Women and the military

Debates about the relationship between women and the military have become common within Western societies. These debates primarily centre on the issue of the place, fitness and desirability of a female presence within institutions designed for national war making. There are those who claim that equality betwen the sexes demands the full integration of women into national militaries, including in combat roles, others however argue that women are ill‐equipped for the traditional tasks required of ‘warriors’. This article argues that these debates are increasingly irrelevant. Future wars are increasingly less likely to be fought only by clearly defined national combat forces and more likely to be ‘virtual’ wars involving the deployment of Western technologies against militarily inferior opponents. This too is an age in which Western states will be engaged not just in virtual wars but in ‘humanitarian intervention’, peacekeeping, enforcement and postwar reconstruction. This allows, even encourages, a rethinking of traditional notions and debates over the place of women within the military sphere.     

伊拉克战争对国际政治格局的影响

美国凭借其强大的势力肆意出兵攻打伊拉克。这一结果虽不能使国际政治格局发生重大变化 ,世界多极化的趋势不能改变 ,但它进一步强化了美国的单边主义思想 ,使世界多极化的进程受到严峻挑战 ,同时也将改变中东地区的力量对比 ,重塑中东地区的政治格局 ,也使联合国的权威和地位受到了严重的挑战。     

Dirty war: chemical weapon use and domestic repression

The utilization of chemical weapons to quash domestic rebellion is a drastic action for a regime facing domestic challengers to take, especially given the reputation costs and risk of international intervention. However, recent developments have illustrated that some regimes have contemplated and implemented extraordinary measures (including the use of chemical munitions) to quash rebellion. This study addresses the question of why some states utilize chemical weapons against domestic challengers while others refrain from this level of state repression. I argue that the utilization of chemical weapons has both domestic and international elements. Specifically, that ethnic cleavages that lead to secessionist challenges and factors associated with inter-state rivalry impact the likelihood that a state utilizes the employment of chemical munitions. I test my argument and other explanations regarding repression with a casestudy approach utilizing captured Iraqi Government documents comparing Iraq’s Al-Anfal campaigns with developments during the recent Syrian Civil War.     

Ideoscapes in the World Society: Framing Violence in Somalia

The article uses the example of the Somali war to analyse how globally travelling ideas and political concepts are adapted to local settings and translated into frames that promote collective action and feature violence. It outlines how two ideas with universal claim, nationalism and modernisation were combined with an anti-colonial rhetoric and evolved into the meta-narrative of Somali history. This meta-narrative changed little, and keywords such as (pan-Somali) nationalism, anti-colonialism, development, sovereignty structure most of the discursive repertoires of political actors in Somalia. The main difference is that politicized clan affiliations were during the war dragged out of their shadowy existence and placed in the spot-light of political practice. They alone were however not sufficient to justify claims to power, but were complemented by ‘injustice’, ‘modernisation’ and ‘territorial’ narratives that justified violent deeds as ‘liberation’, ‘defence’ or ‘territorial rights’. Islamists employed similar key narratives and revived the pan-Somali anti-colonialist nationalism, but rooted it in a religious rational. Their ability to abandon culturalised frames contributed to their success.     

On Government-industry Nexus and Indigenous Armed Resistance

This paper proposes a simple game-theoretic framework for analyzing the relationship between the government, industry and indigenous community, especially in the context of mounting violence surrounding displacement of indigenous communities by governments for the purposes of commercial use of their habitat. It specifically takes into account the possibility of alleged ‘nexus’ between the government and the industry and explores its implications on the level of allocation and utilities of the players. We find that the bias in allocation that occurs when the government and the industry enter a ‘nexus’ can be rectified when there is resistance from the indigenous groups. Moreover, rebellion is a dominant strategy of the indigenous community, irrespective of whether there is ‘nexus’ or not, and being in ‘nexus’ with the government is a best response for the industry. The unique SPNE occurs when there is ‘nexus’ between the industry and the government and resistance by the indigenous groups, corroborating the widespread allegations of ‘nexus’ and evidence of resistance worldwide. We also explore a few extensions of the basic model and present some narrative evidence in support of the theoretical model.     

清季民初国家主义教育思潮及其影响述论

作为近代中国教育思潮的一种，国家主义教育思潮最早出现在清末，五四后至二十年代达到鼎盛，其标志是出现了专门的教育团体——国家教育协会和专门的学派——国家主义教育派。清季民初国家主义教育思潮的兴起与发展，从内因上看是受民族危机的刺激，在外因上则是受日本和欧美同类思潮的影响。该思潮对清季民初中国教育，特别是对二十年代的收回教育权运动，产生了重要影响。     

The day Stalin died: American plans for exploiting the Soviet succession crisis of 1953

One of the effects of Deng Xiaoping's economic reforms is the steady erosion of the ideological integrity of Marxism‐Leninism‐Maoism. To compensate for that erosion, the Chinese Communist Party has turned to patriotic nationalism for a new source of legitimacy. China's new nationalism transcends mere rhetoric but is manifested in the behavior of its armed forces ‐ which makes an understanding of the nationalist ideology of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) important. As revealed in PLA and related military publications, that ideology is a potentially problematic mix of wounded pride, historical resentment, and irredentism.     

Politics in the shadow of the gun: revisiting the literature on ‘Rebel-to-Party Transformations’ through the case of Burundi

Abstract

This article provides a critical review of ‘rebel-to-party transformation’ scholarship. It shows how three flawed assumptions have underpinned much of the literature: (1) an ideal-typical differentiation between rebel group and political party as distinct by their use or rejection of violence; (2) the analysis of armed conflict as breakdown of ‘normal’ politics, and the study of ‘rebel-to-party conversions’ as a gradual, natural shift from violence back to politics; (3) a failure to integrate the study of rebel legacies into an examination of broader authoritarian legacies. These assumptions have clouded our understanding of politico-military organizations in conflict-torn societies, which combine social protest, armed rebellion, political violence, and party politics throughout their history. Drawing on the ‘no peace, no war’ and ‘armed politics’ paradigms, this article revisits these assumptions through the case of Burundi.     

Introduction: Exploring the jungle of terminology

When twentieth-century authors wrote about ‘partisan warfare’, they usually meant an insurgency or asymmetric military operations conducted against a superior force by small bands of ideologically driven irregular fighters. By contrast, originally (i.e. before the French Revolution) ‘partisan’ in French, English, and German referred only to the leader of a detachment of special forces (party, partie, Parthey, détachement) which the major European powers used to conduct special operations alongside their regular forces. Such special operations were the classic definition of ‘small war’ (petite guerre) in the late seventeenth and in the eighteenth centuries. The Spanish word ‘la guerrilla’, meaning nothing other than ‘small war’, only acquired an association with rebellion with the Spanish War of Independence against Napoleon. Even after this, however, armies throughout the world have continued to employ special forces. In the late nineteenth century, their operations have still been referred to as prosecuting ‘la guerrilla’ or ‘small war’, which existed side by side with, and was often mixed with, ‘people's war’ or popular uprisings against hated regimes.     

How the High North became Central in NATO Strategy: Revelations from the NATO Archives

From the late 1970s and until the end of the Cold War, the ‘High North’ constituted a central theatre for military forces. Extensive NATO preparations were made, a solid infrastructure developed in northern Norway, and frequent and large-scale exercises were carried out. These developments, from the late 1970s, were much discussed by scholars and strategists. However, the change of perception, laying the foundation for the military build-up, had actually occurred a decade earlier, in the late 1960s. This change has not yet been given its rightful attention, partly because the relevant documents have only recently become available. This essay takes the chronology of events back into the 1960s and to NATO's secret discussions between the national Ministers of Defence and Chiefs of Staff. The most significant turning-points were the Flexible Response strategy of 1967; SACLANT's concern over increased Soviet naval activity and his ‘Maritime Strategy’ studies of 1965 and 1967; NATO's awakening to the Soviet SSBN threat in 1967; and the concept of ‘External Reinforcement of the Flanks’ of 1968 – finally followed by the ‘Brosio Study’ (named after the then NATO Secretary-General) of 1969. As a consequence of these developments NATO's ‘tactical northern flank’ was set to become an independent strategic theatre.     

Understanding the ‘failure’ of the Séléka rebellion

This paper examines the downfall of the Séléka rebellion, which staged a coup in the Central African Republic in March 2013. The coup plunged the country into violence and chaos, and there has been an uneasy quest for peace ever since. This article explains why the leader of the rebellion lost control over his troops and was finally pushed by regional actors to leave power. The article concludes that the Séléka rebellion was already fragile and, together with the poor leadership demonstrated by the coalition leader, the rebellion was unable to hold on to power.     

ISIS-K: deadly nuisance or strategic threat?

ABSTRACT

In 2014, an affiliate of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria emerged in Afghanistan. Wilayat Khorasan, or ISIS-K, intends to secure Afghanistan to legitimize the Islamic State’s caliphate across the ‘Khorasan Province’ including portions of Central Asia, China, Iran, the Indian Subcontinent, and Southeast Asia. While the group’s intent is clear, its capability confounds analysts. The authors argue that Wilayat Khorasan is likely the Islamic State’s most viable and lethal regional affiliate based on an expansionist military strategy. This is designed to enable the group’s encirclement of Jalalabad City in Nangarhar Province and is foundational to its expanded operational reach, regionalization, and lethality. Since 2016, the US-led Coalition’s counter-terrorism strategy has disrupted ISIS-K’s critical requirements and prevented external attacks. Yet, raids and strikes alone will not defeat ISIS-K. They must be calibrated against an institution-building approach that legitimizes Afghanistan’s government and redresses grievances that ISIS-K exploits to resolve.     

Aid versus sanctions for taming oppressors: theory and case study of the Iraqi Kurds

We model an oppressor aiming at victimizing an excluded group in his country, with two main variants. A foreign power affects his behaviour using either conditional aid, subject to the dictator’s participation constraint, or the threat of sanctions, broadly defined, subject to the credibility constraint. The choice between the two is either determined by the latter, or by their relative cost. Aid is preferred when the threat of sanctions is ineffective, and sanctions are too expensive. Sanctions might be imposed, if the threat is ineffective. A case study of the Iraqi Kurds after Iraq was subject to sanctions is presented.     

India nuclear weapons: No first use or no full disclosure?

This article argues India is laying the foundation to move away from “no-first-use” (NFU) as its nuclear weapons employment policy. Since the inception of its nuclear weapons program, India has claimed NFU as the centerpiece of its nuclear strategy. But India has a history of developing foundational changes to its nuclear weapons program before such changes actually occur. For example, the infrastructure of India’s nuclear weapons program was already being created in the 1950s under the guise of civilian nuclear power. Similarly, the weaponization of India’s program, which did not officially occur until after the 1998 tests, had its genesis in far earlier decisions. A close examination of trends in India’s nuclear weapons production complex, its delivery systems, and its command and control complex all lead to the conclusion that India is laying the groundwork for more flexible employment options, up to and including first use. This article does not argue such a decision has been taken. Rather, it argues the underpinning is in place to allow for a move to more flexible options, perhaps very quickly, at some point in the future. This could occur during crisis or it could occur incrementally over time.     

Reluctant guerrillas in early nineteenth century China: the White Lotus insurgents and their suppressors

ABSTRACT

At the turn of the nineteenth century, China’s Qing dynasty (1644–1912) was hit by a sectarian rebellion. Commonly considered a breakpoint marking the end of the dynasty’s golden age spanning most of the eighteenth century, the war to suppress the rebels, referred to as the White Lotus War (1796–1804) in this article (‘White Lotus’ was the umbrella name used by both the authorities and some sectarians for their teaching), exposed many structural drawbacks of the Qing political and military systems and depleted the dynasty’s financial resources, which had never been recovered. Reluctant in embracing guerrilla warfare in the beginning, the insurgents quickly turned themselves into master guerrillas. Shuttling in two massive mountain ranges in central China, they managed to prolong their rebellion and fought some successful battles against their suppressors. Superior in manpower, weaponry, and logistical support, the government forces had to adapt to guerrilla warfare, albeit passively and ineptly. This article gives a brief introduction to this little-known episode of guerrilla war at the turn of the nineteenth century in Qing China, expounds the strengths and weaknesses of both sides, and sheds light on the roots of the war’s long duration and the grim consequences to the Qing state.     

The National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad factor in the Mali crisis

Mali has been a battleground for more than a year now. While the armed conflict came in the aftermath of the Libyan crisis that left the regional security environment depleted, it also served as a catalyst for the collapse of state authority in Mali. This created conditions conducive for the proliferation of, and attacks by, radical religious armed groups in the northern regions of the country, including the Tuareg armed movement: the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA). But, far from being a new phenomenon, the Tuareg-led armed insurrection in the northern regions is as old as the post-colonial Malian state, and continues to pose tremendous challenges in West Africa and the Sahel region for both regional and extra-regional actors. The recent crisis in the Sahel region is seen as one of the most serious since the end of the Cold War, with anticipated dire long-term impacts on the security of the region and beyond. While attention is predominantly focused on defeating the jihadist groups that have threatened the survival of the Malian state, one must not lose sight of the fact that the ‘Tuareg Factor’, as represented by the rebellion launched by MNLA, remains critical both in terms of appreciating the deterioration of the situation and attempting to frame long-lasting solutions. The paper argues that the Tuareg's persistent recourse to rebellion against Bamako needs to be understood within a historical trajectory that takes into consideration three key parameters: firstly, the post-colonial state in Mali and its African leadership's relations with the descendants of the Tuareg communities; secondly, the amalgamation created by the so-called war on terror; and, finally, the contradictions of the democratisation process of the 1990s.¹1 This article is based on field research carried out between 2008 and 2013 on the ‘Resurgence of Tuareg-led Rebellions’.     

The Afghan model in northern Iraq

In Operation ‘Iraqi Freedom’, as the Coalition's heavy forces fought in the South, in the North a handful of special operations forces, working with Kurdish rebels, clashed with the Iraqi army along the Green Line. In operations reminiscent of those used a year earlier to defeat the Taliban in Afghanistan, the lightly armed and heavily outnumbered Coalition forces called in air strikes to defeat Iraq's regular and Republican Guard army divisions. This article tells the story of these operations and discusses some of their implications for future US military policy. The success of the Afghan model in Iraq goes a long way toward demonstrating the efficacy of new air-heavy tactics and shows the strategic value of using light indigenous allies to replace heavy US land forces in both conventional combat and occupation operations.     

Imperial nostalgia,the liberal lie,and the perils of postmodern counterinsurgency

Since 9/11, counterinsurgency is back in fashion; the ‘war on terror’ has even been branded a ‘global counterinsurgency’. However the context within which counterinsurgency originally arose is critical to understanding the prospects for its present success; the radically changed environment in which it is currently being conducted casts into considerable doubt the validity of the doctrine's application by many national militaries currently ‘rediscovering’ this school of military thought today. Above all, classical counterinsurgency was a profoundly imperial, state-centric phenomenon; consequently it only rarely faced the thorny issue of sovereignty and legitimacy which bedevils and may doom these same efforts today.     

The artful use of national power: Portuguese Angola (1961–1974)

In its colony of Angola, Portugal during its colonial wars (1961–1974) was able to exploit the economic dependence and divided population loyalties of its hostile neighbours the Congo and Zambia as well as the cleavages within the nationalist movements to prevent a crippling insurgency. The rulers of both countries were largely dependent on Angola for trade, and were eager to have the side effects of the robust Angolan economy with its 11% annual growth brush off on their own moribund ones. While relationships were never comfortable, the sponsors of revolution were forced to reign in their ‘freedom fighters’ in order to maintain the functioning of their export-dependent economies. Portuguese leadership also played a vital role, as it was able to bring together diverse elements of national power in a concerted policy for dealing with these enemies, whether they were insurgents or their sanctuary countries. This policy of leveraging national power and playing on the vulnerabilities of its opponents worked well during its war in Angola and still holds valuable lessons for countries that find themselves in similar circumstances.     

The British Army, ‘Understanding’, and the Illusion of Control

Over the past decade, Western military doctrines concerned with matters of irregular warfare and counterinsurgency have emphasised the requirement for properly ‘understanding’ the social, political and cultural environments in which those militaries may operate; the so-called human and socio-political ‘terrain’. This has led to a number of advancements and initiatives designed to facilitate the way that militaries may enhance that understanding. One of those initiatives has been the emergence from within the British military of a doctrine – JDP 04 ‘Understanding’ – designed for that purpose. Using that doctrine and other subsequent publications as a template, this article will examine the utility of ‘understanding’ for those commanders seeking to match military activities with political ends. It proposes that while any advances in understanding the operating environment are to be applauded, the ‘understanding’ of greatest importance is that relating to the feasibility of the strategic objectives at hand. If those objectives lack inherent feasibility, then the development of subordinate forms of understanding, particularly in relation to the socio-political dynamics of target societies, will likely only serve to slow the process of failure.