‘Winston has gone mad’: Churchill,the British Admiralty,and the Rise of Japanese Naval Power

As Chancellor of the Exchequer during the late 1920s, Winston Churchill was at the center of British strategic decision making about how to respond to the naval challenge posed by Japan's rise as a rival sea power. Churchill downplayed the likelihood of war with Japan. The leadership of the Royal Navy disagreed: they saw Japan as a dangerous threat to the security of the British Empire. Examining this dispute between Churchill and the Admiralty highlights the awkward political, economic, and strategic tradeoffs confronting British leaders between the world wars.     

Transformation and Technology in the Fisher Era: the Impact of the Communications Revolution1

The Fisher naval revolution of 1904–10 represented a deliberate attempt to achieve defense transformation to bolster Britain's pretensions to global naval supremacy. The vision called for smaller, more capable forces to do the work of larger, more expensive conventional formations. It consisted of three main elements. First, the replacement of the traditional station fleet system for protecting overseas interests by rapid deployment forces comprised of battlecruisers that could be ‘maneuvered’ by wireless to combat specific enemy threats. Second, at home, instead of a sea control strategy based upon a superior battle-fleet, a sea denial strategy based on flotilla defense commanded and controlled from London via wireless. The third element of the Fisher revolution depended upon ‘plunging’, or shaping and directing technological change through a special relationship with armaments firms. A sophisticated information-communications network was integral to the revolution.     

Noncombatant Immunity and the Ethics of Blockade

This article counters Michael Walzer's argument against tight blockades. It shows that the interdiction of food shipments need not violate the principle of noncombatant immunity. Whether it is morally permissible to impose a strict blockade depends on the circumstances of the target state. The more self-sufficient a country is, the more acceptable it should be for a belligerent to cut the enemy's external lines of supply. The Allied blockade of Germany during the First World War illustrates the argument. Fault in this case should be assigned to the German government for the loss of civilian lives.     

Strategy,Fleet Logistics,and the Lethbridge Mission to the Pacific and Indian Oceans 1943–1944

In modern warfare at and from the sea, logistics are crucially important to the implementation of strategy and conduct of operational campaigns. Between August 1943 and March 1944, a British joint service mission led by Major-General John Lethbridge travelled to North America, the Pacific, and India to study the organisation, equipment, and methods necessary for coming offensive operations against Japan. The British obtained valuable information from the Americans and connected with those countries of the British Empire most directly involved. The Lethbridge Mission's progress and findings informed evolving Admiralty planning for supporting naval forces to be sent to the Indian and Pacific Oceans in pursuance of British wartime strategy.     

Basra's not Belfast: the British Army, ‘Small Wars’ and Iraq

This article examines British Army operations in Iraq. It focuses on the causes of the army's apparent failure to live up to its reputation for the conduct of small wars. The paper discusses the British experience of small wars in the context of Iraq, the influence of doctrine and strategy, and the political and moral factors that shaped the army's performance. The paper's conclusions suggest that the Iraq War may cause a significant reappraisal, not just of military doctrine and strategy, but also of Britain's role in future small wars.     

The origins of the British breakthrough into South Palestine: The Anzac raid on the ottoman railway, 1917

Following two failed attacks on the Ottoman defence line in Gaza in the first part of 1917, the Egyptian Expeditionary Force successfully broke through the enemy eastern flank at Beersheba in October 1917 and occupied South Palestine. Traditional historiography has placed the shift of the British focus from the coast to the east immediately after the failure of Second Gaza, in April 1917. This article argues that the tentative idea of turning east matured into a solid operational concept only after, and as a result of, a successful mounted raid on the Ottoman Beersheba‐'Awja railway in May. A minor operation, aimed at achieving tactical gain, recovering personal prestige and placating an activist War Cabinet, the railway raid unintentionally affected the entire Palestine Campaign.     

The right place at the right time,or the right person in the right place?

South Africa's military has, since the First World War, been an oft-used and effective tool in the conduct of South African foreign policy, but this role has not always translated into power for Defence Department principals in its formulation. South African Defence Ministers for most of the country's history have played a minor role in the making of foreign policy; despite a change in this dynamic between approximately 1975–1990, the post-apartheid era has once again seen a diminishment of Defence's power in this arena. This article examines why Defence Ministers have generally been such weak players, with an eye toward disaggregating whether this was a product of interpersonal relationships with Cabinet and – most importantly – the Head of State, or whether this influence (or lack thereof) was more a function of South Africa's international standing. While determining who has influence on this process is difficult given the primacy of the national leader in making foreign policy and a lack of insider accounts by participants in the process, this article relies upon several interviews with participants and knowledgeable observers that help illuminate the process and Defence's role in it.     

The Future of Insurgency

This article examines Great Britain's role in South Vietnam in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Great Britain and the United States certainly did not enjoy a special relationship in South Vietnam, but it is also true that some British officials did manage to exert a real influence on the policy choices of the kennedy administration. The most important obstacle to the development of effective policies in South Vietnam was not the limits of British influence on the US but the inability of both Britain and the US to influence the actions of the Diem regime in Saigon.     

IRA operational intelligence: the heartbeat of the war

This article will seek to provide a detailed examination of the IRA's operational intelligence methodologies. Providing not only a lengthy discussion on the organization's intelligence collection protocols, it will also examine the interplay between intelligence and IRA decision-making. It will be contended that intelligence's influence resided in its ability to introduce a strong element of predictability into the IRA's decision-making process. This depended on an ability to construct a detailed intelligence picture of the target and its geographical milieu so as to minimize the likelihood of volunteers encountering unforeseen circumstances that could adversely affect planned or anticipated outcomes.     

The German Invasion of Norway, 1940: The Operational Intelligence Dimension

While many analyses of the 9 April 1940 invasion of Norway have looked at the successful interplay of German air, sea and land components, the part performed by intelligence has largely received only cursory attention. This article seeks to redress this, and investigates the pivotal role intelligence played in the planning, preparation, and carrying out of Weserübung. The study examines the dearth of relevant information in the early planning stage; the subsequent accumulation of military assessments of Norway's defensive capabilities; the process of denying London and Oslo intelligence regarding Berlin's intentions; the significance of Danish and Norwegian airfields to the operation; and the importance of maritime reconnaissance and wireless intercepts in monitoring the disposition of the Royal Navy. Although primarily concerned with German intelligence gathering and utilisation, British efforts, including the potential impact of Ultra, are also considered.     

‘Troops were then forced to fire’: British army crowd control in Palestine,November 1945

In November 1945, British army shooting during street riots and search operations in Palestine resulted in the death of 13 Jews and the injuring of dozens. The most costly in casualties caused by army fire during the whole Jewish insurgency, these incidents have nevertheless not received detailed attention in literature on the British army's counterinsurgency campaign in postwar Palestine. This article outlines British military use of firepower to control civilian crowds and the difficulties involved during these incidents, contributing to the debate on the army's principal of ‘minimum force’. It also highlights the serious problem of legitimizing opening of fire on unarmed protestors, epitomized in the army's fabricated account justifying shooting at a large crowd rushing a military cordon at Givat Hayim.     

Preventing the ‘Smiling Buddha’: British-Indian nuclear relations and the Commonwealth Nuclear force, 1964–68

This article examines two related issues: the policy objectives pursued by the British government to prevent India from developing nuclear weapons and the challenges presented to the Indian government in balancing Gandhian idealism with the reality of nuclear diplomacy. Building on recent research, the following issues are explored: the implementation of Anglo-American non-proliferation policy in Asia, the provision of security guarantees for India and Pakistan and the UK proposal to establish a Commonwealth Nuclear force as a means of maintaining British influence in the region. The analysis is placed within the context of Britain's overall defence policy during the 1960s focusing particularly on the British withdrawal from East of Suez and the development of nuclear-sharing arrangements within NATO. The article argues that the Wilson government regarded security guarantees for India as an obstacle towards the successful conclusion of a non-proliferation agreement. Britain's primary objective in advancing the concept of a Commonwealth Nuclear Force was not to increase Indian security in the face of Chinese nuclear threats but to explore possible options to internationalise Britain's nuclear forces after initial plans for a NATO nuclear force had failed.     

British Special Forces in the Falklands War of 1982

This article explores the role of British Special Forces in the Falklands War of 1982 and argues that they played an indispensable part in the British victory. The concepts underpinning British Special Forces today can be linked to ideas developed in World War II (to influence strategy by unconventional means) which subsequently underwent significant redevelopment during the Cold War. The tremendous difficulties posed by the military campaign during the Falklands War, most notably the intelligence gap on Argentine forces, placed great emphasis on the activities of Special Forces to tip the strategic balance in Britain's favour.     

Reconsidering a Naval Blockade of China: A Response to Mirski

Sean Mirski's assessment of a naval blockade is an important contribution to the debate over how the United States should respond to China's growing military power. Nevertheless, it has three limitations. First, although distant and close-in blockades could be employed in tandem, analyzing them separately helps to explain when they might be used and how they could influence escalation. Second, while conventional countervalue and counterforce options could also be employed together, this would depend on the degree to which they overlapped and the order in which they were implemented. Third, a blockade could lead to unanticipated prewar, intra-war, and postwar challenges.     

Britain's Great Security Mirage: The Royal Navy and the Franco-Russian Naval Threat, 1898–1906

This article focuses on the relationship between the threat perception analyses of the British Admiralty and the strategic orientation of the Royal Navy at the outset of the twentieth century. The current view is that this was an era when fear of France and Russia drove British naval policy. However, as this article will show, Britain's Naval Intelligence Department formed a low opinion of French and Russian naval capabilities at this time and this negative evaluation exerted considerable influence over decision making. The belief that, owing to multiple qualitative deficiencies, these powers could definitely be beaten in battle lessened the standing of the Franco-Russian naval challenge and freed the Admiralty to consider the danger posed by other possible enemies, most notably Germany.     

航母编队防空作战编成评判方法

航母编队防空作战编成是影响其海上生存和完成作战任务的关键因素,在构建航母编队防空作战效能评估指标体系基础上,运用直觉模糊集理论的多属性决策方法,对航母编队防空作战编成待评方案进行评估。实例证明了该方法的可用性和有效性,可为航母编队指挥员指挥决策提供理论和方法支撑。     

舰船远海维修保障的适应性及平台选型

舰船远海维修保障平台选型实质是属性包括操作性、稳定性、及时性、安全性和经济性的模糊关联多属性群决策问题。为了更客观地反映平台选型过程中决策者的决策意图，更准确地融合决策信息，构建了三角模糊数犹豫直觉模糊关联有序加权几何平均（Related Triangular Hesitate Intuitionistic Ordered Weighted Geometric Average, R-THIOWGA）算子，给出了三角模糊数犹豫直觉模糊数的比较规则，并基于R-THIOWGA提出了远海维修保障平台选型的群决策方法。将提出的群决策方法应用于我国海军舰船远海维修保障平台选型的实例分析。分析结果表明：用R-THIOWGA算子解决模糊关联多属性决策问题是可行的、有效的，自航式半潜维修船是远海维修保障最佳作业平台。     

Misapplying lessons learned? Analysing the utility of British counterinsurgency strategy in Northern Ireland, 1971–76

This article examines the British Army's deployment in support of the civil power in Northern Ireland. It argues that the core guiding principles of the British approach to counterinsurgency (COIN) – employing the minimum use of force, firm and timely action, and unity of control in civil–military relations – were misapplied by the Army in its haste to combat Irish Republican Army (IRA) terrorism between 1971 and 1976. Moreover, it suggests that the Army's COIN strategy was unsuccessful in the 1970s because commanders adhered too closely to the customs, doctrine, and drill applied under very different circumstances in Aden between 1963 and 1967, generally regarded as a failure in Britain's post-war internal security operations. The article concludes with a discussion of the British government's decision to scale back the Army's role in favour of giving the Royal Ulster Constabulary primacy in counter-terrorist operations, a decision which led ultimately to success in combating IRA violence.     

Stranglehold: The Context,Conduct and Consequences of an American Naval Blockade of China

The mounting challenge posed by China's military modernization has highlighted the need for the United States to analyze its ability to execute a naval blockade. A blockade strategy is viable, but it would be limited to a narrow context: the United States would have to be engaged in a protracted conflict over vital interests, and it would need the support of key regional powers. The United States would also need to implement a mix between a close and distant blockade in order to avoid imperiling the conflict's strategic context. If enacted, a blockade could exact a ruinous cost on the Chinese economy and state.     

Bringing Balancing Back In: Britain's Targeted Balancing, 1936–1939

This article challenges the conventional wisdom that Neville Chamberlain rejected the British tradition of balance of power in the 1930s. In contrast to balance of power and balance of threat theories, states do not balance against aggregate or net shifts in power. Instead, leaders define threats based on particular elements of a foreign state's power. The import is that different components of power of a foreign state are more or less threatening and aggregate shifts in power alone may not provoke counterbalancing behavior. In the 1930s, Britain balanced against the most threatening components of power: the German Luftwaffe and the threat of a knock-out air assault against the homeland, Japan's Imperial Navy and its threat to Britain's commercial trade routes and the Dominions in East Asia, and the Italian Navy and the threat to Britain's line of communication through the Mediterranean Sea to India and Asia. Given Britain's difficult financial circumstances, all other components of power, such as the army and the land components of power of Germany, Japan, and Italy were ranked as secondary in terms of its rearmament priorities. Thus, London was able to narrow the gap with Berlin in specific components of power of strategic importance such as aircraft production or to exceed Germany in other areas such as the Royal Navy and its battlefleet.