具有随机寿命的二维期权定价

由于期权合约在到期日之前可能被终止及标的资产的价格可能会因重大信息的到达而发生跳跃 ,文中在假设合约被终止的风险与重大信息导致的价格跳跃风险皆为非系统的风险情况下 ,应用无套利资本资产定价及Feynman kac公式 ,首先研究了标的资产服从连续扩散过程和跳—扩散过程具有随机寿命的交换期权定价 ,得到相应的定价公式 ;然后 ,研究了标的资产服从跳—扩散过程及利率随机变化具有随机寿命的期权定价 ,得到相应的定价公式     

套利与记账单位的关系

通常说一策略是套利策略,是指其初始资产为0,而最后的资产以正概率严格大于0,也就是无中生有。如果只是看净收益是否严格大于0还不能判断该策略是否是套利策略。当策略的初始资产不是0时,如何判断该策略是否是套利策略?将就套利给出另一种定义,并证明一策略是否为套利策略只要判断其折准净收益是否以正概率严格大于0。给出了原市场和不同折准市场下无套利数学表达式的等价形式,并给出了在选择不同的记账单位作折准及对策略的不同要求(如:可取,折准可取,折准可取等)时无套利的数学表达式的等价形式。     

基于Copula方法的含交易方违约的信用违约互换定价

本文讨论了含交易方违约的信用违约互换定价问题，应用无套利原理得到了模型的价格，文章采用蒙特卡洛方法对模型进行了数值模拟，讨论了模型的价格与合约期限以及公司违约相关系数的关系。     

有交易费未定权益的一个公平定价的初步讨论

在有交易费模型下,初步讨论了未定权益的公平价的定义形式和基本性质,并给出了基于无套利分析的公平价结果。     

倒向随机微分方程在欧式期权中的应用

假设市场为无套利市场,而且市场上只有两种证券:一种是无风险债券;一种是有风险的股票。通过自筹资策略,得到期权价格所满足的倒向随机微分方程(BSDE),利用倒向随机微分方程给出欧式期权价格概率表示;并证明欧式期权的完全套期保值性。     

可转换债券的复合期权定价模型

可转换债券是一种内含期权结构的特殊金融产品。可转换债券的内含期权是一种奇异期权——复合期权。本文通过分别对无期权债券和复合期权的定价，获得了可转换债券在风险中性条件下的定价模型。     

一种基于RST的多准则选择和排序问题解决方法

提出一种多准则方案对偏好程度粗度量的一般方法。构造了一种从参考方案集中获取偏好规则并用于全体方案排序和选择的方法。将参考方案对的偏好关系定量分级表示为能反映方案间关系的成对比较表 ,对综合偏好关系进行粗近似后获取决策者偏好规则 (偏好模型 ) ,在此基础上利用打分机制完成方案的选择和排序。最后分析了新方法的有效性。     

我国装备价格定价模式研究

文章在对装备价格定价模式进行理论探讨的基础上,分析了我国目前装备定价模式的弊端,提出了与国家军事订货制度相一致的我国装备价格定价目标模式,包括目标定价、全程控价方式,市场定价方式,合同定价方式,事后定价方式和国际军品市场定价方式等。     

计划中的时序偏好表示和非单调推理

针对行动序列计划中的时序偏好问题开展研究,重点关注时序偏好集合内部存在不一致性时完成行动计划的方法。论文的难点和创新点体现在两个方面。针对时序偏好的表示问题,建立了一种二元描述结构,能够实现对时序约束和时序偏好的归一化描述。使用计算辩论技术建立推理框架,用以排除约束/偏好集合中的冲突关系,获得具有最大一致性的约束/偏好子集。在此基础上建立了一种新的计划生成策略,通过映射的方法得到行动序列片段,组合这些片段后形成完整的行动序列计划。通过实例验证了方法的可行性。     

我国企业定价决策中需要注意的几个问题

该文在分析了我国的市场营销环境的基础上,讨论了企业定价决策的几个基本因素,并就我国企业的定价目标、定价策略和定价方法进行了初步的探讨.     

Dynamic pricing in a dual‐market environment

This article is concerned with the determination of pricing strategies for a firm that in each period of a finite horizon receives replenishment quantities of a single product which it sells in two markets, for example, a long‐distance market and an on‐site market. The key difference between the two markets is that the long‐distance market provides for a one period delay in demand fulfillment. In contrast, on‐site orders must be filled immediately as the customer is at the physical on‐site location. We model the demands in consecutive periods as independent random variables and their distributions depend on the item's price in accordance with two general stochastic demand functions: additive or multiplicative. The firm uses a single pool of inventory to fulfill demands from both markets. We investigate properties of the structure of the dynamic pricing strategy that maximizes the total expected discounted profit over the finite time horizon, under fixed or controlled replenishment conditions. Further, we provide conditions under which one market may be the preferred outlet to sale over the other. © 2015 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 62: 531–549, 2015     

Spatial pricing and product allocation in online retailing

Spatial pricing means a retailer price discriminates its customers based on their geographic locations. In this article, we study how an online retailer should jointly allocate multiple products and facilitate spatial price discrimination to maximize profits. When deciding between a centralized product allocation ((i.e., different products are allocated to the same fulfillment center) and decentralized product allocation (ie, different products are allocated to different fulfillment centers), the retailer faces the tradeoff between shipment pooling (ie, shipping multiple products in one package), and demand localization (ie, stocking products to satisfy local demand) based on its understanding of customers' product valuations. In our basic model, we consider two widely used spatial pricing policies: free on board (FOB) pricing that charges each customer the exact amount of shipping cost, and uniform delivered (UD) pricing that provides free shipping. We propose a stylized model and find that centralized product allocation is preferred when demand localization effect is relatively low or shipment pooling benefit is relatively high under both spatial pricing policies. Moreover, centralized product allocation is more preferred under the FOB pricing which encourages the purchase of virtual bundles of multiple products. Furthermore, we respectively extend the UD and FOB pricing policies to flat rate shipping (ie, the firm charges a constant shipping fee for each purchase), and linear rate shipping (ie, the firm sets the shipping fee as a fixed proportion of firm's actual fulfillment costs). While similar observations from the basic model still hold, we find the firm can improve its profit by sharing the fulfillment cost with its customers via the flat rate or linear rate shipping fee structure.     

Sensitivity analysis on responsive pricing and production under imperfect demand updating

This paper examines three types of sensitivity analysis on a firm's responsive pricing and responsive production strategies under imperfect demand updating. Demand has a multiplicative form where the market size updates according to a bivariate normal model. First, we show that both responsive production and responsive pricing resemble the classical pricing newsvendor with posterior demand uncertainty in terms of the optimal performance and first‐stage decision. Second, we show that the performance of responsive production is sensitive to the first‐stage decision, but responsive pricing is insensitive. This suggests that a “posterior rationale” (ie, using the optimal production decision from the classical pricing newsvendor with expected posterior uncertainty) allows a simple and near‐optimal first‐stage production heuristic for responsive pricing. However, responsive production obtains higher expected profits than responsive pricing under certain conditions. This implies that the firm's ability to calculate the first‐stage decision correctly can help determine which responsive strategy to use. Lastly, we find that the firm's performance is not sensitive to the parameter uncertainty coming from the market size, total uncertainty level and information quality, but is sensitive to uncertainty originating from the procurement cost and price‐elasticity.     

中国收费公路制度改革的利益机制设计

收费公路是我国市场化改革延伸到基础设施的重大举措。收费公路已经被作为一种商品在向市场提供,且公路特殊性,使得收费公路产业具有明显的自然垄断性。在公路收费定价优势信息的主导下,在收费公路定价方面通行者处于明显劣势地位。本文希望通过利益机制的设计来提升通行者在收费公路定价博弈中的地位,通过利益机制设计中的激励与约束使公路收费定价者会倾向于选择更公平、公正的价格。     

Supply chain coordination with shelf‐space and retail price dependent demand and heterogeneous retailers

We consider supply chain coordination in which a manufacturer supplies some product to multiple heterogeneous retailers and wishes to coordinate the supply chain via wholesale price and holding cost subsidy. The retail price is either exogenous or endogenous. The market demand is described by the market share attraction model based on all retailers'shelf‐spaces and retail prices. We obtain optimal solutions for the centralized supply chain, where the optimal retail pricing is a modified version of the well‐known cost plus pricing strategy. We further get feasible contracts for the manufacturer to coordinate the hybrid and decentralized supply chains. The manufacturer can allocate the total profit free to himself and the retail market via the wholesale price when the retail price is exogenous, but otherwise he cannot. Finally, we point out that different characteristics of the retail market are due to different powers of the manufacturer, and the more power the manufacturer has, the simpler the contract to coordinate the chain will be. © 2010 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2010     

Bayesian strategies for dynamic pricing in e‐commerce

E‐commerce platforms afford retailers unprecedented visibility into customer purchase behavior and provide an environment in which prices can be updated quickly and cheaply in response to changing market conditions. This study investigates dynamic pricing strategies for maximizing revenue in an Internet retail channel by actively learning customers' demand response to price. A general methodology is proposed for dynamically pricing information goods, as well as other nonperishable products for which inventory levels are not an essential consideration in pricing. A Bayesian model of demand uncertainty involving the Dirichlet distribution or a mixture of such distributions as a prior captures a wide range of beliefs about customer demand. We provide both analytic formulas and efficient approximation methods for updating these prior distributions after sales data have been observed. We then investigate several strategies for sequential pricing based on index functions that consider both the potential revenue and the information value of selecting prices. These strategies require a manageable amount of computation, are robust to many types of prior misspecification, and yield high revenues compared to static pricing and passive learning approaches. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2007     

Joint pricing and ordering policy for exponentially decaying inventory with known demand

This paper is concerned with the problem of simultaneously setting price and production levels for an exponentially decaying product. Such products suffer a loss in utility which is proportional to the total quantity of stock on hand. A continuous review, deterministic demand model is considered. The optimal ordering decision quantity is derived and its sensitivity to changes in perishability and product price is considered. The joint ordering pricing decision is also computed and consideration of parametric changes of these decisions indicates a non-monotonic response for optimal price to changes in product decay. Issues of market entry and extensions to a model with shortages are also analyzed.     

Timing of information acquisition in a competitive environment

This article investigates the impact of timing on sellers' information acquisition strategies in a duopoly setting. Market uncertainty is captured by a representative consumer who has a private taste for the product's horizontal attribute, and both sellers can acquire this information either before (ex‐ante acquisition) or after (ex‐post acquisition) observing their own product qualities. We identify several conflicting effects of information acquisition that vary significantly in its timing and market characteristics. In the monopoly scenario, information acquisition is unambiguously beneficial and ex‐ante acquisition is the dominant option, because it helps a seller not only design the proper product but also craft better pricing strategy. By contrast, when there is competition, information acquisition eliminates the buffer role of market uncertainty and leads to the fiercest production or pricing competition, which makes the subsequent effects of acquisition detrimental, and a seller's payoff is nonmonotonic in terms of its acquisition cost. Moreover, compared with the ex‐ante information acquisition, ex‐post information acquisition normally generates higher sellers' equilibrium payoffs by postponing the timing of acquisition and maintaining product differentiation. Nonetheless, ex‐post information acquisition also provides the seller with greater acquisition incentive and occasionally makes him worse off than that in the ex‐ante scenario. Thus, in a competitive environment, having the option of information acquisition and flexibility in its timing can be both detrimental and irresistible. © 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 63: 3–22, 2016     

Allocation with demand competition: Uniform,proportional, and lexicographic mechanisms

We examine capacity allocation mechanisms in a supply chain comprising a monopolistic supplier and two competing retailers with asymmetric market powers. The supplier allocates limited capacity to retailers according to uniform, proportional, or lexicographic mechanism. We study the impact of these allocation mechanisms on supplier pricing decisions and retailer ordering behavior. With individual order size no greater than supplier capacity, we show that all three mechanisms guarantee equilibrium ordering. We provide precise structures of retailer ordering decisions in Nash and dominant equilibria. Further, we compare the mechanisms from the perspective of the supplier, the retailers, and the supply chain. We show that regardless of whether retailer market powers are symmetric, lexicographic allocation with any priority sequence of retailers is better than the other two mechanisms for the supplier. Further, under lexicographic allocation, the supplier gains more profit by granting higher priority to the retailer with greater market power. We also extend our study to the case with multiple retailers. © 2017 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 64: 85–107, 2017