40小时大营救——武警河南总队登封反劫持行动纪实

劫持与反劫持,历来是正义与邪恶的较量。当今世界劫持事件时有发生,反劫持战斗不断,但成功的战例却寥寥无几。因此,反劫持成了各国特种部队和武装警察训练的重点科目。 在中国,劫持人质事件极少,武警部队经过反劫持战斗考验的也为数不多。因而,1月18日,发生在河南省登封市看守所里的一起死刑犯抢枪劫持人质     

新疆生产建设兵团组织反恐应急处突国防动员演练

前不久,新疆生产建设兵团在某民兵训练基地组织实施了"军垦—2012"反恐应急处突国防动员演练。演练坚持劳武结合、平战结合、寓兵于民的方针,着眼平时服务、急时应急、战时应战需要,设置了启动应急指挥机制、应急力量集结和投送、群众性暴力犯罪事件现场处置、反劫持现场联合处置4个课目。通过演练,进一步提高了新形势下兵团国防动员系统戍边     

反恐怖劫持事件中不同目的谈判语言的运用策略

在反劫持谈判中,为了能够解除现场的那种僵持、对抗、凝固的情形,谈判者就得运用不同目的的语言来使劫持者向预期的方向前进。从理论上讲,每一名谈判人员都希望通过和平的方式解决劫持事件。因此,我们必须学会运用反恐谈判讨价的语言、拖延的语言、劝降的语言和摊牌的语言,来使劫持事件得到和平解决或为武力解救行动创造良好时机。     

武警指挥自动化语言在处置大规模群体性事件中的应用研究

近几年来,大规模群体性事件出现,使武警部队处置群体性事件的任务愈来愈艰巨。指挥自动化语言如何在新形势下满足武警部队处置群体性事件的需要,适应信息化条件下武警部队的发展,已成为迫切需要研究和解决的课题。文章研究,通过提高指挥员的指挥自动化语言运用能力,指导部队在处置群体性事件过程中高效指挥、快速处置、减少伤亡,减小群体性事件给国家和人民的生命财产带来的损失。同时,对处置群体性事件指挥自动化语言进行理论化、系统化的研究,填补了指挥自动化语言在这一领域研究的空白。     

处置群体性事件训练问题研究

处置群体性事件能力,既是确保处置行动圆满成功的关键因素,又是武警部队战斗力的重要组成部分。实践证明,军事训练是提高处置群体性事件能力的基本途径。要大力加强处突基础训练、强化指挥谋略训练、抓好编组合成训练、搞好警地联训联演,不断提高部队的快速反应、组织指挥、高效处置和协同配合能力,为稳妥高效处置群体性事件奠定坚实基础。     

“蛇吞象”为哪般

“蛇吞大象”，听起来不可思议，然而这样的事确实发生了。11月15日，索马里海盗劫持了长330米、能装200万桶原油的沙特阿拉伯巨型油轮“天狼星”号。小小的海盗竟然劫持体型堪比航空母舰的巨轮!这一事件再次将全球的目光吸引到这片号称世界上最危险的海域。     

论边防部队预防和处置群体性事件的出发点和立足点

边防部队预防、处置群体性事件应该以维护社会稳定、构建和谐社会为出发点和立足点.这个定位符合国家发展的总要求,有利于发挥边防部队在预防、处置群体性事件中的作用,有利于转变角色,克服思维惯性,进一步做好预防、处置群体性事件的工作.     

美国最新反恐绝招一览

美国是恐怖组织袭击的重点对象,美国成为了世界级反恐“专业户”,其反恐专项资金投入、武器装备是任何一个国家都不能与之相提并论的,而美国在反恐方面的战略战术更是引人关注。武装民航客机,实行军事管制自有恐怖袭击以来,民航客机一直是恐怖组织行动的目标。据统计,20世纪70年代以来,世界上共发生了43起便携式导弹袭击民用飞机的事件,其中30次导致机毁人亡。恐怖分子劫持飞机事件更是屡见不鲜,特别是发生在美国的9·11事件。痛定思痛,英美反恐专家对恐怖组织分析得出其恐怖袭击的三种方式:一是劫持客机将其用作“飞行炸弹”冲撞地面重点目…     

边防部队处置群体性事件情报工作存在的问题及对策

情报工作是边防部队预防和处置群体性事件中一项重要的工作,对于群体性事件处置成功与否具有重要作用.针对目前边防部队处置群体性事件中情报工作存在的问题,提出了"情报先行"、稳定情报队伍、拓宽情报来源、提高情报工作含金量等方法和对策.     

公安边防部门处置境外边民大规模涌入事件探析

近年来,境外边民大规模涌入事件时有发生,严重危害我国边境地区的安全稳定。归纳和总结境外边民涌入事件的特点,研究处置的要求和方法,为境外边民大规模涌入事件的各阶段分别制定处置方法。     

《孙子兵法》谋略思想在反劫持战斗中的运用

用兵作战是一种诡诈之术。“诡道”“奇袭”“利诱”交织而成的战略思想贯穿孙子兵法思想的始终。它们是战斗克敌制胜的法宝。研究借鉴并灵活运用孙子谋略思想,对提高武警部队反劫持战斗行动能力,具有十分重要的现实意义。     

The Islamic insurgency in the Philippines

The Moro insurgency in the Philippines represents an interesting case of Islamically‐based insurgency with very differing roots and developments from the more widely studied Islamic movements in the Middle East. The Moro groups in the Philippines have displayed the difficulties in combining ethnic and religiously based ideologies of insurgencies. The insurgent groups have been marked by considerable factionalism and defections, but the government's counterinsurgency operations have been largely ineffective. Although neither the government nor the insurgent groups have ‘won’ the war, the Moros have gained significant autonomy from government control.     

The fertile ground of Hell’s carnival: Charles T. R. Bohannan and the US Army’s Counter Intelligence Corps’ investigations of war criminals,collaborators, and the Huk,in the Philippines 1945–1947

Insurgencies thrive in regions where government legitimacy is absent. In the post-war Philippines, Captain Charles T. R. Bohannan of the Army’s Counter Intelligence Corps became actively aware of this dynamic. Bohannan is best known for his later work with Edward Lansdale and Ramon Magsaysay in defeating the Huk Rebellion (1950–1954). Here the author examines Bohannan’s early investigative work against Japanese war criminals, wartime Filipino collaborators, and the rising threat of communist subversion most associated with the Huk. All of these experiences fed into what would be the successful campaign against the Huk, chronicled in his seminal work, Counter Guerrilla Operations: The Philippines Experience, and offers lessons on the investigative (as opposed to tactical or psychological) nature of effective counter-insurgency work, as it relates to both legitimacy in governance and the rise of insurgencies.     

The contexts of strategy as a guide for defense planning in the Philippines

Efforts toward developing an independent and credible Philippine defense policy were revived when Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III was elected President of the Philippines in 2010. President Aquino renewed the military modernization program in 2012 and emphasized the necessity of a “minimum credible defense posture.” Given the modernization efforts of the government, this article aims to contribute to the development of the concept of minimum credible defense posture by exploring how theory contributes to defense planning. It argues that the contexts of strategy are useful in planning for national defense because these contexts can provide a conceptual framework for defense planners. It proceeds in three parts: the opening section reviews the literature on defense planning; the second surveys the context of developing strategies as discussed in the General Theory of Strategy; and the last provides a definition of minimum credible defense and applies the context of developing strategies to the case of the Philippines.     

US grand strategy and the origins of the developmental state

ABSTRACT

Scholars have credited a model of state-led capitalism called the ‘developmental state’ with producing the economic miracles of Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. This article examines how the developmental state was shaped by the Cold War. US grand strategy focused on accelerating economic development among allies that were under the greatest threat from Communist China and North Korea. American aid agencies became involved in the process of state-building in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan and supported economic planning. I verify this claim by contrasting US policies on Taiwan with US policies in the Philippines, which faced a weaker Communist threat.     

A lost work of El Lobo: Lieutenant-Colonel Charles T.R. Bohannan's unpublished study of guerrilla warfare and counterinsurgency in the Philippines, 1899–1955

Charles Ted Rutledge Bohannan (1914–1982) became an integral agent of US counterinsurgency operations during the early Cold War, contributing to both the success of the COIN effort to defeat the communist Huk insurgents in the Philippines and the stalled COIN efforts in Vietnam. In the early 1960s, he wrote a short and compact analysis of the US and Filipino experience of guerrilla warfare, from the Philippine–American war until the defeat of the Huk Rebellion. It was never published. Reprinted here, Bohannan's analysis of lessons learned makes a substantial contribution to the history of American ideas of unconventional warfare by an expert who contributed these lessons to the successful defeat of an insurgency in South East Asia.     

Mapping Out a Counterinsurgency Campaign Plan: Critical Considerations in Counterinsurgency Campaigning1

This paper argues on the basis of a series of historical examples that include the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaya and Northern Ireland, that there is no perfect counterinsurgency model and that each counterinsurgency campaign is different. Counterinsurgents need to have a series of basic tenets to wage successful war against guerrillas and insurgents. These include: a clear political policy from the government under insurgent attack, a strategy to keep the population safe, successful intelligence gathering, a recognition that successful counterinsurgency is manpower intensive and a high priority on the destruction of the insurgent infrastructure. This paper urges that in period of peacetime it is essential that militaries develop a Standing Counterinsurgency Concepts Unit that can conceptualise past and present insurgent patterns and build this into military and strategic planning.     

Algeria: A case study of insurgency in the new world order

Much of the literature on the decolonization of Namibia is set in a narrative mode and demonizes one or the other of the protagonists. This article, organized in a topical fashion, concerns the diplomatic, military, and economic facets of the Namibian war and draws upon the literature of comparable twentieth century colonial and anti-colonial wars in Algeria, Angola, Kenya, Mozambique, the Philippines, South Africa, Vietnam and Zimbabwe. It explores the changing discourse of legitimacy concerning independence for Namibia, the conduct of insurgency and counterinsurgency in the bush war, and economic aspects of that war.     

Framing Political Violence: Success and Failure of Religious Mobilization in the Philippines and Thailand

How do religious civil wars evolve? Many violent conflicts are fought between groups of different faiths. The paper argues, however, that religious differences rarely directly lead to conflict onset. Rather, the apparent religious dimension of many civil wars is a consequence of successful religious framing. Political and military leaders offer religious interpretations designed to legitimize the use of force and to mobilize believers to violent action. Such framing processes can be more or less successful, depending inter alia on the authority of the political and religious leadership, on the coherence and appropriateness of the frames, on the existence of persuasive counter-frames, and on the availability of communication infrastructures that allow for effective dissemination of religious frames. Comparing violent conflicts in the Philippines and Thailand, the paper shows that religious mobilization can fail along the theoretically predicted lines.