Introduction: Exploring the jungle of terminology

When twentieth-century authors wrote about ‘partisan warfare’, they usually meant an insurgency or asymmetric military operations conducted against a superior force by small bands of ideologically driven irregular fighters. By contrast, originally (i.e. before the French Revolution) ‘partisan’ in French, English, and German referred only to the leader of a detachment of special forces (party, partie, Parthey, détachement) which the major European powers used to conduct special operations alongside their regular forces. Such special operations were the classic definition of ‘small war’ (petite guerre) in the late seventeenth and in the eighteenth centuries. The Spanish word ‘la guerrilla’, meaning nothing other than ‘small war’, only acquired an association with rebellion with the Spanish War of Independence against Napoleon. Even after this, however, armies throughout the world have continued to employ special forces. In the late nineteenth century, their operations have still been referred to as prosecuting ‘la guerrilla’ or ‘small war’, which existed side by side with, and was often mixed with, ‘people's war’ or popular uprisings against hated regimes.     

The Hidden Factors that Turned the Tide: Strategic Decision-Making and Operational Intelligence in the 1973 War

This article analyzes the quality of the Egyptian and Israeli intelligence advice and decision-making process in the October 1973 War as key factors that determined its course. Following a background to the subject, we focus on the 9–13 October standstill stage, in which Sadat decided, despite his generals’ advice, to renew the Egyptian offensive. Effective Israeli intelligence collection about the coming attack, which was well used by the decision-makers, saved Israel from accepting an undesired ceasefire. The result was the 14 October failed Egyptian offensive that turned the tide of the war and led to Israeli military achievements at the war’s final stage     

The Challe Plan: Vain Yet Indispensable Victory

On April 23, 1960, General Maurice Challe left Algiers and his position as Commander in Chief there, having achieved a rapid military victory over the rebellion within Algeria. As an airman at the head of an essentially ground force engaged since 1954 in counter-insurgency warfare, he had within 16 months gained the military success everyone deemed indispensable. It proved a vain victory though over an enemy already made irrelevant by rapid developments on the national and international political stage. The enemy, Front de Libération Nationale (FLN), was a two-tiered organization. In accordance with revolutionary doctrine, the military branch, the Armée de Libération Nationale (ALN), supported the political arm, the Organisation Politico-Administrative (OPA), and in this case all operated both inside Algeria and in exile. The strength of the FLN over the course of the conflict had shifted externally to Algeria, particularly under Houari Boumedienne's leadership in Tunis. The major portion of the ALN its Tunisian sanctuary had gradually renounced the costly support of its internal units and chosen to wait in exile for further developments. The freshly formed Gouvernement Provisoire de la Republique Algerienne (GPRA), also in Tunis, had managed to obtain international recognition, and with this development the war within Algeria lost its decisive character. From an operational perspective though, the Challe Plan belongs to the list of military successes. Four years into a fight of limited tactical and strategic accomplishments, Challe, through his imagination and energy, was able to achieve victory within his short assignment with the resources at hand. Just how he accomplished this feat, as we shall see, is a fascinating example of a successful ‘small war’.     

Operational idealism: doctrine development of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army under Soviet threat, 1969–1989

This article analyses the doctrine development of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) coping with the Soviet military threat between 1969 and 1989. In the 1970s, the PLA applied a doctrine of ‘active defence and luring the enemy into depth’ based on its traditional operational art. In 1980, the PLA decided to focus its doctrine on positional defence. In 1986, the PLA introduced ‘integrated operations and prioritised strike’, a generalised doctrine that originated from its war history. Many organisational and intellectual challenges in peacetime doctrine development contributed to the PLA’s operational idealism, including its aging leadership, command structure, attitude towards its previous experience, limited analysis of contemporary military developments, and failure in test and validation of doctrines. In the post-Cold War decade, many of these challenges persisted in spite of military modernization efforts. The ongoing military reform has to address these challenges and improve the PLA doctrine development in peacetime.     

Why Culture Matters: Revisiting the Sino-Indian Border War of 1962

This article examines the nuclear command and control (C²) system implemented in Pakistan since 1998, and discusses its potential consequences for the risk of inadvertent or unauthorised use of nuclear weapons. I argue that troubled civil-military relations and Pakistan's doctrine of ‘asymmetric escalation’ account for the creation of a command and control system with different characteristics during peacetime and military crises. Although the key characteristics of Pakistan's nuclear C² system allow relatively safe nuclear operations during peacetime, operational deployment of nuclear weapons during military standoffs is likely to include only rudimentary protections against inadvertent or unauthorised nuclear release. The implication of this study is that any shift from peacetime to wartime command and control procedures is likely to further destabilise Indo-Pakistani relations during the early stages of a diplomatic or military standoff, and introduce a non-trivial risk of accidental escalation to the nuclear level.     

Learning ‘Under Fire’: Israel’s improvised military adaptation to Hamas tunnel warfare

What organisational attributes enhance a military’s ability to effectively adapt on the battlefield? Upon the outbreak of war in July 2014 between Israel and the Palestinian militant group Hamas, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) encountered an expansive network of tunnels from which Hamas was launching large-scale assaults into Israel. This article illustrates that the IDF’s ability to successfully adapt ‘under fire’ to this battlefield surprise was facilitated by several important attributes related to its organisational learning capacity: a dynamic, action-oriented organisational culture, a flexible leadership and command style, specialised commando units which acted as ‘incubators’ for learning and innovation, and a formal system to institutionalise and disseminate lessons learned.     

French war plans, 1914: The ‘Balance of Power Paradox’

Historians have noted that both German and French war preparation in 1914 fell victim to the inadequacies of traditional threat-based planning: vulnerability to ‘threat deception’ which caused each to underestimate or mischaracterize the threat; a tendency to ‘mirror-image’ by fitting intelligence into preconceived notions of how the enemy was expected to behave; and ‘group think’ that discouraged a serious consideration of alternative scenarios. This article applies the ‘Balance of Power Paradox’ to explain why, at the dawn of the twentieth century, war planning in both Germany and France was driven by an acute sense of weakness which encouraged each side to fashion highly ‘risk acceptant’ strategies. In particular, he examines why and how French commander-in-chief General Joseph Joffre evolved and rationalized his audacious, and disastrous, Plan XVII to leverage French weaknesses and prevent the stronger German Army from bringing the full weight of its military strength to bear against France. The potential implication of this historical vignette is that leaders, and by extension military planners, of both strong and weak states focus on the constraints faced by their opponents, and assume that they can avoid the limitations of their position, while their opponent cannot.     

The sixteenth-century antecedents of special operations ‘small war’

The first conceptual, theoretical treatises about small war (la petite guerre) as special operations appeared only from the middle of the seventeenth century. The term is not used in the eighteenth-century sense of ‘special operations’ in older sources. The supposed absence of any treatment of the subject is surprising considering the obsession with the ‘art of war’ in the Renaissance, but other authors attribute it to a supposed antinomy between chivalric ideals and irregular warfare. But the absence of explicit manuals on the subject is not evidence of absence of advanced reflection on this kind of operations in the Middle Ages and in Early Modern times. We should thus look elsewhere, in other genres, for writings that contain and pass on military knowledge. Epics, romances, educational and military treatises, and memoirs in fact contain elements of a theory of special operations, even though these genres differ from our conception of rationality inherited from the Enlightenment.     

Mission Command in the Information Age: A Normal Accidents Perspective on Networked Military Operations

Theory on the use of information technology in military operations assumes that bringing together units in an information network helps units to work together. Decentralized command systems such as mission command have been proposed for these networks, so that units can adapt to changes in their turbulent working environments. Others have proposed centralized command systems that permit higher organizational levels to closely direct military operations. This article uses Perrow’s (1984, 1999) Normal Accidents Theory to propose that increasing interdependencies between units in information networks places incompatible demands on the design of networked military operations. It is concluded that networked military operations require decentralized command approaches, but only under the condition that interdependencies between modules of networked units are weak rather than tight. This precondition is essential for retaining control over networked military operations.     

Did the Russian General Staff experiment with free play during VOSTOK-2018?

The VOSTOK-2018 strategic field training exercise (FTX) that took place in mid-September 2018 rehearsed forces’ integration and combat preparedness across multiple strategic directions. Regarding combat readiness, the research question outlined in this paper relates to whether the General Staff experimented with mission-command - a key component of Russia’s modern military thinking. The answer is clearly no: operational creative manoeuvring hardly featured during the VOSTOK-2018 drills for clearly identified reasons. At the systemic level, little room was left for initiatives since the drills focused on implementing and testing command and control (C2) systems. At the structural level, VOSTOK-2018 was not oriented towards mission-command but ‘mission-control’ and streamlining centralised decision-making processes down to the tactical level. At the symbolic level, free play was not exercised due to the participation of China in the drills, and the necessity to impress Chinese military observers.     

Space,the New Domain: Space Operations and Chinese Military Reforms

ABSTRACT

The Chinese military has embarked on a series of organizational and doctrinal reforms intended to better enable it to fight modern war. Prominent among these reforms is the growing emphasis on space to enable long-range precisions strikes and on counterspace to deny space capabilities to an adversary. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has officially designated space as a new domain and established an organization to command space forces. With this increased focus on space, the PLA may begin to develop a doctrine to govern the use of space in military operations. The higher priority given to space, especially space control, by the PLA coincides with similar actions by the US military, increasing the possibility of warfare in space and the risks of escalation.     

MAD,not Marx: Khrushchev and the nuclear revolution

The revival of nuclear strategy in US policy and scholarship has been strengthened by arguments that the ‘nuclear revolution’ – the assumption that thermonuclear bombs and missiles had made major war too dangerous to wage – does not affect international behaviour as much as nuclear revolution advocates claim. This article shows that the Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev indeed regarded nuclear war as too dangerous to wage, a decision which manifested itself not so much in foreign policy or military doctrine but in his determination to avoid war when the possibility arose. We argue that Khrushchev’s experience provides us with a more useful way to characterise the nuclear revolution and suggest some implications of this argument for contemporary debates about nuclear weaponry.     

The Needs of Political Policy versus the Reality of Military Operations: Royal Navy Opposition to the Arctic Convoys, 1942

It has become commonplace, especially in the post-Vietnam strategic environment, to quote Clausewitz's dictum that war is the continuation of policy by other means. We are told that military operations are dictated by, and must serve, clear political ends. Such thinking has been invoked to support everything from punitive strikes, to peacekeeping missions, to the ‘Powell’ doctrine and its political ‘exit strategies’, but at times political policy and military operations do not mix. In 1942 the Royal Navy bowed to political pressure and, against its collective better judgement, continued the Arctic convoys to the Soviet Union. These military operations culminated in the destruction of convoy PQ 17 in early July. This conflict between political policy and military strategy provides an object lesson of why in war issues of means and priorities must outweigh the importance of any given political policy.     

Wellington's use of deception tactics in the Peninsular War

Wellington's use of intelligence developed throughout his military career. Arguably, his experiences in India taught him the importance of intelligence, but it was during the Peninsular War that he honed his analytical techniques. As the war progressed, he developed sophisticated methods for the integration of strategic intelligence – largely gathered by civilian agents – with operational intelligence – collected by military personnel. This allowed him to develop operational conceptualisation, which in turn contributed to the successes he achieved over the French forces in Iberia. However, more than anything, it was his considered use of intelligence, combined with intricate deception operations in the latter stages of the conflict, which deprived the French of reliable intelligence on his own movements, and demonstrated his understanding of the importance of intelligence. This article investigates Wellington's increasing awareness of the importance of intelligence and deception during the Peninsular War.     

The History of Proliferation Optimism: Does It Have a Future?

Students of international politics known as ‘proliferation optimists’ argue that when it comes to the spread of nuclear weapons ‘more may be better’ because nuclear weapons deter great power war and produce greater levels of international stability. This essay provides a critique of proliferation optimism, challenging optimism’s conception of nuclear deterrence theory, its logical underpinnings, and its policy recommendations. It does this by conducting an intellectual history of proliferation optimism, identifying the core weaknesses of proliferation optimism as a theoretical framework, and articulating the myriad threats posed by nuclear proliferation.     

Beginning of the End: ARVN and Vietnamisation (1969–72)

The ‘Nixon Doctrine,’ announced on 25 July 1969, which emphasised the singularity of US interest over all others, was a reflection of US war weariness and the President Richard Nixon's political constraints. The net effect was the unilateral withdrawal of troops in phases and Vietnamisation returning combat responsibilities to the South Vietnamese. Indeed, negotiations and diplomacy fell short of expectations, failing to force the North Vietnamese to abandon their objectives. However, Vietnamisation, the third leg of Nixon's strategy, became the most visible of Nixon's failures. Such was the debacle that Nixon was sorely tempted to simply walk away concluding, ‘Vietnamization has been completed and [South Vietnam President Nguyen Van] Thieu then can do what he likes.’     

基于人工势场的军事态势分析模型

在基于Agent建模仿真方法的战争复杂性研究过程中,为了解决高层指挥控制Agent对军事态势自主分析判断能力的问题,引入了高等物理学中电势场的基本原理来对战场军事态势分析进行建模--并取名为人工势场.介绍了人工势场模型构建的基本原理,结合工程实践详细讨论了该模型在理论和工程实现上的一些基本问题,最后给出了基于该模型的几个简单的分析测试实例.仿真实验证明该模型用于高层指挥控制Agent的实时军事态势分析是可行的.     

Cultural barriers to organisational unlearning: The US army,the ‘zero‐defects’ culture and operations in the post‐cold war world

Much intellectual effort in the post‐Cold War US Army has been put into examinations of how best to conduct MOOTW and urban warfare. One of the main problems for the Army in this respect is the fact that these operations require a good deal of initiative to be displayed by troops at the lowest command levels. This has not normally been forthcoming. There is, in the Army, a ‘zero‐defects’ culture that is stymying the necessary initiative. Only when this culture has been properly appreciated and tackled will the Army that has proved itself so adept at the ‘big war’ be able to conclusively tackle the ‘small war’.     

基于效果的炮兵行动C2系统动力学建模与仿真

一体化联合作战参战军兵种多、指挥控制(C2)与协调复杂。围绕炮兵行动特点要求,运用系统动力学理论建立联合作战炮兵行动指挥控制的系统动力学模型,研究常规打击和基于效果作战两种指挥控制模式下炮兵行动所产生的不同结果及其原因,并给合作战想定仿真验证,得出较为可靠的结论,为解决联合作战炮兵行动精确指挥控制与协调提供一种有效途径     

Currency Warfare and Just War: The Ethics of Targeting Currencies in War

ABSTRACT

Is Currency Warfare defined as, the use of monetary or military force directed against an enemy’s monetary power as part of a military campaign, a just way to fight a war? This article explores the ethics of waging currency warfare against the Just War Tradition’s principles of jus in bello (just conduct in war) and its criteria of discrimination and proportionality. The central argument is that currency warfare is inherently indiscriminate but may be proportionate when policy makers consider the nature of the threat confronted and the targeted currency's level of internationalization, that is, to what degree it is used in foreign transactions or used as a foreign currency reserve. I evaluate this argument against historical cases during the Second World War (1939–1945), the Gulf War (1990–1991), subsequent operations against Saddam Hussein in the early 1990s, and the ongoing campaign against ISIS.