Untruthful probabilistic demand forecasts in vendor‐managed revenue‐sharing contracts: Coordinating the chain

Vendor‐managed revenue‐sharing arrangements are common in the newspaper and other industries. Under such arrangements, the supplier decides on the level of inventory while the retailer effectively operates under consignment, sharing the sales revenue with his supplier. We consider the case where the supplier is unable to predict demand, and must base her decisions on the retailer‐supplied probabilistic forecast for demand. We show that the retailer's best choice of a distribution to report to his supplier will not be the true demand distribution, but instead will be a degenerate distribution that surprisingly induces the supplier to provide the system‐optimal inventory quantity. (To maintain credibility, the retailer's reports of daily sales must then be consistent with his supplied forecast.) This result is robust under nonlinear production costs and nonlinear revenue‐sharing. However, if the retailer does not know the supplier's production cost, the forecast “improves” and could even be truthful. That, however, causes the supplier's order quantity to be suboptimal for the overall system. © 2007 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2007     

Scheduling and due‐date quotation in a make‐to‐order supply chain

We consider a manufacturer, served by a single supplier, who has to quote due dates to arriving customers in a make‐to‐order production environment. The manufacturer is penalized for long lead times and for missing due dates. To meet due dates, the manufacturer has to obtain components from a supplier. We model this manufacturer and supplier as a two‐machine flow shop, consider several variations of this problem, and design effective due‐date quotation and scheduling algorithms for centralized and decentralized versions of the model. We perform extensive computational testing to assess the effectiveness of our algorithms and to compare the centralized and decentralized models to quantify the value of centralized control in a make‐to‐order supply chain. Since complete information exchange and centralized control is not always practical or cost‐effective, we explore the value of partial information exchange for this system. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2008     

Lateral capacity exchange and its impact on capacity investment decisions

We study the problem of capacity exchange between two firms in anticipation of the mismatch between demand and capacity, and its impact on firm's capacity investment decisions. For given capacity investment levels of the two firms, we demonstrate how capacity price may be determined and how much capacity should be exchanged when either manufacturer acts as a Stackelberg leader in the capacity exchange game. By benchmarking against the centralized system, we show that a side payment may be used to coordinate the capacity exchange decisions. We then study the firms' capacity investment decisions using a biform game framework in which capacity investment decisions are made individually and exchange decisions are made as in a centralized system. We demonstrate the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium capacity investment levels and study the impact of firms' share of the capacity exchange surplus on their capacity investment levels.© 2007 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2007     

Pricing bridges to cross a river

We consider a pricing problem in directed, uncapacitated networks. Tariffs must be defined by an operator, the leader, for a subset of m arcs, the tariff arcs. Costs of all other arcs in the network are assumed to be given. There are n clients, the followers, and after the tariffs have been determined, the clients route their demands independent of each other on paths with minimal total cost. The problem is to find tariffs that maximize the operator's revenue. Motivated by applications in telecommunication networks, we consider a restricted version of this problem, assuming that each client utilizes at most one of the operator's tariff arcs. The problem is equivalent to pricing bridges that clients can use in order to cross a river. We prove that this problem is APX‐hard. Moreover, we analyze the effect of uniform pricing, proving that it yields both an m approximation and a (1 + lnD)‐approximation. Here, D is upper bounded by the total demand of all clients. In addition, we consider the problem under the additional restriction that the operator must not reject any of the clients. We prove that this problem does not admit approximation algorithms with any reasonable performance guarantee, unless P = NP, and we prove the existence of an n‐approximation algorithm. © 2007 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2007     

Some implications of pricing bundles

In this article, we consider a problem in which two suppliers can sell their respective products both individually and together as a bundle, and study the impact of bundle pricing. Four pricing models (centralized, decentralized, coop–comp, and comp–coop) are analyzed with regard to the competition formats and sequences. As one would expect, the firms are always better off when pricing decisions are centralized. However, rather surprisingly, we find that firms may be worse off if the bundle prices are set in a cooperative way; we provide analytical characterization of those instances. Numerical studies show that these insights also hold for some nonlinear demand. © 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2013     

Collaboration in contingent capacities with information asymmetry

We study the optimal contracting problem between two firms collaborating on capacity investment with information asymmetry. Without a contract, system efficiency is lost due to the profit‐margin differentials among the firms, demand uncertainty, and information asymmetry. With information asymmetry, we demonstrate that the optimal capacity level is characterized by a newsvendor formula with an upward‐adjusted capacity investment cost, and no first‐best solution can be achieved. Our analysis shows that system efficiency can always be improved by the optimal contract and the improvement in system efficience is due to two factors. While the optimal contract may bring the system's capacity level closer to the first‐best capacity level, it prevents the higher‐margin firm from overinvesting and aligns the capacity‐investment decisions of the two firms. Our analysis of a special case demonstrates that, under some circumstances, both firms can benefit from the principal having better information about the agent's costs. © 2007 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 54:, 2007     

Dynamic routing of prioritized warranty repairs

Recent years have seen a strong trend toward outsourcing warranty repair services to outside vendors. In this article we consider the problem of dynamically routing warranty repairs to service vendors when warranties have priority levels. Each time an item under warranty fails, it is sent to one of the vendors for repair. Items covered by higher priority warranty receive higher priority in repair service. The manufacturer pays a fixed fee per repair and incurs a linear holding cost while an item is undergoing or waiting for repair. The objective is to minimize the manufacturer's long‐run average cost. Because of the complexity of the problem, it is very unlikely that there exist tractable ways to find the optimal routing strategies. Therefore, we propose five heuristic routing procedures that are applicable to real‐life problems. We evaluate the heuristics using simulation. The simulation results show that the index‐based “generalized join the shortest queue” policy, which applies a single policy improvement step to an initial state‐independent policy, performs the best among all five heuristics. © 2007 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2008     

Non‐greedy heuristics and augmented neural networks for the open‐shop scheduling problem

In this paper we propose some non‐greedy heuristics and develop an Augmented‐Neural‐Network (AugNN) formulation for solving the classical open‐shop scheduling problem (OSSP). AugNN is a neural network based meta‐heuristic approach that allows integration of domain‐specific knowledge. The OSSP is framed as a neural network with multiple layers of jobs and machines. Input, output and activation functions are designed to enforce the problem constraints and embed known heuristics to generate a good feasible solution fast. Suitable learning strategies are applied to obtain better neighborhood solutions iteratively. The new heuristics and the AugNN formulation are tested on several benchmark problem instances in the literature and on some new problem instances generated in this study. The results are very competitive with other meta‐heuristic approaches, both in terms of solution quality and computational times. © 2005 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2005.     

Revenue sharing contracts in a supply chain with uncontractible actions

We consider a supplier–customer relationship where the customer faces a typical Newsvendor problem of determining perishable capacity to meet uncertain demand. The customer outsources a critical, demand‐enhancing service to an outside supplier, who receives a fixed share of the revenue from the customer. Given such a linear sharing contract, the customer chooses capacity and the service supplier chooses service effort level before demand is realized. We consider the two cases when these decisions are made simultaneously (simultaneous game) or sequentially (sequential game). For each game, we analyze how the equilibrium solutions vary with the parameters of the problem. We show that in the equilibrium, it is possible that either the customer's capacity increases or the service supplier's effort level decreases when the supplier receives a larger share of the revenue. We also show that given the same sharing contract, the sequential game always induces a higher capacity and more effort. For the case of additive effort effect and uniform demand distribution, we consider the customer's problem of designing the optimal contract with or without a fixed payment in the contract, and obtain sensitivity results on how the optimal contract depends on the problem parameters. For the case of fixed payment, it is optimal to allocate more revenue to the supplier to induce more service effort when the profit margin is higher, the cost of effort is lower, effort is more effective in stimulating demand, the variability of demand is smaller or the supplier makes the first move in the sequential game. For the case of no fixed payment, however, it is optimal to allocate more revenue to the supplier when the variability of demand is larger or its mean is smaller. Numerical examples are analyzed to validate the sensitivity results for the case of normal demand distribution and to provide more managerial insights. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2008     

Dynamic service rate control for a single‐server queue with Markov‐modulated arrivals

We consider the problem of service rate control of a single‐server queueing system with a finite‐state Markov‐modulated Poisson arrival process. We show that the optimal service rate is nondecreasing in the number of customers in the system; higher congestion levels warrant higher service rates. On the contrary, however, we show that the optimal service rate is not necessarily monotone in the current arrival rate. If the modulating process satisfies a stochastic monotonicity property, the monotonicity is recovered. We examine several heuristics and show where heuristics are reasonable substitutes for the optimal control. None of the heuristics perform well in all the regimes and the fluctuation rate of the modulating process plays an important role in deciding the right heuristic. Second, we discuss when the Markov‐modulated Poisson process with service rate control can act as a heuristic itself to approximate the control of a system with a periodic nonhomogeneous Poisson arrival process. Not only is the current model of interest in the control of Internet or mobile networks with bursty traffic, but it is also useful in providing a tractable alternative for the control of service centers with nonstationary arrival rates. © 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 60: 661–677, 2013     

Contractual agreements for coordination and vendor‐managed delivery under explicit transportation considerations

We consider the coordination problem between a vendor and a buyer operating under generalized replenishment costs that include fixed costs as well as stepwise freight costs. We study the stochastic demand, single‐period setting where the buyer must decide on the order quantity to satisfy random demand for a single item with a short product life cycle. The full order for the cycle is placed before the cycle begins and no additional orders are accepted by the vendor. Due to the nonrecurring nature of the problem, the vendor's replenishment quantity is determined by the buyer's order quantity. Consequently, by using an appropriate pricing schedule to influence the buyer's ordering behavior, there is an opportunity for the vendor to achieve substantial savings from transportation expenses, which are represented in the generalized replenishment cost function. For the problem of interest, we prove that the vendor's expected profit is not increasing in buyer's order quantity. Therefore, unlike the earlier work in the area, it is not necessarily profitable for the vendor to encourage larger order quantities. Using this nontraditional result, we demonstrate that the concept of economies of scale may or may not work by identifying the cases where the vendor can increase his/her profits either by increasing or decreasing the buyer's order quantity. We prove useful properties of the expected profit functions in the centralized and decentralized models of the problem, and we utilize these properties to develop alternative incentive schemes for win–win solutions. Our analysis allows us to quantify the value of coordination and, hence, to identify additional opportunities for the vendor to improve his/her profits by potentially turning a nonprofitable transaction into a profitable one through the use of an appropriate tariff schedule or a vendor‐managed delivery contract. We demonstrate that financial gain associated with these opportunities is truly tangible under a vendor‐managed delivery arrangement that potentially improves the centralized solution. Although we take the viewpoint of supply chain coordination and our goal is to provide insights about the effect of transportation considerations on the channel coordination objective and contractual agreements, the paper also contributes to the literature by analyzing and developing efficient approaches for solving the centralized problem with stepwise freight costs in the single‐period setting. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2006     

Approximation algorithms for minimizing total weighted completion time of orders on identical machines in parallel

We consider the problem of scheduling orders on identical machines in parallel. Each order consists of one or more individual jobs. A job that belongs to an order can be processed by any one of the machines. Multiple machines can process the jobs of an order concurrently. No setup is required if a machine switches over from one job to another. Each order is released at time zero and has a positive weight. Preemptions are not allowed. The completion time of an order is the time at which all jobs of that order have been completed. The objective is to minimize the total weighted completion time of the orders. The problem is NP‐hard for any fixed number (≥2) of machines. Because of this, we focus our attention on two classes of heuristics, which we refer to as sequential two‐phase heuristics and dynamic two‐phase heuristics. We perform a worst case analysis as well as an empirical analysis of nine heuristics. Our analyses enable us to rank these heuristics according to their effectiveness, taking solution quality as well as running time into account. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2006     

Integrated scheduling of loading and transportation with tractors and semitrailers separated

Motivated by some practical applications, we study a new integrated loading and transportation scheduling problem. Given a set of jobs, a single crane is available to load jobs, one by one, onto semitrailers with a given capacity. Loaded semitrailers are assigned to tractors for transportation tasks. Subject to limited resources (crane, semitrailers, and tractors), the problem is to determine (1) an assignment of jobs to semitrailers for loading tasks, (2) a sequence for the crane to load jobs onto semitrailers, (3) an assignment of loaded semitrailers to tractors for transportation tasks, and (4) a transportation schedule of assigned tractors such that the completion time of the last transportation task is minimized. We first formulate the problem as a mixed integer linear programming model (MILPM) and prove that the problem is strongly NP‐hard. Then, optimality properties are provided which are useful in establishing an improved MILPM and designing solution algorithms. We develop a constructive heuristic, two LP‐based heuristics, and a recovering beam search heuristic to solve this problem. An improved procedure for solutions by heuristics is also presented. Furthermore, two branch‐and‐bound (B&B) algorithms with two different lower bounds are developed to solve the problem to optimality. Finally, computational experiments using both real data and randomly generated data demonstrate that our heuristics are highly efficient and effective. In terms of computational time and the number of instances solved to optimality in a time limit, the B&B algorithms are better than solving the MILPM. © 2015 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 62: 416–433, 2015     

Dynamic inventory and pricing models for competing retailers

We address infinite‐horizon models for oligopolies with competing retailers under demand uncertainty. We characterize the equilibrium behavior which arises under simple wholesale pricing schemes. More specifically, we consider a periodic review, infinite‐horizon model for a two‐echelon system with a single supplier servicing a network of competing retailers. In every period, each retailer faces a random demand volume, the distribution of which depends on his own retail price as well as those charged by possibly all competing retailers. We also derive various comparative statics results regarding the impact several exogenous system parameters (e.g., cost or distributional parameters) have on the equilibrium decisions of the retailers as well as their expected profits. We show that certain monotonicity properties, engrained in folklore as well as in known inventory models for centralized systems, may break down in decentralized chains under retailer competition. Our results can be used to optimize the aggregate profits in the supply chain (i.e., those of the supplier and all retailers) by implementing a specific wholesale pricing scheme. © 2003 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2004.     

Optimal control of a production‐inventory system with both backorders and lost sales

We consider the optimal control of a production inventory‐system with a single product and two customer classes where items are produced one unit at a time. Upon arrival, customer orders can be fulfilled from existing inventory, if there is any, backordered, or rejected. The two classes are differentiated by their backorder and lost sales costs. At each decision epoch, we must determine whether or not to produce an item and if so, whether to use this item to increase inventory or to reduce backlog. At each decision epoch, we must also determine whether or not to satisfy demand from a particular class (should one arise), backorder it, or reject it. In doing so, we must balance inventory holding costs against the costs of backordering and lost sales. We formulate the problem as a Markov decision process and use it to characterize the structure of the optimal policy. We show that the optimal policy can be described by three state‐dependent thresholds: a production base‐stock level and two order‐admission levels, one for each class. The production base‐stock level determines when production takes place and how to allocate items that are produced. This base‐stock level also determines when orders from the class with the lower shortage costs (Class 2) are backordered and not fulfilled from inventory. The order‐admission levels determine when orders should be rejected. We show that the threshold levels are monotonic (either nonincreasing or nondecreasing) in the backorder level of Class 2. We also characterize analytically the sensitivity of these thresholds to the various cost parameters. Using numerical results, we compare the performance of the optimal policy against several heuristics and show that those that do not allow for the possibility of both backordering and rejecting orders can perform poorly.© 2010 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 2010     

Emergency transshipment in decentralized dealer networks: When to send and accept transshipment requests

While there has been significant previous literature on inventory transshipment, most research has focused on the dealers' demand filling decision (when to fill transshipment requests from other dealers), ignoring the requesting decision (when to send transshipment requests to other dealers). In this paper we develop optimal inventory transshipment policies that incorporate both types of decisions. We consider a decentralized system in which the dealers are independent of the manufacturer and of each other. We first study a network consisting of a very large number of dealers. We prove that the optimal inventory and transshipment decisions for an individual dealer are controlled by threshold rationing and requesting levels. Then, in order to study the impact of transshipment among independent dealers in a smaller dealer network, we consider a decentralized two‐dealer network and use a game theoretic approach to characterize the equilibrium inventory strategies of the individual dealers. An extensive numerical study highlights the impact of the requesting decision on the dealers' equilibrium behavior in a decentralized setting. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2006     

Oligopolistic contracting: Channel coordination under competition

We study contracts between a single retailer and multiple suppliers of two substitutable products, where suppliers have fixed capacities and present the retailer cost contracts for their supplies. After observing the contracts, the retailer decides how much capacity to purchase from each supplier, to maximize profits from the purchased capacity from the suppliers plus his possessed inventory (endowment). This is modeled as a noncooperative, nonzero‐sum game, where suppliers, or principals, move simultaneously as leaders and the retailer, the common agent, is the sole follower. We are interested in the form of the contracts in equilibrium, their effect on the total supply chain profit, and how the profit is split between the suppliers and the retailer. Under mild assumptions, we characterize the set of all equilibrium contracts and discuss all‐unit and marginal‐unit quantity discounts as special cases. We also show that the supply chain is coordinated in equilibrium with a unique profit split between the retailer and the suppliers. Each supplier's profit is equal to the marginal contribution of her capacity to supply chain profits in equilibrium. The retailer's profit is equal to the total revenue collected from the market minus the payments to the suppliers and the associated sales costs.     

Machine scheduling with an availability constraint and job delivery coordination

In this paper we study the scheduling problem that considers both production and job delivery at the same time with machine availability considerations. Only one vehicle is available to deliver jobs in a fixed transportation time to a distribution center. The vehicle can load at most K jobs as a delivery batch in one shipment due to the vehicle capacity constraint. The objective is to minimize the arrival time of the last delivery batch to the distribution center. Since machines may not always be available over the production period in real life due to preventive maintenance, we incorporate machine availability into the models. Three scenarios of the problem are studied. For the problem in which the jobs are processed on a single machine and the jobs interrupted by the unavailable machine interval are resumable, we provide a polynomial algorithm to solve the problem optimally. For the problem in which the jobs are processed on a single machine and the interrupted jobs are nonresumable, we first show that the problem is NP‐hard. We then propose a heuristic with a worst‐case error bound of 1/2 and show that the bound is tight. For the problem in which the jobs are processed on either one of two parallel machines, where only one machine has an unavailable interval and the interrupted jobs are resumable, we propose a heuristic with a worst‐case error bound of 2/3. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2007     

Inventory control in divergent supply chains with time‐based dispatching and shipment consolidation

This article analyses a divergent supply chain consisting of a central warehouse and N nonidentical retailers. The focus is on joint evaluation of inventory replenishment and shipment consolidation effects. A time‐based dispatching and shipment consolidation policy is used at the warehouse in conjunction with real‐time point‐of‐sale data and centralized inventory information. This represents a common situation, for example, in various types of vendor managed inventory systems. The main contribution is the derivation of an exact recursive procedure for determining the expected inventory holding and backorder costs for the system, under the assumption of Poisson demand. Two heuristics for determining near optimal shipment intervals are also presented. The results are applicable both for single‐item and multiitem systems. © 2011 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 58: 59–71, 2011