Did Star Wars Help End the Cold War? Soviet Response to the SDI Program

The Strategic Defense Initiative was a U.S. missile defense program that played a very prominent role in the U.S.–Soviet relationships in the 1980s and is often credited with helping end the Cold War, as it presented the Soviet Union with a technological challenge that it could not meet. This article introduces several official Soviet documents to examine Soviet response to SDI. The evidence suggests that although the Soviet Union expressed serious concerns about U.S. missile defense program, SDI was not a decisive factor in advancing arms control negotiations. Instead, the program seriously complicated U.S.–Soviet arms control process. SDI also failed to dissuade the Soviet Union from investing in development of ballistic missiles. The Soviet Union quickly identified ways to avoid a technological arms race with the United States and focused on development of advanced missiles and anti-satellite systems to counter missile defenses. Some of these programs have been preserved to the current day.     

NATO’s push into the Caucasus: geopolitical flashpoints and limits for expansion

The Caucasus has been a major flashpoint of contention between NATO and a resurgent Russia since the collapse of the Soviet Union. The rivalry saw the escalation of hostility in the region during the brief 2008 Russo-Georgian War where a NATO-backed Georgia challenged South Ossetia supported by the Russian military. In 2011, NATO officially recognised Georgia as a potential member, challenging Russia’s traditional sphere of influence in the Caucasus. Moscow says the Eastward expansion of NATO into the Baltics and to include Georgia as a member state is a method of containing a resurgent Russia. However, the former Soviet Republics of Ukraine, the Baltics and Georgia, maintain that Russia represents a threat to their sovereignty, as seen by the Russian support of the breakaway unrecognised Republics of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. A hostile rivalry between the Russian-backed Armenia and Azerbaijan, which is reliant upon NATO-member Turkey, intensifies the polarisation in the Caucasus.     

Tacit support for terrorism: The rapprochement between the USSR and Palestinian guerrilla organizations following the 1967 war

This article demonstrates the inconsistent and wavering Soviet attitude towards national liberation movements in general and the Palestinian organizations in particular. Until the late 1960s, the Soviets viewed these organizations with suspicion, hesitating to engage in political dialogue with them. However, in the 1970s, political and military events in the region, as well as modifications in the Kremlin's Cold War strategies, led to a general shift towards the Middle East in Soviet foreign policy. Soviet leaders showed increased willingness to provide certain Palestinian organizations with arms with which to conduct terrorist activities against Israeli, pro-Israeli, Jewish and Western targets. The article explores the complex relations between Palestinian organizations and the USSR in the field of international terror. The study also exposes and analyzes the nature and content of Soviet–Palestinian arms dialogues and transactions. It provides clear evidence that Soviet policymakers and other luminaries were fully informed of, and sometimes directly involved in, these transactions and dialogues at the highest levels.     

The financing factor in military trade

Available sources value transfers of weapons irrespective of whether they are paid for and how. Data from the U.S. indicates that the shares of arms given for free or on credit are high. If other arms exporters, all military aid and all credits used for military purposes are considered, which is done here on the basis of rough estimates and an opportunity cost model, the true cash costs of weapons in the year of the actual transfer are small. On the other hand, the financial burden of earlier arms imports via debt service has grown over time. It most probably exceeded the true cash cost of imports of arms in the late 1980s. Large differences between arms transfer data and the actual true costs of arms transfers means that analysis of the economic effects of arms imports without considering these financial aspects makes little sense.     

Israeli foreign policy and the arms race in the Middle East 1950–1960

Previous accounts of the arms race in the Middle East during the 1950s have focused on the imbalance that resulted from the ‘Czech deal’ of September 1955. While that transfer of weaponry by the Soviet Union to Egypt constituted both a historical turning point and sharp acceleration of the arms race, it was only one of several changes in the regional strategic balance of that decade. This article makes extensive use of archival material in order to identify five phases of the arms race of the 1950s and analyze the manner in which Israeli policy‐makers dealt with the exigencies of procurement during each phase. Except for a brief period following the arms deals with France in 1956 that marked the beginning of the fifth phase examined below, the Israelis never abandoned the attempt to obtain arms from the United States. Israel's success in maintaining a high degree of independence in foreign policy throughout this period was the result of arms purchases from Britain and France that marked each phase of the arms race examined here. Yet, the Israelis considered arms from both of these Western powers to be temporary substitutes for the arms relationship with the USA that came about during the 1960s.     

Arming China: Major powers’ arms transfers to the People’s Republic of China

The rise of China has been fuelled by a massive military modernisation programme relying, in large part, on the acquisition of foreign military equipment. The question of how the world’s major powers define their arms transfer policies towards China is therefore crucially important. This article makes two original contributions. First, drawing on neoclassical realism, it proposes an explanatory framework integrating international and domestic factors to explain variations in major powers’ arms transfers. Second, based on a large body of elite interviews and diplomatic cables, it offers the first comprehensive comparison of American, British, French and Russian arms transfer policies towards China since the end of the Cold War.     

The role and capabilities of major weapon systems transferred between 1950 and 2010: Empirical examinations of an arms transfer data set

Arms transfers provide exporters an avenue to provide security to other states while gaining economic benefits. Arms transfers provide importers an avenue to gain security without having to rely on alliances. Past research uses aggregate measures of the monetary or security value of major weapon system transfers without accounting for strategic differences in possible use in interstate and civil conflict. This article presents a data set on interstate transfers of major weapon systems between 1950 and 2010 building upon Stockholm Peach Research Institute’s Arms Trade Register with several improvements. First, it disaggregates land weapons and air weapons into categories reflecting their strategic capabilities. Second, model level characteristics (e.g. age, speed, and range) are drawn from Jane’s Defence sources. Additionally, the data set covers a larger range of time and states than previous data sets categorizing arms. To demonstrate the usefulness, this article first presents summary statistics of the data set and then replicates an earlier test to show that the effect of human rights and regime types on United States transfers differs across the categories of arms compared to alternative measures of arms transfers.     

Through the Looking Glass: The Soviet Military-Technical Revolution and the American Revolution in Military Affairs

The roots of the information technology Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) can be traced to the mid-1970s, when the West capitalized on scientific-technological developments to neutralize the threat posed by Soviet second echelons. However, the cultivation of the technological seeds of the American RMA preceded the maturation of the conceptual ones. Although it was the US that was laying the technological groundwork for the RMA, Soviet, rather than the American military theorists, were the first to argue that the new range of technological innovations constituted a fundamental discontinuity in the nature of war, which they dubbed the ‘Military-Technical Revolution’ (MTR). About a decade later, this fundamental Soviet approach to the transformations in military affairs was analyzed, adapted and adopted by the US, and designated the RMA. This article deals with the intellectual history of the Soviet MTR and the American RMA.     

The Nuclear Peace Fallacy: How Deterrence Can Fail

Some scholars counter-intuitively argue that the proliferation of nuclear weapons increases international security by substantially reducing the chances for inter-state armed conflict. This school of thought draws heavily on the history of the American-Soviet Cold War rivalry to inform its analysis. The security dilemmas in the contemporary Middle East and South Asia where numerous states have or want nuclear weapons, however, are profoundly different than the competition between the United States and the Soviet Union. States in the Middle East and South Asia today may see nuclear weapons as usable instruments of warfare in contrast to conventional wisdom in the West that views them as weapons of deterrence and last resort. As common sense would have it, American and Allied policy designed to stem the proliferation of nuclear weapons is prudent. American diplomatic intervention, moreover, in regional crises as a third party may be needed in the future in the Middle East and South Asia to lessen the risks of nuclear warfare. Nevertheless, American policy-makers are likely in the future to find themselves facing a nuclear-armed nation-state-or soon to be nuclear weapons-capable state-in a crisis and will have to grapple with the risks of pre-emptive or preventive military action.     

Strategic hedging in Indonesia’s defense diplomacy

With the rapid pace of regional arms modernization and unresolved territorial disputes, Indonesia is increasingly susceptible to the impact of emerging great power rivalry in Asia-Pacific. Rather than pursuing a robust military build-up, Indonesian policy-makers assert that diplomacy is the country’s first line of defense. This article argues that defense diplomacy serves two agenda of Indonesia’s hedging strategy – strategic engagement and military modernization. This way, Indonesian defense and security officials seek to moderate the impact of geopolitical changes while maintaining the country’s defensive ability against regional uncertainties.     

‘Stay-Behind’ in France: Much ado about nothing?

Stay-behind networks in France were set up starting in 1948 and were aimed at responding to the possibility of a Soviet armed attack into Western Europe. Participants were identified, and arms and explosives cached, to be activated in case of hostilities. This activity became folded into a multilateral effort under the Allied Coordination Committee (ACC) of NATO. In France, the network was run as a highly compartmented activity under the French external intelligence service (DGSE). As the Soviet threat receded, the stay-behind activity became more and more dormant, and in 1990 it was quietly disbanded, immediately after the P-2 scandal broke in Italy.     

Country Survey XIII: Japan's security posture and defense industry prospects

Defense budgets in Japan have been complicated compromises from numerous inputs ‐ including threat perceptions, domestic industrial/technological base development, support for the bilateral security treaty with the United States and internal bureaucratic politics ‐ but with the fall of the former Soviet Union, the clearest justification for higher spending disappeared. Double‐digit defense spending increases that were common in the 1980s have been replaced by annual increases lower than present inflation rates, resulting in negative real growth in the country's defense budget. Domestic economic problems and consistent government pressures for smaller budgets have further slowed annual growth in total spending and have contributed to lower procurement budgets. As a result, the domestic Japanese defense industry is facing far more constrained conditions from the growth years of a decade before.

Government policymakers are examining Japan's regional security environment as well as its alliance with the United States to determine the appropriate course for the country to take in the coming years. The formal security treaty with the United States is likely to remain a major element of government positions, but other aspects of the country's overall security posture are open to debate. Perceptions of a reduced threat environment are fueling additional pressures for defense budget cuts.

The domestic defense industry seeks means to assure its survival in domestic defense markets in this constrained environment. Expansion into overseas markets to offset declining domestic markets is an option that currently is constrained by policy restrictions on arms exports. Industry is advocating re‐examination of those policies and unlike earlier years, government appears willing to respond positively but cautiously to this lobbying.     

Re-thinking the Unthinkable: Arms Control in the Twenty-First Century

ABSTRACT

Since the end of the Cold War, arms control proponents tried to make the case for deep nuclear reductions and other forms of security cooperation as necessary for strategic stability. While different versions of strategic stability analysis did sometimes produce innovative proposals, constructive negotiations, and successful ratification campaigns in the past, this analytical framework has become more of a hindrance than a help. Treating arms control as a predominantly technical way to make deterrence more stable by changing force structure characteristics, military operations, relative numbers of weapons on either side, or total number of nuclear weapons gives short shrift to political factors, including the fundamental assumptions about world politics that inform different arms control logics, the quality of political relations among leading states, and the political processes that affect negotiation, ratification, and implementation. This article compares two logics for arms control as a means to enhance strategic stability, one developed by the Cambridge community in the 1960s and one used by the Reagan administration and its successors, with current perspectives on strategic stability in which flexibility and freedom of action are preferable to predictability and arms control. It also contrasts what the Barack Obama administration has tried to achieve through strategic stability dialogues with Russia and China with how they envision security cooperation. It then presents an approach developed during the Cold War by Hedley Bull for thinking about both the technical and the political dimensions of arms control, and suggests that the logic of Cooperative Security (which shares important features with Bull's approach) is a more appropriate and productive way to think about arms control in the twenty-first century than strategic stability analysis is.     

The Scope of Foreign Assistance to North Korea’s Missile Program

There is evidence that North Korea’s ballistic missile program benefited from support from the Soviet Union until its collapse and from Russia thereafter. Along with transfers of missile systems and rocket components, it appears that Russian engineers directly supported the program in North Korea. Analysis of missile launches, imagery, design solutions, and technology suggest that Pyongyang’s recent missile program may have continued to have external support despite a pause in the 2000s. This assistance may have enabled the progress in North Korea’s missile program leading to tests of an intercontinental range ballistic missile in 2017.     

East versus West in the defeat of Nazi Germany

One of the most commonly expressed opinions about victory in the Second World War is that the Soviet Union was mostly responsible for beating Nazi Germany. Supposedly the great land war fought between these two powers in the East was the decisive front in Europe. The West's contribution to German defeat, on the other hand, is often seen as somewhat marginal. The Anglo‐American strategic bombing campaign in 1943 paid few dividends and it was not until after the Normandy landings in June 1944 that the West really began to divert a large amount of German resources.

The purpose of this article is to challenge some of these basic notions. Through analysing what Germany produced, where it was sent and how it was destroyed, the West's contribution to defeating Germany moves from an ancillary position to a dominant one. Taking German war production as a whole, from 1943 onwards the West was responsible for tying down and destroying a significantly larger share than the Soviet Union.     

Competitive Strategies against Continental Powers: The Geopolitics of Sino-Indian-American Relations

This article makes three arguments about the Sino-American competition, the Sino-Indian rivalry, and the US-India partnership. First, past maritime-continental rivalries suggest that China will pose a greater challenge to American interests as it confronts fewer threats on land, while the US may require continental allies to counter-balance China's rise. Second, whereas a Sino-Indian continental security dilemma could benefit the US by compelling China to invest in capabilities that do not threaten it, a Sino-Indian maritime security dilemma could have the opposite effect. Third, Washington should consider India as a prospective continental ally rather than a potential maritime partner.     

Cover for Thor: Divine Deception Planning for Cold War Missiles

In the late 1950s, as intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) replaced bombers, the development of Soviet ICBMs prompted fears of strategic vulnerability in the West. The Eisenhower administration's decision to deploy Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBMs) on the territory of NATO allies sought to redress the perceived vulnerability until American ICBMs were ready. British deception planners considered how to enhance the threat posed by the IRBMs. An outline plan codenamed ‘Celestial’ was intended to persuade the Soviets that the otherwise vulnerable missiles could not be readily neutralised. This article explores this deception and how such planning also sought to convey accurate information alongside disinformation. It also suggests that deception planners appear to have given little heed to the potentially counterproductive consequences of such an operation.     

Cognitivism,prospect theory,and foreign policy change: a comparative analysis of the politics of counterinsurgency in Malaya and Afghanistan

This article investigates the cognitive limitations on policy change in counterinsurgency (COIN) efforts by examining why American decision-makers failed to revise their government strategy substantially while fighting the insurgency in Afghanistan in 2003–2014 and why their British counterparts were more successful in adjusting their policies in the Malayan insurgency in 1948–1954. Unlike most of the COIN literature that concentrates on military strategy and tactics, the analysis of government policy-making in Malaya holds some important political lessons for American leaders today despite differences between the insurgencies in Afghanistan and British Malaya. As a response to the criticism of COIN studies in general that they lack theoretical guidance, this article utilizes an integrated cognitivist-prospect theory framework. It is argued that some of the COIN literature mistakenly suggests that a more difficult strategic situation was primarily responsible for American failure in Afghanistan. Instead, American decision-makers faced a more difficult task cognitively than their British counterparts, as policy change in Afghanistan would have required greater ideational change. American principals were much more attached to their beliefs emotionally, had no alternative problem representation, and had to shift between frames in order to engineer a response that was more in line with events on the ground in Afghanistan. Regarding prospect theory, findings indicate that gains frames appear to be unhelpful in monitoring progress until catastrophic failure endangers the reference point, and that decision-makers often have more than one reference point to attune their policies to, which often results in suboptimal choices with regard to at least one reference point.     

Brothers in arms,yet again? Twenty-first century Sino-Russian strategic collaboration in the realm of defence and security

2014–2015 were years of turmoil for strategic relations, with Sino-Russian relations emerging as a particularly interesting set of ties to observe. This article asks whether recurrent Sino-Russian exhortations of friendship are mirrored by their strategic alignment in the defence and security realm, half a century after the end of the Sino-Soviet pact during the communist era. We examine the arms trade between the two countries and with regional partners, but also the recent pattern of bilateral and multilateral military exercises, as a combined test of the security and defence relationship. We are able to show that the image of friendship that both Moscow and Beijing like to promote, while apparent at the UN Security Council and within the BRICS group, remains constrained by rivalry in high-tech segments of the arms industry and by lingering concerns about the prospects of peer interference in their shared regional vicinity.     

“It would be impossible to estimate the value of these works...” Mass Production at Springfield Armory during the American Civil War

The U.S. Armory in Springfield, Massachusetts, rarely appears in Civil War histories except perhaps as an unexplained statistical wonder. By late 1863, the Armory was the largest single supplier of rifles to Union forces. Springfield Armory workers out-produced over thirty American contractors, making more Army rifles at less cost while providing contractors with gauges, inspectors, and models, even though there were significant wartime private-sector mechanical innovations. This article identifies and explains the factors in the Armory’s success, provides context on contemporary American arms production and rifle models, and argues that the Armory’s methods and performance were among the first if not the first example of mass production in American small arms manufacture. The relative brevity of the Civil War episode, and the fact that it was not repeated in any comparable way at the Armory until World War II, has obscured its significance in American manufacturing history.