自动化武器的发展及对未来战争的影响

在信息技术和生命技术革命的双重影响下，人工智能发展突飞猛进，剧烈改变着现代军事技术发展方向。战争形态由信息化逐步向智能化转变。自动化武器作为智能化装备重要的组成部分，其发展经历了三级进阶，愈发趋向人机一体和全自主化方向改变。这种发展趋势对引领未来战争产生重要而深远的影响。伴随着武器无人化、智能化、自主化的发展趋向，如何有效研发、利用、管控自动化武器成为未来无人化战争的重要议题。同时世界各国对自动化武器的研发部署也加剧了国际军控的紧张，特别是致命性自主武器的出现将有可能对战争伦理和法律构成前所未有的挑战，这将成为国际社会必须认真审视的问题。     

“合法”的新概念化学武器

所谓新概念化学武器,是区别于传统化学毒剂弹药而言的一种武器。这种新化学武器由于其弹药并不对作战人员构成伤害,更不会致人死亡,也不污染环境,因此短期内还不会受国际《禁止化学武器公约》的限制。说它不受《禁止化学武器公约》限制,是指它既不违背1925年日内瓦议定书的内容和精神,也不受1993年1月公开签署的人类历史上第一个全面禁止、彻底销毁大规模杀伤性武器的军控条约《关于禁止发展、生产、储存和使用化学武器及销毁此种武器的公约》的约束。它是一种新型概念武器。这种新概念化学弹内装的不是普通炸药,也不是常说的沙林、芥子气等种种     

国际禁雷运动的兴起和地雷三公约

在不到20年的时间里,国际社会已经制订了三部关于地雷的公约。这在所有类型的常规武器中是绝无仅有的。地雷问题正在成为国际政治、外交、军控与裁军领域中的一个重要问题．应当从战略全局的高度对其加以关注。一、国际禁雷运动的兴起80年代初,随着国际形势的缓和,在常规武器谈判中形成了第一个限制地雷武器的国际公约,即1980年10月10日通过的《禁止或限制使用某些可被认为具有过分伤害力或滥杀滥伤作用的常规武器公约》（以下简称特定常规武器公约）第二议定书《禁止或限制使用地雷。诱杀装置和其他装置的议定书》（以下简称地雷第一公…     

2007年国际军控与裁军形势新动向

2007年，国际军控与裁军形势发生了复杂而深刻的变化，出现了一些引人注目的新动向。多边军控进程酝酿重要变化，有望走出多年低谷；国际防扩散领域形势依然复杂，和平利用核能与核不扩散矛盾突出；美俄围绕东欧反导问题展开新一轮战略博弈，国际军控体制受到新的冲击；美国全面推进反导系统建设，各国发展空间军事能力势头越来越强，防止外空武器化前景更加黯淡；国际社会在集束弹药议定书谈判和小武器军控方面取得进展，常规军备控制成为亮点。     

对后疫情时代我国军贸工作发展的思考

正2020年6月20日,十三届全国人大常委会第十九次会议表决通过了全国人大常委会关于加入《武器贸易条约》的决定。中国加入(ArmsTrade Treaty,简称ATT)条约的决定,是中国积极参与全球武器贸易治理、维护国际和地区和平稳定的重要举措,体现了中国政府支持多边主义、维护现有国际军控体系、践行构建人     

从《中导条约》的失效看未来国际军控走向

《美苏消除两国中程导弹和中短程导弹条约》的失效重创了本就脆弱的国际军控体系，对美俄战略稳定和全球军事安全带来消极影响，国际军控合作和全球军事安全迫切需要重构新的军控体系。本文立足当前国际军控现状，在分析美俄“退约”背后各方战略考量及国际军控面临的挑战，如“美国优先”理念下的霸权主义和单边主义、国际军控体系自身的脆弱性和局限性和新军事革命给全球安全增添新的变量的基础上，提出了“构建人类命运共同体”理念凝聚全球安全共识、以大国责任和义务为基础构建多层次军控体系和以多边军控体系循序推进国际军控进程等措施和建议，以期为推动国际军控合作，建立更为公平、合理、有效的国际军控体系做出贡献。     

自主武器的特点及对未来战争影响 ——《无人军队：自主武器与未来战争》述评

以自主武器为代表的人工智能正在掀起一场新的军事革命。保罗·沙瑞尔所著的《无人军队：自主武器与未来战争》一书通过技术概念解释、各路专家访谈与大量战场实例，深入浅出地探讨了自主武器的内涵、特点与影响。本文基于该书内容，结合相关文献、书籍、评论等资料，首先对自主武器与无人军队的内涵、现阶段的运用情况进行简要介绍；其次，通过对自主武器技术内核的分析，简要介绍自主武器在各类战争样式的运用、存在的反为敌方利用的可欺骗性风险和故障发生后产生更严重后果的不稳定性风险；最后从三方面总结自主武器对战争其他方面的影响，即对军队建设模式提出更高要求，对国际战略稳定的双重作用以及对战争法与战争伦理道德的挑战。     

人工智能在军备控制领域的争议与挑战

随着人工智能技术的发展,当前国际社会对管控以“杀手机器人”为代表的致命性自主武器系统的呼声日益强烈,对于这类武器系统可能在未来引发伦理和安全危机的担忧逐渐增多。针对致命性自主武器,最严格的观点是全面禁止其研发和使用,以防止“杀手机器人”的出现;较宽松的观点是限制其使用、转让、扩散和购买;介于两者之间的观点是暂停其研发或使用,待相关管控规则形成后,再开展相关活动。本文认为,目前,国际社会就这一军控问题达成共识依然任重道远。根据现实情况,我国不宜过早寻求限制相关技术的研发工作,而应力求先确立管控致命性自主武器部署、使用、流通等方面的规则。     

国际军火技术的转移及其影响

20世纪末期以来,世界上能够生产性能先进武器的国家越来越多。在国内需求有限的情况下,许多军火企业都将自己的目光瞄准国际市场,使国际武器市场的竞争日趋激烈。为了在国际军火市场上占得一席之地,军火商们改变了过去军火贸易中那种单纯的“武器买卖关系”,转而加强相互的军事技术合作,使国际军火技术的转移呈现增长趋势。然而,由于军火技术被视为“敏感技术”,其进出口在国际上有很多限制,从而出现合法与非法两条转移渠道。国际军火技术转移有利于发展中国家实现国防现代化,同时也影响国际军控与裁军进程,威胁国际安全环境。一、国际军火…     

打击核化设施——现代作战的重要手段

核化设施一旦遭袭,可产生使用核化武器类似的效应,造成巨大的军事、经济和政治影响。打击敌核化设施,政治风险低,作战效应大,已成为现代作战的重要手段。 一、游离公约之外、政治风险低,打击核化设施有隙可钻 打击核化设施与核化打击由于其性质不同,因而其战争形态、受国际社会关注程度、政治风险也不同。     

ADVANCING THE GOALS OF NPT ARTICLE VI

International technical cooperation on issues relevant to the challenges of nuclear disarmament can demonstrate commitment to obligations under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, strengthen the security of fissile materials and weapons, and develop technical approaches to support more ambitious disarmament activities in the future. Including non-nuclear weapon states would ensure that their views are taken into account and would invest them in developing solutions to key challenges. This article discusses three areas for technical cooperation that would build on past activities and that could produce such benefits as improved protection, control, and accounting of nuclear weapons and fissile material; enhanced transparency for nuclear weapon complexes; and mechanisms for international management of sensitive civilian nuclear facilities. International cooperation in each of these areas could provide a technical basis for pursuing possible future disarmament negotiations and substantively demonstrate commitment to Article VI.     

THE 2005 NPT REVIEW CONFERENCE

The 2005 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) failed to produce any agreed action plan for addressing nuclear disarmament or proliferation. Detailed discussions and negotiations on such a plan were much curtailed because of procedural wrangles. This article describes the evolution of the conference and argues that changes in the international political environment and problems inherent in the revised NPT review process agreed at its 1995 Extension Conference contributed to the meager outcome. The main issues raised by delegations in their plenary statements, working papers, and the limited time available for interactive discussion are summarized, and three perspectives are offered on the reasons for the lack of any substantive product. Finally, the implications of that failure for the NPT, its review process, the wider regime for international nuclear governance, and nuclear disarmament, nuclear nonproliferation, and the peaceful use of nuclear energy are examined.     

How viable is international arms control for military artificial intelligence? Three lessons from nuclear weapons

Many observers anticipate “arms races” between states seeking to deploy artificial intelligence (AI) in diverse military applications, some of which raise concerns on ethical and legal grounds, or from the perspective of strategic stability or accident risk. How viable are arms control regimes for military AI? This article draws a parallel with the experience in controlling nuclear weapons, to examine the opportunities and pitfalls of efforts to prevent, channel, or contain the militarization of AI. It applies three analytical lenses to argue that (1) norm institutionalization can counter or slow proliferation; (2) organized “epistemic communities” of experts can effectively catalyze arms control; (3) many military AI applications will remain susceptible to “normal accidents,” such that assurances of “meaningful human control” are largely inadequate. I conclude that while there are key differences, understanding these lessons remains essential to those seeking to pursue or study the next chapter in global arms control.     

THE G8 GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP

ABSTRACT

Since the 1990s, the group of stakeholders working to combat biological weapons (BW) proliferation has broadened to include new actors who have not traditionally focused on security issues, including organizations from the public health sector, researchers in the life sciences, and the biosafety community. This has had significant benefits for the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) and the arms control establishment more broadly. However, the BWC's agenda has become increasingly dominated by issues of international health and global health security. By focusing solely on response strategies, the United States and other interested parties risk losing sight of other important elements of a counter-BW strategy, including deterrence and prevention. Focusing on public health-related issues to the exclusion of more traditional security matters puts the nonproliferation regime at risk, because it limits the amount of time that stakeholders have available to grapple with the critical questions facing the BWC and the biological weapons nonproliferation establishment—questions that must be answered if the regime is to survive.     

The impotence of conventional arms control: why do international regimes fail when they are most needed?

Amid tensions with the West over Ukraine, Russia pulled out of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe in March 2015. The Russian case is another example of a country disengaging from conventional arms control when relations with other member states deteriorate. This raises an important question: can arms control regimes aimed at preventing conflict survive periods of tension and preserve peace? This article argues no. It demonstrates that the prospect and stability of conventional arms control regimes depend on healthy international relations. In times of tension, governments rely on military institutions for advice and absorb military biases incompatible with arms control. Therefore, these regimes fail when most needed and are impotent as instruments of peace. Beyond conventional arms control, the article hints at the fragility of nuclear agreements such as the 2015 Iran deal and the 2010 New START between the United States and Russia.     

伊拉克战争对中东地区乃至世界军品贸易的影响

在分析了伊拉克战争对中东地区军品贸易影响的基础上,重点分析了其对世界军品贸易的深刻影响———加剧军备竞赛、刺激军工技术发展、引起军贸格局及产品结构发生变化、国际军控形势更加严峻。     

Strategic Ambiguity: Nuclear Sharing and the Secret Strategy for Drafting Articles I and II of the Nonproliferation Treaty

ABSTRACT

Since the 1950s, the United States has engaged in nuclear sharing with its NATO allies. Today, 150-200 tactical nuclear weapons remain on European soil. However, the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) prohibits the transfer of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear weapon states. The potential discrepancy between text and practice raises the question of how the NPT's negotiators dealt with NATO's nuclear-sharing arrangements while drafting the treaty that would eventually become the bedrock of the international nonproliferation regime. Using a multitiered analysis of secret negotiations within the White House National Security Council, NATO, and US-Soviet bilateral meetings, this article finds that NATO's nuclear-sharing arrangements strengthened the NPT in the short term by lowering West German incentives to build the bomb. However, this article also finds that decision makers and negotiators in the Lyndon B. Johnson administration had a coordinated strategy of deliberately inserting ambiguous language into drafts of Articles I and II of the Treaty to protect and preserve NATO's pre-existing nuclear-sharing arrangements in Europe. This diplomatic approach by the Johnson administration offers lessons for challenges concerning NATO and relations with Russia today.     

涉外非战争军事行动的法律保障问题研究

近年来,随着军队使命任务的拓展,涉外非战争军事行动日益成为国家运用军事力量的重要方式。因此,必须加强涉外非战争军事行动中法律保障问题研究,使其在法律框架下进行。加强对涉外非战争军事行动的法律保障,有助于为军队遂行多样化军事任务提供有力的法律支持和保障。     

Africa and the 2015 NPT Review Conference

African states' attendance at and participation in the preparations for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) has produced mixed results, with the continent acting as both agent and bystander in respect of certain issues. African agency is evident in, for example, its position as a member of groupings on Iran's nuclear weapons programme and the Middle East Nuclear Weapons Free Zone. Less agency is evident in states' individual actions. This underscores the importance of African states' preference for multilateralism. However, African agency is also less evident in African multilateral efforts at the NPT preparatory meetings. The impact of these developments on the 2015 NPT Review Conference is too soon to tell but may bode ill for African agency.     

ALTERNATIVE NARRATIVES FOR ARMS CONTROL

The efforts of President Barack Obama and his administration to restore the United States as a driving force of multilateral arms control and nonproliferation negotiations are commendable, yet the lack of progress on such issues over the last eight years has ensured that U.S. policy has not kept pace with changes in the geostrategic environment and the evolving security agenda. Meanwhile, an alternative agenda has been articulated by non-Western countries. This article focuses on the arms control perspectives of Non-Aligned Movement states and others that have begun to embrace the idea of “disarmament as humanitarian action.” It explores this idea in the context of recent initiatives and argues that if the Obama administration wants to make progress on its arms control and nonproliferation priorities, it should consider a multifaceted approach that incorporates this emerging alternative agenda.