Globalisation in the defence industry: An exploration of the paradigm for us and European defence firms and the implications for being global players

This paper explores some of the key issues associated with the restructuring of the defence industry. A comparison is made between the US and the European Defence Industrial Bases in terms of the drivers for change and the paradigms within which change has taken place. Having shown that some very important differences exist, the paper then explores the approaches that have been adopted for industry consolidation and references them to the academic literature on mergers and acquisitions (M&As) and strategic alliances (SAs). Given that most of the key defence players recognise the need to be global players, the paper presents an argument that the European firms’ experience of operating with a wide range of forms of corporate alliance will serve them in good stead for operating on a global defence scale. US firms, in contrast, have focused largely on M&A activity.     

Defence and firm performance in the UK

The UK Ministry of Defence is British industry's largest single customer and a number of firms and industries are highly dependent on defence sales. Various hypotheses have been proposed about the impact of defence procurement on firms and these are investigated using four performance indicators: financial structure, investment, productivity and profitability. With regard to the borrowing ratio, capital investment and the rate of return, there is no statistically significant difference between the mean financial ratios for low and high dependence firms. However, non‐dependents appear to have a higher level and rate of growth of labour productivity than dependents.     

Corporate performance and military production in South Africa

With the end of the Cold War and apartheid, a process of demilitarisation and dramatic cuts in military spending has marked the transition to democracy in South Africa. Between 1989 and 1997 the South African defence budget was cut by more than 50% in real terms, with most of the cuts coming from the procurement budget, which was cut by nearly 70% in real terms during the same period. These cuts have had a significant impact on the country's defence industrial base. However, there has been surprisingly little research on the changes to defence companies that have taken place since the late 1980s. This paper makes a start at rectifying that deficiency by providing an analysis of the restructuring of the major defence‐dependent companies over the period 1988–97. It uses a number of financial ratios and other measures of corporate performance to compare their experience with non‐defence companies in the rest of the South African economy during the same period.     

EUROPEAN DEFENCE FIRMS: THE INFORMATION BARRIER ON PRIVATE FINANCE*

After the fall of the Berlin Wall, European governments adopted a hands‐off policy towards the defence industrial base, in an attempt to increase the sector’s efficiency and reactivity. In this context, one topical issue is how to motivate defence firms to apply for private rather than public finance. Since banks have no prior experience with European defence firms, a problem of asymmetric information may block this transition. The problem is analysed within the framework of a game between defence firms and banks. It is shown that the Bayesian Equilibrium might correspond to a situation where low‐risk firms prefer the state‐financed scheme; yet, in a perfect information set‐up, the same firms would apply for bank credit. In order to facilitate the transition to private finance, the government might decide to subsidize investors who agree on financing defence firms; the state aid should be made available during a transitory learning period.     

The UK defence electronics industry: adjusting to change

The electronics industry provides components and capabilities that are critical to modern defence requirements. It is anticipated that the effectiveness of both weapons systems and the command and control network that supports military operations will become increasingly dependent upon the electronics sub‐systems they employ in the future. With the ascendancy of ‘network centric warfare’, it seems certain that defence electronics will continue to grow in importance in the future, enabling far‐reaching advances in military capability and efficiency. Yet little is known about the structure, conduct, performance and competitiveness of the UK defence electronics sector as it prepares to meet the challenges ahead. This paper reports the findings of a study commissioned in 2002 by Intellect, the UK defence electronics trade association, and supported by the Department of Trade and Industry. The UK defence electronics industry is found to be a high technology, R&D‐intensive and decreasing cost industry, which is competitive in world defence markets. The UK industry faces major competitive threats in the future from established US and European firms and from potential new entrants from China, India, Israel, Singapore, South Korea and Turkey. The future competitiveness of the UK defence electronics industry will depend on maintaining both technical advantage and open access to the large US market.     

The future of the defence firm: the case of the UK aerospace industry

The focus of this paper is the future of the defence firm within the context of the UK aerospace industry and its supply chain. The analysis considers aerospace markets and the aerospace industry in the UK before assessing the future of the defence/aerospace firm as a case study. The paper concludes that its future in terms of the strategic and important aerospace industry is uncertain. The corporate governance of the defence firm will have to change to reflect the hollowing‐out of the firm as the industry experiences significantly less vertical integration. The emphasis of the future defence/aerospace firm will be on ‘buy’ and not necessarily ‘make’. There will also be fewer independent defence aerospace firms as horizontal integration will occur across air, land and sea platforms as well as civil and defence aerospace firms. Indeed, conglomerate integration may even occur with cost pressures and market forces ensuring that merger activity goes beyond defence and aerospace into wider manufacturing industries and, in some cases, service industries in global markets.     

Patents and Dual-use Technology: An Empirical Study of the World's Largest Defence Companies

Abstract

This paper examines the generation of technological knowledge by leading companies in the defence industry. In particular, we test whether the characteristics of large defence companies are related to both the production of different types of patents (civilian, military and mixed), and the generation of dual-use technologies. To explore these links, we rely on economic data for the top 100 defence companies from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute database, and patent information from the Worldwide Patent Statistical Database. Our results show that the relationship between the production of civilian patents and the size of the company is positive and significant. However, this relationship does not hold for the production of military patents. Furthermore, the military commercial profile is unrelated to the generation of military patents. Regarding the involvement in dual-use technologies, firms engaged in dual-use are those with higher military sales, a greater number of employees and a larger number of patents (civilian, military and mixed) than those not engaged in dual-use. Furthermore, we found a skill effect (more involvement in dual-use per employee) in European firms compared to US firms. These findings help to identify which firms should be targeted by government policies if increasing dual-use technologies becomes a political objective.     

Country survey IX: Spain

From the early 1980s Spain embarked on a wide‐ranging process of military reform, from organisational changes to defence industrial policies. Investment in military equipment was set to grow, policies were drawn up to foster the domestic defence industrial base, defence R&D rocketed, and Spain joined a myriad of international arms development programmes. Yet, by 1991 the process of reform had run out of steam. Expenditure planning proved unreliable, and firms suffered from sharp cutbacks in procurement expenditure. The model of defence industrial growth sketched in the mid‐1980s had floundered. The Spanish case provides an example of how the quest to maximise defence procurement from domestic sources can fall victim to industrial and budgetary constraints. Spanish defence producers are now becoming increasingly intertwined with foreign defence companies.     

Defence closure and job loss: The case of swan hunter on tyneside

Recently in this journal Hooper and Butler (1996) drew attention to the scale of job loss associated with restructuring in the defence sector in the aftermath of the Cold War. They noted that there is comparatively little knowledge of the experiences of workers following the closure of defence plants. This research communication attempts to shed further light on this issue by reporting the results of a survey of the experiences of former Swan Hunter shipyard workers who were made redundant after the firm went into receivership. The results confirm the complex but generally negative effect of redundancy on the workers involved.     

Capable Companies or Changing Markets? Explaining the Export Performance of Firms in the Defence Industry

The paper presents an analysis of the factors explaining the export performance of firms in the defence sector. We focus on the case of Norway, and make use of two complementary methodologies: the first is based on econometric firm-level data analysis for the whole population of defence companies, and the second is based on qualitative case study research on the three most important defence export products (weapon stations, ammunition and electronics). Our empirical results highlight the importance of four major success factors for exporting firms: (1) the participation in offset agreements; (2) the ability to focus on their set of core competencies; (3) their R&D activities and interactions with the public S&T system; and (4) demand opportunities and, relatedly, user-producer interactions.     

UK firms’ experience and perceptions of defence offsets: Survey results 1

Offsets are a growing feature of international trade in defence equipment. This article assesses the economics of offsets and outlines UK offsets policy. There is a lack of empirical work in the field and the article presents the results of a survey of UK firms’ experience of their involvement in offsets against UK imports of defence equipment. There is also a case study of the AWACS offset programme and an evaluation of policy implications.     

Military Debt: Perspectives from the Experience of Arab Countries

The sectoral production function model of Feder (1983) has been widely used to examine the link between defence spending and economic growth. In this paper, the model, for which too much has been claimed in some past work, is examined, and the case is made for using growth in real non‐defence output rather than growth in real aggregate output (inclusive of military spending) as the dependent variable. Attention is restricted to a small group of OECD countries for which reliable labour force and capital stock (as well as defence) data are obtainable. With non‐defence output as the dependent variable and using only high quality data, no evidence in favour of the underconsumptionist (as opposed to the defence as a burden) position is found.     

European defence industry consolidation and domestic procurement bias

How have European cross-border defence industrial mergers and acquisitions affected domestic procurement bias among the major EU powers? This article departs from the findings of Andrew Moravcsik more than two decades ago suggesting that major West European states had no ingrained preferences for defence industrial autarchy. When cross-national armament projects were derailed, this could be attributed to political efforts of national defence industrial champions favouring purely domestic projects. As former national champions join pan-European defence groups, their preferences are likely modified. Does this shift procurement towards non-European “off-the-shelf” solutions which, according to Moravcsik, are favoured by defence departments? Or does it give impetus to a stronger preference for European as opposed to domestic systems? In this article, procurement patterns in the aftermath of cross-border defence industry consolidation will be analysed. Procurement bias is assessed in two industry segments characterised by pervasive consolidation.     

SECURITY SECTOR PLANNING IN AFRICA

The security sector in Africa has often been a threat to citizens instead of being a benefit. Military leaders, feared by politicians for their ability to seize power by force, are often reluctant to be open about problems within the military. The lack of dialogue between politicians, citizens and soldiers has made it difficult for the real problems to be identified or addressed. States need to take stock of their security sector assets, decide how they are to be used and then agree on a clear vision for the future of the military forces within the context of the broader national interest. A defence review, the restructuring of personnel, and a transparent budgeting process can all help to achieve a more motivated and better-equipped force. A properly planned transition from the old system to the new will ensure that only manageable steps are attempted and long-term goals are not sacrificed because of short-term crises.     

A Revolution Too Far? US Defence Innovation,Europe and NATO’s Military-Technological Gap

The United States is launching another defence innovation initiative to offset the growing military-technological might of countries such as China, Russia and Iran. However, by utilising emerging technologies from the commercial sector to achieve greater military power the US may further open up the technology gap within NATO. This raises serious questions for NATO’s European allies. This article probes the nature of the US’s latest innovation strategy and sets it within the strategic context facing Europe today. Whether European governments, firms and militaries will join the US in its new defence innovation drive will hinge on politico-military and industrial considerations.     

A neural network measurement of relative military security ‐ the case of Greece and Cyprus

I demonstrate the existence of two sources of contestability in the military aerospace market, within producing and export countries, through the State’s triple role as unique buyer, regulator and seller. For the producing countries, I introduce the new concept, ‘sovereignty price’; that is, the profit a State agrees to grant to its defence firms to perpetuate their domestic activities. This subjective, evolutionary concept provides a dynamic character to the theory of contestable markets. Moreover, I show that contestability is more effective than antitrust policies and a solution of the cost disease. Empirical cases are shown to confirm the theoretical analysis.     

‘I have seen the future and it works’: The US defence industry transformation – lessons for the UK defence industrial base

The US has embarked upon a major transformation of its approach to defence industrial base planning. Although bureaucratic and industrial inertia, as well as budgetary constraints, may delay transformation, its effects will lead to radical changes in the US defence industrial base with new entrants and new combinations of players. The UK, with more modest defence ambitions, capabilities and budget, will seek to keep in touch with the US. However, a commercially‐led drive to embed UK industry even more deeply in the US defence market could be the last step in creating a largely US–UK North Atlantic relationship, with much of Europe very much a subsidiary business concern. This contains a risk that the UK will become increasingly dependent on the US for design and integration of major systems and national defence industrial capability focused on a limited number of niche technologies.     

Brazilian National Defence Policy: foreign policy,national security,economic growth,and technological innovation

ABSTRACT

With the world’s ninth largest economy and comprising nearly 60% of South America’s GDP, 47% of its territory, and 49% of its population, Brazil has become a regional power and an important actor in world affairs over recent decades. This scenario has led the government to re-evaluate its role in the world order, resulting in the enactment of the National Defence Policy, whose objective was to consolidate the country as a regional power while at the same time addressing national security issues, promoting economic development through a series of defence programmes, restructuring the defence industrial base, fostering innovation through technology and knowledge transfer to Brazil, and indigenous research and development. However, the policy’s implementation suffers from several challenges discussed in this article, which may test the capability and competence of Brazilian policymakers, military, industrialists, and other individuals and organisations involved in its implementation.     

The Development of Military Logistics: An Introduction

Abstract

John Weston looks at the prospects for defence and security with tn a transformed Europe, concentrating on the increased importance of atr power within the military armoury. Looking to the future, he pinpoints key technologies and thetr bearing on aircraft design and spots trends in industry and the defence industrial base which are likely to have an impact wtthin the next 20 years