EXTENDED DETERRENCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST

The article presents and analyzes the US extended deterrence commitments in the Middle East as well as those provided by regional states, and assesses the effectiveness and credibility of these commitments. The article then proceeds to analyze a situation wherein Iran successfully develops nuclear weapons. It considers first the security requirements and alternatives of Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, and then proceeds to assess the stability—or instability—of an Israeli-Iranian nuclear balance. The enhancement of US extended deterrence in the region is required in order to deter Iran, reassure allies, and contribute to the stability of an Israeli-Iranian nuclear balance. The article also discusses several contextual issues, such as: the future form of US extended deterrence; distinguishing between the latter and other US extended deterrence commitments; and the different approaches of specific GCC states and Israel.     

Optimal service‐capacity allocation in a loss system

We consider a loss system with a fixed budget for servers. The system owner's problem is choosing the price, and selecting the number and quality of the servers, in order to maximize profits, subject to a budget constraint. We solve the problem with identical and different service rates as well as with preemptive and nonpreemptive policies. In addition, when the policy is preemptive, we prove the following conservation law: the distribution of the total service time for a customer entering the slowest server is hyperexponential with expectation equal to the average service rate independent of the allocation of the capacity. © 2015 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 62: 81–97, 2015     

An infiltration game with time dependent payoff

The problem of assigning patrol boats, subject to resource constraints, to capture or delay an infiltrator with perishable contraband attempting escape across a long, narrow strait is formulated as a two-sided time sequential game. Optimal mixed strategies are derived for the situation of one patrol boat against one smuggler. Procedures for obtaining numerical solutions for R > 1 patrol boats are discussed.