Multilateral Counter-Insurgency Networks

Postmodern terrorism presents a significant challenge to global security and law enforcement institutions. Non-state actors operating across international borders, engaged in an apparent global insurgency of extremism that transects the traditional boundaries of crime and war, pose significant challenges to both intelligence and law enforcement agencies. These networked global insurgents blend political and religious fanaticism with criminal enterprises to challenge the rule of law and pose an epochal shift in the structures and relations among states. Negotiating this epochal shift requires traditional organs of national security (the diplomatic, military and intelligence services) to forge new partnerships with police and public safety organizations at the state and local (sub-national), as well as transnational levels. Significant operational, policy and cultural challenges must be overcome to forge an effective multi-lateral global network to counter global terrorism and insurgency.     

Terrorism,crime and public spending: Panel VAR evidence from europe

Within a panel VAR framework and utilizing generalized impulse response and forecast error variance decomposition analysis, we explore the dynamic effects of terrorism and crime on public order and safety spending across European countries during the period 1994–2006. Our findings show that a ‘shock’ in terrorism and/or in crime, significantly increases the subsequent trajectory of public order and safety spending. As a by-product, we find that public spending is ineffective in reducing observed crime or terrorism.     

Urban gangs evolving as criminal Netwar actors

The nature of conflict and crime is changing. Technology allows groups to spread their influence without regard to geographic limitations. A shift from hierarchies to network organizational forms is also occurring. As a consequence non‐state actors can extend their influence to gain social, political or economic power and challenge state institutions. This article examines the potential for gangs, transnational criminals and terrorists to embrace network forms and utilize technology to wage netwar. Factors which influence ‘third generation’ gang organization (politicization, internationalization and sophistication) are described to illustrate how a net‐based threat can mature. A move toward network organization within transnational criminal organizations and terrorist groups demonstrating the potential for these classic criminal entities to emerge as netwar actors is also reviewed. Finally, the need for state institutions such as the police and military to develop networked responses to combat networked threats is stated.     

我国跨境恐怖主义犯罪特征分析

现代恐怖主义正在迅速蔓延全球，恐怖主义活动已经严重威胁了各国的国家安全和人民的正常生活，而且，现代恐怖主义越来越朝着国际化的方向发展，这种国际性恐怖主义犯罪活动的危害性和有效打击难度都明显加大。我国也不可避免地卷入到跨境恐怖主义犯罪漩涡中来。深入研究我国跨境恐怖主义犯罪活动的特征，以期提高防范和惩治我国跨境恐怖主义犯罪活动的针对性。     

Deterrence of nuclear terrorism in the context of South Asia

Stability among the great powers during the Cold War is widely theorized in terms of nuclear deterrence. Rationality of States and their preference for survival are the basis of nuclear deterrence. The rationality of non-state terrorist groups is different from that of nation-states. Even though they are also rational actors with their own hierarchy of preferences, survival may not be their ultimate goal. Deterrence of nuclear terrorism is therefore different from deterrence against states. South Asia is more vulnerable to nuclear terrorism than any other region of the world for many reasons. This article analyzes the possibility of nuclear terrorism and the ways of deterrence against it in the context of South Asia.     

我国跨境恐怖主义犯罪的防控与惩治

我国跨境恐怖主义犯罪日益猖獗,不仅造成了大量的无辜平民伤亡和公私财产的损失,而且侵害了其他国家的利益和国际社会的共同秩序。防范和惩治我国跨境恐怖主义犯罪活动,应当坚持经济和社会的协调发展,消除恐怖主义滋生的土壤;积极参与多边安全合作,探寻维护我国安全利益的新途径;完善我国反恐怖主义犯罪的刑事立法。     

Deterrence of nuclear terrorism in the context of South Asia

Stability among the great powers during the Cold War is widely theorized in terms of nuclear deterrence. Rationality of states and their preference for survival are the basis of nuclear deterrence. The rationality of non-state terrorist groups is different from that of nation-states. Even though they are also rational actors with their own hierarchy of preferences, survival may not be their ultimate goal. Deterrence of nuclear terrorism is therefore different from deterrence against states. South Asia is more vulnerable to nuclear terrorism than any other region of the world for many reasons. This article analyzes the possibility of nuclear terrorism and the ways of deterrence against it in the context of South Asia.     

Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria

Since the July 2009 Boko Haram terrorist outburst in Nigeria, there have been increasing questions on the phenomenon in the country. There has not been any substantial analysis on the emergence of the Boko Haram group and its terrorist activities in Nigeria as the out-rage continues. This study is advanced to explain the phenomenon of Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria. It employs the levels of analysis framework popular in the field of international relations to explain the terrorism at three major levels: individual, state and international. The study relies on dependable news reports, which include interviews with key actors relevant to the subject matter, and finds that Boko Haram terrorism has its roots in the ideology and motivations of its founder and members, the failures and deficiencies of the Nigerian state, and the modern trend of religious terrorism in the international system.     

Competitive Statehood in Libya: Governing Differently a Specific Setting or Deconstructing its Weak Sovereign State with a Fateful Drift Toward Chaos?

Abstract

Libya in 2011 witnessed a real process of political change, though different from all the policy-oriented jargon equating transition with a teleological transition to democracy. Due to the resilience of the Qadhafi regime in power and with the essential role of NATO intervention, the process was eased out by a eight-month civil war. Governance in post-Qadhafi Libya was not done through the rebuilding of centralized authorities. But it took the specific form of the emergence of multiple non-state actors embedded in local dynamics and then connected with weakened central authorities that had access to the huge Libyan resources. That raised complex questions about the quality of this mode of governance, especially at a time of pressing problems for Libya and its neighbors, whether direct ones (Tunisia, Egypt, Mali) or farther countries across the Mediterranean sea: terrorism with the expansion of Da’esh into the country and flows of refugees crossing Libya’s uncontrolled borders and flowing into Italy and then Europe by thousands.     

Deterring the Undeterrable: Coercion,Denial, and Delegitimization in Counterterrorism

This article argues that deterrence theory can be applied to counterterrorism. Doing so requires broadening the traditional concept of deterrence by punishment, expanding deterrence by denial to include defense, mitigation, and strategic hindrance, and developing deterrence by delegitimization to influence the political, ideological, and religious rationales informing terrorist behavior. In practice, deterring terrorism requires tailoring threats against state and individual facilitators, diffusing the intended consequences of terrorism, and manipulating terrorist self–restraints. When these and other deterrent leverages are applied simultaneously against various actors and processes involved in terrorism, coercion can be achieved.     

Why a small probability of terror generates a large macroeconomic impact

The basic narrative of bargaining theory predicts that, all else equal, anarchy favors concessions to challengers who demonstrate the will and ability to escalate against defenders. For this reason, post-9/11 political science research explained terrorism as rational strategic behavior for non-state challengers to induce government compliance given their constraints. Over the past decade, however, empirical research has consistently found that neither escalating to terrorism nor with terrorism helps non-state actors to achieve their demands. In fact, escalating to terrorism or with terrorism increases the odds that target countries will dig in their political heels, depriving the non-state challengers of their given preferences. These empirical findings across disciplines, methodologies, as well as salient global events raise important research questions, with implications for counterterrorism strategy.     

恐怖性爆炸犯罪防范对策初探

近年来,国内外恐怖组织不断实施恐怖性爆炸犯罪,给世界各国造成了巨大的生命和财产损失。恐怖性爆炸犯罪主要有自杀性恐怖爆炸犯罪、交通工具上的恐怖性爆炸犯罪、特定建筑物的恐怖性爆炸犯罪、制造混乱的恐怖性爆炸犯罪等几种类型。防范爆炸性犯罪的主要措施有：加大反恐立法、加强国际合作、严格安检制度、强化基础建设、落实新闻管控和和谐民族关系等。     

Globalization's Bastards: Illegitimate Non-State Actors in International Law

The international system has great difficulty in dealing with illegitimate non-state actors such as transnational terrorist groups and organized crime syndicates. This is due to two main factors: the quality and quantity of influence these illegitimate actors have obtained in an era of globalization, and the fact that international law considers only individual criminals and terrorists as subjects, rather than the entire illegitimate enterprise, and does not adequately link individuals, enterprises and states to more nuanced and complex forms of sponsorship of illegal activities. This work offers an outline for tools that should be embedded in the fabric of international law and agreements, to sustain credibility against illegal non-state actors, to hold accountable  sponsors of illegality and to reinforce the legitimacy of globalization.     

Terrorism in Nigeria

Using the Boko Haram terrorist group in Nigeria as a point of departure, this paper examines the implications of the operations of terrorist groups on the security and stability of states in West Africa. It predominantly utilises secondary sources of data. Findings indicate that the membership and operations of this terrorist group are spreading across the sub-region. This spread is consequent upon Boko Haram's collaboration with other terrorist groups within West Africa and beyond. This constitutes threats to the security and stability of states in the sub-region. Thus, the paper recommends, among other things: a thorough understanding of the operational strategies of terrorist groups by states and those involved in security policymaking in the sub-region; and for agreements to be reached among Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) member states and their governments for collaboration in various areas in order to curtail transnational crime and terrorism, and reduce socio-economic inequality that generates aggressive behaviours among the less privileged.     

Law Enforcement Intelligence: A Call for New Strategies and Tactics in Countering Criminal Insurgency

This paper underscores the theory that efficacious law enforcement intelligence addresses current problems of criminal insurgency including acts of terrorism, asymmetric warfare and low intensity conflict, and suggests possible solutions. By introducing the notion of crime as insurgency, a new paradigm may be developed that could assist practitioners and academics alike in analyzing, solving and managing crime. By shifting the perspective for both military and civilian forces from their traditionally reactive stance, to a proactive posture, and merging national security with homeland defense on the most perplexing issues and threats facing US security, this work may provide a base upon which new and actionable policies can be designed. Public administrators must take seriously the lessons from past failures. The single most important supposition being, sound policy is reliant upon good intelligence.     

Preventing conflict upstream: impunity and illicit governance across Colombia’s borders

This article explores how transnational borderlands matter for conflict prevention and, in particular, so-called upstream engagement, which aims to reduce threats to global stability and security that arise from the world’s increasing interconnectedness. Accounting for transnational borderlands in vulnerable regions is crucial for conflict prevention as pursued by the defence and security sector because borderlands are catalysts of the negative side of global interconnectedness: they are business hubs for transnational organised crime, sites of retreat for conflict actors, and safe havens for terrorists. The border areas’ proneness to impunity and the ability of violent non-state actors to govern these spaces illicitly contribute to the emergence of these characteristics. I therefore argue that upstream conflict prevention needs to do two things to address these risks: first, to overcome a national security approach centred on the borderline and instead acknowledge transnational security dynamics in borderlands on both sides of the border; second, to overcome the state-centred governance lens to also consider governance exerted by non-state actors. The article draws on empirical data from a six-year study including over a year of fieldwork in and on Colombia’s borderlands.     

Does Terrorism Increase after a Natural Disaster? An Analysis based upon Property Damage

Does an emergency such as a natural disaster lead to a surge of terrorism? This paper contributes to the emerging literature on this issue. We consider the experience of 129 countries during the period 1998–2012 to determine the effect of a natural disaster on both domestic as well as transnational terrorism. We also control for endogeneity using expenditure on health care and land area in a country as instruments. In contrast to the existing literature, we measure the extent of terrorism by the value of property damage. The results indicate that after natural disasters, (a) transnational terrorism increases with a lag, and (b) a statistically significant impact on domestic terrorism is not observed.     

Terrorism as Method in Nepali Maoist Insurgency, 1996–2016

During the period 1996–2006, the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) waged overt people’s war to seize state power and institute a new order that realized the party’s understanding of ‘New Democracy’ as posited by Mao Tse-tung. Contextual shifts led to a crucial strategic turning point in September 2005, when the Maoists agreed to a united front with estranged legal parties to oust the monarchy and establish a republic. Though touted as acceptance of political reintegration, the move was tactical rather than strategic. The party had no intention of supporting a parliamentary version of democracy and thus, 2006–2016, engaged in a covert effort to seize power. Central to this effort was the paramilitary Young Communist League (YCL), the members of which responded to inflammatory party verbiage and exhortations with attacks upon rival political actors. These attacks, academically and legally, were terrorism and offered a salient illustration of intra-state unrestricted warfare. Ultimately, organizational, national, and regional circumstances caused the main Maoist movement to move decisively away from its covert approach. By that time, however, radical splinters had embraced the use of terrorism against rival political actors, creating a situation whereby local politics is yet a dangerous endeavor in certain areas and at certain times.     

Uranium yellowcake trafficking incidents in Africa

The perpetuation of an otherwise astute fissile material safeguards model by the current non-proliferation regime raises a number of concerns, not least the efficacy of the approach in reducing clandestine weapon developments and the nuclear terrorism threat. Mindful of potential shifts in illicit nuclear material and weapon acquisition, following an excessive focus on fissile material safeguards and the proliferation of nuclear weapon technology, this article uses proliferation trend and scenario analysis in a bid to identify potential proliferation threats and non-proliferation opportunities. The results of the article's assessment of reported incidents (1992–2013) involving theft, unauthorised possession, and attempts to smuggle or sell highly enriched uranium (HEU), plutonium, low-enriched uranium (LEU), natural uranium and uranium yellowcake reveal a decline in occurrences involving fissile material but an increase in uranium yellowcake incidents, particularly in Africa. Presumptions that yellowcake may have provided the newest threat to clandestine weapon developments and nuclear terrorism wane amid concerns over possible biases in reporting, scepticism over an organised and demand-driven nuclear black market, and the difficulties of non-state actors’ development of crude nuclear weapons off the tedious yellowcake conversion-enrichment-fabrication pathway. To secure Africa's uranium yellowcake from potential proliferators, the article proposes concerted domestic, regional and multilateral non-proliferation efforts.     

海警部队参与海上反恐作战的思考

随着各国加强对空中和陆地恐怖主义的防控，恐怖主义把视角转向海上。海上恐怖主义具有事件的突发性、手段的多样性、处置的复杂性等特点。边防海警部队参与海上反恐作战有利于取得海上反恐斗争的胜利，有利于掌握海上反恐主动权，有利于顺应国际海上反恐斗争的形势。针对海上恐怖主义的特点，边防海警部队应做到以下几点：一是平时反恐作战准备应具有超前性，二是参与海上反恐作战应体现实效性，三是参与海上反恐作战应把握全局性。