Dynamic inventory control with limited capital and short‐term financing

For most firms, especially the small‐ and medium‐sized ones, the operational decisions are affected by their internal capital and ability to obtain external capital. However, the majority of the literature on dynamic inventory control ignores the firm's financial status and financing issues. An important question that arises is: what are the optimal inventory and financing policies for firms with limited internal capital and limited access to external capital? In this article, we study a dynamic inventory control problem where a capital‐constrained firm periodically purchases a product from a supplier and sells it to a market with random demands. In each period, the firm can use its own capital and/or borrow a short‐term loan to purchase the product, with the interest rate being nondecreasing in the loan size. The objective is to maximize the firm's expected terminal wealth at the end of the planning horizon. We show that the optimal inventory policy in each period is an equity‐level‐dependent base‐stock policy, where the equity level is the sum of the firm's capital level and the value of its on‐hand inventory evaluated at the purchasing cost; and the structure of the optimal policy can be characterized by four intervals of the equity level. Our results shed light on the dynamic inventory control for firms with limited capital and short‐term financing capabilities.Copyright © 2014 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 61: 184–201, 2014     

Dynamic pricing under first order Markovian competition

We evaluate the effect of competition on prices, profits, and consumers' surplus in multiperiod, finite horizon, dynamic pricing settings. In our base model, a single myopic consumer visits two competing retailers, who offer identical goods, in a (first order Markovian) probabilistic fashion—if the posted price exceeds the consumer's valuation for the good, he returns to the same store in the following period with a certain probability. We find that even a small reduction in the return probability from one—which corresponds to the monopoly case at which prices decline linearly—is sufficient to revert the price decline from a linear into an exponential shape. Each retailer's profit is particularly sensitive to changes in his return probability when it is relatively high, and is maximized under complete loyalty behavior (i.e., return probability is one). On the other hand, consumer surplus is maximized under complete switching behavior (i.e., return probability is zero). In the presence of many similar consumers, the insights remain valid. We further focus on the extreme scenario where all consumers follow a complete switching behavior, to derive sharp bounds, and also consider the instance where, in this setting, myopic consumers are replaced with strategic consumers. © 2011 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2011     

The loss‐averse newsvendor problem with supply options

In this article, we consider a loss‐averse newsvendor with stochastic demand. The newsvendor might procure options when demand is unknown, and decide how many options to execute only after demand is revealed. If the newsvendor reserves too many options, he would incur high reservation costs. Yet reserving too few could result in lost sales. So the newsvendor faces a trade‐off between reservation costs and losing sales. When there are multiple options available, the newsvendor has to consider how many units of each to reserve by studying the trade‐off between flexibility and costs. We show how the newsvendor's loss aversion behavior affects his ordering decision, and propose an efficient algorithm to compute his optimal solution in the general case with n options. We also present examples showing how the newsvendor's ordering strategy changes as loss aversion rises. © 2014 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. 62:46–59, 2015     

The impact of operational decisions on the design of salesforce incentives

When facing high levels of overstock inventories, firms often push their salesforce to work harder than usual to attract more demand, and one way to achieve that is to offer attractive incentives. However, most research on the optimal design of salesforce incentives ignores this dependency and assumes that operational decisions of production/inventory management are separable from design of salesforce incentives. We investigate this dependency in the problem of joint salesforce incentive design and inventory/production control. We develop a dynamic Principal‐Agent model with both Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection in which the principal is strategic and risk‐neutral but the agent is myopic and risk‐averse. We find the optimal joint incentive design and inventory control strategy, and demonstrate the impact of operational decisions on the design of a compensation package. The optimal strategy is characterized by a menu of inventory‐dependent salesforce compensation contracts. We show that the optimal compensation package depends highly on the operational decisions; when inventory levels are high, (a) the firm offers a more attractive contract and (b) the contract is effective in inducing the salesforce to work harder than usual. In contrast, when inventory levels are low, the firm can offer a less attractive compensation package, but still expect the salesforce to work hard enough. In addition, we show that although the inventory/production management and the design of salesforce compensation package are highly correlated, information acquisition through contract design allows the firm to implement traditional inventory control policies: a market‐based state‐dependent policy (with a constant base‐stock level when the inventory is low) that makes use of the extracted market condition from the agent is optimal. This work appears to be the first article on operations that addresses the important interplay between inventory/production control and salesforce compensation decisions in a dynamic setting. Our findings shed light on the effective integration of these two significant aspects for the successful operation of a firm. © 2014 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 61: 320–340, 2014     

Inventory pooling games for expensive,low‐demand spare parts

We consider several independent decision makers who stock expensive, low‐demand spare parts for their high‐tech machines. They can collaborate by full pooling of their inventories via free transshipments. We examine the stability of such pooling arrangements, and we address the issue of fairly distributing the collective holding and downtime costs over the participants, by applying concepts from cooperative game theory. We consider two settings: one where each party maintains a predetermined stocking level and one where base stock levels are optimized. For the setting with fixed stocking levels, we unravel the possibly conflicting effects of implementing a full pooling arrangement and study these effects separately to establish intuitive conditions for existence of a stable cost allocation. For the setting with optimized stocking levels, we provide a simple proportional rule that accomplishes a population monotonic allocation scheme if downtime costs are symmetric among participants. Although our whole analysis is motivated by spare parts applications, all results are also applicable to other pooled resource systems of which the steady‐state behavior is equivalent to that of an Erlang loss system. © 2012 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2012     

Emergency transshipment in decentralized dealer networks: When to send and accept transshipment requests

While there has been significant previous literature on inventory transshipment, most research has focused on the dealers' demand filling decision (when to fill transshipment requests from other dealers), ignoring the requesting decision (when to send transshipment requests to other dealers). In this paper we develop optimal inventory transshipment policies that incorporate both types of decisions. We consider a decentralized system in which the dealers are independent of the manufacturer and of each other. We first study a network consisting of a very large number of dealers. We prove that the optimal inventory and transshipment decisions for an individual dealer are controlled by threshold rationing and requesting levels. Then, in order to study the impact of transshipment among independent dealers in a smaller dealer network, we consider a decentralized two‐dealer network and use a game theoretic approach to characterize the equilibrium inventory strategies of the individual dealers. An extensive numerical study highlights the impact of the requesting decision on the dealers' equilibrium behavior in a decentralized setting. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2006     

Dynamic capacity reservation and due date quoting in a make‐to‐order system

We consider a make‐to‐order manufacturer facing random demand from two classes of customers. We develop an integrated model for reserving capacity in anticipation of future order arrivals from high priority customers and setting due dates for incoming orders. Our research exhibits two distinct features: (1) we explicitly model the manufacturer's uncertainty about the customers' due date preferences for future orders; and (2) we utilize a service level measure for reserving capacity rather than estimating short and long term implications of due date quoting with a penalty cost function. We identify an interesting effect (“t‐pooling”) that arises when the (partial) knowledge of customer due date preferences is utilized in making capacity reservation and order allocation decisions. We characterize the relationship between the customer due date preferences and the required reservation quantities and show that not considering the t‐pooling effect (as done in traditional capacity and inventory rationing literature) leads to excessive capacity reservations. Numerical analyses are conducted to investigate the behavior and performance of our capacity reservation and due date quoting approach in a dynamic setting with multiple planning horizons and roll‐overs. One interesting and seemingly counterintuitive finding of our analyses is that under certain conditions reserving capacity for high priority customers not only improves high priority fulfillment, but also increases the overall system fill rate. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2008     

Optimal control of a capacitated inventory system with multiple demand classes

This article studies the optimal control of a periodic‐review make‐to‐stock system with limited production capacity and multiple demand classes. In this system, a single product is produced to fulfill several classes of demands. The manager has to make the production and inventory allocation decisions. His objective is to minimize the expected total discounted cost. The production decision is made at the beginning of each period and determines the amount of products to be produced. The inventory allocation decision is made after receiving the random demands and determines the amount of demands to be satisfied. A modified base stock policy is shown to be optimal for production, and a multi‐level rationing policy is shown to be optimal for inventory allocation. Then a heuristic algorithm is proposed to approximate the optimal policy. The numerical studies show that the heuristic algorithm is very effective. © 2011 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 58: 43–58, 2011     

The one‐warehouse multiretailer problem with an order‐up‐to level inventory policy

We consider a two‐level system in which a warehouse manages the inventories of multiple retailers. Each retailer employs an order‐up‐to level inventory policy over T periods and faces an external demand which is dynamic and known. A retailer's inventory should be raised to its maximum limit when replenished. The problem is to jointly decide on replenishment times and quantities of warehouse and retailers so as to minimize the total costs in the system. Unlike the case in the single level lot‐sizing problem, we cannot assume that the initial inventory will be zero without loss of generality. We propose a strong mixed integer program formulation for the problem with zero and nonzero initial inventories at the warehouse. The strong formulation for the zero initial inventory case has only T binary variables and represents the convex hull of the feasible region of the problem when there is only one retailer. Computational results with a state‐of‐the art solver reveal that our formulations are very effective in solving large‐size instances to optimality. © 2010 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2010     

Dynamic learning,pricing, and ordering by a censored newsvendor

We address the problem of determining optimal ordering and pricing policies in a finite‐horizon newsvendor model with unobservable lost sales. The demand distribution is price‐dependent and involves unknown parameters. We consider both the cases of perishable and nonperishable inventory. A very general class of demand functions is studied in this paper. We derive the optimal ordering and pricing policies as unique functions of the stocking factor (which is a linear transformation of the safety factor). An important expression is obtained for the marginal expected value of information. As a consequence, we show when lost sales are unobservable, with perishable inventory the optimal stocking factor is always at least as large as the one given by the single‐period model; however, if inventory is nonperishable, this result holds only under a strong condition. This expression also helps to explain why the optimal stocking factor of a period may not increase with the length of the problem. We compare this behavior with that of a full information model. We further examine the implications of the results to the special cases when demand uncertainty is described by additive and multiplicative models. For the additive case, we show that if demand is censored, the optimal policy is to order more as well as charge higher retail prices when compared to the policies in the single‐period model and the full information model. We also compare the optimal and myopic policies for the additive and multiplicative models. © 2007 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2007     

Synchronizing pricing and replenishment to serve forward-looking customers

We incorporate strategic customer waiting behavior in the classical economic order quantity (EOQ) setting. The seller determines not only the timing and quantities of the inventory replenishment, but also the selling prices over time. While similar ideas of market segmentation and intertemporal price discrimination can be carried over from the travel industries to other industries, inventory replenishment considerations common to retail outlets and supermarkets introduce additional features to the optimal pricing scheme. Specifically, our study provides concrete managerial recommendations that are against the conventional wisdom on “everyday low price” (EDLP) versus “high-low pricing” (Hi-Lo). We show that in the presence of inventory costs and strategic customers, Hi-Lo instead of EDLP is optimal when customers have homogeneous valuations. This result suggests that because of strategic customer behavior, the seller obtains a new source of flexibility—the ability to induce customers to wait—which always leads to a strictly positive increase of the seller's profit. Moreover, the optimal inventory policy may feature a dry period with zero inventory, but this period does not necessarily result in a loss of sales as customers strategically wait for the upcoming promotion. Furthermore, we derive the solution approach for the optimal policy under heterogeneous customer valuation setting. Under the optimal policy, the replenishments and price promotions are synchronized, and the seller adopts high selling prices when the inventory level is low and plans a discontinuous price discount at the replenishment point when inventory is the highest.     

Pricing and inventory management during new product introduction when shortage creates hype

In this study, we analyze the joint pricing and inventory management during new product introduction when product shortage creates additional demand due to hype. We develop a two‐period model in which a firm launches its product at the beginning of the first period, before it observes sales in the two periods. The product is successful with an exogenous probability, or unsuccessful with the complementary probability. The hype in the second period is observed only when the product is successful. The firm learns the actual status of the product only after observing the first‐period demand. The firm must decide the stocking level and price of the product jointly at the beginning of each of the two periods. In this article, we derive some structural properties of the optimal prices and inventory levels, and show that (i) firms do not always exploit hype, (ii) firms do not always increase the price of a successful product in the second period, (iii) firms may price out an unsuccessful product in the first period if the success probability is above a threshold, and (iv) such a threshold probability is decreasing in the first‐period market potential of the successful product. © 2015 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 62: 304–320, 2015     

Nash bargaining over allocations in inventory pooling contracts

When facing uncertain demand, several firms may consider pooling their inventories leading to the emergence of two key contractual issues. How much should each produce or purchase for inventory purposes? How should inventory be allocated when shortages occur to some of the firms? Previously, if the allocations issue was considered, it was undertaken through evaluation of the consequences of an arbitrary priority scheme. We consider both these issues within a Nash bargaining solution (NBS) cooperative framework. The firms may not be risk neutral, hence a nontransferable utility bargaining game is defined. Thus the physical pooling mechanism itself must benefit the firms, even without any monetary transfers. The firms may be asymmetric in the sense of having different unit production costs and unit revenues. Our assumption with respect to shortage allocation is that a firm not suffering from a shortfall, will not be affected by any of the other firms' shortages. For two risk neutral firms, the NBS is shown to award priority on all inventory produced to the firm with higher ratio of unit revenue to unit production cost. Nevertheless, the arrangement is also beneficial for the other firm contributing to the total production. We provide examples of Uniform and Bernoulli demand distributions, for which the problem can be solved analytically. For firms with constant absolute risk aversion, the agreement may not award priority to any firm. Analytically solvable examples allow additional insights, e.g. that higher risk aversion can, for some problem parameters, cause an increase in the sum of quantities produced, which is not the case in a single newsvendor setting. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2008     

On the effectiveness of returns policies in the price‐dependent newsvendor model

We study in this paper the price‐dependent (PD) newsvendor model in which a manufacturer sells a product to an independent retailer facing uncertain demand and the retail price is endogenously determined by the retailer. We prove that for a zero salvage value and some expected demand functions, in equilibrium, the manufacturer may elect not to introduce buybacks. On the other hand, if buybacks are introduced in equilibrium, their introduction has an insignificant effect on channel efficiency improvement, but, by contrast, may significantly shift profits from the retailer to the manufacturer. We further demonstrate that the introduction of buybacks increases the wholesale price, retail price, and inventory level, as compared to the wholesale price‐only contract, and that the corresponding vertically integrated firm offers the lowest retail price and highest inventory level. © 2005 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2005.     

Constant risk aversion in stochastic contests with exponential completion times

This article analyzes a class of stochastic contests among multiple players under risk‐averse exponential utility. In these contests, players compete over the completion of a task by simultaneously deciding on their investment, which determines how fast they complete the task. The completion time of the task for each player is assumed to be an exponentially distributed random variable with rate linear in the player's investment and the completion times of different players are assumed to be stochastically independent. The player that completes the task first earns a prize whereas the remaining players earn nothing. The article establishes a one‐to‐one correspondence between the Nash equilibrium of this contest with respect to risk‐averse exponential utilities and the nonnegative solution of a nonlinear equation. Using the properties of the latter, it proves the existence and the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium, and provides an efficient method to compute it. It exploits the resulting representation of the equilibrium investments to determine the effects of risk aversion and the differences between the outcome of the Nash equilibrium and that of a centralized version.© 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 66:4–14, 2019     

Capacity allocation with traditional and Internet channels

In this paper we study a capacity allocation problem for two firms, each of which has a local store and an online store. Customers may shift among the stores upon encountering a stockout. One question facing each firm is how to allocate its finite capacity (i.e., inventory) between its local and online stores. One firm's allocation affects the decision of the rival, thereby creating a strategic interaction. We consider two scenarios of a single‐product single‐period model and derive corresponding existence and stability conditions for a Nash equilibrium. We then conduct sensitivity analysis of the equilibrium solution with respect to price and cost parameters. We also prove the existence of a Nash equilibrium for a generalized model in which each firm has multiple local stores and a single online store. Finally, we extend the results to a multi‐period model in which each firm decides its total capacity and allocates this capacity between its local and online stores. A myopic solution is derived and shown to be a Nash equilibrium solution of a corresponding “sequential game.” © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2006     

An exact analysis of a joint production‐inventory problem in two‐echelon inventory systems

We consider a two‐echelon inventory system with a manufacturer operating from a warehouse supplying multiple distribution centers (DCs) that satisfy the demand originating from multiple sources. The manufacturer has a finite production capacity and production times are stochastic. Demand from each source follows an independent Poisson process. We assume that the transportation times between the warehouse and DCs may be positive which may require keeping inventory at both the warehouse and DCs. Inventory in both echelons is managed using the base‐stock policy. Each demand source can procure the product from one or more DCs, each incurring a different fulfilment cost. The objective is to determine the optimal base‐stock levels at the warehouse and DCs as well as the assignment of the demand sources to the DCs so that the sum of inventory holding, backlog, and transportation costs is minimized. We obtain a simple equation for finding the optimal base‐stock level at each DC and an upper bound for the optimal base‐stock level at the warehouse. We demonstrate several managerial insights including that the demand from each source is optimally fulfilled entirely from a single distribution center, and as the system's utilization approaches 1, the optimal base‐stock level increases in the transportation time at a rate equal to the demand rate arriving at the DC. © 2011 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2011     

Capacity games for partially complementary products under multivariate random demands

In this study, we consider n firms, each of which produces and sells a different product. The n firms face a common demand stream which requests all their products as a complete set. In addition to the common demand stream, each firm also faces a dedicated demand stream which requires only its own product. The common and dedicated demands are uncertain and follow a general, joint, continuous distribution. Before the demands are realized, each firm needs to determine its capacity or production quantity to maximize its own expected profit. We formulate the problem as a noncooperative game. The sales price per unit for the common demand could be higher or lower than the unit price for the dedicated demand, which affects the firm's inventory rationing policy. Hence, the outcome of the game varies. All of the prices are first assumed to be exogenous. We characterize Nash equilibrium(s) of the game. At the end of the article, we also provide some results for the endogenous pricing. © 2012 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 59: 146–159, 2012     

Callable products for an implicit time model with dependent demands

Capacity providers such as airlines and hotels have traditionally increased revenues by practicing market segmentation and revenue management, enabling them to sell the same capacity pool to different consumers at different prices. Callable products can enhance profits and improve consumers' welfare by allowing the firm to broker capacity between consumers with different willingness to pay. A consumer who buys a callable product gives the capacity provider the right to recall capacity at a prespecified recall price. This article studies callable products in the context of the model most commonly used in industry, which handles time implicitly imposing fewer restrictions on the nature of randomness compared to the Poisson arrival process favored in academia. In the implicit time model, capacity providers set booking limits to protect capacity for future high-fare demand. Our numerical study identifies conditions where callable products result in significant gains in profits.     

Inventory control and periodic price discounting campaigns

This paper develops an inventory model that determines replenishment strategies for buyers facing situations in which sellers offer price‐discounting campaigns at random times as a way to drive sales or clear excess inventory. Specifically, the model deals with the inventory of a single item that is maintained to meet a constant demand over time. The item can be purchased at two different prices denoted high and low. We assume that the low price goes into effect at random points in time following an exponential distribution and lasts for a random length of time following another exponential distribution. We highlight a replenishment strategy that will lead to the lowest inventory holding and ordering costs possible. This strategy is to replenish inventory only when current levels are below a certain threshold when the low price is offered and the replenishment is to a higher order‐up‐to level than the one currently in use when inventory depletes to zero and the price is high. Our analysis provides new insight into the behavior of the optimal replenishment strategy in response to changes in the ratio of purchase prices together with changes in the ratio of the duration of a low‐price period to that of a high‐price period. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2007.