药物爆燃产生强红外辐射的分析研究

定向红外脉冲强光辐射是定向红外对抗技术中的关键技术,用来破坏敌方精确制导武器或C4I系统中的红外传感器。本文主要研究了药物爆燃产生近红外辐射的特性,通过计算化学反应热分析了药物爆燃产生的总能量,并且详细介绍了几种不同的实验方法和实验结果。     

超连续谱激光光源研究进展

高非线性光纤制造技术的成熟和光纤激光器性能的提升,极大地促进了超连续谱光源的快速发展,以光纤为非线性介质的超连续谱的产生成为当前研究热点。从可见光、近红外和中红外3个不同波段,综述了超连续谱产生的技术方案与最新进展。当前,可见光和近红外波段的超连续谱光源输出功率已经突破百瓦量级,并出现了多芯光子晶体光纤、光纤放大器和随机光纤激光器产生超连续谱等众多新方案;以氟化物光纤和亚碲酸盐光纤为非线性介质的中红外超连续谱,输出功率也突破了十瓦量级;在光谱拓展方面,以硫系光纤为非线性介质的超连续谱,输出光谱已扩展到12μm以上。     

冲击雷达战胜隐形飞机的想法在试验中受挫

在对F-117的试验中,一种新奇的使用“冲击雷达”探测隐形飞机的方法被认为是不成立的。这种方法是在极端高的峰值功率上辐射非常短的脉冲。 试验结果进一步证实了美国DARPA（国防高级研究计划局）的专家组早先的估计,他们发现冲击雷达不能战胜隐形飞机。     

为了延长杀伤距离应该注意脉冲激光器

华盛顿——鉴于目前连续波高能化学激光器对付战术导弹和近地飞机,其杀伤距离相对地说比较短,仅1—2公里;而对于下一代较高功率的器件来说,最大杀伤距离也只有几公里。为了延长杀伤距离,促使我们对脉冲器件发生兴趣。 脉冲激光器在传输方面具有超过连续波激光器的一些优点,但对于某些特殊应用来说,它又存在若干缺点。 另外,脉冲激光器能够更有效地把它的能量传递到目标中去,在目标内产生冲击效应;而采用连续波激光辐射却不能获得这种效应.     

辐射时间和能量限制下雷达最优脉冲积累研究

为了限制雷达辐射,提高雷达的隐蔽性,研究了给定雷达辐射时间和能量限制下的雷达最优脉冲积累检测问题,提出了一种最优脉冲积累数的选择模型,分别得出了确知脉冲串相参积累、随机相位脉冲串积累、随机振幅相位脉冲串积累情况下单脉冲信噪比与最优脉冲积累数的对应关系。研究结果对给定辐射时间和能量限制下提高雷达目标检测数目及跟踪精度有一定的理论和实际意义。     

炸药冲击波激励工作气体产生可见光的辐射机理研究

研究炸药冲击波激励工作气体的辐射问题。通过理论分析 ,给出气体冲击波波阵面的数学模型。提出了高温环境下工作气体产生可见光的辐射机理 ,最后提出在冲击波作用下提高气体辐射强度的方法。     

小波变换在红外脉冲幅值序列算法中的应用

针对四元探测器信号处理中的脉冲幅值序列算法,提出了用小波变换进行序列数据分析和目标识别的方法。通过分析红外干扰弹的工作过程和其辐射能量变化与典型目标辐射的差异,选择db3小波函数对提取出的脉冲幅值序列进行小波分解和重构,有效地区分了目标信号和干扰弹信号,提高了四元探测器抗红外干扰和识别目标的能力。     

低截获概率技术对抗反辐射导弹研究

反辐射导弹的迅速发展对雷达构成了极大的威胁,研究切实可行的反辐射导弹对抗措施显得十分迫切.首先介绍了低截获概率雷达的定义;然后推导出低截获概率方程,得到雷达截获因子公式;最后根据截获因子公式,以扩谱技术、脉冲压缩和脉冲积累为例,论述低截获概率技术对抗反辐射导弹的有效性,并分别进行了仿真分析.这为雷达对抗反辐射导弹的提供了理论指导.     

红外脉冲强光辐射产生技术研究

定向红外脉冲强光辐射技术是定向红外对抗中的关键技术,主要用来破坏敌方精确制导武器或C4I系统的红外传感器。本文进行了三种产生技术的研究,即爆炸激励惰性气体,多丝电爆激励惰性气体和多点同步爆燃药物。在同步爆燃产生技术的研究中,当有效载荷弹药为0.2kg时,在距离源50m处得到三个波段(1～3、3～5、8～12μm)的辐射强度为(2.00～3.55)×l05W／Sr,脉冲半高宽为约20ms的强红外辐射脉冲。     

强脉冲 CO2 激光与靶的相互作用

在真空背景下的实验表明,当微秒量级的强脉冲激光与靶材相互作用时,由于靶材的升华,激光维持爆震波依然存在。爆震波产生的压缩波传入靶内,该应力波的作用是材料破坏的重要因素。而强脉冲激光引起的汽化反冲压力、热应力和烧蚀破坏也是不可忽视的因素。实验还表明,在真空背景下维持爆震波足以将后续激光屏蔽。     

Putin – the masked nemesis of the strategy of ambiguity

Recent events demonstrate the complex and adaptive approach employed by Russia to reassert influence in Europe. The changing face of Russia’s strategy commenced in 2007 when it launched a crippling cyber-attack against Estonia. This was followed by a large Russian conventional attack against Georgia in 2008, occupying two large areas of the nation. 2014 witnessed the Russian annexation of Crimea where in just a week, Russia seized control of Crimea “without firing a shot.” The annexation of Crimea was rapidly followed by a Russian inspired and led subversive war in eastern Ukraine. The common thread among these diverse Russian operations is its use of ambiguity to confound and confuse decision makers in the West.     

India's counter-insurgency experience: the ‘trust and nurture’ strategy

The Indian Army, a force trained primarily for conventional warfare, has been engaged in internal counter-insurgency operations since the 1950s. Despite such a long innings on a counter-insurgency mode, little attention has been accorded within military circles to doctrinal innovation for waging sub-conventional warfare in India's democratic political context. At best, the Army continues to view counter-insurgency duty as secondary to its primary duty of defending India from external conventional threats. By conceptualizing a counter-insurgency strategy of ‘trust and nurture’, this article aims to fill this critical doctrinal gap in India's military policy. The author argues that a counter-insurgency strategy of ‘trust and nurture’ based on democratic political culture, measured military methods, special counter-insurgency forces, local social and cultural awareness and an integrative nation-building approach will result in positive handling of India's internal security problems. The author utilizes India's counter-insurgency experiences in Assam, Mizoram, Nagaland, Punjab, and Operation ‘Sadhbhavana’ in Jammu and Kashmir as illustrative empirical indicants in order to validate the ‘trust and nurture’ strategy.     

Remembering and forgetting Mirambo: Histories of war in modern Africa

ABSTRACT

While the study of organised violence is considered essential to understanding the history of the West, and accordingly imbued with various layers of meaning and remembrance, war is widely regarded as inimical to the modern nation in Africa and stable development more broadly. Using examples drawn from primarily from East Africa, this paper considers the ways in which warfare in the deeper (‘precolonial’) past has been framed and envisioned in recent decades, in particular by governments whose own roots lie in revolutionary armed struggle and who began life as guerrilla movements. While in some cases particular elements of the deeper past were indeed mobilised in pursuit of contemporary political goals, in many other scenarios histories of precolonial violence were beheld as problematic and unworthy of remembrance. This paper highlights the paradox and ambiguity which has attended the memory of key aspects of Africa’s deeper past.     

The UK,interrogation and Iraq, 2003–2008

The UK’s interrogation operations during the conflict in Iraq (2003–2008) are often portrayed by the media as involving significant amounts of mistreatment. This article demonstrates that these practices are not necessarily representative of the UK’s interrogation operations across this conflict. In doing so it contributes to the limited literature on the practice of interrogation and on the UK’s combat operations in Iraq. The UK’s interrogation capability, and therefore its intelligence-gathering capability, is shown to have rested primarily with the military’s Joint Forward Interrogation Team (JFIT). The JFIT suffered from limitations to the number, training and experience of its interrogators and interpreters. It is argued that maintaining a permanent, higher level of preparedness for interrogation by the British armed forces is desirable.     

SIM—LISP:一个通信网络管理专家系统外壳的设计与实现

本文介绍了笔者为开发名为OONMES的网络管理专家系统所实现的一个简单专家系统工具SIM-LISP。SIM-LISP是一个用C/C++语言来实现的模拟LISP语言的可调用函数集,它短小精巧,速度快,可以完成针对网管专家系统的事实或规则知识的表示、匹配、合一和推理等基本操作,并有与知识对象的连接功能,是网管专家系统内核实现的支撑环境。     

Al Qaida on the US invasion of Afghanistan in their own words

This article consists of selected translations from captured interviews and dairies of Al Qaida members. The time period covered is from mid-2001 to early 2002 and concerns their operations in Afghanistan. The material clearly conveys a range of emotion, from confident to despondent, as well as efforts to contest the US actions. The first several pages give the reader context and some possible “lessons learned,” but the story(ies) are best told by the Al Qaida members themselves. All names are pseudonyms.     

Does Intent equal Capability? Al-Qaeda and Weapons of Mass Destruction

The prospect of terrorists deploying weapons of mass destruction (WMD) is often referred to as the foremost danger to American national security. This danger has become more realistic because of al-Qaeda's expanding global network and the expressed willingness to kill thousands of civilians. In the past four years, numerous media reports have documented the group's ongoing quest for WMD capabilities; many reports have detailed al-Qaeda members’ attempts to manufacture or obtain certain chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) agents to use in WMD against targets in the West and the Middle East. Yet the question remains: Does al-Qaeda's current WMD capability match its actual intent? While most studies of the group have focused on its explicit desire for WMD, allegations of CBRN acquisition, and the killing potential of specific CBRN agents, few open-source studies have closely examined the evolution of al-Qaeda's consideration of WMD and, most notably, the merit of actual CBRN production instructions as depicted and disseminated in the group's own literature and manuals. The following report will examine the history of al-Qaeda's interest in CBRN agents, the evolution of the network's attitude toward these weapons, and the internal debate within the organization concerning acquisition and use of WMD. More so, the following research will assess the validity of actual CBRN production instructions and capabilities as displayed and disseminated in al-Qaeda's own literature and websites.     

Late Medieval Lance Use: Mounted Combat and Martial Arts in Western Europe from the 14th to the 16th Century

Despite the lance’s status and the amount of attention the couched lance has received in historiography, study of its martial art has been neglected. The various lance types and techniques used by western European cavalry have only recently begun to receive scholarly attention. Additionally, Medieval European lance use has too often been studied in isolation, without an adequate understanding of the idiosyncratic and asymmetrical dynamics of mounted combat. Although the charge with the couched lance was a valid tactic, it was only one of many. Light and heavy lances were used in one hand or two to trip, block, unhorse, and wrestle. These techniques were governed by the harsh laws of distance, speed, impact, iron, and asymmetry. By utilizing the surviving Fechtbücher and several Peninsular and Near Eastern sources, a brief foray into the diverse techniques of lance use and their purposes has been attempted here.     

物理学中的辩证自然观——控制、信息、系统与辩证自然观

和谐律、守恒律、方向律是自然辩证法中自然观的三大规律,它们贯穿、融合并体现于各具体学科的研究领域中。本文主要以自然辨证规律在控制与系统科学中的体现为依托,系统阐述物理学中控制系统理论与信息理论及其应用中自然观三大规律的具体表现。     

The practice and theory of British counterinsurgency: the histories of the atrocities at the Palestinian villages of al-Bassa and Halhul, 1938–1939

This article details two largely unreported atrocities by British forces operating against Arab rebels during the Arab revolt, 1936–9, at the Palestinian villages of al-Bassa and Halhul. It then examines the military-legal system that underpinned and authorised British military forces operating in aid of the civil power, suggesting that the law in place at the time allowed for a level of reprisals and punitive actions, such as happened at al-Bassa and Halhul. The article does not conclude that the law allowed for atrocities but it does argue that it gave a basic form and understanding to an operational method that was brutal and could lead to atrocities. It thus tests the idea in much of the literature on counterinsurgency that the British were restrained and used minimum force when compared to other colonial and neo-colonial powers fighting insurgents.