共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 178 毫秒
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Jerome Bracken 《海军后勤学研究》1984,31(4):653-670
The basing of ICBMs is a fundamental problem of defense analysis. Deceptive basing and antiballistic missile defense are two of the methods available to attempt to insure that there are ICBMs surviving after undergoing an attack. This article treats tradeoffs among missiles, silos or shelters, exoatmospheric interceptors, and endoatmospheric interceptors. Most of the analysis deals with 200 missiles, the number of MX missiles which were recommended to be moved among the 4600 shelters of the Multiple Protective Shelter (MPS) deployment, though some variants in the number of missiles (from 115 to 400) are also treated here. The basic reference point of the analysis is the provision of 1000 ICBM warheads delivered in a second strike. The combination of exoatmospheric interceptors and endoatmospheric interceptors is referred to as “layered defense.” Warheads are destroyed by interceptors after the warheads separate from the missile which carries them. Exoatmospheric interceptors are assumed to achieve a non-nuclear kill, while endoatmospheric interceptors are assumed to achieve either a non-nuclear or nuclear kill, depending on the technology available to both sides. Exoatmospheric interceptors may be capable of protecting value targets against the warheads of a second strike. To the extent that this can be achieved, they facilitate a first strike with relative impunity and hence are destabilizing. This article explores various layered defense topics. 相似文献
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On-site verification of ICBMs in the context of an arms control agreement might involve a situation where an inspector would choose one or more of a number of identical areas to inspect and would have confidence that the other areas had the same characteristics. This article considers optimal attack and defense of missiles deceptively based in a number of identical areas. The attacker may allocate warheads across areas as he desires and uniformly within areas. The defender may allocate interceptors across areas as he desires and either uniformly or preferentially within areas. The effect of restricting the defender to uniform allocation across areas is explored for various assumptions. Robustness of surviving missiles with respect to the number of attacking warheads is studied. Results are presented for a wide range of cases. 相似文献
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This article analyzes the North Korean nuclear crisis from a balance-of-power perspective. It is in the long-term interests of international peace for a secure and independent North Korea to serve as a buffer between US and Chinese ground forces. However, the conventional military advantage of the South Korean-American alliance over North Korea has grown drastically since the end of the Cold War, threatening North Korea’s survival. Since North Korea lacks any reliable ally, nuclear weapons represent its most cost-effective way to restore a balance of power and thus secure itself. Accepting security guarantees in exchange for its nuclear arsenal is rhetorically appealing but not a viable approach. North Korea’s development of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), however, has overcompensated for the post-Cold War imbalance, inviting talk in Washington of waging a preventive war. Persuading North Korea to give up its ICBM capability, not its nuclear arsenal, should therefore be the primary objective of US diplomacy. 相似文献
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Douglas Porch 《战略研究杂志》2013,36(1):117-144
Historians have noted that both German and French war preparation in 1914 fell victim to the inadequacies of traditional threat-based planning: vulnerability to ‘threat deception’ which caused each to underestimate or mischaracterize the threat; a tendency to ‘mirror-image’ by fitting intelligence into preconceived notions of how the enemy was expected to behave; and ‘group think’ that discouraged a serious consideration of alternative scenarios. This article applies the ‘Balance of Power Paradox’ to explain why, at the dawn of the twentieth century, war planning in both Germany and France was driven by an acute sense of weakness which encouraged each side to fashion highly ‘risk acceptant’ strategies. In particular, he examines why and how French commander-in-chief General Joseph Joffre evolved and rationalized his audacious, and disastrous, Plan XVII to leverage French weaknesses and prevent the stronger German Army from bringing the full weight of its military strength to bear against France. The potential implication of this historical vignette is that leaders, and by extension military planners, of both strong and weak states focus on the constraints faced by their opponents, and assume that they can avoid the limitations of their position, while their opponent cannot. 相似文献
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Martijn van Ee 《海军后勤学研究》2020,67(2):147-158
We consider the salvo policy problem, in which there are k moments, called salvos, at which we can fire multiple missiles simultaneously at an incoming object. Each salvo is characterized by a probability pi: the hit probability of a single missile. After each salvo, we can assess whether the incoming object is still active. If it is, we fire the missiles assigned to the next salvo. In the salvo policy problem, the goal is to assign at most n missiles to salvos in order to minimize the expected number of missiles used. We consider three problem versions. In Gould's version, we have to assign all n missiles to salvos. In the Big Bomb version, a cost of B is incurred when all salvo's are unsuccessful. Finally, we consider the Quota version in which the kill probability should exceed some quota Q. We discuss the computational complexity and the approximability of these problem versions. In particular, we show that Gould's version and the Big Bomb version admit pseudopolynomial time exact algorithms and fully polynomial time approximation schemes. We also present an iterative approximation algorithm for the Quota version, and show that a related problem is NP-complete. 相似文献
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This article examines British deception operations in the early Cold War. It illustrates how, in the years before Britain could threaten atomic retaliation, Britain’s deception organisation, the London Controlling Section (LCS) was tasked with conducting operations to deter the USSR and China from starting a war or threatening British interests. It introduces a number of their ploys – some physical and military, others subversive and political. It argues that the LCS faced significant challenges in implementing its deceptions. Repeating the great strategic successes of the Second World War was extremely difficult; what remained for the Cold War were more limited deceptions. 相似文献
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Michael J. Armstrong 《海军后勤学研究》2007,54(1):66-77
This article considers two related questions of tactics in the context of the salvo model for naval missile combat. For a given set of targets, how many missiles should be fired to produce an effective attack? For a given available salvo size, how many enemy targets should be fired at? In the deterministic version of the model I derive a simple optimality relationship between the number of missiles to fire and the number of targets to engage. In the stochastic model I employ the expected loss inflicted and the probability of enemy elimination as the main performance measures and use these to derive salvo sizes that are in some sense “optimal.” I find that the offensive firepower needed for an effective attack depends not only on a target's total strength but also on the relative balance between its active defensive power and passive staying power. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2007 相似文献
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与STT导弹相比,BTT导弹在气动效率、机动能力、控制性能等方面具有明显优势,但其运动耦合特性也给传统研究框架下的制导律设计带来了挑战。本文针对BTT导弹制导律设计问题展开研究,首先描述了BTT导弹制导基本问题,分析了BTT导弹制导律设计的技术难点,需要综合考虑运动耦合、多约束、目标机动、弹体动态效应等因素,然后综述了国内外现代制导律设计的基本方法,将其分为双通道解耦法、球坐标法、现代几何法等,最后指出了BTT导弹制导律的进一步研究方向。 相似文献
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制导炸弹--一种重要的空袭兵器和应对措施 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
根据越南战争、海湾战争和科索沃战争的战例,阐述了制导炸弹的主要战术技术特点,认为制导炸弹是未来空袭作战重要兵器,是中低空中近程地(舰)空导弹的重要目标,拦截制导炸弹是地(舰)空导弹应该着力研究的问题.论证了中低空中近程地(舰)空导弹拦截制导炸弹的可行性,并提出了应开展的专项技术研究课题. 相似文献
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Carol Atkinson 《Defense & Security Analysis》2015,31(1):35-43
This article investigates how US national security planners have envisioned the emerging strategic environment during the early twenty-first century and evaluates how their perceptions of this strategic environment have changed during these years. This conceptual evolution can be seen in how defense planners define threats, identify defense priorities, and design security strategies. Five key strategic planning documents serve as the basis for this analysis and illustrate significant shifts in how the US government has envisioned its own security requirements as well as the context within which its strategic vision will need to be realized. These planning documents are: (1) Joint Vision 2020, (2) the Bush Administration's 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States, (3) the Obama Administration's 2010 National Security Strategy, (4) US Strategic Defense Guidance entitled Sustaining US Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense, and (5) the US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's Capstone Concept for Joint Operations: Joint Force 2020. 相似文献
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舰载弹炮结合近程反导武器系统火力分配模型研究 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
为最大程度发挥弹炮结合武器系统的作战效能,引入优化设计方法求取最大毁伤概率,建立了基于毁伤概率的火力分配模型。该模型将弹炮结合武器系统导弹和火炮的火力分配转化为导弹火力分配。根据导弹杀伤纵深和发射间隔确定导弹发射数量。根据导弹在杀伤区内毁伤概率特性,确定导弹发射时机。 相似文献
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地面防空火力单元基于D-S理论选择反导防御手段 总被引:4,自引:0,他引:4
在现代战争中,飞航导弹发挥了重要作用,取得了巨大的作战效能。地面防空火力单元面临着如何合理使用防御措施、正确选择干扰手段加强对飞航导弹防御的问题。提出一种把基于D-S理论的数据融合技术应用于地面防空火力单元选择干扰手段进行反导防御的方法。结果表明,利用D-S理论可以较好地选择对飞航导弹的干扰手段。 相似文献
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研究Gauss伪谱法在空空导弹最优中制导律设计中的应用。建立空空导弹中制导律设计问题最优控制模型,首次提出采用Gauss伪谱法求解最优中制导律设计问题的思路,详细阐述了求解流程,通过仿真算例验证了求解方法的有效性,并同比例导引、打靶法等传统方法进行了对比。仿真结果表明,综合考虑性能指标、计算精度、计算效率等因素,Gauss伪谱法具有明显优势,Gauss伪谱法求解结果和求解效率与配点个数密切相关。研究结果为空空导弹中制导律设计提供理论参考。 相似文献
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Dinshaw Mistry 《The Nonproliferation Review》2013,20(3-4):361-377
ABSTRACTOver the past decade, contrary to declarations that they are pursuing “minimum” deterrence, India and Pakistan have considerably expanded their missile forces. India has developed eleven types of missiles while Pakistan has fielded nine. These missile forces have a mixed impact on deterrence stability. Both states' medium-range missiles strengthen their countervalue deterrent capabilities against the other, though India's China-specific missiles still have limitations. India's and Pakistan's short-range missiles and first-generation naval systems raise concerns about nuclear ambiguity, command and control, and escalation across the nuclear threshold, ultimately undermining deterrence stability on the subcontinent. 相似文献
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Wallace J. Thies 《战略研究杂志》2013,36(4):51-76
Does proliferation increase the risk of war between new nuclear powers? Two schools of thought ‐ proliferation pessimists and optimists ‐ offer very different answers. The former stress the first‐strike danger of nuclear‐armed ballistic missiles and the resulting crisis instability as a cause of preemptive war. The latter stress the caution‐inducing effects of nuclear warheads and fear of retaliation as a check on would‐be attackers. To bridge the gap between these two schools, Daniel Ellsberg's concept of critical risk is used to show how the likelihood of war changes as new nuclear powers enlarge and improve their missile forces. Ellsberg's framework suggests that the danger of war is low between recent proliferators but rises as nuclear stockpiles grow, thereby changing the payoffs associated with striking first or striking second and increasing the danger of war due to accidents, miscalculations, and uncontrollable interactions between rival nuclear forces. Ellsberg's framework also suggests that the transition from weaponization to secure second strike force is likely to be long and difficult, in part because short‐range missiles like India's Prithvi are better suited to strike first than to strike second, and in part because negative control procedures reduce the value of striking second, thereby increasing the attraction of a preemptive strike. 相似文献