The Enfield Lock Barrel Mill of 1815 and Moves to Replace Musket Barrel Grinding by Turning c1780 to c1840

In 1841 Henry Wilkinson in his book Engines of War and William Greener in The Science of Gunnery describe a range of methods then in use for shaping the outside of gun barrels after the barrel forging process, ranging from manual off-hand grinding to the use of precision machines. In the same year G. & J. Rennie published the design of their state-of-the-art lathe that was capable of turning complex and dished barrel forms. This built upon the earlier work of both Henry Nock and John Jones. In the early years of the 19th century both Britain, at Enfield and other locations, and the USA, at Harpers Ferry and Springfield, began to introduce barrel-turning technology. This paper uses measurements taken from a significant number of military barrels made by several makers, and also newly exposed information about Henry Nock and the Enfield Factory of 1815, to understand better the technologies that were applied to military flintlock barrel finishing from the 1780s to the 1840s, and particularly during the major wars of 1793–1815, when high output was paramount. Measurements both of barrel form and out-of-roundness are presented. These allow the interpretation of the techniques being used by different makers at different locations, and raise questions about the purpose and achievement of the complex dished barrel forms found on British military flintlock muskets. This approach also allows us to better describe the earliest factory on the Enfield site, one of the most significant sites in the wider history of UK manufacturing.     

The Tower of London and Firearms in the Reign of Edward IV

Little attention has been paid by historians to the production of firearms in the Tower of London in the fifteenth century before the reign of Henry VII. This is due to the lack of surviving records for the office of the ordnance prior to the 1490s. The discovery of the earliest surviving set of accounts by a Master of the Ordnance based at the Tower, however, means that it is now possible to examine the manufacture and refurbishment of guns at the Tower in the early 1470s. This evidence demonstrates that Edward IV was responsible for the re-establishment of the Tower as the principle facility for the production and storage of firearms in England, which laid important foundations that his Tudor successors built upon.     

New Evidence on the Original Setup of the ‘Tilbury Group’, Formerly in the Tower of London

Abstract

An argument is presented that Valentine Green’s mezzotint engraving ‘Queen Elizabeth at the Head of her Army at Tilbury-Fort, A.D. 1588’ (1792) was inspired by the late 18th-century life-sized group of three figures representing the same subject that was formerly on show at the Tower of London. The mezzotint presented in Acta Historica Reginarum Angliae is the only known image of the original pre-1828 setup of the display, showing the figure of the queen in a skirt-like piece of armour that has since been re-identified as King Henry VIII’s tonlet armour.     

火炮炮闩击发机构可靠性强化试验技术

为提高炮闩的试验效率和可靠性,将可靠性强化试验理论引入其可靠性研究中。以火炮炮闩为强化试验载体,基于虚拟样机技术对击发机构磨损失效进行强化试验研究,依据受力分析确定了增大击针簧刚度的强化试验技术,通过仿真试验和分析,结果表明机构磨损量强化系数随强化应力水平的提高而变大,所确定的强化试验技术加快了零部件失效进程,有利于缩减可靠性试验的时间,为可靠性强化试验在装备机械系统中的应用提供理论和技术支撑。     

The Maudslay Connection,the Reid Bequest and Forsyth’s Early Percussion Ignition Systems

Abstract

Neal and Back identify that, in 1808, Maudsley, of 78 Margaret Street, was appointed Primer Magazine Maker to the Forsyth Patent Gun Company. Blackmore confirms in a short entry in A Dictionary of London Gunmakers that Henry Maudslay/Maudsley supplied the company with magazine primers. Henry Maudslay was the most influential mechanical engineer of his generation and his factory formed the nursery for many later engineering greats. This connection between Alexander Forsyth and his new company with Maudslay and his company is therefore significant. Determining how these two giants may have interacted and how Maudslay may have influenced the design and manufacture of the new percussion ignition systems is of interest. This interest is increased when we read that Forsyth observes in one of his letters to James Brougham, the day-to-day manager of the business, that ‘Maudsley’s account is most unreasonable in every respect’. In order to understand where Maudslay may have influenced the design and the detail of their manufacture, it is necessary to examine the early evolution of Forsyth’s percussion ignition devices. These are primarily those of the Reid Bequest of 1929 held in the Royal Armouries and those collected by Colonel Colt. As it has been two hundred years since their original creation this requires careful object study to establish the chronology of the objects and obtain an insight into the relationship between Forsyth and Maudslay and their innovations.     

The Crowe Memorandum,the Rebalance to Asia,and Sino-US Relations

Many contemporary academics and policy analysts have revisited the Anglo-German rivalry before 1914 to predict what may await China and the United States in the twenty-first century. However, few, if indeed any, have specified in what sense this comparison can be made. This paper attempts to fill this gap with a detailed analysis of the strategic parallels between the Anglo-German rivalry then and the China–US competition now through the lens of the Crowe Memorandum. The author argues that the basic parallel between the rise of Germany and the rise of China lies in the challenges they posed or pose to the dominant maritime power and system leader – Great Britain then and the United States today. This parallel also explains the similarity between the Triple Entente initiated by Great Britain prior to 1914 and the Rebalance to Asia launched by the United States in 2011. Furthermore, as in the case of the Anglo-German rivalry before 1914, the most crucial problem underlying the mounting China–US competition in recent years has been America’s deepening apprehension about the development of China’s anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) and naval capabilities. This development, from the US perspective, is threatening to deprive the US of its most crucial instrument to influence the strategic equilibrium on the East Asian littorals. Based on the lessons of the Anglo-German rivalry prior to 1914, the essay also examines the potential for mitigating, if not eliminating, the mounting competition and misgivings between China and the United States.     

Explaining the security paradigm shift: strategic culture,epistemic communities,and Israel’s changing national security policy

The paper’s main argument is that Israel’s security policy, which traditionally focused on defending its territorial integrity against regular Arab armed forces, was, by the 2010s, transformed into one that focuses on facing a variety of state- and non-state-based threats. Neo-realist explanations could neither account for the contested nature of the security debate during this period, nor the inconsistent evolution of the policy. The present study aims to solve this conundrum by introducing an alternative approach known as 4th generation strategic culture research. The paper is comprised of four parts. First, the origins and evolution of strategic culture are reviewed, with emphasis placed on the commonly accepted weaknesses that, to date, have prevented it from being used as a testable theoretical concept, and subsequently as an explanatory factor for security policy changes. The second part presents the “modernist constructivism” approach that bridges the gap between traditional constructivism and hypothesis-driven research design. Next, the paper introduces the emerging fourth generation in strategic culture literature, followed by a conceptual framework designed to resolve the inherent weaknesses of the more traditional approaches. Finally, this conceptual framework is applied to analyse the transformation of Israel’s security policy between 1982 and 2014.     

MAD,not Marx: Khrushchev and the nuclear revolution

The revival of nuclear strategy in US policy and scholarship has been strengthened by arguments that the ‘nuclear revolution’ – the assumption that thermonuclear bombs and missiles had made major war too dangerous to wage – does not affect international behaviour as much as nuclear revolution advocates claim. This article shows that the Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev indeed regarded nuclear war as too dangerous to wage, a decision which manifested itself not so much in foreign policy or military doctrine but in his determination to avoid war when the possibility arose. We argue that Khrushchev’s experience provides us with a more useful way to characterise the nuclear revolution and suggest some implications of this argument for contemporary debates about nuclear weaponry.     

Risk,War, and the Dangers of Soldier Identity

The profession of arms is distinct from other professions for many reasons. One reason which is not so obvious is that, unlike members of other professions, soldiers may go their entire careers preparing for a day that never arrives. All things considered, we should think this to be a very good thing. For soldiers, however, this can feel somewhat odd, since there is a natural desire to want to feel useful and to see one’s role and purpose find realization. Accordingly, the common soldier is forced to adopt a rather paradoxical mindset, one of longing for peace, and therefore for uselessness, while at the same time longing to be useful, which would entail that there be a war. This latter desire to be useful and to vindicate one’s identity as a soldier can sometimes take on an unhealthy life of its own. The pull of wanting too strongly to live up to a warrior identity, I argue, can sometimes skew a soldier’s ability to assess risk rationally. This article will therefore investigate how a soldier’s concept of self influences his or her overall capacity to evaluate risk in war and when such influence might become morally problematic.     

炮闩闩体击针孔强度仿真计算与结构改进

从击针和闩体的装配结构关系入手，在闩体击针室受力分析的基础上，进行了闩体有限元分析，得到了击针室两个不同部位受力时闩体击针孔处的应力和应变情况，从而提出解决闩体镜面击针孔产生凸出或裂纹问题的可行方案。     

The UK,interrogation and Iraq, 2003–2008

The UK’s interrogation operations during the conflict in Iraq (2003–2008) are often portrayed by the media as involving significant amounts of mistreatment. This article demonstrates that these practices are not necessarily representative of the UK’s interrogation operations across this conflict. In doing so it contributes to the limited literature on the practice of interrogation and on the UK’s combat operations in Iraq. The UK’s interrogation capability, and therefore its intelligence-gathering capability, is shown to have rested primarily with the military’s Joint Forward Interrogation Team (JFIT). The JFIT suffered from limitations to the number, training and experience of its interrogators and interpreters. It is argued that maintaining a permanent, higher level of preparedness for interrogation by the British armed forces is desirable.     

The ‘one-plus-four’ formula and transition in the Democratic Republic of Congo

In the aftermath of the signing of the ‘Accord Global et Inclusif’ (AGI) in Pretoria on 17 December 2002, not much was expected of President Thabo Mbeki's ‘imposed political monster’. In effect, after Mbeki came up with his ‘final plan’ providing for a transitional presidency made up of a president and four vice-presidents, many blamed ‘Mbeki's ignorance of Congolese political intricacies’. Mbeki's ‘one-plus-four’ formula was not only said to be unknown to the Congolese, but was also doomed to failure, given the nature of the stakeholders and the interests at stake in the DRC crisis. However, in view of the latest political developments in the DRC (a successful constitutional referendum as well as presidential, legislative and provincial elections, among others), we contend that, given the complexity of the Congolese conflict, Mbeki's design has emerged as a commendable contribution to the political solution of the Congolese crisis. Factors that have enabled such a transition mechanism to hold ought to be critically studied and eventually applied as a model for similar conflict situations in Africa and probably beyond.     

The Trump effect downunder: U.S. allies,Australian strategic culture,and the politics of path dependence

Donald Trump’s election precipitated a debate in Australia about the value of retaining close alliance ties with the United States. Similar dynamics are discernible in other U.S. allies as the negative impact of Trump administration policies becomes clearer. Yet despite this “Trump effect,” we argue Australia is unlikely to distance itself from the United States because at the core of Australia’s strategic culture is a very positive “cultural orientation” toward the United States that is highly institutionalized in treaties, formal bilateral ties, Track 2 diplomacy, and public opinion. Such institutionalized ties have powerful path dependent effects. Accordingly, we conclude that the Trump effect does not constitute a powerful enough “exogenous shock” to move Australia off its well-worn grand-strategic path. But this alliance relationship is marked by both high cultural affinity and high institutionalization: American policy-makers should seriously consider whether other U.S. allies can tolerate similar levels of “stress.”     

William and John Pickering and the garniture made for the Prince of Brunswick under their supervision at the Royal ‘Almain’ Armoury at Greenwich, 1610 to 1612

Abstract

The princely garniture ‘commanded’ to be made by Prince Henry Frederick for his cousin, Prince Friedrich Ulrich, later Duke of Brunswick, from the Royal ‘Almain’ Armoury at Greenwich, during the stewardship of the Master Armourer, William Pickering, his son, John, and the men of the Greenwich workshop, is described, illustrated and discussed. Accounts are presented of the lives and work of the Pickerings and the evidence is reviewed for the manufacture of this last decorated garniture of the Greenwich School.     

钢质管道挤压变形过程数值模拟

基于对钢质输油管道挤压变形原理的分析,建立上下刀具加载作用下钢质输油管道挤压变形模型,采用扩展拉格朗日方法求解三维接触挤压问题,完成20号无缝钢挤压变形过程的数值模拟。将模拟试验数据与前人实际试验数据进行对比与验证,模拟结果与实际试验结果吻合。该模型可以用于模拟不同规格管道挤压变形情况,得到管道挤压变形的位移、载荷和应力分布规律,为管道应急抢修提供理论和实践依据。     

Next steps in the creation of an accidental nuclear war prevention center

In early 1983, members of Stanford University's Center for International Security and Arms Control met to discuss ideas on the establishment of a joint U.S.‐U.S.S.R. center to support cooperative efforts to prevent accidental nuclear war. William Perry (former Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering) began the discussion by outlining several measures he felt could help to reduce the risk of nuclear war by accident or miscalculation. Calling attention to the earlier proposals of Senators Gary Hart, Sam Nunn, and Henry Jackson, he endorsed the concept of a joint accidental nuclear war prevention center as a mechanism to support efforts of the two superpowers to prevent or reduce the likelihood of the outbreak of nuclear war. Most notable in this regard was his personal experience of an erroneous warning of a large‐scale Soviet missile attack on the U.S., which resulted from a NORAD computer malfunction. Information exchanges and consultation to clarify circumstances surrounding an accident ‐ or the misperceptions that might result from one ‐ could be facilitated by a number of different types of centers that have been suggested. Perry described one possible configuration for such a center, consisting of two stations, jointly staffed and located in Washington and Moscow.

Members of the Stanford Center met again in June 1983 to examine in more detail the issues raised by this idea and similar ones, and possible next steps involved in implementation. This paper reports on research in progress on this subject. In addition to the Perry contribution, much of the conceptual analysis of the missions of a joint center derives from the work of Alexander George on crisis prevention and crisis management.’ Those elements of the research covering the technical and ‘mechanization’ requirements are contributed by Elliott Levinthal and Ted Ralston. Lastly, the suggested negotiating approach derives from the experiences and thinking of Sidney Graybeal, former U.S. Commissioner of the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC).     

British and German initiatives for defence cooperation: the Joint Expeditionary Force and the Framework Nations Concept

At NATO’s 2014 Wales Summit, the UK and Germany unveiled two new initiatives for European defence cooperation, known, respectively, as the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) and the Framework Nations Concept (FNC). Both were the result of economic pressures and the need to exercise intra-alliance leadership, but they represented very different approaches to cooperation. The JEF was to be a UK-led contingency force for short-notice operations, selectively incorporating forces from allies and partners. The FNC sought to coordinate capability development between groups of allies, centred on larger framework nations, to develop coherent capability-clusters available to meet NATO’s force requirements. The common denominator and novelty of the initiatives was the building of forces and capabilities multinationally by having major states act as framework nations for groups of smaller allies. The UK and Germany have ownership and continue to provide leadership to these initiatives. This is one key reason why they continue to evolve to accommodate changing circumstances and are likely to endure.     

Chains,networks and shifting paradigms: the UK defence industry supply system

Industrial supply chains have emerged as the focus of much economic and business research over the previous decade and defence is no exception. This paper reviews contributions made to the body of knowledge in this field with particular attention given to primary research undertaken on the UK defence industrial supply system. In doing so, the author assesses the quantity and quality of knowledge available to researchers, analysts and policy makers. There have been a number of valuable contributions to the literature and this paper reveals a subject that is extremely complicated, dynamic and yet under‐researched. It is suggested that it may well be this complexity and dynamism, coupled with difficulty in accessing data, that has inhibited research development in this field. Defence industry supply systems are repeatedly referred to as ‘chains’; however, primary research consistently suggests this is a misnomer – the author concludes that future analysis of the UK defence sector must embrace directly the economics of networks if understanding of the same is to progress and industrial ‘invisibility’ is to be avoided.