Business and peace in the Niger Delta: what we know and what we need to know

The global restructuring of state–society relationships driven by neoliberal logic has not only allowed for the taming of the ‘state’, which has paradoxically accentuated its inadequacies, but has also facilitated, for better or for worse, the emergence of business – especially transnational corporations – as a major political force in global governance. Consequently, while the issues of peace and conflict have traditionally been the concern of governments, businesses are now increasingly being expected to make peace and conflict their concern. However, despite claims and counterclaims that businesses can be moneymakers and peacemakers, analyses of the relationship between business and peace remain largely embryonic. This paper seeks to contribute to this emerging business and peace debate by drawing on insights from the Niger Delta conflict to ascertain what we know and what we need to know if businesses are to become peacemakers in conflict zones in Africa.     

2015 and the survival of the Nigerian State

Nigeria is currently faced with serious domestic challenges. While the state is not officially at war, it is standing on the precipice, especially with the eruption of violence occasioned by the emergence of the Boko Haram sect and the tenuous peace in the Niger Delta. With the 2015 general elections on the horizon, fears of further violence and disintegration are rife, more so because of the debate over who occupies the Presidential Villa at Abuja. President Goodluck Jonathan, a southerner, seems poised for a comeback even amidst the vociferous challenge posed by the political elites of northern Nigeria. This article looks at the different scenarios that might play out in 2015. It analyses the challenges of the survival of the Nigerian state, and makes some policy recommendations that Nigeria and its people need to put into place in order to ensure its survival beyond 2015.     

Unrestricted warfare: Review essay I

During the Nigerian Civil War (1967–1970), France chose to support Biafra, but only on a limited scale, providing mercenaries and obsolete weaponry to Ojukwu's regime. General Charles de Gaulle's assistance to Ojukwu was conditioned by the French military drawdown after 1961, the increased power of French secret services on the continent, and the interventions in Katanga (1960–1963), Gabon (1964) and Chad (1968–1972). France supported Biafra primarily to protect its former colonies from Nigeria, stop Soviet subversion and acquire an economic foothold in the oil-rich Niger Delta. De Gaulle chose a limited strategy for two reasons. If Biafra won the war, France would be Biafra's greatest ally. If Nigeria won the war, France could extricate itself from the situation relatively easily and re-establish relations with the Nigerian government, which is what ultimately occurred.     

A Deal with the Devil: Issues in Offering Joseph Kony Amnesty to Resolve the Conflict in Uganda

Peace talks have commenced between the Ugandan Government and the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), which has committed countless atrocities during the nearly 20 years it has tried to overthrow the government. The head of the LRA, Joseph Kony, has been offered amnesty by the government in the hope that peace will ensue. This raises the question of whether a government should forego the pursuit of justice in order to prevent further bloodshed.     

PUBLIC ATTITUDES REGARDING UNDOCUMENTED MIGRATION AND POLICING/CRIME

The incessant bomb attacks by the Niger Delta militants and Boko Haram elements among other popular movements, against the people and government targets, have unmistakably put Nigeria on the global terrorist nations’ map. The grievances of these groups which are political, economic and religious may not be unconnected from the design and operation of the federation; this paper thus examines the constitutional provisions, and political and economic attributes, of the Nigerian federation in the Fourth Republic with a view to discovering why a mechanism put in place with the objective of achieving interethnic unity, democratic stability and socio-economic development has worked to enthrone crisis, violence and disintegrative tendencies in the country. This paper argues that the current reign of terror is a manifestation of a more serious de-linkage and inconsonance between the state and the people, with popular movements providing an alternative platform for spaces, voices and benefits from the streets and away from the state. The paper concludes that the hope for federal renewal lies in the ability of the current handlers of the Nigerian statecraft to marry decentralist constitutional reforms with an agenda for mass-based socio-economic development of the country.     

Desert insurgency: lessons from the third Tuareg rebellion

This article provides an in-depth examination and analysis of the 2006–2009 Tuareg rebellion in Mali and Niger. It identifies the underlying reasons behind the rebellion, explores contrasting counter-insurgency (COIN) strategies employed by the two governments, and presents some lessons learned. While both COIN approaches ultimately produced similar peace settlements, the article argues that the Malian strategy of reconciliation combined with the selective use of force was far more effective than the Nigerien iron fist approach at limiting the size and scope of the insurgency and producing a more sustainable peace. It concludes by looking at the role of external actors, particularly the United States, and how the failure to internationalize the conflict was actually more beneficial to the local COIN effort, as well as to the longer strategic interests of the United States in the region.     

Special Forces for Counter Revolutionary Warfare: The South African Case

Special Forces have long formed a central part of counter-revolutionary warfare. In the South African case, between 1974 and 1990, these were central to Pretoria's regional strategies. Serving as the primary tool for inflicting punishment on any Frontline State that allowed the ANC and its allies basing rights, the Special Forces conducted sabotage, raids, bombings and assassinations throughout the Frontline States, alongside the Special Tasks contra-mobilization programmes throughout the region and internally. When these tools proved insufficient - especially internally - the security forces turned to the medical Special Forces, who were at the centre of South Africa's chemical and biological warfare programme, for assistance in incapacitating and killing the state's opponents. Overall, these units worked under the banner of the state's 'Total Counter-Revolutionary Strategy' and in co-operation with the more covert elements of the security forces (such as the Civil Co-operation Bureau, the SAP's Koevoet and C1 counter-intelligence units, and the Directorate of Covert Collection) involved in the direct-targeting of the state's opponents.     

South Africa's arsenal of terrorism legislation

After only ten years in existence, the African Union (AU) has already made its mark on the landscape of peace and security in Africa. This paper seeks to explore the relationship between the AU's leading collaborative interstate security policy, the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), and sustainable peace in the Horn of Africa. It examines four countries – Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Kenya – and how engaging with the APSA through early warning systems can contribute to developing the elements necessary for sustainable peace, namely regional stability, conflict management, and good governance.     

Keeping Nothing Secret: United Kingdom Chemical Warfare Policy in the 1960s

After renouncing an offensive chemical warfare programme in 1956, the UK Cabinet Defence Committee decided in 1963 to re-acquire a chemical warfare retaliatory capability. This article describes how the re-acquisition decision was engendered by a combination of novel research findings, changes in strategic thinking, new intelligence and pressures from NATO. Despite the 1963 decision, no new chemical weapons capability was acquired by the UK and information that Britain lacked a stockpile of chemical weapons was eventually leaked to the public, initiating a fierce debate between ministries over the significance of this leak. This paper argues that non-existent technology is equally problematic for government secrecy, and equally consequential for government action, as what exists. Furthermore, actors' different interpretations of what constituted a secret, point towards a more subtle understanding of secrecy than simply construing it as the hiding or uncovering of items of information.     

The British Army, ‘Understanding’, and the Illusion of Control

Over the past decade, Western military doctrines concerned with matters of irregular warfare and counterinsurgency have emphasised the requirement for properly ‘understanding’ the social, political and cultural environments in which those militaries may operate; the so-called human and socio-political ‘terrain’. This has led to a number of advancements and initiatives designed to facilitate the way that militaries may enhance that understanding. One of those initiatives has been the emergence from within the British military of a doctrine – JDP 04 ‘Understanding’ – designed for that purpose. Using that doctrine and other subsequent publications as a template, this article will examine the utility of ‘understanding’ for those commanders seeking to match military activities with political ends. It proposes that while any advances in understanding the operating environment are to be applauded, the ‘understanding’ of greatest importance is that relating to the feasibility of the strategic objectives at hand. If those objectives lack inherent feasibility, then the development of subordinate forms of understanding, particularly in relation to the socio-political dynamics of target societies, will likely only serve to slow the process of failure.     

The German wars of liberation 1807–1815: The restrained insurgency

In the Age of Napoleon, ‘small wars’ and ‘revolutionary war’ were closely connected. There were, however, different strands of this phenomenon: speaking professionally, conservative officers condemned small wars as an irregular regression to previous less disciplined forms of warfare. The Prussian state continually tried to discipline and regulate spontaneous risings. Yet the irregular character of small wars offered the opportunities for a less complex way of fighting, thus enabling the arming of the ‘people’ to fight. Individual undertakings, such as Ferdinand von Schill's doomed campaign in 1809, were designed to spark off a general popular uprising. But they were cheered by many and supported by few. Meanwhile, Neidhardt von Gneisenau conceived guerrilla-style Landsturm home-defence forces, which were designed for an irregular people's war. These concepts were put into practice in the ‘war of freedom’ – or ‘war of liberation’ – in 1813. Eventually both the mobilisation and the tactics remained regular, however, despite the emphatic appeal to a national ‘people's war’.     

MOZAMBIQUE

Mozambique is widely regarded as a success story. The parliamentary and presidential lections in 1994 marked the peak of the peace process in Mozambique. Despite minor irregularities, the elections were declared free and fair by international observers. Mozambique has succeeded where other countries such as Angola has failed—a stable peace process, multiparty elections and the transformation of the armed opposition into a civil political party. Its transition to liberalism and capitalism brought macro-economic growth rates that are probably envied by many countries in the region. This article argues, however, that Mozambique provides an example of a third wave democracy where the transition from in electoral democracy to a consolidated democracy has not yet been completed, with little progress towards democratic maturity. In particular, the repercussions of the elections in 1999, Mozambique's ‘black’ November in 2000 and the process of recent consultation between the and Frelimo leadership in order to resolve the paralysed state of Mozambican politics underline a tendency towards a permanent entrenchment of democratic minimalism.     

PEACE PROCESSES AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN THE HORN OF AFRICA

Conflict resolution processes must meet certain prerequisites and conditions. Unless the warring parties or the mediators meet, it will be difficult to find lasting and just solutions to the conflicts in the Horn (Djibouti, Eritrea and Ethiopia, and Somalia). Most of these conflicts have ethnic or religious components and also have a lot do with the nature of the government institutions and the power distribution among the communities within these states. Identifying the main causes of the conflict and the issues involved in each country is a very necessary first step toward peace. Secondly, conditions have to be identified that would make the current peace agreements work. This includes identifying the specific problems faced by the parties involved; ascertaining the validity of the mechanisms through which the problems will be overcome; and planning how the agreements will be maintained. The knowledge that mediators have about the conflict is often as important as the actual meeting of parties at the negotiation table. This article also evaluates the peace initiatives underway in the Horn and attempts to identify the apparent reasons that prevented their implementation.     

TOWARDS NEW PEACEKEEPING PARTNERSHIPS IN AFRICA?

The recent conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea has seen interesting developments in cooperation between international bodies and the Organisation of African Unity. The success of the OAU initiative and intervention in the Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict is laudable, even at this early stage of assessment. A factor in this success has been the speed with which the OAU intervened and, subsequently, its close co-operation with facilitators, the United Nations and the European Union. This article provides an overview of the OAU's peacemaking initiatives and focuses on the implications of the OAU Liaison Mission in Ethiopia-Eritrea (OLMEE), future OAU peace support initiatives and the emergent division of labour between the OAU and the United Nations On the eve of the transition to the African Union, the contributions that the Organisation car successfully make within the context of a continent that remains wracked by civil conflict are of great importance. Its ability to react rapidly and intervene successfully will no doubt have a profound effect on the short-term implementation of the ideals of continental pacification.     

Lesotho’s 2015 elections in the context of an ongoing security vacuum

After inconclusive elections in 2012, Lesotho had a coalition government for the first time, made up of three political parties that had a narrow majority in parliament. The new government, however, faced several challenges, some of which were of its own making. The agreement among the three parties was to literally divide the government into three parts, leading to a continuous stalemate in its operation; the most serious consequence was the prorogation of parliament and the resultant attempted coup. The flight of the prime minister to South Africa and his return under a Southern African Development Community (SADC) security detail provided a short-term solution to Lesotho's security crisis. Under Cyril Ramaphosa's mediation, the prorogued parliament was conditionally opened and the election date set for 28 February 2015. However, the security dilemma – whereby the prime minister, who is also minister of defence, has no control over the military – remains. When elections are held, there does not seem to be a guarantee that they will be held in peace; moreover, there are now fears that the losers will not accept the results of the elections because of the security vacuum in Lesotho. This article argues that peace can only be salvaged by enhanced SADC security before, during and after the elections. It argues that the SADC mission should remain beyond the elections to oversee the constitutional changes that are necessary for ensuring long-term stability. On their own, Lesotho politicians are unlikely to be able to work together in order to move the country forward.     

The continuing resonance of the war as risk management perspective for understanding military interventions

In the late 1990s and 2000s, a slew of books and journal articles proposed that a nexus between risk management and warfare was emerging. This article argues that risk management ideas continue to shape recent campaigns against Libya, Islamic State, Syria, and the war on terror from Niger, Yemen to Somalia. It uses existing literature on risk and warfare to examine four key aspects of contemporary interventions. First, the article evaluates the overall strategic context as security concerns shift from terrorism toward renewed great power competition. Second, it re-assesses the risk calculus for military action through the language and grammar of risk invoked by politicians. Third and fourth, it addresses the continuing reliance on air power and the managerial ethos of military operations as important features of war as risk management.     

Ministries of peacebuilding in sub-Saharan Africa: rationale,functions and establishment

Abstract

This paper begins by explaining the concept of a culture of peace and contrasts it with a culture of violence. It argues that traditional ways of trying to achieve peace – based on force or threat of force – are costly, ineffective and of doubtful morality. At the same time, nonviolent means have achieved some formidable successes. The paper proposes the establishment of national ministries of peacebuilding to coordinate and implement the building cultures of peace in sub-Saharan Africa. The broad tasks and specific functions of such ministries are explained and some likely objections are answered. The paper concludes with a discussion of the necessary conditions for such ministries to be established and to be effective in building cultures of peace.     

The Nepalese Army: From counterinsurgency to peacekeeping?

Can peacekeeping participation help reform military institutions in democratizing states? Drawing on evidence from Nepal – one of the world's largest troop contributors to UN peacekeeping operations – this essay illustrates that participation in peace missions can sometimes undermine security sector reform and deteriorate civil–military relations. Furthermore, this analysis shows that peacekeeping participation will not necessarily reorient troops away from their conventional internal roles (such as counterinsurgency) or improve civilian control over the armed forces. Hence, civilians can lose control over soldiers just as frequently when they are deployed overseas as when they are at home.     

‘Today we shall drink blood’: internal unrest in Nigeria

Despite some tentative internal peace agreements, Nigeria continues to face violence from multiple groups. This violence feeds upon itself, with segments of the population being mobilized both for self defense and for pressing their ideological and practical goals. These multiple sources of violence, which the Nigerian government appears unable to control to any significant degree, have a long term corrosive effect on the country's internal stability. There are few reasons to be sanguine as to any rapid changes to the level of overall violence or the relative number of armed groups, although their specific identities may shift. Nigeria represents a good case study of a country in which relatively low but persistent violence by a multiplicity of groups can have major impacts on internal security.     

Review Article: Reading Guerrilla Radio in Wartime Liberia

Numerous writers have acknowledged the importance of radio communications and hate propaganda in the Liberian civil war (1990–1997), but none have explored the subject in depth. A wide variety of related issues have been neglected, including military efforts to seize control of broadcast facilities, the deliberate manipulation of public information and perceptions, and the implications of both for wartime atrocities and post-war justice. In the following essay, I identify and discuss six general strands of thought on guerrilla radio broadcasting and communications in wartime Liberia. The first looks to the relationship between mass media and the state in the pre-civil war era. The second covers the cooption of the wartime free press. Three further themes – Charles Taylor's cultivation of personal power, the relevance of broadcasting for rebel command and control capabilities, and Taylor's media dominance during the 1997 Presidential campaign – demonstrate the strategic and public roles of radio communications and broadcasting. Finally, I look to written survivor memoirs for elite responses to wartime media monopolies, guerrilla propaganda, and psychological warfare. I conclude with some notes on indicators for future research, and their implications for historical and contemporary issues in Liberia.