. The present paper outlines a new approach designed to overcome this deadlock, and consists of three arguments. First, the three previous generations of strategic culture studies have failed to explain how strategic culture influences behaviour. Second, aligning strategic culture theory-building with discursive institutionalism offers a way to overcome this fundamental fallacy. Third, a research programme for strategic culture should draw on computational social science to enable it to present and test middle-range theories.     

What is the global landpower network and what value might it provide?

US national security guidance, as well as the US Army’s operational experiences since 2001, emphasizes the importance of working closely with partner countries to achieve US strategic objectives. The US Army has introduced the global landpower network (GLN) concept as a means to integrate, sustain and advance the Army’s considerable ongoing efforts to meet US national security guidance. This study develops the GLN concept further, and addresses three questions. What benefits can the GLN provide the Army? What are the essential components of the GLN? What options exist for implementing the GLN concept? By developing the GLN concept, the Army has the opportunity to transition the GLN from an often ad hoc and reactive set of relationships to one that the Army more self-consciously prioritizes and leverages as a resource to meet US strategic objectives.     

The Deutch commission report: An overview

The threat posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is real and urgent. Combating this threat requires a new and comprehensive approach by the federal government. It requires sustained leadership at the top and an organizational structure that can set policies and objectives for combating proliferation; develop integrated, government‐wide plans to implement those policies and objectives, including plans for acquiring necessary technology; make appropriate decisions regarding how resources should be allocated to carry out those plans; and regularly evaluate the effectiveness of our policies, programs, and operations. There is no such comprehensive approach today.     

Rebels & Legitimacy; An Introduction

Abstract

This introduction to the double special issue on the theme of rebels and legitimacy aims to set out the parameters for the discussion. It looks at legitimacy as a concept and at legitimation as a process. To date most of the literature on legitimacy has focused on the state. However, rebel groups such as insurgents, terrorists, warlords and guerrillas have all had claims, and continue to claim, legitimacy as well. How and when are these rebels seen as legitimate actors? Existing suggestions of rebel legitimacy focus heavily on state models of social order and the social contract. This first contribution discusses how to conceptualize legitimacy and how to make it operational. A two-pronged approach, borrowing heavily from Max Weber, is proposed. Legitimacy is investigated based on beliefs and belief systems about what is considered legitimate. This is combined with practices whereby legitimacy is enacted, copied and emulated by the population the rebels claim to represent.     

Attacking the Atom: Does Bombing Nuclear Facilities Affect Proliferation?

Abstract

What are the consequences of military strikes against nuclear facilities? In particular, do they ‘work’ by delaying the target states ability to build the bomb? This article addresses these questions by conducting an analysis of 16 attacks against nuclear facilities from 1942 to 2007. We analyze strikes that occurred during peacetime and raids that took place in the context of an ongoing interstate war. The findings indicate that strikes are neither as uniformly fruitless as the skeptics would suggest, nor as productive as advocates have claimed. There is evidence that the peacetime attacks delayed the target's nuclear program, although the size of this effect is rather modest. The wartime cases were less successful, as attacks often missed their targets either due to operational failure or limited intelligence on the location of critical targets. In our concluding section we show that many of the conditions that were conducive to past success are not present in the contemporary Iran case. Overall, our findings reveal an interesting paradox. The historical cases that have successfully delayed proliferation are those when the attacking state struck well before a nuclear threat was imminent. Yet, this also happens to be when strikes are the least legitimate under international law, meaning that attacking under these conditions is most likely to elicit international censure.     

Modern liberal wars,illiberal allies,and peace as the failure of policy

ABSTRACT

The post-Cold War period nearly up to the present has been characterised as the age of liberal wars, yet key facets of the liberal guidance of war remain under appreciated. This article seeks to address this wider gap with regard to the particular concern of war termination and the fulfilment or failure of policy. First, it develops characterisations of liberal wars based on the existing literature, identifying three broad types through consideration of context—defensive versus offensive—and of political and strategic agency, particularly regarding the motives for and intents of action. Three types of liberal wars result: defensive liberal wars, offensive liberal wars with humanitarian motive and geopolitical intent, and offensive liberal wars with geopolitical motive and humanitarian intent. The article then presents one exemplary case for each liberal war with an emphasis on how liberal strategy required an illiberal ally and that ally's effect on the subsequent peace.     

The snowball phenomenon: the US Marine Corps,military mythology and the spread of hybrid warfare theory

ABSTRACT

This article reviews the book by Ofer Fridman and seeks to situate the strategic debate on hybrid war in the context of debate on the US involvement in Iraq. It points to intellectuals from the Marine Corps having a significant role in the initial development of the hybrid warfare concept at a time of some reservation in US military circles over COIN strategy as this was set out in the field manual FM3-24. Thereafter, the hybrid war concept rapidly spread and became a conceptual device used to explain Russian strategic intentions in the aftermath of the invasion of Ukraine in 2014.     

Don't stop with Joint Forces Command … cut AFRICOM too

Abstract

The United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) has been a military success but a strategic messaging failure. The United States’ relationships across Africa cannot be boiled down to military affairs. This paper argues that Africa has many more opportunities than challenges and thus requires a more balanced foreign policy solution from Washington DC than a new military command. For the military engagement that does need to take place, a more low-profile approach would benefit the United States in Africa.     

Local ownership as international governmentality: Evidence from the EU mission in the Horn of Africa

ABSTRACT

While some Foucault-inspired studies construe local ownership in international interventions as a form of liberal governmentality that aims to govern through freedom, others lambast it as an illiberal governmentality that is likely to be resisted because it undermines local autonomy. However, we still do not know what is the rationality behind local ownership, how it is being operationalized, and why a principle that aims to govern through freedom ends up curtailing it. I argue that local ownership, echoing the colonial principle of indirect rule, is driven by the rationality of advanced democracies on how best to govern global insecurities at a distance. Consequently, ownership is operationalized as responsibilization for externally designed objectives. This often gives rise to local resistance which undermines international efforts to achieve ownership. I illustrate my arguments with evidence from the EU Mission on Regional Maritime Capacity Building in the Horn of Africa (EUCAP Nestor).     

India’s nuclear counter-revolution: nuclear learning and the future of deterrence

ABSTRACT

The India–Pakistan near war of February–March 2019 highlights India’s ongoing evolution in strategic thought and practice since its emergence in 1998 as an overt nuclear-weapon possessor. These changes, involving an increasing willingness to engage in the intentional escalation of conflict with a nuclear-armed rival willing to be the first to use nuclear weapons, challenge certain academic assumptions about the behavior of nuclear-weapon states. In particular, they undermine the expectations of the nuclear-revolution theory—which anticipates nuclear and conventional restraint among nuclear-armed rivals through fear of mutual assured destruction—and the model of nuclear learning which underpins this theory, in which new nuclear-weapon states gradually absorb this restraint through policy-maker learning. This article explores how India’s learning pathway since 1998 has deviated from these expectations. India is instead pursuing its own “revolution,” in the direction of creating capabilities for flexible response and escalation dominance. It concludes by illuminating the similarities between Indian strategic behavior and contemporary practices of other nuclear-armed states, and suggests that New Delhi’s emerging de facto nuclear doctrine and posture is part of a broader empirical challenge to our current conceptions of the nuclear revolution and of nuclear learning.     

Bedeviled by a Paradox: Nitze,Bundy, and an Incipient Nuclear Norm

ABSTRACT

This article explores how two influential American policy makers—Paul Nitze and McGeorge Bundy—wrestled with the idea of a norm against the use of nuclear weapons. Existing scholarship has overlooked how both Bundy and Nitze came to understand the idea of nuclear non-use, especially related to the credibility of threats to use nuclear weapons. Using documentary evidence from their personal papers, this article illuminates the thinking of Bundy and Nitze, finding that both engaged with the idea of a norm of non-use of nuclear weapons in their strategic writing and thought.     

Introduction

ABSTRACT

The new nuclear history can make a critical contribution by forcing us to reconsider or reframe the theoretical premises of the concepts we apply to our understanding of the present – and with which we try to navigate the future. It bears on fundamental questions, such as: How should the US manage its alliances? Should it establish a multilateral nuclear policy dialogue in Asia? In what depth should it discuss issues of doctrine and targeting with its Asian allies? What capabilities might reassure European allies in light of current Russian revisionism? Could nuclear war be limited and controlled in an East Asian maritime arena? Do nuclear weapons strengthen an alliance, or do they introduce a divisive bone of contention? Is extended nuclear deterrence (END) stabilizing or is it on the contrary pushing the allies to ask for more? What is the relationship between nuclear and conventional forces in END credibility? How do nuclear alliances contribute to international security and international order? The lessons and insights from these papers, which look at five historical cases of US extended deterrence during the Cold War, should help us think about crucial current issues, and be of use both to historians who want to have a better understanding of the Cold War past and to policymakers who are currently grappling with these issues.     

Demobilisation,disarmament and reintegration in the Democratic Republic of Congo: The numbers game

Abstract

The creation of the Africa Command (AFRICOM) has reflected the growth in the strategic importance of Africa in US foreign policy since the end of the 1990s. One of the objectives of this new geographical military command is to forge closer links between foreign, security and development policies. However, this approach met with a number of difficulties associated with the challenge of ‘inter-agency cooperation’ among rather disparate actors from foreign affairs, defence and development. In addition, the establishment of AFRICOM has met with fierce criticism in the US and elsewhere – especially in Africa – culminating in the charge that the US foreign and development policies in Africa are being militarised. Although AFRICOM has a number of interesting features, this paper shows that it has reacted to these criticisms by realigning itself more closely with the traditional model of a military command, at the expense of the innovative interagency elements.