Kenya and Somalia

Much research has been done on patriarchy in numerous contexts in Africa, contributing to an understanding of the phenomenon. Recent developments in Kenya and Somalia, characterised by the adoption of new constitutions against the backdrop of stringent patriarchal practices, prompted the writing of this article. Kenya's journey towards gender equality has not been an easy one, given that prior to 2010 – when its new constitution was adopted – customary law that endorsed the violation of women's rights held precedence. For Somalia, over two decades of civil war had encouraged lawlessness, which acted as a barrier for women's progress. With the two countries' new constitutions now in place, expectations are high that past hindrances will be eradicated. Kenya and Somalia stand a good chance of achieving gender equality if lessons from other countries can be carefully considered to avoid a repeat of their failures. Using secondary and primary data, it is this article's argument that an honest dialogue on women's rights involving all relevant stakeholders needs to be initiated to tackle the deeper structural problem of patriarchy, which poses a huge threat to the gains achieved on paper.     

A Clash of Wills: Hizballah's Psychological Campaign Against Israel in South Lebanon

This article analyzes Hizballah's war against Israel in south Lebanon as a psychological contest where public opinion, perception, and persuasion were the real determinants of victory. Hizballah successfully mobilized popular support for its war by communicating nationalist and religious themes to different sectarian groups in Lebanon. At the same time, it used classic guerrilla warfare as a carefully calibrated psychological tool to erode the morale of Israeli forces, their Lebanese allies, and the Israeli public's support for the war. Hizballah's sophisticated media capability, particularly combat video footage aired on its satellite TV station and the Internet, played a critical role in amplifying the effects of its attrition campaign. By orchestrating information-age media and guerrilla tactics, this strategy has important implications for the future of irregular warfare.     

About the contributors

From the beginning of history, war has been an almost exclusively male affair and those who took part in it were often extolled as the most manliest of men. The recent feminization of the armed forces of many developed countries does not prove that women's liberation is making progress, as most people believe. Rather, it is part symptom, part cause, of the decline of those forces. Other things being equal, the fewer and less important the wars fought by any armed force the more women it has; the more women it has, the less likely it is to undertake serious wars.     

The German wars of liberation 1807–1815: The restrained insurgency

In the Age of Napoleon, ‘small wars’ and ‘revolutionary war’ were closely connected. There were, however, different strands of this phenomenon: speaking professionally, conservative officers condemned small wars as an irregular regression to previous less disciplined forms of warfare. The Prussian state continually tried to discipline and regulate spontaneous risings. Yet the irregular character of small wars offered the opportunities for a less complex way of fighting, thus enabling the arming of the ‘people’ to fight. Individual undertakings, such as Ferdinand von Schill's doomed campaign in 1809, were designed to spark off a general popular uprising. But they were cheered by many and supported by few. Meanwhile, Neidhardt von Gneisenau conceived guerrilla-style Landsturm home-defence forces, which were designed for an irregular people's war. These concepts were put into practice in the ‘war of freedom’ – or ‘war of liberation’ – in 1813. Eventually both the mobilisation and the tactics remained regular, however, despite the emphatic appeal to a national ‘people's war’.     

Lost through non-translation: bringing Clausewitz's writings on ‘new wars’ back in

While Carl von Clausewitz has generally been respected as one of the most profound philosophers of war, his expertise has been regarded as somewhat limited if not even irrelevant to the so-called ‘new wars’ of the post-Cold War world. Many scholars in international relations have claimed that ‘new wars’ are essentially ‘post-Clausewitzian’ and ‘post-trinitarian’ in nature, meaning that they are no longer fathomable through a Clausewitzian framework. However Clausewitz's earlier writings were nearly exclusively dedicated to guerrilla warfare, or what he called ‘small wars’. These writings have been largely overlooked by many analysts of contemporary conflicts. By drawing on his rare and untranslated writings, the article uncovers a critical part of Clausewitz's expertise in asymmetric warfare and shows that, far from being irrelevant in an age where interstate warfare is increasingly being replaced by conflicts between states and semi-/non-state actors, Clausewitz's philosophical writings actually shed new light into the particular interactive dynamics generated during wars waged under conditions of asymmetry.     

A blunted spear: the failure of the African National Congress/South African Communist Party revolutionary war strategy 1961–1990

Following a classic Maoist revolutionary war strategy, with both Guevarian and Giapist elements, the African National Congress (ANC) attempted to overthrow, through revolutionary violence, the apartheid government of South Africa. This struggle, which began in 1961 and was eventually suspended in mid-1990, witnessed the general failure of the ANC strategy: for all intents and purposes – and despite all claims to the contrary – the ANC and its armed wing Umkhonto we Sizwe (‘Spear of the Nation’) failed to overthrow of the South African state by force, the purpose for which it was intended. The strongest indication of this was that the ANC was never able to establish (Phase One of revolutionary war) effective internal underground structures of any duration within South Africa. This much was clear when the ANC was unbanned in 1990, but was recognised long before: in October 1986, the ANC stated that ‘despite all our efforts, we have not come anywhere near the achievement of the objectives we set for ourselves’. The ANC's ‘use’ of the UDF structures inside South Africa, in this sense, was not the same thing as establishing effective internal ANC/MK structures in the way that they intended. The ANC/South African Communist Parry (SACP) also underestimated continuously the ability of the government to react strongly and viciously to the ‘Revolutionary Onslaught’: at least part of the blame for this underestimation lay with the promotion of the armed struggle over all other activities. In eidle, the ANC/SACP were unable to reach back effectively into the country to lead a revolution. In the end, the apartheid regime was defeated not by guerrilla action or by revolutionary overthrow, but through the mass action of millions of South Africans.     

Review Article: Reading Guerrilla Radio in Wartime Liberia

Numerous writers have acknowledged the importance of radio communications and hate propaganda in the Liberian civil war (1990–1997), but none have explored the subject in depth. A wide variety of related issues have been neglected, including military efforts to seize control of broadcast facilities, the deliberate manipulation of public information and perceptions, and the implications of both for wartime atrocities and post-war justice. In the following essay, I identify and discuss six general strands of thought on guerrilla radio broadcasting and communications in wartime Liberia. The first looks to the relationship between mass media and the state in the pre-civil war era. The second covers the cooption of the wartime free press. Three further themes – Charles Taylor's cultivation of personal power, the relevance of broadcasting for rebel command and control capabilities, and Taylor's media dominance during the 1997 Presidential campaign – demonstrate the strategic and public roles of radio communications and broadcasting. Finally, I look to written survivor memoirs for elite responses to wartime media monopolies, guerrilla propaganda, and psychological warfare. I conclude with some notes on indicators for future research, and their implications for historical and contemporary issues in Liberia.     

Remembering the war of liberation: legitimacy and conflict in contemporary Algeria

The aim of this article is to consider how Algeria's most prized achievement and treasured memory – the FLN's victory over the French in the war of liberation – has helped stimulate and sustain the violence that has blighted the country since independence. It argues that successive governments have propagated a legend of the war that encourages and legitimises rebellion and armed resistance. By celebrating the actions and achievements of a committed band of revolutionaries they have established a precedent whereby it is every citizen's duty to oppose and resist an unjust government. Time and again therefore, insurgent groups like the FFS, MIA, and AIS have justified their actions and won popular support by portraying themselves as the early FLN's natural heir.     

Policeman versus Soldiers,the debate leading to MAAG Objections and Washington rejections of the Core of the British Counter Insurgency Advice

The British recognized that insurgencies were based upon a struggle for political legitimacy and subordinated to this was the military conflict. Their plan countered insurgents by denying them political legitimacy. They cast the insurgent in the role of the criminal while they enhanced the government's legitimacy. Policemen were considered vital to this process because they arrest and charge criminals. If policemen impute criminality upon insurgents then the use of army troops had the opposite effect. Armies are used in combat and this bestows a well-recognized legitimacy on the foes they combat. The American military advisory group in Vietnam found this difficult to accept.     

The FARC’s militaristic blueprint

This article intends to explain the outstanding sequence of success and failure exhibited by the FARC, the main Colombian guerrilla since the 1980s. It claims that such sequence is unintelligible unless the adoption by the FARC of a militaristic organizational blueprint at its 1982 7^th Conference is taken into account. By building itself like an army, the FARC could boost its combat capacity, maintain its structural integrity, and develop powerful mechanisms that held the whole structure together. At the same time, the militarization of the FARC also entailed significant risks and costs like political isolation and high personnel turnover. After describing the militaristic blueprint, the article compares the FARC with other irregular forces that operated in the Colombian context – a comparison which is important to understand the specificity of the FARC trajectory, as well as the benefits and costs involved in it. The analysis highlights the critical role of organizational dimensions in the explanation of civil war outcomes, and suggests that at least for some problems organizational dynamics should be observed at a low level of granularity.     

Misapplying lessons learned? Analysing the utility of British counterinsurgency strategy in Northern Ireland, 1971–76

This article examines the British Army's deployment in support of the civil power in Northern Ireland. It argues that the core guiding principles of the British approach to counterinsurgency (COIN) – employing the minimum use of force, firm and timely action, and unity of control in civil–military relations – were misapplied by the Army in its haste to combat Irish Republican Army (IRA) terrorism between 1971 and 1976. Moreover, it suggests that the Army's COIN strategy was unsuccessful in the 1970s because commanders adhered too closely to the customs, doctrine, and drill applied under very different circumstances in Aden between 1963 and 1967, generally regarded as a failure in Britain's post-war internal security operations. The article concludes with a discussion of the British government's decision to scale back the Army's role in favour of giving the Royal Ulster Constabulary primacy in counter-terrorist operations, a decision which led ultimately to success in combating IRA violence.     

Boko Haram’s increasingly sophisticated military threat

ABSTRACT

This paper evaluates Boko Haram’s military capabilities and details the process of how its standing army, driven by these capabilities, came to pose a phased threat between 2013 and 2015 in particular. This was a period when military fighting dominated the insurgency in north-east Nigeria. Whereas there is an abundance of literature on Boko Haram’s histories and the impact of its insurgency on north-east Nigeria, analysis of Boko Haram’s military campaigning is still deficient. Attempting to fill this gap, this paper uses field findings and battlefield case studies from north-east Nigeria to highlight how Boko Haram’s overt front – its standing army – came to supplant its guerrilla operations as the main security threat to the frontier area.

This pivot towards military fighting, for a group initially composed of a few ragtag combatants, on the surface might seem surprising. Yet, whereas Boko Haram may lack the popular support required for ‘people’s war’, classic insurgency theories nevertheless hold some explanatory power for this deliberate shift: away from guerrilla warfare as the expedient of the weaker side, and towards the use of a large standing army of locals to swarm, and sometimes successfully overrun, state forces.     

Women and the military

Debates about the relationship between women and the military have become common within Western societies. These debates primarily centre on the issue of the place, fitness and desirability of a female presence within institutions designed for national war making. There are those who claim that equality betwen the sexes demands the full integration of women into national militaries, including in combat roles, others however argue that women are ill‐equipped for the traditional tasks required of ‘warriors’. This article argues that these debates are increasingly irrelevant. Future wars are increasingly less likely to be fought only by clearly defined national combat forces and more likely to be ‘virtual’ wars involving the deployment of Western technologies against militarily inferior opponents. This too is an age in which Western states will be engaged not just in virtual wars but in ‘humanitarian intervention’, peacekeeping, enforcement and postwar reconstruction. This allows, even encourages, a rethinking of traditional notions and debates over the place of women within the military sphere.     

The Second-Generation Liberation Movement in Southern Sudan: Anti-Colonialism as a Set of Practices

A remarkable feature of the Southern Sudanese liberation movement during the First Sudanese Civil War was its use of anti-colonial discourse and tactics. Soon into their struggle, the Southern Sudanese came to depict their situation as colonisation by the Muslim-Arab elite in Khartoum. As this article argues, this adoption of anti-colonial identity was the outcome of Southern Sudanese interaction with neighbouring Arab and African first-generation liberation movements, through which the future leaders of the Southern Sudanese liberation movement observed and absorbed the practices used against European colonialism. When the Southern Sudanese launched their liberation struggle, these practices shaped their struggle.     

Insurgency and Genocide: La Vendée

The struggle between the peasant population of the Vendee and the revolutionary government in Paris during the 1790s was perhaps the first, and certainly one of the earliest, of the modern ideological insurgencies. The conflict demonstrates the fatal weaknesses of a purely popular guerrilla movement deprived of sustained outside assistance. It also brings to the surface some less‐familiar aspects of the French Revolutionary regime. Most notably, that regime, determined to eradicate rather than conciliate the Vendean peasantry, employed methods that foreshadowed the techniques of National Socialism.     

Putin's Wars: The Rise of Russia's New Imperialism

ABSTRACT

This article discusses the Rhodesian Front regime propaganda warfare strategy during Zimbabwe’s war of liberation. It uses the case of the Chilonga area of Chiredzi located in the south-east of Zimbabwe to demonstrate that propaganda warfare was introduced as a measure to counter guerrilla infiltration and civilian cooperation with them. Drawing on ideas of military anthropology vis-à-vis the importance of cultural awareness in counterinsurgency, the paper argues that the efforts of the Rhodesian Front regime to use propaganda were fruitless. This is because they mostly ignored the culture of the Shangani, local people. Despite that, there were other reasons for the failure of the Rhodesian Front’s propaganda strategy, including the lack of conformity between politics and military action.     

Reform,democratization, and counter-insurgency: evaluating the US experience in Cold War-era Latin America

Current debate on US counter-insurgency doctrine is dominated by the notion that promoting ‘legitimacy’ and ‘good governance’ constitutes a central strategic imperative. This idea is hardly new; during the Cold War US officials often sought to encourage democratization and socio-economic reform as antidotes to revolution in Latin America. This article reviews four such cases – Venezuela during the first half of the 1960s, Guatemala throughout the 1960s, Nicaragua during the late 1970s, and El Salvador during the 1980s. The purpose is to bring a historical perspective to bear on current debates about the feasibility of US counter-insurgency strategy by evaluating the effectiveness of previous campaigns to promote improved governance in developing societies wracked by guerrilla violence.     

Security in the Americas: Neither Evolution nor Devolution – Impasse

This article begins with a discussion of sovereignty and goes on to discuss the idea of national security threats with reference to two different levels of analysis. First, the traditional-legal versus a more realistic contemporary level of analysis. Second, the operational, strategic, and political levels of analysis. The traditional concept tends to focus attention on the tactical-operational levels of activity, and the more contemporary notion broadens analysis to more strategic-political concerns. The article concludes with the argument that a broadened concept of threat to national security and sovereignty is meaningful and important. This is particularly important for those governments in the Western Hemisphere – and elsewhere – that do not discern any serious security issues, or proverbial clouds, on their peaceful horizons. Ample evidence indicates that non-traditional security problems can lead nation-states to failing or failed state status. That is to say, as examples, dysfunctional states, criminal states, narco-states, rogue states, and new ‘people's democracies'.     

The strategic utility of New Zealand Special Forces

In 1955, the New Zealand government authorised the creation of a Special Forces unit to operate with British forces in Malaya to counter a communist-inspired guerrilla insurgency. Drawing upon the operational experiences of the New Zealand SAS largely taken from the Cold War period, and underpinned by Colin Gray's Special Forces essentials of ‘economy of force’ and ‘expansion of choice’, this article will show how New Zealand's SAS is now accepted not only as a respected and relevant part of the nation's military capability, but also empowers its political decision-makers with the confidence to take on significant, and at times difficult, strategic foreign-policy choices.