Africa's toy soldiers,non-state armed groups,and ‘voluntary’ recruitment

Armed conflict on the African continent has witnessed increasing recruitment of child soldiers, often at the hands of non-state armed groups. Unfortunately this practice continues unabated in the face of legal obligations prohibiting the recruitment of child soldiers under international humanitarian law, and international and regional human rights law. While international condemnation of the practice has led to attempts to increase the minimum age for recruitment to 18, a disjuncture persists between the legal obligations states sign up to, and the actual enforcement of these prohibitions at a domestic level.

International criminal law jurisprudence emanating from the Special Court for Sierra Leone and the International Criminal Court is being monitored closely, as these courts seek to enforce the prohibition in all armed conflicts, and against both state actors and non-state armed groups. International humanitarian law only protects child soldiers who have been unlawfully recruited. In this piece, the authors take a closer look at what amounts to unlawful recruitment in light of customary international humanitarian law, since this body of law also binds non-state actors, even without further criminalising legislation at a domestic level. Moreover, the article briefly explores whether a child can ever void this protected status by volunteering to participate directly in hostilities.     

ARMED NON-STATE ACTORS IN AFRICA AND THE BAN ON ANTI-PERSONNEL LANDMINES

A truly universal ban on anti-personnel mines cannot be realized without engagement of armed non-state actors and armed groups operating outside state control, including rebels and national liberation movements. Events after 9/11 have complicated engagement with organizations that can be classified as ‘terrorists’. Yet, the use of anti-personnel landmines itself can be viewed as an act of terrorism and African leaders have, on various occasions, classified the use of landmines and the presence of unexploded ordnance as engendering insecurity and a serious impediment to development. The success of a total ban ultimately depends upon ensuring that armed non-state actors act in accordance with international humanitarian law. The Geneva Call Deed of Commitment for Adherence to a Total Ban on Anti-Personnel Mines and for Cooperation in Mine Action (DoC) might be described as an alternative instrument to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention and can serve an important and impartial channel of communication with non-state actors. Already 18 armed groups in Africa have signed the Geneva Call DoC.     

The Changing Nature of Legitimate Authority in the Just War Tradition

ABSTRACT

The legitimate authority principle has become reduced to the issue of state authority. In its current formulation, the state has the sole authority to wage war, and because non-state actors, by their very definition, cannot satisfy this principle, their use of force is inherently unethical. This does not reflect the reality that non-state actors are increasingly engaging in the use of force, sometimes legitimately. As a result, the legitimate authority principle can and should look beyond the state. This article navigates a terrain in which non-state actors engage in the use of force, and in which revisionist just war thinking proposes that the concept of legitimate authority is irrelevant to thinking about the ethics of war. It proposes a principled approach to the inclusion of some non-state actors under the rubric of legitimate authority. This approach draws upon the historical development of the legitimate authority principle and incorporates the factors important to early writers on the subject.     

An Analysis of the Threat of Malicious Chemical Use by Nonstate Actors: Questioning the State-based Approach to Chemical Nonproliferation

ABSTRACT

This study seeks to evaluate the threat of malicious chemical use by non-state actors. It finds that non-state actors have primarily turned to ready-to-use crude chemical weapons (CW) instead of traditional CW agents. Interestingly, the worst crude CW attacks have been more destructive than those employing traditional CW. Scenarios for catastrophic consequences exist, but chemical attacks have typically been used to accomplish tactical goals, which leverage psychological and economic impacts. Therefore, successful efforts to counter CW proliferation by non-state actors must be substantially different from those targeting states.     

Deviant globalization: the application of strategic landpower*

In both Afghanistan and Iraq, US landpower was able to gain control rapidly over terrain. However, that control ebbed as US presence weakened. Non-state actors, such as the Taliban, the Haqqani network, the Islamic State, and Al Qaeda, gained control of segments of the population. Transnational Criminal Organizations capitalized on this permissive environment to strengthen their networks, often eroding the legitimacy of the host nation government, fueling regional instability, and, ultimately, undermining US policy objectives. The proliferation of deviant globalization, or the connectedness of subversive elements, is a key indicator of future conflict. Strategic landpower is uniquely positioned to influence the physical, psychological, economic, and social interactions of various non-state actors and their association with deviant globalization. It is no longer enough to seize and hold terrain. Landpower must also have the capability to influence the actions and attitudes of populations on that terrain wherever and whenever these interactions occur.     

Armed Groups and the Politics of Legitimacy

This article serves as an introduction to a special section on the question of the legitimacy of non-state armed groups. Starting with a short discussion of the literature on armed groups as political actors, the authors emphasize the importance of the often-underestimated dimension of legitimacy. After having conceptualized legitimacy in more detail, the article addresses three key challenges armed groups usually face regarding the politics of legitimacy: first, they need to legitimize the use of violent means; second, for moral and material support, they depend on beliefs of legitimacy; and third, they need to simultaneously address various domestic and international audiences. Finally, the authors highlight a number of pending questions for further research on armed groups.     

Territoriality of radical Islam: comparative analysis of jihadist groups' approach to territory

ABSTRACT

The paper compares political territoriality of selected jihadist violent non-state actors. Looking at selected groups that attempted to control territory (Afghan Taliban, Al-Shabaab, the Islamic State), it attempts to establish a generalization regarding the use of territory by this type of violent non-state actors. To this end, it analyses connection of territory to groups´ security provision, economic activity, and identity. Despite many differences among the groups, it concludes that these groups often utilize both territorial and personal characteristics. Territoriality of these actors is reactive as they are unable to present a sustained control in contested regions.     

US Counterinsurgency vs Iranian-Sponsored Terrorism

Terrorist networks involve not only non-state actors but also an international environment in which state sponsors and 'gray areas' play significant roles. Non-state actors need the sanctuaries of state sponsors and of areas outside of effective state control to recruit, organize, and train their ranks, and to finance their activities. Through statistical analysis of statements of Iranian state intentions, and measures of direct US military interventions, this study examines how US military interventions into Iran's perceived sphere of interests deterred Iranian support for terrorist actions by its proxy groups against United States targets from 1980 to 1990.     

Militias as sociopolitical movements: Lessons from Iraq's armed Shia groups

The Shia militia has emerged as one of the most powerful and important actors in the Middle East security environment. Despite this trend, they remain poorly understood by scholars and policymakers alike. This article seeks to expand our understanding of the militia as a type of non-state armed group through an examination of Shia militia movements in Iraq between 2003 and 2009. More than simply warlords, paramilitaries, or foreign proxies, Shia militias in Iraq enjoyed substantial popular legitimacy, pursued a broad social and political agenda, and participated actively in the formal institutions of the state. Understanding the triangular relationship between the militia, the state, and the population is essential in explaining the rise and fall of the Shia militias during the US occupation as well as in developing strategies to deal with their most recent resurgence     

Preventing conflict upstream: impunity and illicit governance across Colombia’s borders

This article explores how transnational borderlands matter for conflict prevention and, in particular, so-called upstream engagement, which aims to reduce threats to global stability and security that arise from the world’s increasing interconnectedness. Accounting for transnational borderlands in vulnerable regions is crucial for conflict prevention as pursued by the defence and security sector because borderlands are catalysts of the negative side of global interconnectedness: they are business hubs for transnational organised crime, sites of retreat for conflict actors, and safe havens for terrorists. The border areas’ proneness to impunity and the ability of violent non-state actors to govern these spaces illicitly contribute to the emergence of these characteristics. I therefore argue that upstream conflict prevention needs to do two things to address these risks: first, to overcome a national security approach centred on the borderline and instead acknowledge transnational security dynamics in borderlands on both sides of the border; second, to overcome the state-centred governance lens to also consider governance exerted by non-state actors. The article draws on empirical data from a six-year study including over a year of fieldwork in and on Colombia’s borderlands.     

Between the Cracks: Actor Fragmentation and Local Conflict Systems in the Libyan Civil War

Abstract

After nearly four years of civil war, Libya continues to be described as an ‘ungoverned space’ where the collapse of state institutions reignited tribal, political, religious and ideological tensions. These accounts, however, obscure Libya’s complex subnational governance, and the role of non-state armed groups in shaping the emerging political orders. By contrast, we contend that distinct subnational political orders have emerged in Libya since 2014 in which actors engage in state-making practices driven by local interests. Using empirical evidence to explore the activity of non-state armed groups during the Libyan civil conflict, we highlight that the local conflict environments in eastern, western and southern Libya provide specific incentives that shape the process of armed group splintering and patterns of violence. The findings demonstrate that claims to authority and notions of statehood extend far beyond the state whereby governance relations are negotiated between state and non-state actors. Conflict patterns, (in)stability and the prevailing political order are therefore conditional on the nature of the dominant actor, their strategies and modes of violence within their areas of influence. Through this analysis, the paper provides a more granular understanding of the local political dynamics that drive violence in Libya and civil wars more generally.     

‘What is in a Name?’: The Role of (Different) Identities in the Multiple Proxy Wars in Syria

Abstract

Post-uprisings Middle East politics is frequently described as a ‘regional cold war’ involving proxy warfare that emphasises the role of shared identities linking external and local actors. But does the ‘content’ of identities impact proxy war dynamics? This article considers the present ‘battle for Syria’, a local conflict that became a theatre for multiple proxy wars involving actors emphasising identities on various levels, most notably national, religious/ sect and ethnic. It suggests that identity content does matter, with global powers more reluctant than regional players to back groups identifying at sub-national level, while foreign non-state actors are enthusiastic backers of sub-national identity.     

Proportional use of force in asymmetric military operation

This paper studies a strategic conflict between a state and a non-state military organization. The non-state military organization decides whether to attack or not to attack the state, while the state decides on its counter-measure. If the state uses a high level of violence against the non-state organization, it may be accused by the international community of ‘non-proportional’ use of force, and both sides of the conflict take this possibility into account. The model predicts that it may be rational for the non-state organization to attack the state, even if as a reaction the state will militarily destroy this organization, due to a positive probability the state will be punished by the international community for non-proportional use of violence.     

Recognizing Fragmented Authority: Towards a post-Westphalian Security Order in Iraq

Abstract

The rollback of Daesh’s territorial control during 2017 has (re-)established an area of limited statehood in large parts of Iraq that may endure for many years. The government of Iraq projects its authority into a large geographical and political space that it shares with a multitude of other state, non-state and hybrid actors, competing and collaborating to achieve advantageous security and political outcomes. This paper examines the heterarchy of actors in post-Daesh Iraq to develop a typology and start a critical discussion about post-Westphalian alternatives for security governance in Iraq during the coming period of reconstruction and reconciliation.     

Reading the Riot Act: Toward a More Comprehensive Ban on Chemical Weapons

ABSTRACT

The recent use of chemicals in warfare in Syria and Iraq illustrates that, despite the important work of the 1997 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), the world has not yet been totally successful in stopping the use of indiscriminate toxic agents in conflicts, either by states or non-state actors. Michael Crowley's excellent and timely new book, Chemical Control, analyzes the use of “riot control agents” (RCAs) and “incapacitating chemical agents” (ICAs), including launch and dispersal systems, by police, paramilitary, and military forces over the last decades and raises the challenging question about where the red line might be drawn between banned and permitted uses of chemicals. He discusses this problem not only in the context of the CWC, which allows use of RCAs for civilian riot control, but also in the context of international law, human rights, and criminal justice, including the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and other disarmament and abolition regimes. He proposes a “holistic, three-stage approach” to addressing this issue “for effective regulation or prohibition of the weapon or weapon-related technology of concern.” As we approach the global abolition of a whole class of weapons of mass destruction in the next decade or even sooner, Chemical Control is helpful in better understanding and solving the dilemma of what's actually banned or permitted under international law, and precluding states undermining the chemical weapons ban.     

Missile warfare and violent non-state actors: the case of Hezbollah

Over the last three decades, Hezbollah adapted its military strategy and the operational function conferred to its missiles. Starting in 1992, rocket warfare became one of the primary tactics of the group to compel Israeli Forces in Lebanon. After the Israeli withdrawal in 2000, the strategy evolved into a deterrence posture to support the Party’s objective to remain the primary military power inside Lebanon. Hezbollah’s posture could serve as a template for smaller terrorist groups. It would broaden the array of strategic options for violent non-state actors, allowing them to implement military postures that could be described as rudimentary and low-cost denial of access strategies. However, this scenario would require the same level of state support that Hezbollah currently enjoys from Iran, and that other non-state actors (Hamas, Houthi insurgents) do not at this stage.     

Born violent: Armed political parties and non-state governance in Lebanon's civil war

We know little of the internal governing practices of non-state actors once in control of territory. Some territories have witnessed the establishment of new institutions of public goods remarkably similar to state institutions. This article compares four armed political parties governing territory during the Lebanese civil war. These non-state violent actors established complex political and economic institutions and administrative structures. Despite the wide range of ideologies and identities of these actors, they all converged in their institutional priorities, although not in their capacities or the particular ways of achieving those priorities. Data from interviews and the actions of the armed political parties suggest a combination of ideology and desire for control is causal in generating public institutions, partly attributable to the high degree of citizen activism marking the Lebanese case.     

Lost through non-translation: bringing Clausewitz's writings on ‘new wars’ back in

While Carl von Clausewitz has generally been respected as one of the most profound philosophers of war, his expertise has been regarded as somewhat limited if not even irrelevant to the so-called ‘new wars’ of the post-Cold War world. Many scholars in international relations have claimed that ‘new wars’ are essentially ‘post-Clausewitzian’ and ‘post-trinitarian’ in nature, meaning that they are no longer fathomable through a Clausewitzian framework. However Clausewitz's earlier writings were nearly exclusively dedicated to guerrilla warfare, or what he called ‘small wars’. These writings have been largely overlooked by many analysts of contemporary conflicts. By drawing on his rare and untranslated writings, the article uncovers a critical part of Clausewitz's expertise in asymmetric warfare and shows that, far from being irrelevant in an age where interstate warfare is increasingly being replaced by conflicts between states and semi-/non-state actors, Clausewitz's philosophical writings actually shed new light into the particular interactive dynamics generated during wars waged under conditions of asymmetry.     

The disconnect between arms control and DDR in peace processes

The article discusses the disconnect between arms control and disarmament practices vis-à-vis peacebuilding practices. It critically analyzes Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) practices focusing on their absence of dialogue with international arms control and disarmament (ACD) practices. It proposes that a conversation between experts involved in these distinct practices could promote a political discussion on the place of weapons held by state and non-state actors in times of peace. The argument is illustrated through an analysis of the treatment of rules on weapons in the Colombian peace process (2012–present) with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). The article concludes that the disconnect between the arms control and disarmament and the peacebuilding associations, as seen in the context of DDR practices, reinstates the rule on the monopoly of violence by the state, preventing a broader discussion of the role of weapons and violence in the building of political communities.     

Smart Power and Military Force: An Introduction

Abstract

Smart power is comprised of two elements: the quest for building society among states and between states and non-state actors; as well as the desire for cleaner forms of power projection. This special issue explores how states continue to fumble over achieving the optimum mix of hard and soft power across several country cases and themed articles. This set of contributions suggests that smart power is not unlike a ‘Swiss Army Knife’ analogy: multifunctional and challenging to choose the right combination of ideational and material tools.