BANNING BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) underpins the international regime to control biological weapons. The strength of the treaty however relies on national implementation. The first step for many states party to the Convention is drafting appropriate national laws and regulations. So far, 32 countries in Africa are signatory to the BTWC. More recently, in 2004, the United Nations Security Council adopted resolution 1540, which requires all UN Member States to put in place legislation to prevent the illicit trafficking of material that could be used to develop weapons of mass destruction. The need for such wide-ranging legislation is recognised African countries but its creation and implementation pose specific challenges.     

Russia and Strategic Conventional Weapons:

ABSTRACT

Russian political leaders and military strategists are growing increasingly concerned about “strategic conventional weapons”—a broad category that appears to include all non-nuclear, high-precision, standoff weapons—and about long-range, hypersonic weapons, in particular. These concerns are complex and multifaceted (and, in some cases, contradictory), but chief among them are the beliefs that strategic conventional weapons could prove decisive in a major conflict and that Russia is lagging behind in their development. US programs to develop and acquire such weapons—namely, the Conventional Prompt Global Strike program—are of great concern to Russian strategists, who argue both that the United States seeks such weapons for potential use against Russia—its nuclear forces, in particular—and because strategic conventional weapons are more “usable” than nuclear weapons. Asymmetric responses by Russia include increased reliance on tactical nuclear weapons, efforts to enhance the survivability of its nuclear forces, and investments in air and missile defenses. There is also strong—but not completely conclusive evidence—that Russia is responding symmetrically by attempting to develop a long-range, conventionally armed boost-glide weapon.     

THE AMBIVALENT NEUTRAL

Traditional analyses of Switzerland's nuclear weapons program often explain both its beginning and its end by merely subsuming it under the broad logic of security calculations: the country originally developed an interest in nuclear weapons due to its precarious security environment after the end of World War II; it ended its nuclear ambitions roughly two decades later when it felt less threatened by external powers. Yet this depiction of the Swiss case brushes aside the historical political context in which Switzerland's nuclear decision-making was embedded. Drawing upon studies in sociology and political theory, this article argues that understanding the Swiss debate on nuclear weapons is possible only if we manage to comprehend the significant political and cultural changes that took place within Swiss society. These changes deeply affected the country's defense and foreign policy conceptions and also altered prevalent notions of neutrality, thereby ultimately foreclosing the nuclear option. In more abstract theoretical terms the article moreover suggests that we need to overcome depictions of objectively given threats or predetermined interests and develop analytical tools that help us disentangle the complex, non-linear ways in which threat perceptions, identities, and preferences evolve and shape states’ proliferation policies.     

VISIONS OF FISSION

For many years, non-nuclear weapons states have sought binding commitments from nuclear armed states that they would not be the victim of either the threat or use of nuclear weapons—so-called negative security assurances (NSAs). The nuclear weapon states have traditionally resisted granting such unconditional NSAs. Recent U.S. efforts to use nuclear deterrence against the acquisition and use by other states of chemical, biological and radiological weapons, however, have further exacerbated this divide. This article analyzes the historical development of NSAs and contrasts U.S. commitments not to use nuclear weapons with the empirical realities of current U.S. nuclear weapons employment doctrines. The authors conclude that NSAs are most likely to be issued as unilateral declarations and that such pledges are the worst possible manner in which to handle the issue of security assurance.     

The politics of international chemical weapon justice: The case of Syria, 2011–2017

There has been near-universal condemnation of the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian conflict. The international community has nevertheless struggled to make progress on holding the perpetrators to account. This article reviews developments at the international level in terms of Syrian chemical weapon justice between 2011 and 2017. It argues that there have been substantive disagreements between states on the rationale and means of justice in the Syrian case. It also argues that international initiatives have been tightly intertwined with developments in chemical disarmament and conflict resolution processes as well as the broader war. The article describes progress and challenges to chemical weapon justice in a number of distinct formal international mechanisms during the period studied. The analysis concludes by contextualizing international responses—including the U.S. tomahawk strikes against a Syrian airbase—to the Khan Shaykhun chemical attacks of April 2017.     

Security,autonomy and defense burdens: The effects of alliance membership in the 19th and 20th centuries

This paper investigates the effect of alliance membership on the defense burdens of major powers in the 19th and 20th centuries. We hypothesize that the reactions of states to alliance membership will be different in the pre‐nuclear and nuclear eras. Possession of nuclear weapons by allies makes the security provided by the alliance more akin to a collective good than is the case in the pre‐nuclear era. States join alliances for two reasons: security and autonomy. The effects of each of these concerns are identified. We include in our model such alliance‐level factors as the power equivalence of the allies and the number of states in the alliance. We also look at state‐level variables such as power position within the alliance. We conclude that the nuclear period generally operates as the free‐rider principle would posit, while models based on “complementarity of effort” are more applicable in the earlier period.     

The Nuclear Peace Fallacy: How Deterrence Can Fail

Some scholars counter-intuitively argue that the proliferation of nuclear weapons increases international security by substantially reducing the chances for inter-state armed conflict. This school of thought draws heavily on the history of the American-Soviet Cold War rivalry to inform its analysis. The security dilemmas in the contemporary Middle East and South Asia where numerous states have or want nuclear weapons, however, are profoundly different than the competition between the United States and the Soviet Union. States in the Middle East and South Asia today may see nuclear weapons as usable instruments of warfare in contrast to conventional wisdom in the West that views them as weapons of deterrence and last resort. As common sense would have it, American and Allied policy designed to stem the proliferation of nuclear weapons is prudent. American diplomatic intervention, moreover, in regional crises as a third party may be needed in the future in the Middle East and South Asia to lessen the risks of nuclear warfare. Nevertheless, American policy-makers are likely in the future to find themselves facing a nuclear-armed nation-state-or soon to be nuclear weapons-capable state-in a crisis and will have to grapple with the risks of pre-emptive or preventive military action.     

EXTENDED DETERRENCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST

The article presents and analyzes the US extended deterrence commitments in the Middle East as well as those provided by regional states, and assesses the effectiveness and credibility of these commitments. The article then proceeds to analyze a situation wherein Iran successfully develops nuclear weapons. It considers first the security requirements and alternatives of Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, and then proceeds to assess the stability—or instability—of an Israeli-Iranian nuclear balance. The enhancement of US extended deterrence in the region is required in order to deter Iran, reassure allies, and contribute to the stability of an Israeli-Iranian nuclear balance. The article also discusses several contextual issues, such as: the future form of US extended deterrence; distinguishing between the latter and other US extended deterrence commitments; and the different approaches of specific GCC states and Israel.     

A NEW STANDARD FOR PREEMPTIVE MILITARY ACTION AGAINST WMD THREATS

International law clearly requires an imminent threat of attack as a justification for the preemptive use of military force. However, the standard definition of an imminent threat was derived centuries before the development of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons or ballistic missiles and other delivery systems that can reach their targets in a matter of minutes. Any use of force to alleviate threats posed by weapons of mass destruction (WMD) prior to tactical warning of the actual launch of such weapons falls into the legally and ethically controversial category of “anticipatory self-defense,” leaving decision makers potentially liable to prosecution for war crimes. Effective and ethical enforcement of nonproliferation therefore demands a standard for imminence of threat broad enough to allow military action as a last resort but sufficiently restrictive to prohibit indiscriminate action against suspected WMD programs. Following a critical review of selected literature and cases on preemption, the author proposes a new standard for preemptive military action: the existence of operational WMD, or a clandestine program to develop WMD, in contravention of international law. The author discusses the implications of this new proposed standard, which at the time of writing would permit preemptive attack against WMD-armed terrorist groups but prohibit it against all states except Iran and possibly North Korea.     

How viable is international arms control for military artificial intelligence? Three lessons from nuclear weapons

Many observers anticipate “arms races” between states seeking to deploy artificial intelligence (AI) in diverse military applications, some of which raise concerns on ethical and legal grounds, or from the perspective of strategic stability or accident risk. How viable are arms control regimes for military AI? This article draws a parallel with the experience in controlling nuclear weapons, to examine the opportunities and pitfalls of efforts to prevent, channel, or contain the militarization of AI. It applies three analytical lenses to argue that (1) norm institutionalization can counter or slow proliferation; (2) organized “epistemic communities” of experts can effectively catalyze arms control; (3) many military AI applications will remain susceptible to “normal accidents,” such that assurances of “meaningful human control” are largely inadequate. I conclude that while there are key differences, understanding these lessons remains essential to those seeking to pursue or study the next chapter in global arms control.     

BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS ARMS CONTROL IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Nonproliferation policies to prevent biological and chemical weapons use are important, but insufficient, particularly in view of the rise of global terrorism. Given the history of developing and using these weapons, it is crucial that governments properly prepare for biological and chemical threats, whether naturally occurring or man-made, such as by developing and managing effective healthcare infrastructure to mitigate widespread illness and injuries resulting from pandemics or terrorist attacks. Although the Middle East is one of the most sensitive and complex areas in the world—especially regarding regional arms control efforts and prevention—coordinating preparedness strategies among states in the region may be possible. Cooperatively addressing biological and chemical threats could lead to constructive progress towards the otherwise elusive goal of establishing a weapons of mass destruction-free zone in the Middle East.     

INCAPACITATING BIOCHEMICAL WEAPONS

Military interest in incapacitating biochemical weapons has grown in recent years as advances in science and technology have appeared to offer the promise of new “non-lethal” weapons useful for a variety of politically and militarily challenging situations. There is, in fact, a long and unfulfilled history of attempts to develop such weapons. It is clear that advances are opening up a range of possibilities for future biological and chemical weapons more generally. The treaties prohibiting biological and chemical weapons make no distinction between lethal and “non-lethal” weapons—all are equally prohibited. Indeed, a sharp and technically meaningful distinction between lethal and “non-lethal” biological and chemical weapons is beyond the capability of science to make. Thus, interest in incapacitating biochemical weapons, and efforts on the part of various states to develop them, pose a significant challenge to the treaty regimes, to the norms against biological and chemical warfare that they embody, and, ultimately, to the essential protections that they provide. Preventing a new generation of biological and chemical weapons from emerging will take concerted efforts and action at the local, national, and international levels.     

Reactor-grade plutonium and nuclear weapons: ending the debate

The claim that reactor-grade plutonium cannot or will not be used to produce nuclear weapons has been used to justify non-nuclear-weapon states’ large stockpiles of plutonium that has been separated from highly radioactive spent fuel. However, by using reduced-mass plutonium cores, it is possible to manufacture reliable nuclear weapons with reactor-grade plutonium. These weapons can have the same design, size, weight, and predetonation probability as weapons using weapon-grade plutonium and would require no special cooling. The increased radiation from reactor-grade plutonium could be easily managed by shielding and operational procedures. Weapons using plutonium routinely produced by pressurized-water reactors could have a lethal area between 40 percent and 75 percent that of weapons using weapon-grade plutonium. In the past, both Sweden and Pakistan considered using reactor-grade plutonium to produce nuclear weapons, and India may be using reactor-grade plutonium in its arsenal today. Despite claims to the contrary, the United States used what was truly reactor-grade plutonium in a successful nuclear test in 1962. The capability of reactor-grade plutonium to produce highly destructive nuclear weapons leads to the conclusion that the separation of plutonium, plutonium stockpiling, and the use of plutonium-based fuels must be phased out and banned.     

Gas,power, and norms: competing logics for the declining use of chemical warfare

ABSTRACT

What restrains states from employing chemical weapons during modern war? Despite widespread and consistent efforts by the international community to outlaw chemical weapons in the twentieth century, major deviations from this goal occur. Two of the strongest explanations that exist for this trend are the logics of deterrence and norms that consider the use of chemical weapons to be a taboo. We test these theories using factor analysis and find that norms provide a better explanation of non-use in the twentieth century among states with a chemical-weapon capability. We then conclude with avenues for future research in this burgeoning field of study, which includes closer qualitative examination of norms, as well as the expansion of the dataset to include intrastate warfare and non-state warfare.     

EXPLORING THE NEXT GENERATION OF PROLIFERATORS

This theoretical analysis explores which countries might constitute the next generation of nuclear proliferators, using Venezuela as a case study of one of the possible next nuclear weapon states. Three alternative theoretical frameworks or models are used to analyze the preconditions that might or might not drive Venezuela to pursue nuclear weapons in the near future. This study finds that there is little evidence to support the alarmist claims surrounding a future Venezuelan nuclear weapons program. These findings are important for both devising an accurate US national security strategy for identifying and combating the next generation of proliferators and also for implementing effective policies for the future of US-Latin American relations.     

The Requirements of Nuclear Stability in South Asia

While recent history arguably demonstrates a high level of nuclear stability in South Asia, this article argues that this stability has historically been a function of India's relative weakness. It argues that, as India becomes stronger, attention must be paid to the technical and political requirements of nuclear stability: the reliability of weapons and command and control and the political conditions that underpin stable relations between nuclear-armed states. It concludes by recommending the United States aim to modify the perceptions of regional elites about their various intentions and decision-making processes and the role of the United States as crisis manager.     

The rise and fall of counterproliferation policy

The US government initiated a Defense Counterproliferation Initiative to address the concern that, in the post-Cold War years, the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons would be widespread and create a significant challenge to the US military’s combat operations. In particular, non-nuclear states might use chemical or biological warfare agents against US forces with the belief that nuclear weapons would not be used against them in retaliation. Following the events of September 11, 2001, defense strategy and policy shifted to a wider view of the threat of adversarial use of “weapons of mass destruction” (WMD) and the term “counterproliferation” was replaced by “combating” or “countering WMD.” Over time, the Defense Department increasingly moved away from counterproliferation principles with the detrimental effect of losing capabilities that US forces still need for contemporary adversaries. This shift has been aggravated by other US government agencies’ use of “counterproliferation” in lieu of what would have been termed “nonproliferation” activities in the 1990s. The loss of clarity within the US government on these terms has led to the inability to focus the “whole of government” on this significant national security challenge. To alleviate this challenge, the US government needs a top-down initiative to refocus policy on the distinctly different aspects of WMD with respect to military combat operations, combating terrorism, and homeland security.     

INTERNATIONAL REGIME OF FRESH FUEL SUPPLY AND SPENT FUEL DISPOSAL

Recent events in Iran and elsewhere demand a reevaluation of the need for increasing nuclear fuel supplies and assuring reliable flow of fuel to nuclear power user states vis-à-vis the need for strengthened security for all countries against the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The right of countries to a guaranteed supply of nuclear energy for peaceful uses must be balanced with the global community's desire to limit flows of nuclear material and sensitive nuclear facilities that could create opportunities for nuclear proliferation. This article proposes elements of an international regime of fresh fuel supply and spent fuel disposal that will guarantee fresh fuel supplies to countries honoring their obligations under the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), while reducing concerns about diversion of spent fuel for weapons purposes. A specific application to countries with small pre-commercial uranium enrichment plants is also proposed.     

STRATEGY FOR A NEW NUCLEAR AGE

Current U.S. nuclear weapons strategy, force structure, and doctrine contribute to the threat of nuclear terrorism in several ways. First, the U.S. nuclear stockpile presents opportunities for nuclear terrorists to seize the materials they need. Second, U.S. nuclear forces remain a key justification for Russia's maintenance of similar nuclear forces that are less well protected. Third, America's continued embrace of nuclear weapons encourages and legitimizes other states to seek nuclear weapons that they will have difficulty securing from terrorists. The national security interests of the United States would be better served by a strategy to shrink the global footprint of nuclear weapons and provide the highest possible levels of security for the most minimal possible deterrent forces. Given the inability to secure nuclear weapons and materials perfectly or to eliminate terrorism in the foreseeable future, reducing the global inventory of nuclear weapons and materials is the most reliable way to reduce the chances of nuclear terrorism.