Impacts of sequential acquisition,market competition mode,and confidentiality on information flow

We investigate information flow in a setting in which 2 retailers order from a supplier and sell to a market with uncertain demand. Each retailer has access to a signal. The retailers can disclose signals to each other (horizontal information sharing), while the supplier can solicit signals by offering retailers differential payments as incentives for signal disclosure (vertical information acquisition). In the base setting, market competition is in quantity, and a retailer can fully infer the signal that the other retailer discloses to the supplier. We show that the supplier prefers to sequentialize the procedure for information acquisition. Moreover, vertical information acquisition by the supplier is a strategic complement to horizontal information sharing between the retailers to establish information flow. In the equilibrium, the retailers have no incentive to exchange signals, but system wide information transparency can be realized through a combination of information acquisition and inference. We further study the signaling effect, whereby the supplier utilizes wholesale pricing as an instrument to affect the retailers' inference of the shared signals, and price competition to explore their impacts on the supplier's preference for sequential acquisition and the sustainability of information flow.     

The value of losing control: Competition in markets for complements

When selling complementary products, manufacturers can often benefit from considering the resulting cross‐market interdependencies. Although using independent retailers makes it difficult to internalize these positive externalities, the ensuing double marginalization can mitigate within‐market competition. We use standard game theoretic analysis to determine optimal distribution channel strategies (through independent retailers or integrated) for competing manufacturers who participate in markets for complements. Our results suggest that a firm's optimal channel choice is highly dependent on its competitive positioning. A firm with a competitive advantage in terms of product characteristics (customer preferences) or production capabilities (cost) might benefit from selling through company‐controlled stores, allowing coordinated pricing across the two markets, whereas a less competitive firm might be better off using independent channel intermediaries to mitigate price competition. We consider two scenarios depending on whether the two firms make their distribution channel decisions sequentially or simultaneously. Although firms are unlikely to make such decisions at exactly the same instant, the simultaneous model also serves as a proxy for the scenario where firms decide sequentially, but where they cannot observe each other's strategic channel choices. For the sequential case, we find that the sequence of entry can have tremendous impact on the two firms'profits; whereas in some cases, the first mover can achieve substantially higher profits, we find that when the two markets are of sufficiently different size and only loosely related, a firm with a competitive advantage might be better off as a follower. Interestingly, our results suggest that, when the markets are of rather similar size, both firms are better off if they enter the industry sequentially. In those cases, the first entrant has incentive to reveal its planned channel strategies, and the follower has incentive to seek out and consider this information. © 2010 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2010     

Resale price maintenance contracts with retailer sales effort: Effect of flexibility and competition

In Resale Price Maintenance (RPM) contracts, the manufacturer specifies the resale price that retailers must charge to consumers. We study the role of using a RPM contract in a market where demand is influenced by retailer sales effort. First, it is well known that RPM alone does not provide incentive for the retailer to use adequate sales effort and some form of quantity fixing may be needed to achieve channel coordination. However, when the market potential of the product is uncertain, RPM with quantity fixing is a rigid contract form. We propose and study a variety of RPM contracts with quantity fixing that offer different forms of flexibility including pricing flexibility and quantity flexibility. Second, we address a long‐time debate in both academia and practice on whether RPM is anti‐competitive in a market when two retailers compete on both price and sales effort. We show that depending on the relative intensity of price competition and sales effort competition, RPM may lead to higher or lower retail prices compared to a two‐part tariff contract, which specifies a wholesale price and a fixed fee. Further, the impact of RPM on price competition and sales effort competition is always opposite to each other. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2006     

Markets for surplus components with a strategic supplier

We study markets for surplus components, which allow manufacturers with excess component inventory to sell to firms with a shortage. Recent developments in internet commerce have the potential to greatly increase the efficiency of such markets. We develop a one‐period model in which a monopolist supplier sells to a number of independent manufacturers who are uncertain about demand for final goods. After uncertainty is resolved, the manufacturers have the opportunity to trade. Because uncertainty is over demand functions, the model allows us to endogenize both the price of final goods and the price of components in wholesale and surplus markets. We derive conditions on demand uncertainty that determine whether a surplus market will increase or decrease supplier profits. Increased costs of transacting on the surplus market may benefit manufacturers, because of the impact of these costs on the supplier's pricing power. The surplus market can decrease overall efficiency of the supply chain, since the benefit of better allocation of components may be outweighed by an increased double‐marginalization effect. © 2005 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2005.     

Dynamic inventory and pricing models for competing retailers

We address infinite‐horizon models for oligopolies with competing retailers under demand uncertainty. We characterize the equilibrium behavior which arises under simple wholesale pricing schemes. More specifically, we consider a periodic review, infinite‐horizon model for a two‐echelon system with a single supplier servicing a network of competing retailers. In every period, each retailer faces a random demand volume, the distribution of which depends on his own retail price as well as those charged by possibly all competing retailers. We also derive various comparative statics results regarding the impact several exogenous system parameters (e.g., cost or distributional parameters) have on the equilibrium decisions of the retailers as well as their expected profits. We show that certain monotonicity properties, engrained in folklore as well as in known inventory models for centralized systems, may break down in decentralized chains under retailer competition. Our results can be used to optimize the aggregate profits in the supply chain (i.e., those of the supplier and all retailers) by implementing a specific wholesale pricing scheme. © 2003 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2004.     

Supply chain coordination with shelf‐space and retail price dependent demand and heterogeneous retailers

We consider supply chain coordination in which a manufacturer supplies some product to multiple heterogeneous retailers and wishes to coordinate the supply chain via wholesale price and holding cost subsidy. The retail price is either exogenous or endogenous. The market demand is described by the market share attraction model based on all retailers'shelf‐spaces and retail prices. We obtain optimal solutions for the centralized supply chain, where the optimal retail pricing is a modified version of the well‐known cost plus pricing strategy. We further get feasible contracts for the manufacturer to coordinate the hybrid and decentralized supply chains. The manufacturer can allocate the total profit free to himself and the retail market via the wholesale price when the retail price is exogenous, but otherwise he cannot. Finally, we point out that different characteristics of the retail market are due to different powers of the manufacturer, and the more power the manufacturer has, the simpler the contract to coordinate the chain will be. © 2010 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2010     

Flexible capacity strategy in an asymmetric oligopoly market with competition and demand uncertainty

This article studies flexible capacity strategy (FCS) under oligopoly competition with uncertain demand. Each firm utilizes either the FCS or inflexible capacity strategy (IFCS). Flexible firms can postpone their productions until observing the actual demand, whereas inflexible firms cannot. We formulate a new asymmetrical oligopoly model for the problem, and obtain capacity and production decisions of the firms at Nash equilibrium. It is interesting to verify that cross‐group competition determines the capacity allocation between the two groups of firms, while intergroup competition determines the market share within each group. Moreover, we show that the two strategies coexist among firms only when cost differentiation is medium. Counterintuitively, flexible firms benefit from increasing production cost when the inflexible competition intensity is sufficiently high. This is because of retreat of inflexible firms, flexibility effect, and the corresponding high price. We identify conditions under which FCS is superior than IFCS. We also demonstrate that flexible firms benefit from increasing demand uncertainty. However, when demand variance is not very large, flexible firms may be disadvantaged. We further investigate the effects of cross‐group and intergroup competition on individual performance of the firms. We show that as flexible competition intensity increases, inflexible firms are mainly affected by the cross‐group competition first and then by the intergroup competition, whereas flexible firms are mainly affected by the intergroup competition. Finally, we examine endogenous flexibility and identify its three drivers: cost parameters, cross‐group competition, and intergroup competition. © 2017 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 64: 117–138, 2017     

Evergreening and operational risk under price competition

“Evergreening” is a strategy wherein an innovative pharmaceutical firm introduces an upgrade of its current product when the patent on this product expires. The upgrade is introduced with a new patent and is designed to counter competition from generic manufacturers that seek to imitate the firm's existing product. However, this process is fraught with uncertainty because the upgrade is subject to stringent guidelines and faces approval risk. Thus, an incumbent firm has to make an upfront production capacity investment without clarity on whether the upgrade will reach the market. This uncertainty may also affect the capacity investment of a competing manufacturer who introduces a generic version of the incumbent's existing product but whose market demand depends on the success or failure of the upgrade. We analyze a game where capacity investment occurs before uncertainty resolution and firms compete on prices thereafter. Capacity considerations that arise due to demand uncertainty introduce new factors into the evergreening decision. Equilibrium analysis reveals that the upgrade's estimated approval probability needs to exceed a threshold for the incumbent to invest in evergreening. This threshold for evergreening increases as the intensity of competition in the generic market increases. If evergreening is optimal, the incumbent's capacity investment is either decreasing or nonmonotonic with respect to low end market competition depending on whether the level of product improvement in the upgrade is low or high. If the entrant faces a capacity constraint, then the probability threshold for evergreening is higher than the case where the entrant is not capacity constrained. Finally, by incorporating the risk‐return trade‐off that the incumbent faces in terms of the level of product improvement versus the upgrade success probability, we can characterize policy for a regulator. We show that the introduction of capacity considerations may maximize market coverage and/or social surplus at incremental levels of product improvement in the upgrade. This is contrary to the prevalent view of regulators who seek to curtail evergreening involving incremental product improvement. © 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 63: 71–89, 2016     

Optimal operating policies in a commodity trading market with the manufacturer's presence

With the help of the Internet and express delivery at relatively low costs, trading markets have become increasingly popular as a venue to sell excess inventory and a source to obtain products at lower prices. In this article, we study the operational decisions in the presence of a trading market in a periodic‐review, finite‐horizon setting. Prices in the trading market change periodically and are determined endogenously by the demand and supply in the market. We characterize the retailers'optimal ordering and trading policies when the original manufacturer and the trading market co‐exist and retailers face fees to participate in the trading market. Comparing with the case with no trading fees, we obtain insights into the impact of trading fees and the fee structure on the retailers and the manufacturer. Further, we find that by continually staying in the market, the manufacturer may use her pricing strategies to counter‐balance the negative impact of the trading market on her profit. Finally, we extend the model to the case when retailers dynamically update their demand distribution based on demand observations in previous periods. A numerical study provides additional insights into the impact of demand updating in a trading market with the manufacturer's competition. © 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2010     

Social benefits of government investment in enterprises

A critical issue for many governments is boosting the adoption rates of products or technologies that enhance consumer surplus or total social welfare. Governments may, for example, pay subsidies to producers or to consumers to stimulate the manufacture or consumption of specific products, for example, energy-efficient appliances or more effective drugs. This research proposes a strategic government investment policy, namely, share acquisition, and demonstrates its effectiveness in reaching societal objectives. We consider a Cournot quantities-choice market comprised of homogeneous firms where the government intervenes to buy shares, and turning private firms into state-owned enterprises. We recognize that purchasing a single private firm is the optimal policy for the government to reach its societal objectives. Additionally, taking into consideration financial constraints, we find that the optimal stake increases with the budget. Compared with the optimal output-based subsidy policy, when the budget is low, the optimal government investment policy induces a higher consumer surplus. In addition, in differentiated Cournot competition, under which firms compete in selling substitutable products, we find that when the budget is sufficient, the optimal stake purchased first decreases and then increases according to the substitutability level among products.     

Should firms conceal information when dealing with common suppliers?

A firm making quantity decision under uncertainty loses profit if its private information is leaked to competitors. Outsourcing increases this risk as a third party supplier may leak information for its own benefit. The firm may choose to conceal information from the competitors by entering in a confidentiality agreement with the supplier. This, however, diminishes the firm's ability to dampen competition by signaling a higher quantity commitment. We examine this trade‐off in a stylized supply chain in which two firms, endowed with private demand information, order sequentially from a common supplier, and engage in differentiated quantity competition. In our model, the supplier can set different wholesale prices for firms, and the second‐mover firm could be better informed. Contrary to what is expected, information concealment is not always beneficial to the first mover. We characterize conditions under which the first mover firm will not prefer concealing information. We show that this depends on the relative informativeness of the second mover and is moderated by competition intensity. We examine the supplier's incentive in participating in information concealment, and develop a contract that enables it for wider set of parameter values. We extend our analysis to examine firms' incentive to improve information. © 2014 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. 62:1–15, 2015     

Allocation with demand competition: Uniform,proportional, and lexicographic mechanisms

We examine capacity allocation mechanisms in a supply chain comprising a monopolistic supplier and two competing retailers with asymmetric market powers. The supplier allocates limited capacity to retailers according to uniform, proportional, or lexicographic mechanism. We study the impact of these allocation mechanisms on supplier pricing decisions and retailer ordering behavior. With individual order size no greater than supplier capacity, we show that all three mechanisms guarantee equilibrium ordering. We provide precise structures of retailer ordering decisions in Nash and dominant equilibria. Further, we compare the mechanisms from the perspective of the supplier, the retailers, and the supply chain. We show that regardless of whether retailer market powers are symmetric, lexicographic allocation with any priority sequence of retailers is better than the other two mechanisms for the supplier. Further, under lexicographic allocation, the supplier gains more profit by granting higher priority to the retailer with greater market power. We also extend our study to the case with multiple retailers. © 2017 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 64: 85–107, 2017     

How to deal with consumers who group to request a discount?

We investigate operations impacts of consumer‐initiated group buying (CGB), whereby consumers voluntarily form buying groups to negotiate bulk deals with retailers. This differs from regular purchasing whereby consumers visit retailers individually and pay posted prices. Upon the visit by group consumers, a retailer decides to forgo or satisfy their demand in its entirety. Turned down by a retailer, group consumers continue to visit other retailers. In the case where their group effort fails to conclude a deal, some group consumers switch to individual purchasing provided they receive a non‐negative utility by doing so. Even after a successful group event, the group consumers who forgo the event out of utility concern may switch to individual purchasing as well. Retailer competition, group size, and the chance that group consumers switch to individual purchasing upon unsatisfaction are crucial to how retailers adjust operations to deal with CGB. With retailer competition, the rise of CGB results in every consumer paying the same reduced price when group size is small but makes group consumers pay more than by purchasing individually when group size is large. This has mixed consequences on the profits for retailers in both absolute and relative terms.     

The impact of animal welfare regulations on firms' product offerings: Humane or organic product?

Increased public concerns about animal welfare have spurred new regulations to improve animals' treatment and living conditions. We study how these regulations affect firms' product offerings, prices, and profits. We consider two competing animal agriculture supply chains, each consisting of a supplier and a buyer. New regulations require firms to choose between offering humane or organic products, which are differentiated by animals' living conditions. We find that consumers' growing awareness of animal welfare encourages firms to offer organic products, which require the highest standards for animals' living conditions. We also show that tightening humane product standards and loosening organic product standards encourage firms to offer organic products—but with distinct pricing implications. The former leads to higher retail prices whereas the latter may lower retail prices. Depending on costs and consumers' awareness of animal welfare, a humane product may be priced higher or lower than an organic product. Furthermore, we provide conditions under which a regulator should offer a unit-cost or an investment cost subsidy to improve social welfare. We show that subsidies can encourage firms to change from offering humane to organic products, or vice versa, to enhance total social welfare.     

The effect of a temporary product distribution channel on supply chain performance

We analyze a supply chain of a manufacturer and two retailers, a permanent retailer who always stocks the manufacturer's product and an intermittent deal‐of‐the day retailer who sells the manufacturer's product online for a short time. We find that without a deal‐of‐the‐day (DOTD) retailer, it is suboptimal for the manufacturer to offer a quantity discount while it is optimal for the retailer to offer periodic price discounts to consumers. With the addition of a DOTD retailer, it is likely to be optimal for the manufacturer to offer a quantity discount. We show that even without market expansion, i.e., no exclusive DOTD retailer consumers, opening the intermittent channel can leave the permanent retailer no worse‐off while increasing the manufacturer's profit. We identify the regular and discounted wholesale prices and the threshold quantity at which the manufacturer should give the discount. We also identify the optimal retail prices. We find that opening the intermittent channel increases the profit of the manufacturer, is likely to decrease the average retail price and to increase sales, and may increase the permanent retailer's profit. © 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 63: 505–528, 2016     

Competing with channel partners: Supply chain conflict when retailers introduce store brands

Private‐label products are of increasing importance in many retail categories. While national‐brand products are designed by the manufacturer and sold by the retailer, the positioning of store‐brand products is under the complete control of the retailer. We consider a scenario where products differ on a performance quality dimension and we analyze how retailer–manufacturer interactions in product positioning are affected by the introduction of a private‐label product. Specifically, we consider a national‐brand manufacturer who determines the quality of its product as well the product's wholesale price charged to the retailer. Given the national‐brand quality and wholesale price, the retailer then decides the quality level of its store brand and sets the retail prices for both products. We find that a manufacturer can derive substantial benefits from considering a retailer's store‐brand introduction when determining the national brand's quality and wholesale price. If the retailer has a significant cost disadvantage in producing high‐quality products, the manufacturer does not need to adjust the quality of the national‐brand product, but he should offer a wholesale price discount to ensure its distribution through the retailer. If the retailer is competitive in providing products of high‐quality, the manufacturer should reduce this wholesale price discount and increase the national‐brand quality to mitigate competition. Interestingly, we find the retailer has incentive to announce a store‐brand introduction to induce the manufacturer's consideration of these plans in determining the national‐brand product quality and wholesale price. © 2010 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2010     

Environmental regulation in project‐based industries

We study the environmental regulation of industrial activities that are organized as projects. Applications arise in construction, ship and aircraft building, and film making, among other industries. Relative to manufacturing, environmental regulation is different in project‐based industries, due to the uniqueness and geographical diversity of projects, and a lack of product takeback programs. Because the amount of waste and pollution generated by project companies can be large, regulators need environmental policies to ensure reduction of waste and pollution. We consider a regulator who attempts to maximize social welfare. We model this problem as a bilevel nonlinear program. The upper level regulator specifies waste reduction targets, which the lower level project companies meet using waste stream reduction and remediation of pollution, while attempting to control their project costs. We find that high waste diversion targets lead to outcomes with little pollution, but excessive project costs and only modest waste stream reduction. Projects that have lower task precedence density, or that have pollutants with different environmental impacts, show larger increases in project cost and time resulting from regulation. We describe a subsidy for waste stream reduction that coordinates the system, and we estimate the value of coordination. We also describe a bonus that encourages truthful reporting by project companies, and evaluate the relative cost and effectiveness of the subsidy and the bonus. © 2015 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 62: 228–247, 2015     

Market entry strategy in the presence of market spillovers and efficiency differentiation

Firms form various alliances or use brand extensions to enter new markets in order to improve their operational efficiency and create a positive spillover. However, they do not always know the implications of these strategies for market entry and multimarket competition because the sale of products in one market can have negative spillover effects on product sales in other markets. We present an analytical framework to examine whether and how (i.e., by choosing alliance entry or independent entry) competing firms should enter a market in a situation where market spillovers occur when a firm enters a spillover-producing market to sell products that may increase or decrease the consumers' willingness to pay for products in the primary market. Our analysis shows that the operational efficiency (or quality differentiation ability) of firms in a spillover-producing market varies, and hence, the impact of market spillovers differs for firms. We identify the key factors, such as bargaining power, brand value difference in the primary market, and the extent of efficiencies and spillovers, that determine the firms benefitting from the different entry strategies. Specifically, we show that firms would be more willing to choose an alliance strategy to enter a spillover-producing market if the negative spillover is small and alliance efficiency is high. In contrast, if an alliance entry is not favored, the firms' relative operational efficiency is crucial for them to decide whether to enter the market independently under moderate spillover conditions. Finally, we show the implications of market entry strategies for managers.     

The future of the defence firm: the case of the UK aerospace industry

The focus of this paper is the future of the defence firm within the context of the UK aerospace industry and its supply chain. The analysis considers aerospace markets and the aerospace industry in the UK before assessing the future of the defence/aerospace firm as a case study. The paper concludes that its future in terms of the strategic and important aerospace industry is uncertain. The corporate governance of the defence firm will have to change to reflect the hollowing‐out of the firm as the industry experiences significantly less vertical integration. The emphasis of the future defence/aerospace firm will be on ‘buy’ and not necessarily ‘make’. There will also be fewer independent defence aerospace firms as horizontal integration will occur across air, land and sea platforms as well as civil and defence aerospace firms. Indeed, conglomerate integration may even occur with cost pressures and market forces ensuring that merger activity goes beyond defence and aerospace into wider manufacturing industries and, in some cases, service industries in global markets.     

Stein–Chen approximation and error bounds for order fill rates in assemble‐to‐order systems

Assemble‐to‐order (ATO) is an important operational strategy for manufacturing firms to achieve quick response to customer orders while keeping low finished good inventories. This strategy has been successfully used not only by manufacturers (e.g., Dell, IBM) but also by retailers (e.g., Amazon.com). The evaluation of order‐based performance is known to be an important but difficult task, and the existing literature has been mainly focused on stochastic comparison to obtain performance bounds. In this article, we develop an extremely simple Stein–Chen approximation as well as its error‐bound for order‐based fill rate for a multiproduct multicomponent ATO system with random leadtimes to replenish components. This approximation gives an expression for order‐based fill rate in terms of component‐based fill rates. The approximation has the property that the higher the component replenishment leadtime variability, the smaller the error bound. The result allows an operations manager to analyze the improvement in order‐based fill rates when the base‐stock level for any component changes. Numerical studies demonstrate that the approximation performs well, especially when the demand processes of different components are highly correlated; when the components have high base‐stock levels; or when the component replenishment leadtimes have high variability. © 2012 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2012